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ABSTRACT

CRITICAL PRAGMATISM:
PEIRCE AND MARCUSE ON THE SOCIO-POLITICAL INFLUENCES ON HUMAN
DEVELOPMENT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

By
Clancy Smith
May 2016

Dissertation supervised by Dr. James Swindal, Ph.D.
My dissertation brings together representatives from two otherwise antagonistic
traditions: Charles Peirce of the pragmatists and Herbert Marcuse of the critical theorists.
I demonstrate the affinities between the two philosophers with a focus on their
contributions to socio-political thought in advanced industrial societies. After addressing
the antagonisms between the two traditions I offer a reading that allows for a Peircean
complement to Marcuse’s One-Dimensional Man and a Marcusean complement to
Peirce’s critique of the “method of authority” in his seminal essay, “The Fixation of
Belief.”
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Introduction

The Enigma

The story of Charles Sanders Peirce did not end on April 19, 1914, where he lay
silently on his deathbed, a book propped open upon his lap, a portrait of his favorite dog
Zola on the wall, his adoring (and mysterious) wife Juliette by his side. Throughout his
long and tumultuous life, Peirce had always been fascinated by the lives of “great men”1
and held out hope, to the bitter end, that he’d at last be recognized as the Aristotle or
Leibniz that he felt he had become.2 Crippled by debilitating pain throughout his life,3 the
narcotics he used to ease his suffering,4 the often-hostile attitude that would emerge
during bouts of this ailment,5 his arrogance, his Dandyism, and his life-long battle with
Harvard President Charles Eliot, Peirce failed time and again to attain a permanent
academic position and the only position he did temporarily achieve6 ended in obfuscated
puritanical hatred borne of Peirce’s dalliance with a mysterious French woman7 before

Peirce taught a class at Johns Hopkins on the “psychology of great men” which, as Brent notes, was one
of Peirce’s “lifelong interests,” Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life (Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1995), 128.
2
“The only writers known to me who are in the same rank as I are Aristotle, Duns Scotus, and Leibniz, the
three greatest logicians in [my] estimation,” C.S. Peirce, Letter 482, as quoted in Max Fisch, Peirce,
Semeiotic, and Pragmatism: Essays by Max H. Fisch, edited by Kenneth Laine Ketner and Chistian J.W.
Kloesel (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1986), 250, and in Joseph Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce:
A Life, Op. Cit., 324. This sentiment was corroborated by Ernst Schröder, one of the greatest German
logicians, who claimed that Peirce’s “fame would shine like that of Leibniz or Aristoteles into all the
thousands of years to come,” cited in Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 256.
3
Facial neuralgia plagued him off and on throughout his life.
4
Opiates and cocaine.
5
Which Peirce kept secret from all but his closest friends making it all the more mysterious for those
unfamiliar with his condition when his sudden moodswings would manifest.
6
A temporary lectureship at Johns Hopkins with John Dewey as his student.
7
Peirce’s second wife, Juliette.
1

1

his first marriage had ended.8 As he struggled to earn a living with the U.S. Coast Survey,
his groundbreaking scientific discoveries in the fields of gravimetrics, pendulum
research, and mapping the shape of the Milky Way are only now being recognized for the
genius those theories contained.9 Eking out the barest living writing book reviews,
contributing to the Century Dictionary, publishing what scientific-qua-philosophical
articles he could but, mostly, through a fund organized by William James, his family and
what few friends he had, Peirce lingered on the edge of starvation and financial oblivion
most of his adult life. The despair and keen awareness of a squandered life of potential
greatness was ubiquitously apparent in his correspondences to James, Royce and others
towards the end of his life until he at last perished, alone save for his ever-devoted wife,
amidst the crumbling ruin of what had been intended as a new Academy, “Arisbe,”10
Peirce’s ill-advised palatial estate in Milford.
“The spectacle of great individuals spurned in their own times and rehabilitated in
the next is one of the clichés of history. Each case exhibits an open or suppressed threat
to the dominant ideologies of its world.”11 In Peirce’s case, this was all quite true, cliché

8

His first wife, Melusina.
For example, as Popper notes, Peirce’s early scientific discoveries are “clearly compatible with the new
quantum theory,” Quoted in Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Op. Cit., 426. Further, Peirce’s
“prescience was point our in 1984, one hundred years after Peirce’s lecture at Johns Hopkins titled ‘Design
and Chance,’ by a Nobel Prize-winning chemist and one of the founders of the ‘new physics’ of chaos, Ilya
Prigogine, among the few modern theoreticians to have read Peirce. Prigogine showed how Peirce’s view
of time and the second law of thermodynamics anticipated the ‘new physics’ which derives order out of
chaos by means of the idea that very small, chance differences can quickly create ‘self-organized’ largescale uniform effects – that the physical world we perceive is characterized by extremely sensitive
dependence on initial conditions, a fact which Peirce himself had pointed out,” Brent, Charles S. Peirce: A
Life, Op. Cit., 175. Prigogine famous noted that “Peirce’s metaphysics was considered as one more
example of philosophy alienated from reality…Today, Peirce’s work appears a pioneering step toward
understanding the pluralism involved in physical laws,” Ilya Prigigone and Isabelle Stengers, Order out of
Chaos: Man’s New Dialogue with Nature (New York: Viking Press, 1987), 303.
10
“My ultimate aim is to set going an institution for the pursuit of pure science & philosophy which shall
be self-supporting,” from a letter from Peirce to Francis C. Russell, September 17, 1892, cited in Brent,
Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 191.
11
Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 8.
9
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though it may likewise be. That Peirce’s contributions to science, logic, and philosophy
actively challenged the dominant ideologies of his world is beyond dispute and it wasn’t
until after his death, thanks in part to his widow’s sale of Peirce’s manuscripts to Harvard
for the paltry sum of $500, and the quick-thinking of Peirce’s lifelong friend Josiah
Royce that the rest of his papers and his entire library were handed over to Harvard, that
his work would eventually influence a new generation of philosophers. Under the
guidance of Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, Peirce’s Collected Papers were
published and now, thanks to the Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press is
slowly, but surely, publishing the entirety of his work, volume by volume. In the decades
after his death, one of the most prestigious philosophical journals, The Transactions of
the Charles S. Peirce Society, rose to prominence and continues to influence the
trajectory of pragmatism to this day.
That Peirce has been fundamental in influencing some of the greatest
philosophical minds of the 20th and 21st centuries is beyond question, despite the relative
obscurity he experienced during his own lifetime. Of course, most immediately, his
fellows at Cambridge’s “Metaphysical Club,” most notably William James and Oliver
Wendell Holmes, were influenced by Peirce’s groundbreaking contributions to
philosophy. Then there was John Dewey and Christine Ladd-Franklin, his students in
logic, mathematics and philosophy during his brief time at Johns Hopkins. And beyond
that his reach is nearly limitless: Josiah Royce (whom Peirce considered his only true
philosophical heir), Umberto Eco (the famed novelist and semeiotician), Gilles Deleuze
(the famous French post-modernist), Karl Popper (who called Peirce “one of the greatest

3

philosophers of all time”12), Alfred North Whitehead (who saw Peirce as a modern-day
analogue to Aristotle13), Ernest Nagel (who said of Peirce’s empiricism, “no account of
the development of contemporary empiricism is adequate which neglects the writings and
influence of Charles Peirce”14), Jürgen Habermas (the most celebrated “second
generation” critical theorist out of the Frankfurt School), and Noam Chomsky (who said
that “the philosopher to whom I feel closest and whom I’m almost paraphrasing is
Charles Sanders Peirce”15) to name but a very small few.
Peirce was a man out of place and time and came to loathe the Gilded Age wherein
he lived, an “age whose dominant values he despised,”16 where at every turn his
innovations were curbed by the demand for “results, tangible to them,”17 the controllers
of the flow of capital. A milieu where science was forced to submit to the thrall of the
“holy, holy, holy dollar.”18 The stagnation of his own career in an age of capital
undoubtedly influenced his articulation of capitalism as “The Gospel of Greed,” “the
conviction of the nineteenth century…that progress takes place by virtue of every
individual’s striving for himself with all his might and trampling his neighbour under foot
whenever he gets a chance to do so.”19 As Anderson rightly notes, Peirce’s critique of the
“Gospel of Greed” clearly demonstrated that Peirce “was not an advocate of what seem to

12

Quoted in Fisch, Peirce, Semeiotic, and Pragmatism, Op. Cit., 426.
In a letter from Whitehead to Charles Hartshorne, January 2, 1936, cited in Victor Lowe, Alfred North
Whitehead: The Man and His Work, Vol. 2, ed. J.B. Schneewind (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Hopkins
Pess, 1990), 345.
14
Ernest Nagel, “Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 7, no. 1 (1940):
69–80, 69.
15
Noam Chomsky, Language and Responsibility (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979), 71.
16
Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 1.
17
Charles S. Peirce, The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and
Paul Weiss, 8 Volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931–1936), CP 1.657. I will use the
standard designation “CP” when referring to this collection from here on.
18
Charles S. Peirce to Thomas Corwin Mendenhall, draft letter, November 18, 1891, cited in Joseph Brent,
Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 196.
19
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.294.
13
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many to be the worst demons of American capitalism”20 wherein “the summum bonum,”
was “food in plenty” but “food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence.”21
Peirce claimed that the “the worst feature of the present state of things is that the great
majority of the members of many scientific societies, and a large part of others, are men
whose chief interest in science is as a means of gaining money, and who have a contempt,
or half-contempt, for pure science.”22 He found omnipresent “trappings which serve to
hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the greed-god”23 and that
“society could not exist upon a basis of intelligent greed alone.”24 In an anecdote about
“the social atmosphere” in Baltimore, he claimed it contributed to his “prejudice against
monsters of iniquity and against men of greed.”25
Peirce, raised by his father, Benjamin, the renowned mathematician and Harvard
professor, was never disciplined as a child (except where intellectual discipline was
concerned), encouraged to be hyperbolically independent, creative, imaginative, and
rebellious, and grew up to subsequently rebel against the milieu of authority and
industrial values, save for the very end of his life when the poverty and starvation forged
from his losing battle with the establishments of academia forced him to try his hand at
every get-rich-quick scheme he could conjure to stave off the gnawing pains in his empty
stomach and the declining health of his devoted wife. Perhaps this is why Peirce spent so
much time leveling decimating critiques against any authoritarian structure that would
alter the trajectory of inquiry, binding the free-spirited scientist to values not of his own
Douglas R. Anderson, “A Political Dimension of Fixing Belief” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy
Charles S. Peirce, edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997), 223.
21
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.290.
22
Ibid., CP 8.142.
23
Ibid., CP 6.291.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid., CP 7.265.
20
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making, forcing his otherwise revolutionary mind to submit to the whims and wishes of
capitalism.26 Perhaps this is why Peirce’s ultimate mandate, what he called his “first rule
of reason,” was to never allow any blockade of inquiry, to permit the radical scientific
mind the freedom to inquire, to innovate, to guess at the great riddle of the universe, in
ways Peirce, himself, was never permitted to do. For Peirce, the scientific method was
radical, not conservative as some of his detractors falsely believed: a method of
unbridled truth-seeking, creative imagining, of guessing, of chance, of merging ourselves
with a knowable cosmos if only we were given the opportunity, that is, science, for
Peirce, was a “radicalism that tries experiments.”27 This critique of authority and
capitalism would manifest time and again throughout his long career with an ire and
vitriol unparalleled in philosophy until the rise of the social theorists of the Frankfurt
School a good decade after his death.28
But what might have otherwise been a fruitful dialogue of synchronic doctrines
between the first generation Marxist scholars and their American counterparts was
marred so thoroughly by two primary culprits that, to this day, few and far between are
those foolish enough to try to bridge what has become a seemingly insurmountable
chasm between the two philosophical schools. Those two culprits, I argue, were none
other than Max Horkheimer and Peirce’s dearest, lifelong friend, William James.

26

Frank Thorn, for example, who was in charge of allocating research funds for the U.S. Coast Survey (of
which Peirce was a practicing member), “believed in enforcing the distinction between theoretical and
practical science by denying funding to the former. He immediately set about drastically reducing the
salaries and operating expenses of the scientific staff, thus saving about $25,000 during his tenure, but
gutting the Survey’s scientific program, especially the kind of research done by Peirce,” Brent, Charles
Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 169.
27
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.148.
28
The Frankfurt School was founded 1923 by Carl Grünberg.
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In one of Horkheimer’s seminal texts, Eclipse of Reason, articulating many of the
central doctrines of the Frankfurt School,29 Horkheimer devoted an entire chapter,
“Means and Ends,” to a systematic and scathing evisceration of the American
pragmatists, so thorough and so devastating that I don’t believe (with the exceptions of
Jürgen Habermas and his lifelong friend, Peirce scholar Karl Otto-Apel) that relationship
has ever meaningfully mended. But Horkheimer had a co-conspirator in his cause, one
wholly unaware, at the time, of his participation in pragmatism’s execution by the
vaunted German theorist: this co-conspirator was none other than William James.
Although it was Peirce who coined the phrase “pragmatism,” it was James who
popularized the term and presented it to the world. That James never fully understood
Peirce is well-documented, by his own admission, indeed, so profoundly that Ralph
Barton Perry once said, “perhaps it would be correct, and just to all parties, to say that the
modern movement known as pragmatism is largely the result of James’ misunderstanding
of Peirce.”30 Peirce noticed this himself: “between this [i.e., James’s definition] and mine
there certainly appears to be no slight theoretical divergence”31 and in a separate
correspondence to James, “your mind and mine are as little adapted to understanding one
another as two minds could be.”32 Peirce lamented:
I sent forth my statement in January, 1878; and for about twenty years
never heard from it again. I let fly my dove; and that dove has never come
back to me to this very day. But of late quite a brood of young ones have
been fluttering about, from the feathers of which I fancy that mine had
found a brood.33

29

An institution that included such radical thinkers as Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Georg Lukács,
Herbert Marcuse, among many others.
30
Ralph Barton Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, 2 volumes (Boston: Little, Brown,
and Company, 1935), Vol. II, 409.
31
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.466.
32
Cited in Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, Op. Cit., 431.
33
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.17
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This lead Peirce to abandon the term “pragmatism” altogether, in conjunction with his
changing metaphysical views, to a new term, “pragmaticism,” “a term that he describes
as so ugly it would remain safe from those who kidnapped ‘pragmatism.’”34
Central to James’ version of pragmatism was the self-admittedly “slipshod”35
phrase “cash value” in reference to the metric by which to measure the efficacy of our
beliefs. Although James attempted to retract that unfortunate phrase (or, at least, explain
it properly) in a published defense of pragmatism against its detractors,36 the cataclysmic
damage had already been done. It doesn’t take a critical theorist to realize that a phrase
like “cash value” would not sit well with a consortium of social theorists whose ultimate
philosophical goal was to level as devastating a critique against the modern milieu of
capitalism and commodity fetishism as possible. Indeed, Horkheimer saw (through
James) as good an indication as any that the insidious talons of capitalism had infiltrated
into the very heart of philosophy and the unholy offspring of philosophy’s induced
marriage with commodity was none other than pragmatism itself. Horkheimer called it a
philosophy of adaptation to indoctrination wherein the good pragmatist was synonymous
with the good slave of industry; where all that “mattered” and all that was “true” was an
instrumental attainment of the means to achieve ends proliferated by capital and
commodity. To what degree Horkheimer’s claims might have been applicable to James is
beyond the scope of this investigation but that Peirce was innocent of all charges seems
absolutely beyond dispute and Horkheimer’s reading of Peirce was little more than the
unforgivable (but understandable) retroactive injection of Jamesian pragmatism into
34

Richard Mullin, The Soul of Classical American Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York
Press, 2007), 125.
35
William James, “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstandings,” The Philosophical
Review 17, no. 1 (Jan. 1908): 1–17, 1.
36
See Ibid.
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Peirce’s doctrine, despite the fact that the two were so dissimilar as to warrant a paradigm
shift by Peirce away from James later in his career (and long before Horkheimer came
upon pragmatism). Had it not been for James’ alterations of Peirce, and Horkheimer’s
subsequent critique, the long antipathy towards the Americans by their German
counterparts may never have come about. In Peirce, Horkheimer ought to have seen a
kindred spirit, for Peirce’s pragmatism was a philosophy of creativity and imagination, of
negative thinking and revolution, of guessing at the riddle of the universe and fighting
tooth and nail against any authority (capitalism chief among them) that would dictate the
ends of inquiry for a populace and streamline philosophy into the narrow channels of
apology and reification of that totalitarian milieu. In sum, Peirce was a critical theorist in
his own right, a fact rarely, if ever, noticed even by Peirce scholars and certainly not by
any member of the Frankfurt School.37
To take on the Herculean task of trying to bridge this seemingly insurmountable
chasm, there are several challenges that lie ahead: first, one must address why Peirce was
so insistent that philosophy never be subjugated to socio-political ends (even the most
benevolent); second, one must address Horkheimer’s critique that Peircean pragmatism is
exclusively instrumental by highlighting the abductive and inductive phases of Peirce’s
logic and excavating the imagination, wonder, creativity, free-play of ideas, and
profoundly dialectical (i.e., negative) thinking nascent in his fallibilism, his first rule of
reason, and his ultimate method of inquiry; third, one must explain what, precisely,
“science” meant to Peirce and distance it from the Weberian concern of “technical
rationality,” that is, that science was a tool of indoctrination, by highlighting Peirce’s
insistence that science was not scientism nor was it ever meant to be an “abnormal
37

Though later in his career, Habermas would come round to a greater appreciation of Peirce’s pragmatism.

9

veneration of scientists,”38 nor was it a branch of positivism (which Peirce explicitly
abhorred), by articulating the relationship between science, as Peirce conceived it, and
logic which, for Peirce, was a branch of normative science and intimately related to both
ethics and aesthetics.39
Lastly, one must bring Peirce into direct conversation not only with his primary
detractor, Max Horkheimer, but also a member of the Frankfurt School whose philosophy
demonstrated profound synchronicities with Peirce’s own. To this end I chose Herbert
Marcuse. Douglas Kellner, to the best of his knowledge,40 maintains that Marcuse had
never read Peirce, and yet so profound are the complementary themes between these
thinkers that the reader of this project may find themselves shocked by the realization that
Marcuse was most likely entirely unfamiliar with Peirce’s work. Between Peirce’s
fallibilism, his critique of the Gospel of Greed, his quest for Truth, and his scathing
critique of authority (including a profound exploration of the indoctrination of the young,
rampant censorship, historical revisionism, cultural isolationism, the use of language and
38

Justus Buchler, introduction to Philosophical Writings of Peirce, by Charles S. Peirce (New York:
Dover Publications, 1955), x.
39
Peirce’s ruminations on the three normative sciences (logic, ethics, and aesthetics, by his reckoning)
begin at CP 1.573. However, a particularly intriguing passage can be found at CP 5.35: “for if, as
pragmatism teaches us, what we think is to be interpreted in terms of what we are prepared to do, then
surely logic, or the doctrine of what we ought to think, must be an application of the doctrine of what we
deliberately choose to do, which is Ethics.” Logic, thus, is an outgrowth, as he says, an application, of
ethics, not the other way around. Further, as Potter notes, “pragmatism is a doctrine of logic. It is a logical
method helping us to know just what we think, just what we believe. Our thought’s meaning is to be
interpreted…in terms of its of its conceived consequences…thus logic depends upon ethics. But in its turn
ethics must depend upon something else. Conduct is approved or disapproved to the degree that it conforms
to fails to conform to some purpose, but the question remains as to what purposes are to be adopted in the
first place,” Vincent Potter, S.J., Charles S. Peirce: On Norms and Ideals (Boston: University of
Massacusetts Press, 1967), 39. The task of discovering what we ought to admire, what is admirable per se,
is the task of aesthetics. As Peirce noted, “[Ethics] supposes that there is some ideal state of things which,
regardless of how it should be brought about and independently of any ulterior reason whatsoever, is held
to be good or fine. In short, ethics must rest upon a doctrine which, without at all considering what our
conduct is to be, divides ideally possible states of things into two classes, those that would be admirable
and those that would be unadmirable, and undertakes to define what it is that constitutes the admirableness
of an ideal,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.36.
40
This revelation was the product of short correspondence I had with Dr. Kellner who assured me that, as
far as he knew, Marcuse had never read Peirce.
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semiotics to criminalize and marginalize dissenting voices), I offer a direct and
immediate comparison to the complementary Marcusean themes of one-dimensionality,
the performance principle operative in the advanced industrial society, the ingression of
false needs, and artificial desublimation that all conspire to achieve the same insidious
ends that Peirce articulated over a half a century earlier. Both offered a Utopian vision of
the future: an aesthetic dimension freed from the indoctrinating trappings of technical
rationality for Marcuse and, for Peirce, a democratic, hyperbolically inclusive, radically
egalitarian41 society where Truth is the ultimate value (as a goal in itself 42) and solidarity
and brotherhood aid us in achieving it. Some divergences inevitably emerge but, as I will
demonstrate, what binds them so far outweighs what nuances drive them apart that it will
put James’ “slipshod” phrase and the resultant critique of Horkheimer in stark contrast to
the reality of the synchronicities between Peirce and the critical theory of, at least,
Herbert Marcuse. In sum, I hope to not only close the chasm wrought by decades of
(unfounded) animosity by illuminating a Peirce far more dynamic, creative, imaginative,
and critical than the one Horkheimer attacked, but offer new directions in scholarship for
both pragmatists and critical theorists alike through a fusion-philosophy, “critical
pragmatism,” which remains faithful to both Marcuse and Peirce but speculates about
something more, a guess at this particular riddle, for as Peirce said, “the truth is that the
whole fabric of our knowledge is one matted felt of pure hypothesis confirmed and
refined by induction. Not the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the
As I will demonstrate throughout my analysis of the socio-political dimensions of Peirce’s pragmatism,
his method of inquiry will necessitate an equally radically form of community that is requisite for inquiry to
unfold uninhibited.
42
Peirce’s student at Johns Hopkins, Christine Ladd-Franklin, remarked in 1916 that Peirce was a
“profound, original, dispassionate and impassionaed seeker of truth,” Christine Ladd-Franklin, “Charles S.
Peirce at the Johns Hopkins,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Methods, 13 (1916):
715–723, 716–717.
41

11

state of vacant staring, without making an abduction at every step.” 43 It’s the Peirce that
proudly proclaimed, “I stand for, have always stood for the very freest of free-thinking,”
that I want to elucidate, the man who said that “if there is anyone who goes beyond me in
reprobation of all attempts and any attempt to stifle or discourage free-thought or its
proper expression all I can say is that I have never yet met such a person.”44 I want to
illuminate the Peirce that Nathan Housan called “a visionary, a wise man, a seer,”45 the
Peirce that confronted the riddle of the Sphinx and sought to develop a philosophy so
uncompromising, so “comprehensive that, for a long time to come, the entire work of
human reason, in philosophy of every school, in physical science, in history, in sociology,
and in whatever other department there may be, shall appear as the filling up of its
details,”46 erected upon an “edifice that shall outlast the vicissitudes of time.”47 Here is
the Peirce that looked his students in the eye and said, unflinchingly, to “never allow
yourself to think that any definite problem is incapable of being solved” 48 and to “say to
the student,” that though he must hold “fast to the string by which he controls” his
imagination, so, too, must he “let his fancy take wing.”49

43

Charles S. Peirce, MS 692, cited in Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 72.
Charles S. Peirce cited in Richard Robin, Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce
(Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1967), L387b.
45
John K. Sheriff. Charles Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance (Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1994), ix.
46
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.
47
Charles S. Peirce, Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, ed. the Peirce Edition Project
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Chapter 1

Fallibilism and the Circuit of Inquiry

In 1868, Oliver Wendell Holmes received an urgent missive from Germany.
Therein, William James excitedly recommended the formation of a unique consortium of
extraordinary gentlemen in the form of a “philosophical society” that would “have
regular meetings and discuss none but the very tallest and broadest questions – to be
composed of none but the very topmost cream of Boston manhood.”50 Along with figures
like Chauncey Wright, Nicholas St. Green, John Fiske, and Francis Ellingwood Abbot, a
young Charles Sanders Peirce, working for the U.S. Coast Survey at the time, joined their
illustrious ranks. In this roiling milieu of revolutionary minds, American pragmatism was
born. The precise evolution of the term is unclear. Although Peirce’s “Fixation of Belief,”
and its sister essay, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” published in Popular Science
Monthly in 1877 and 1878, were the first explorations of the concepts of pragmatism, the
term, “pragmatism,” was never explicitly mentioned. James held that particular honor, as
Dewey recounts:
The term pragmatism was introduced into literature in the opening
sentences of Professor James’s California Union Address in 1898. The
sentences run as follows: ‘the principal of pragmatism, as we may call it,
may be expressed in a variety of ways, all of them very simple. In the
Popular Science Monthly for January, 1878, Mr. Charles S. Peirce
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introduces it as follows’: etc. The readers who have turned to the volume
referred to have not, however, found the word there.51

Yet, even James readily admitted that it was Peirce who coined the phrase and introduced
it to that ragtag band of intellectuals in Cambridge. Although Peirce drew from the milieu
of the Club, most notably Wright’s ideas that “scientific laws do much more than
summarize existing knowledge, they lead to new knowledge” which inspired Peirce’s
own ruminations on the scientific method as a means “for arriving at new experimental
results,”52 his ruminations leading up to his inclusion in the Club were already thoroughly
pragmatic.
When Peirce was only ten years old, he composed a short tale entitled “Charles
and Ben” (his brother). Amazingly, this document has survived and, though in a form so
subtle and nascent I don’t wish to say it’s anything more than fancy with a hint, perhaps,
of prophecy, Peirce told the tale of his brother, Ben, who sought to “climb the hill of
knowledge. Now this is a very high hill and full of stones and briars – and rough places –
but at the top there is a beautiful palace where there are many good and sensible people
assembled.”53 After a long and arduous climb, Ben ascended to the top of this hill of
knowledge and began to make “quite a figure among its learned inhabitants.”54 As a
dutiful and doting brother, and with a keen desire all his own to ascend this height and
bask in the glorious company of those elite minds on that palatial mountaintop, “Charles
undertook the same journey.”55 But unlike his brother, Peirce did not write himself as
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having already reached the top, nor does he ever reach the top in his own narrative. Quite
the contrary, Peirce situated himself as being “now on his way there and though he has
not pursued exactly the same path yet he goes on so slow and sure that there can be no
doubt of succeeding as well I hope as his brother.”56 Hallmarks of some of the primary
facets of Peirce’s mature philosophy were eerily present in this whimsical tale, though,
again, such a claim may be little more than chasing after a will-o’-the-wisp. But see the
emphasis on the goal, a mountain of knowledge, at an age when most children likely
dream of mountains of candy, Peirce already bore signs of the true lover of wisdom. And
atop the mountain who do we find but Peirce’s ideal community of inquirers, a
community that is to be “considered as an end in itself,”57 for we, individually, “cannot
reasonably hope to attain the ultimate philosophy which we pursue; we can only seek it,
therefore, for the community of philosophers.”58 The goal is something not yet achieved,
but remains possible, somewhere down the “long run” of inquiry’s unfolding. And the
method is “slow and sure,” a careful plodding up this long path riddled with problems and
obstacles that must be overcome. This led Peirce, even at a young age, to develop a
philosophical method he called “pedestrianism,” the tortoise to his brilliant father’s
hare,59 that the slow and steady will ultimately win the race. “Logic, with its step-bysmall-step progress, gave him, in the long run, the advantage over his facile, brilliant,
impatient, and error-prone father.”60
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With this nascent, proto-pragmatism in mind, combined with Peirce’s
contributions to the Metaphysical Club, that culminated (thematically if not in name) into
“pragmatism” in his sister essays published in Popular Science Monthly, Peirce has
become readily recognized as the founding father of pragmatism.61 And just like
pragmatism itself, Peirce’s work encompassed logic,62 science,63 semiotics,64
phenomenology,65 and theology66 to name but a few of the myriad branches of
philosophy that piqued Peirce’s boundless investigations.67 Richard Bernstein eloquently

“Peirce stands out as the acknowledged father of pragmatism.” Richard Mullin, The Soul of Classical
American Philosophy (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2007), 119.
62
“As the outstanding American logician of his day, his contributions helped to initiate the exciting
advances in mathematical logic,” Richard J. Bernstein, “Charles Sanders Peirce and the Nation,” The
Antioch Review 21, no. 1 (Spring 1961): 15 – 25, 15. Further, “Peirce was one of the creators of the logic of
relations, the extension of classical logic and Boolean algebra that was needed for a full system of symbolic
logic,” Arthur W. Burks, “Peirce’s Evolutionary Pragmatic Idealism,” in “The Philosophy of C.S. Peirce,”
special issue, Synthese 106, no. 3 (March 1996): 323 – 372, 324.
63
As pragmatists Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan note: “Peirce was fond of saying that he grew up in a
laboratory. Later, he did some good work in the observatory. Still later, he was busy with the conduct of a
good many statistical researches in connection with the Coast Survey. He was early and long familiar with
exact measurement, and with the theory and practice of the determination of the errors of measurement in
the measuring sciences. So, when he spoke of being a scientific philosopher, he was not without a really
close knowledge of what scientific method in philosophy ought to mean.” Josiah Royce and Fergus Kernan,
“Charles Sanders Peirce,” The Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods 13, no. 26 (Dec.
1916): 701 – 709, 701 – 702. Brent corroborates this in noting that Peirce, at the tender age of 8, “set up his
own laboratory at home and to work his way through Liebig’s program of quantitative analysis,” Brent,
Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 47.
64
A detailed analysis of Peirce’s semiotics is beyond the scope of this current investigation for, as Nagel
once commented, to analyze Peirce’s semiotics in detail one runs “the risk of treading upon ground on
which angels fear to step.” Ernest Nagel, “Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy
of Science 7, no. 1 (Jan. 1940): 69 – 80, 76. Umberto Eco, a noted Peircean semiotician, offers a similar
warning, saying: “nor do I dare approach the Peircian theory of indexicality.” Umberto Eco, “Peirce’s
Notion of Interpretant,” MLN 91, no. 6, Comparative Literature (Dec. 1976): 1457 – 1472, 1465. Thus I
will confine my analysis of his semiotics to its immediate pertinence to the project at hand and nothing
more.
65
What Peirce called “phaneroscopy”: “the description of the phaneron; and by the phaneron I mean the
collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it
corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these
questions unanswered, never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have
found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds. So far as I have developed this science of
phaneroscopy, it is occupied with the formal elements of the phaneron,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.284.
66
See Peirce’s ruminations on “evolutionary love,” for example, Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.287.
67
“Who is the most original and the most versatile intellect that the Americas have so far produced? The
answer ‘Charles S. Peirce’ is uncontested…mathematician, astronomer, chemist, geodesist, surveyor,
cartographer, metrologist, spectrscopist, engineer, inventor; psychologist, philologist, lexiconographer,
historian of science, mathematical economist, lifelong student of medicine; book reviewer, dramatist, actor,
short story writer; phenomenologist, semiotician, logician, rhetorician [and] metaphysician…the first
61

16

summarizes Peirce’s immense ability as a polymath and a true seeker of wisdom in all its
possible manifestations:
If we were to draw up a list of ideal requirements for a philosopher, we
would certainly want to include an intimate knowledge of the empirical
sciences and the formal disciplines such as logic and mathematics. Our
philosopher should also have a subtle knowledge of the philosophic
tradition, preferably one gained from original sources. But knowledge of
the sciences, logic, and the history of philosophy is not enough. A
philosopher must also combine careful analysis with a curiosity and
imagination that ranges over the totality of human experience. The degree
to which Charles Sanders Peirce was proficient in all these respects…is
unique, and it would be difficult to name another American who was as
erudite and original as Peirce.68
Peirce’s diverse interests, combined with a lifetime of disappointments in his attempts to
complete his ultimate system (his “guess at the riddle”), gives him a profoundly
enigmatic69 quality when one attempts to sift through the tens of thousands of pages
available to us now. As a result, his massive corpus of work,70 bequeathed to us today, is
a maelstrom of notes, letters, and, unpublished manuscripts, mixed in with published
articles of which, as Brent notes, Peirce “wrote more than one version of almost
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everything he believed important” and that it became “impossible to decide which
version of a letter (and sometimes there are many) he sent, or if he sent it at all.”71
The chaos of manuscripts should not be viewed as an indication that Peirce had
no system whatsoever. Quite the contrary, he explicitly outlined it on multiple occasions
in his (ultimately doomed) attempt to find a publisher.72 As Smith notes, it would be “an
error to suppose that [Peirce] developed no clear doctrine whatever,” for “if we
considered the whole range of his thought there emerges a unity which is as remarkable
as it is unexpected.”73 Feibleman agrees, and in his own work on Peirce he attempts to
make explicit Peirce’s nascent architectonic left unfulfilled due to Peirce’s turbulent
academic career,74 noting that “implicit in his isolated papers is the outline of a system.
The fact that he never got round to presenting his system explicitly does not mean that it
is not present in his writings.”75 Between Harvard President Charles Eliot, astronomer
and Peirce’s nemesis Simon Newcomb, and even, on one critical occasion, William
James himself,76 Peirce ran headlong time and again into a bureaucratic apparatus that
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failed to see the merit in his innovative insights and chose, instead, to dismiss him out of
hand due to reasons entirely unrelated to the quality of his work.77
Peirce saw conspiracy everywhere and, as a result, his distaste for authority’s
ubiquitous ability to alter the trajectory of otherwise free-inquiry and the curbing of the
creative expression of great minds grew exponentially. Brent notes one subtle (but in this
context, profoundly pertinent) example of this phenomenon in Peirce’s life while he was
working for the Coast Survey:
Since he found his interest in any science concentrated primarily on its
logic and method and only minimally on its techniques, his commitment to
gravimetrics was bound to lessen drastically in a few years. He quickly
expanded his researches to include the theory of errors of observation, the
logic and mathematics of measurement as such, and other, more
interesting problems associated with gravimetrics, but the Survey proved
increasingly resistant to these lines of original research and pressured him
constantly for ‘results.’78

Peirce encountered this everywhere, even in academia, where Harvard President Charles
Eliot desired only “safe” faculty, teaching “safe” subjects, and professors expressing only
orthodox views. Peirce’s “unyielding quest for truth, regardless of conventional
sanctities”79 no doubt caused the dissolution of Peirce’s relationship with Harvard for “a
Socratic mind such as Peirce’s, which delighted in putting every idea to the test and in
following an argument irrespective of where it led, was bound to raise Eliot’s

James “was unable to abstract even a semblance of pragmatism as he knew it…he therefore strongly
opposed publication of the lectures” (Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 291) which proved to
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suspicions.”80 Undoubtedly, this lead Peirce to his critique of academia as a whole,
reflective of the greater ill of the Gilded Age that under this blanketing conservatism, few
and far between were the great minds capable of flourishing and fewer still are the
students capable of ascending to the heights of their now-handcuffed professors:
They want results, tangible to them. The teacher is dismissed as a failure,
or, if he is allowed another chance, he will take good care to reverse the
method of his teaching and give them results -- especially, as that is the
lazy way. These are some of the causes of there being so few strong
reasoners in the world…81

The ingression of bureaucratic, economic, and socio-political values into the otherwise
free-unfolding of inquiry was not only a perennial theme in Peirce’s work but, too, as
we’ll see, situates itself at the very heart of Herbert Marcuse’s critique of academia and
informs his radical pedagogy. As Brent notes, Peirce leveled a “thoroughgoing and
millennial condemnation of the Gilded Age, with its massive greed, social Darwinism,
and inhumane social values expressed by late nineteeth-century political economy.”82 In
one of Peirce’s more poetic ruminations, he said:
The reign of terror was very bad; but now the Gradgrind banner has been
this century long flaunting in the face of heaven, with an insolence to
provoke the very skies to scowl and rumble. Soon a flash and quick peal
will shake economists quite out of their complacency, too late. The
twentieth century, in its latter half, shall surely see the deluge-tempest
burst upon the social order, - to clear upon a world as deep in ruin as that
greed-philosophy has long plunged it into guilt. No post-thermidorean
high jinks then!83
Peirce’s prophetic ruminations on the late twentieth-century’s immersion in capitalistic
greed would run parallel to the central focus of the Frankfurt School’s critique wherein
80
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the values of capital, above all else, would come to dictate the trajectory of inquiry and
the deployment of reason itself. Horkheimer called this a manifestation of
“instrumentalism,” namely, the deployment of rational faculties solely to ascertain the
means to achieve goals prescribed by someone (or something) external to the inquirer
him/herself. From the start, Peirce railed against this form of instrumentalism that he saw
as a blatant attempt by those in power (who rarely knew anything about the subjects at
hand but who controlled the avenues of capital requisite for ongoing research) to stifle
creativity unless that creativity somehow fed into their own coffers. 84 Even in the
formation of his own Metaphysical Club, Peirce insisted that its constitution ought to
have but one rule: “preventing it from wasting the only intrinsically precious element in
the world, as so many other societies waste it, in the idle frivolity they call ‘business’”85
to focus instead on the sharing of ideas and the ongoing quest for Truth.
This perennial theme throughout Peirce’s career, the hampering of the free-flow
of ideas, lead him to denounce any socio-political ingression into the otherwise
autonomous inquiries of scientists, philosophers, and all those who would inquire. As
Bernstein warns, “Peirce was suspicious of the demand that philosophy should become

This form of instrumentalism was rampant in Peirce’s own life, handicapping his innovations in a milieu
of tightening budgets wherein only the avenues of scientific research that were profitable were championed
over the pursuit of Truth, by whatever form it might otherwise take. As Brent relates: “the Survey had been
an organization in the old style: decentralized, informal, and casual. Finances were more often than not
adjusted to meet conditions as they arose. All that previous superintendents had required of the assistants
was their accountability in carrying out scientific work. The assistants had very general instructions which
allowed them great latitude, and this was considered one of the advantages of being in Survey employ…but
the impetus to reform and reduced government spending…changed the government’s attitude toward many
of its departments, particularly those engaged in scientific work. The change which Peirce objected to and
attacked had brought about the situation, so lamented by scientists in the twentieth century, in which the
bureaucracy takes precedence over and judges all functions within it…henceforth, the criterion of research
would reflect the practical and immediate needs of politics,” Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op.
Cit., 181 – 182. This clear example of instrumentalism (as Horkheimer defined it) was the bane of Peirce’s
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practical in the sense of dealing with current social and political issues.”86 As Gallie
notes, “Peirce fully recognizes that even in its most developed phases science remains
hedged about, and is to some extent directed by, the needs and interests of practical life”
for “science, the free spirit of inquiry, the will to learn, have their roots in our practical
beliefs, and have as their initial motive simply the ‘fixation’ of these beliefs.”87 Resisting
the impulse to subordinate philosophy to socio-political goals, Peirce went so far as to
say:
To declare that the sole reason for scientific research is the good of society
is to encourage those pseudo-scientists to claim, and the general public to
admit, that they, who deal with the applications of knowledge, are the true
men of science, and that the theoreticians are little better than idlers.88

Although Peirce was adamantly opposed to the injection of capitalistic motivations into
the method of inquiry, noting that “the worst feature of the present state of things is that
the great majority of the members of many scientific societies, and a large part of others,
are men whose chief interest in science is as a means of gaining money, and who have a
contempt, or half-contempt, for pure science,”89 his central concern was the subordination
of science (and the scientific method) to the interests of society, in general:
Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it or
not -- and that the notion that we must deny what it is not conducive to the
stability of British society to affirm is the mainspring of the mendacity and
hypocrisy which Englishmen so commonly regard as virtues. I must
confess that I belong to that class of scallawags who purpose, with God's
help, to look the truth in the face, whether doing so be conducive to the
interests of society or not.90
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The goal of philosophy, for Peirce, which he equates with the deployment of the
scientific method, is the attainment of Truth, to the greatest degree possible, whether or
not that Truth in any way benefits society. Ultimately, “the road to truth need not always
follow what were perceived to be the immediate needs of any given society,” 91 for two
reasons I will discuss at length: (a) the long run theory of truth cannot be limited to the
“immediate” needs of a community and (b) the ideal community is, itself, unlimited, and
not a specific community in time and place. The ongoing quest for Truth supercedes a
specific community in a specific time, and thus should not (must not) be subordinated to
immediate socio-political concerns. This would violate Peirce’s ultimate mandate, his
first rule of reason, which demands a dissolution of any blockade of inquiry and
subordinating inquiry to the demands of society would be precisely such a blockade and
precisely the same blockade that Peirce ran into time and time again throughout his life.
But should we engage in the type of negative thinking Marcuse championed, to
negate the current structures and postulate an alternative, there emerges, quite
unexpectedly, a profound socio-political stance that does, indeed, influence inquiry and
(though Peirce might not wish to admit it) must influence inquiry as the only acceptable
socio-political coordination: if philosophy-science must be free to inquire as it will such
that nothing block the road of inquiry, a socio-political coordination must be forged that
allows that free-play of ideas to unfold uninhibited. As such, Peirce is bound by his rule
of reason to support a kind of radical democracy of inquiry. As Anderson notes, Peirce
shared with Dewey and many of the other pragmatists the “common belief that
philosophy-science, whatever its aim, needs to be relatively free from traditional forms of
Douglas R. Anderson, “A Political Dimension of Fixing Belief,” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy
Charles S. Peirce, edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997), 227.
91
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authority in order to carry out its work.”92 That, “whether one wants to articulate an
evolutionary cosmology or make a critical assessment of particular social institutions,
there is no way to be effective if authorities such as churches or political parties stand in
the way and manipulate one’s failure.”93
Thus, Peirce’s concerns that philosophy ought not be subordinated to sociopolitical ideologies are made plain. First, the concerns of a specific community in a
specific time are not, necessarily, the concerns of the unlimited community over the long
run. As Gallie notes, “the ends and standards of scientific inquiry cannot be equated with
those of practice – whether conceived in terms of immediate economic utility, personal
well-being, or social cohesion”94 for “inquiry can only fulfill its proper function, the
settlement of belief, if it abjures all thought of an immediate or temporarily useful
settlement.”95 As Thompson notes, “the final aim of each inquirer is never the
verification of this or that hypothesis but rather the truth which is pursued by the
unlimited community.”96 Second, it is not always abundantly clear that a society in which
one is living is, in fact, free from the indoctrinating tendencies of authority, as we will see
in our subsequent chapters on Marcuse and his critique of even the most purportedly
egalitarian societies like the United States, and thus one runs the risk of employing
philosophy not to Truth but to the aims of an authority masquerading as a democratic
system that only purportedly values free inquiry. Third, even the most benevolent sociopolitical concerns may become, themselves, a type of authority, for if the search for Truth
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is subordinated to the good of the community, should Truth prove to countermand the
goals of that community, the quest for Truth would be stifled and only the experimental
results conducive to the goals of even the most benevolent society would be allowed to
flourish. As Anderson notes, “the political situation, as Peirce saw it, is that the
subservience of philosophy-science to social needs is yet another, more subtle, form of
authority.”97 In Peirce’s critique of Pearson’s Grammar, for example, he notes: “we are
told that we must not believe a certain purely theoretical proposition because it is ‘antisocial’ to do so, and because to do so ‘is opposed to the interests of society.’”98 As Gallie
notes, “if once science is directed to fixing belief in subservience to the interim needs of
practice, it thereby ceases to be genuine science.”99 Thus, even the most benevolent social
arrangements become “authoritarian” in this narrow-sense of violating Peirce’s first rule
of reason by blockading potential avenues of inquiry.100
Yet, even though the aims of philosophy must not be subordinated to the good of
the community, there is no necessary reason that the two do not converge and, I argue,
that convergence would be far more than mere serendipity. For what does Peirce
ultimately critique? His is a critique of any blockade to ongoing inquiry, a deep and farreaching liberalism and inclusiveness that demands, on principle, the dissolution of all
authoritarian powers that would hinder the free, communal participation in inquiry. As
Peirce said in a letter to Francis Russell in 1904:
I stand for, have always stood for the very freest of free-thinking. If there
is anyone who goes beyond me in reprobation of all attempts and any
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attempt to stifle or discourage free-thought or its proper expression all I
can say is that I have never yet met such a person.101
As Anderson notes, “Peirce’s own conception of the philosophical-scientific
community’s role within the larger sociopolitical community involves a much deeper sort
of liberalism in which all avenues of inquiry remain open, though in light of an ideal
hope of convergence.”102
Thus, although Peirce showed little explicit concern for the social arrangements in
which his ideal method of inquiry might flourish,103 this convergence of what is good for
the community and the goals of philosophy is most likely best served in some form of
democracy, potentially, as Anderson suggests, “the best political community, in
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[Peirce’s] eyes, is a democratic republic that keeps the possibility of this deeper
liberalism most alive.”104 In identifying the counterproductive methods of belief
formation (as I will explore in the subsequent chapters), those antithetical to the
flourishing of democratic inquiry and the communal ascent to Truth, Peirce effectively
created a quasi-critical theory by enumerating the aspects of tenacity, a priority and,
especially, authority, that blockade the freedom of inquirers through processes of
historical revisionism, isolationism, indoctrination and totalitarian dominion.
But it was not a rugged or atomic individualism that Peirce championed where
only great men of science (of which he included himself) could come to Truth without
aid, assistance, or inspiration. Quite the contrary, the failure of most inquiries is due
precisely to this unwavering (and entirely misguided) faith in a Horatio Alger
bootstrapping mythos that one can make it entirely on one’s own. In isolation from one’s
fellows, one’s beliefs are never challenged, never refined, never improved, for it is only
in the company of a coordination of other minds that Truth may be asymptotically
approached over time. Peirce always surrounded himself by such a cohort throughout his
life: from his 1870 expedition with the Coast Survey (his “first experiene of large-scale
international scientific cooperation” that “illustrated for him the importance of the
community of science in reevaluating and validating hypothees”), to the formation of the
Metaphysical Club, to his consortium of students at Johns Hopkins (including John
Dewey, where he formed a new Metaphysical Club culminating in a published work, and
one of the most prestigious of Peirce’s career [championed by John Venn himself] where
he and his students combined their efforts to write Studies in Logic by Members of the
Johns Hopkins University to which Peirce [in a rare display of modesty] took no credit
104
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but attributed everything to the work of his students in concerted effort), Peirce was ever
and always enmeshed in a great community of minds. Thus, the “central theme of
pragmatism,” as de Waal notes, “is that philosophical research is a profoundly social
enterprise.”105 As Peirce noted, “no man can be logical whose supreme desire is [limited
to] the well-being of himself or of any other existing person or collection of persons”106
but, rather, one must identify one’s interests “with those of an unlimited community”107
of which “you and I” are “mere cells of a social organism.”108 Indeed, as Bernstein
rightly suggests, “the community of inquirers is the basis for defining both truth and
reality”109 and lies at the heart of Peirce’s entire enterprise. 110 This conception of the
unlimited community places Peirce solidly (perhaps even hyperbolically) in the camp of
adherents to social individualism and democratic egalitarianism in the communal
coordination of inquiry towards a common goal: the flourishing of all through everincreasing approximations of the “Truth”111 awaiting us (ideally) at the end of the long
run.
Peirce’s mandate, this first rule of reason (“do not block the way of inquiry” 112),
infiltrates every facet of his entire philosophical system, so much so that I’d go so far as
to say that it is the single most important aspect of his pragmatism (which is a bold claim
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considering the 100,000 some-odd pages he produced throughout his lifetime). Here,
explicitly, it manifests as a guard against individual isolationism and the bootstrapping
mythos: without a community around us, we have no foils against which to try out our
beliefs, no keen, critical minds to challenge us, better us, test us and help us grow,
intellectually. As Peirce said of his pragmatism, “both logically and dynamically the
whole doctrine develops out of the desire to know, or philosophia, which carries with it
the confession that we do not know already.”113 In a sense, this is no different from the
Socratic definition of wisdom and the Socratic114 method of elenchus for, as Staab notes,
according to the first rule of reason, “one has the responsibility both to learn from and to
speak to fellow inquirers.”115 Socrates’ definition of wisdom is recounted in Plato’s
Apology: “I am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything
worthwhile, but he thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not
know, neither do I think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent,
that I do not think I know what I do not know.”116 How much this resonates with Peirce’s
dictum that “the first step toward finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily
know already; so that no blight can so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of
cocksureness; and ninety-nine out of every hundred good heads are reduced to impotence
by that malady – of whose inroads they are most strangely unaware!”117
This led Peirce on a direct collision course with Descartes. Beyond the rejection
of Descartes’ presumption that a single individual, in total isolation, could come upon
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absolute Truth, and beyond the rejection of Descartes’ presumption that the intuitive
knowing of the contents of one’s mind (without an empirical component of inquiry) was
sufficient for inquiry, the very assumption of apodictic certainty was anathema for Peirce.
Descartes famously responded to the skeptical syllogism (that knowledge requires
absolute certainty, we can never have absolute certainty, therefore we can claim to know
anything), by refuting the second premise and providing (what he thought was) absolute
certainty in the form of the Cogito. But, for Peirce, adhering to his first rule of reason,
both skepticism and dogmatism (the claim of absolute certainty) provided blockades of
inquiry. On the one hand, if we can never know anything, why bother inquiring? On the
other, if we already know something for certain, why bother inquiring? In response,
“Peirce sought to wedge a third alternative between skepticism and dogmatism,”
opposing “the dogmatist’s claim that we know with certainty that some particular beliefs
are true, while at the same time dismissing the skeptic’s conclusion that it follows from
this that all our beliefs must be dismissed as untrustworthy.”118 This is Peirce’s fallibilism
that, I contend, is based upon his simple, but pivotal, mandate that we never block the
road of inquiry. Indeed, for Peirce, fallibilism was the only epistemological stance that
reflected inquiry as it actually occurs. As Peirce said, “nothing can be more completely
contrary to a philosophy the fruit of a scientific life than infallibilism, whether arrayed in
its old ecclesiastical trappings, or under its recent ‘scientistic’ disguise.”119 As Buchler
notes, “the pages of Peirce vibrate with the effort to place philosophy on a scientific
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basis.”120 But “scientific philosophy,” for Peirce, had “a perfectly literal implication, at
once faithful to the method of science and the scope of philosophical tradition, namely,
that the broadest speculative theories should be experimentally verifiable.”121 That
philosophical theories should be “experimentally verifiable” is not merely an attitude that
“is inimical to philosophies in which intuitive cognition is fetish,”122 but a rejection of
any philosophical method that does not require communication between individuals.
Such a theory would guard against any socio-political structure that would otherwise
attempt to force “truth” down upon an individual in isolation from his or her fellows. As
Buchler notes:
To Peirce the scientific method represents the antithesis of individualism.
What distinguishes it from other methods of inquiry is its cooperative or
public character. It conceives of evidence as an objective factor inviting
universal examination and competing ultimate unanimity; it conceives of
its results as essentially provisional or corrigible; and for these reasons it
ensures measurable progress.123
Nor was Peirce’s method of inquiry an “abnormal veneration of science,”124 for as
Buchler notes:
Peirce’s actual scientific experience, his comprehensive grasp of the
scientific enterprise, and his analysis of induction, led him to expect no
specific guarantees of unfailing correctness, no royal road…but instead to
understand that its power dwells in the capacity, through constant
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modification of its own conclusions, to approximate indefinitely to the
truth.125
Indeed, “Peirce defined science as an activity exercised by people passionately
committed to the principle that they should be ready to abandon any hypothesis that is
contradicted by the facts.”126 Although, as we’ll see, Peirce is often accused of being a
positivistic reductionist (absorbed entirely with “facts”), the hypothetical component, the
guess, the abductive procedure of creative, imaginative, free-play of ideas is as central to
his method as the critical, discerning eye he turns to the inductive analysis of those
hypotheses, effectively guarding against indoctrination on the one hand and championing
creative imagination on the other.
Eschewing any possibility of absolute, timeless certainty by respecting ongoing
dialogue and the evolutionary unfolding of scientific discoveries, Peirce’s epistemology
was ultimately fallibilistic, that is, “the doctrine that our knowledge is never absolute but
always swims, as it were, in a continuum of uncertainty and of indeterminacy.” 127 And
yet Peirce does not leave us in hopeless skepticism128 but provides, instead, a robust and
dynamic method of belief formation and a detailed account of a sound method of inquiry.
As De Waal notes,
Peirce rejects the dogmatist’s claim that we know with certainty that some
particular beliefs are true, while at the same time dismissing the skeptic’s
conclusion that it follows from this that all our beliefs must be regarded
untrustworthy. Instead, Peirce argues that overall we can trust our beliefs,
but we should not bet our lives on any single one of them; a view he later
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referred to as critical common-sensism. In Peirce’s eyes, the skeptic makes
the basic mistake of concluding from the fact that each belief can be
doubted, that therefore all beliefs can be doubted. But these are different
things. If at an intersection you can go in any direction, this does not mean
that you can go in all of them at once.129
This method of inquiry will form the backbone of Peirce’s unique brand of
pragmatism and infiltrate every avenue of his thought. At base, as Buchler rightly notes:
For Peirce the idea of the public, the general, the communal, is of primary
importance in sound philosophizing. It is reflected in all of his opinions:
in his opposition to methodological individualism, and his social theories
of truth, reality, knowledge and meaning…more specifically, it is the key
to his conception of leading principles or habits in contrast to intuitive
insight as the foundation of reasoning; in his conception of a scientific
experiment as no isolated, self-contained process but as indissociable from
a complex chain of verification.130
Peirce’s primary critique was aimed at any method of grounding beliefs that lead to
developmental stagnation. As Buchler notes, “most repugnant, perhaps, to Peirce’s
viewpoint is one that winks cynically at the idea of philosophical progress, abetting not a
little what he has eloquently revealed to be a crime as profound as it is subtle, the
obstruction of inquiry.”131 As Peirce said:
The validity of an inductive argument consists, then, in the fact that it
pursues a method which, if duly persisted in, must, in the very nature of
things, lead to a result indefinitely approximating to the truth in the long
run … so far as the truth is capable of being discovered, with an indefinite
approximation to accuracy.132
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As Buchler rightly concludes, if thought is always to some degree general, and always in
this sense inferential and expective, this forms the very “heart of fallibism.”133 There is
always a halo of indeterminacy, for Peirce, in every belief statement, for every belief is
more than an isolated statement, pristine and unchanging, but always and ever “a habit of
action,”134 regulating future behavior in novel, untested situations.

As such,

indubitability and irrevisibility are chimeras, for Peirce. “All science, all significant
inquiry is a web with indefinite frontiers”135 and all inquiry aims to create stronger and
more robust beliefs. As Rockmore notes, Peirce’s critique of Descartes on this matter is
“crucial to the formulation of his own position” and …
… is intended to show the disparity between his French predecessor’s
enormously influential, but abstract theoretical approach to the problem of
knowledge in general and the utterly different problem of understanding
knowledge as it in fact arises in experience, especially within modern
science.136
Though “Peirce and Descartes agree that inquiry is a struggle to attain a belief
unassailable by doubt; they disagree, however, on the nature of doubt, what constitutes a
reason for doubting, and the process of inquiry” 137 itself. In Smith’s exploration of
Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism, he notes that there are “two main features”138 which
characterize Descartes’ position, both of which are rejected by Peirce and in their
rejection is born a positive theory that Peirce would propose instead.
First, Descartes thought of the human mind as a power of grasping the
meaning of a concept in a wholly intuitive way; secondly, he regarded the
133
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mind as self-contained in the sense that its peculiar circumstances – that it
belongs to this person, or that it operates in this place at a certain time – do
not in any way affect its operation.139

In rejecting both of these principles, Peirce forwarded a method of belief
formation that, on the one hand, rejects any form of non-mediated intuiting, and, on the
other hand, rejects the solipsistic claim that a single mind, in communal isolation, could
ever hope to attain true beliefs about reality.140 As Haack notes, “Peirce complains that
Descartes makes the acquisition of knowledge an individual venture when really it is a
community enterprise.”141 Peirce offers three substantive reasons for rejecting the
Cartesian possibility that knowledge can be achieved in isolation from the community,
themes that will recur in greater detail throughout my investigation. First, Peirce “stresses
the ways in which individuals learn from each other,”142 a necessarily dialogical process
between initially antagonistic beliefs held by different parties. 143 Second, Peirce “urges
that the individual’s consciousness of himself is derived from interactions with others,”144
leading to a type of hyperbolic social individualism, a radical intersubjectivity absent
entirely from Descartes’ meditations. Third, “what the individual believes, according to
Peirce, is linguistically expressed (‘all thought is in signs’), and language is essentially
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public.”145 These three articles will inform the bedrock of Peirce’s philosophy, all of
which I will investigate throughout the course of the following chapters, and all
stemming from his robust critique of Descartes’ methodology.
As De Waal notes, “instead of singling out specific ideas as absolutely certain and
building his philosophy upon them, he begins with the beliefs we possess when we begin
our inquiry.”146 Thus, Peirce began with the lived experience of the inquirer him or
herself and accused Descartes of “doubting things, in the safety of his study, such things
as the existence of the material world, which he did not doubt when he went out on the
street.”147 What beliefs are already present, at a given moment, inform the content,
trajectory and method of the inquiry involved. “Inquiry,” De Waal notes for Peirce,
“always takes place against a backdrop of beliefs that are taken for granted.” 148 Indeed,
for Peirce, it would be quite impossible to engage realistically in the sort of hyperbolic
doubt that informed Descartes’ method. Every specific doubt is only ever engaged
against a background of previous beliefs such that doubting all beliefs at once is quite
impossible if we are earnest in our attempt. In part informed by a general sort of gestalt
psychology (which would influence James’s pragmatism, as well), for Peirce a doubt is
something specific, presenting itself as justifiably attention-worthy ever and only against
an ongoing backdrop of precisely what is not attention-worthy at that moment, our
ongoing stable beliefs. Although “doubt,” as we shall see, is an integral part of Peirce’s
method of inquiry, it cannot be the ultimate foundation of the method itself.

145

Ibid.
De Waal, On Pragmatism, Op. Cit., 11.
147
Mullin, The Soul of Classical American Philosophy, Op. Cit., 122.
148
De Waal, On Pragmatism, Op. Cit.,11.
146

36

Contra a Cartesian method of hyperbolic doubt, Peirce maintained that we begin
with what we already know, that is, with our current set of beliefs149 and from there open
a specific inquiry, designed to test some specific facet of our encountered world. 150 “The
object of reasoning is to find out, from the consideration of what we already know,
something else which we do not know.”151 As Cooke notes, “it is impossible to begin
inquiry without beliefs already in place because it is impossible not to have beliefs or
habits of action at any point in time.”152 Nagel, who notes, “in any inquiry we must
plunge into medias res with all the beliefs and prejudices we actually have, and that we
can not, even in principle, engage in a universal Cartesian skepticism”, further reflects
this sentiment.153 Bird gives us a concise articulation of the method of inquiry as it plays
out:
We move from the notice of a wonderful phenomenon to make a startling
conjecture and arrive at a plausible explanation by reasoning from
consequent and antecedent by abduction; then set about collecting the
consequences of the hypothesis, explicating it by deduction and drawing
out its implications; and finally, by induction, ascertaining how far these
consequents accord with experience, classifying, proving, and judging to
what extent the hypothesis is borne out.154

As Peirce noted, in both traditional conceptions of rationalism and empiricism,
“philosophers from diverse stripes propose that philosophy shall take its start from one or
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another state of mind in which no man, least of all a beginner of philosophy, actually
is.”155 Those of Descartes’ ilk propose, “that you shall begin by doubting everything,
and…that there is only one thing that you cannot doubt, as if doubting were ‘as easy as
lying.’”156 And those of a Lockean camp propose, “that we should begin by observing
‘the first impressions of sense,’ forgetting that our very percepts are the results of
cognitive elaboration.”157 Rather (and this will inform Peirce’s own unique brand of
phenomenology), “in truth, there is but one state of mind from which you can ‘set out,’
namely, the very state of mind in which you actually find yourself at the time you do ‘set
out’ – a state in which you are laden with an immense mass of cognition already formed,
of which you cannot divest yourself if you would.”158
However, it should be noted that this particular critique of Descartes might not be
his strongest. Descartes famously notea in the first of his Meditations that “I have today
suitably freed my mind of all cares, secured for myself a period of leisurely tranquility,
and am withdrawing into solitude”159 in order to “raze everything to the ground and begin
again from the original foundations.”160 Descartes even takes care to note his specific
situatedness in saying that he is “sitting next to the fire” and wearing his “winter gown”
while “holding this sheet of paper”161 in his hands. In effect, Descartes is, indeed, setting
out from a specific “state of mind” in which he finds himself, namely, a state of doubt as
to the certitude of his beliefs and the efficacy of his senses. He notes, for example, that
“yesterday’s meditation has thrown me into such doubts that I can no longer ignore
155
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them…it is as if I had suddenly fallen into a deep whirlpool; I am so tossed about that I
can neither touch bottom with my foot, nor swim up to the top.” 162 In this way, Peirce’s
critique of Descartes may not be wholly fair since Descartes did, indeed, have a specific
state of mind when his inquiry began. As Descartes says, “several years have now passed
since I first realized how numerous were the false opinions that in my youth I had taken
to be true.”163 However, I believe the key aspect of Peirce’s critique lies at the end of the
aforementioned passage, namely, that this “state of mind in which you actually find
yourself at the time you do ‘set out’” is “a state in which you are laden with an immense
mass of cognition already formed, of which you cannot divest yourself if you would.”164
Descartes maintained it was possible to divest oneself of all of one’s beliefs in order to
ascertain which, if any, could be considered indubitable enough to make a firm
foundation upon which to build a robust and certain epistemology.

It is to this, I

maintain, more than anything else, that Peirce took exception, saying, instead, that a web
of beliefs must always be in place as the necessary backdrop against which one engages a
specific doubt through inquiry.
Further, Peirce seemed to voice a certain suspicion as to the authenticity of
Descartes’ state of doubt at the time of his Meditations. “Do you call it doubting to write
down on a piece of paper that you doubt? If so, doubt has nothing to do with any serious
business.”165 As Misak notes in her introduction to the Cambridge Companion to Peirce:
Peirce’s…critical commonsensism is a position about how we ought to
regard those beliefs which are settled. It holds that there are many things
which inquirers do not doubt and that inquiry must start with a background
of beliefs which are not doubted. A body of settled belief is presupposed
162
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for the operation of inquiry in that there has to be something settled for
surprise to stir up.166
If Descartes’ project is framed, as Misak says, as “a systematic attempt to bring into
doubt all hypotheses about which error is conceivable,”167 such doubts would be nothing
more than, as Peirce might say, “paper” doubts.
They are not genuine and they cannot motivate inquiry. The mere
possibility of being mistaken with respect to what one believes is never a
reason to revise those beliefs. Any of our beliefs might be false, but it
would be absurd to doubt them all because of this. If we did, we would
not possess a body of stable belief by which to judge new evidence and
hypotheses, and hence, we would block the path of inquiry. We can doubt
one belief and inquire, but we cannot doubt all of our beliefs and inquire.
Peirce’s point against Descartes is that if we were to set the requirements
on knowledge as high as Descartes does, we would have nothing left to go
on.168
Thus, the Cartesian method blocks the path of inquiry and violates Peirce’s most sacred
mandate.
Rather than seeking infallible knowledge (a chimera for Peirce), we must begin,
instead, with what we are: human beings with dispositions to react in one way or another
to new stimuli based upon previous experience and a massive cognitive bank of beliefs
operating as not only the backdrop against which a single belief may be doubted and
investigated but, too, as the pool of resources from which we may draw forth the
necessary cognitive apparatus for the act of inquiry to commence in the first place. As he
said, “that which determines us, from given premises, to draw one inference rather than
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another, is some habit of mind, whether it be constitutional or acquired.”169 From the
premises already within the individual, those beliefs or “habits of mind” influence which
inference will be drawn upon the introduction of new stimuli. That is to say, whom that
individual is in the moment of inquiry will determine, based on those preexisting beliefs,
how that individual will act in the new situation:
The habit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions
from true premises or not; and an inference is regarded as valid or not,
without reference to the truth or falsity of its conclusion specially, but
according as the habit which determines it as such as to produce true
conclusions in general or not. The particular habit of mind which governs
this or that inference may be formulated in a proposition whose truth
depends on the validity of the inferences which the habit determines; and
such a formula is called a guiding principle of inference.170
These beliefs, or habits of mind, are “guiding principles” in their ability to orient the
direction of inquiry to produce either true or false conclusions and are judged, not by an
impossibly high epistemological bar of absolute, timeless certainty, but through their
efficacy to produce for the individual “true” conclusions which retroactively validate the
initial premises (guiding principles).
From a sea of beliefs, a doubt “emerges” as a result of the onset of the
problematic situation. This sea of beliefs represents the background necessary to focus
upon what pops into the foreground (both must be present for either to exist at all),
Peirce, Op. Cit., W3:245. Of importance here is the distinction between beliefs that are “constitutional
or acquired” which Peirce glossed over in this passage. Peirce articulated four distinct methods of belief
formation that I will discuss at length throughout this project. Three of these methods are counterproductive
to the attainment of Truth in the long run and only one, his scientific method of inquiry, brings the inquirer
closer to that proposed Truth. That is not to say that beliefs acquired via one of these counterproductive
methods are false, necessarily, simply because their origins are dubious. An authority, for example, may
proliferate beliefs external to any sort of rigorous scientific method of inquiry that prove, ultimately, to be
quite true in the provisional sense Peirce is using the term, “true,” in this context. Peirce’s point is that
these beliefs are not true because they are proliferated by an authority, they are true and they are
proliferated by an authority. The ultimate test of a belief’s veracity will entail shifting the forum of its
verification from one of these counterproductive methods to the only method that, according to Peirce, can
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allowing a close, careful analysis of the belief-in-doubt. It would be, for Peirce, literally
impossible to doubt all of one’s beliefs at once, for there would be no background against
which scientific analysis even take place and no cognitive tools one could use to analyze
beliefs-in-doubt in the first place. As Rockmore notes, “according to Peirce, who adopts a
version of what we now call holism, we cannot doubt everything, since we are always
already in the world, hence embedded in a web of belief.”171 Further, if the “sole object
of inquiry is the settlement of opinion,” it is clear that Peirce gives no credence to the call
for complete, timeless epistemic certainty (as Descartes desired). As Rockmore notes,
like Descartes, Peirce “has a method; but, unlike Descartes, his method is conceived not
as a theory yielding absolute theoretical truth bur rather as a theory yielding only the best
results we can arrive at.”172 This, of course, was already clear from his inherently
fallibilistic conception of human cognition and the necessary revisability of beliefs, in
general.173 This Peircean conception of the revisability of beliefs, contrary to a Cartesian
demand for an apodictic foundation, is eloquently summarized by Sellars who notes, “for
empirical knowledge, like its sophisticated extension, science, is rational, not because it
has a foundation but because it is a self-correcting enterprise which can put any claim in
jeopardy, though not all at once.”174

Rockmore, “Hegel, Peirce, and Knowledge,” Op. Cit., 174.
Ibid., 173.
173
All beliefs are revisable, though some have undergone the scientific method more rigorously which has,
consequently, resulted in more stable (but never perfectly stable) beliefs. As Tom Rockmore notes, “belief
is the state arrived at when doubt has provisionally (but not definitively, since nothing about knowledge is
definitive) been left behind as the result of overcoming practical doubt as it really arises within the process
of inquiry. Stable beliefs, which are sought in the process of inquiry, are or are comparable to the laws of
science.” Ibid., 174.
174
Wilfrid Sellars, Science, Perception and Reality (New York: Humanities Press, 1963), 170.
171
172

42

Further, “that the settlement of opinion is the sole end of inquiry is a very
important proposition. It sweeps away, at once, various vague and erroneous conceptions
of proof.”175
Some philosophers have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only
necessary to utter a question whether orally or by setting it down upon
paper, and have even recommended us to begin our studies with
questioning everything! But the mere putting of a proposition into the
interrogative form does not stimulate the mind to any struggle after belief.
There must be a real and living doubt and without this all discussion is
idle.176
If the “irritation of doubt” is the motivating force, the impetus to inquiry, this doubt must
therefore be “a real and living doubt” for the resultant “irritation” to take hold. The mere
transforming of a proposition into a question does not suffice to stimulate sufficient doubt
to get the engine of inquiry up and running. As Peirce said:
It is a very common idea that a demonstration must rest on some ultimate
and absolutely indubitable propositions. These, according to one school,
are first principles of a general nature; according to another, are first
sensations. But, in point of fact, an inquiry, to have that completely
satisfactory result called demonstration, has only to start with propositions
perfectly free from all actual doubt. If the premises are not in fact doubted
at all, they cannot be more satisfactory than they are.177
As a scientist,178 Peirce attacked Descartes’ own conception of the scientific
method that demands no communal verifiability (indeed, it is unclear to what degree we
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can know even the existence of other minds in the Meditations). Although Peirce attacked
the “idle” transformation of propositions into interrogatives, is not the progress of science
and knowledge based precisely upon the active problematizing of current beliefs so as to
innovate and move into new arenas of knowledge? Was there not a time that the perfectly
legitimate claim, “I cannot fly to the moon,” was transformed into the question “can I fly
to the moon?” that expanded our knowledge and developed the sciences precisely
because we actively problematized our beliefs without the living, “real” need to do so?
Consider what Peirce said in his follow-up essay, “How to Make Our Ideas Clear”:
I have, for example, to wait in a railway-station, and to pass the time I read
the advertisements on the walls. I compare the advantages of different
trains and different routes which I never expect to take, merely fancying
myself to be in a state of hesitancy, because I am bored with having
nothing to trouble me. Feigned hesitancy, whether feigned for mere
amusement or with a lofty purpose, plays a great part in the production of
scientific inquiry. However the doubt may originate, it stimulates the mind
to an activity which may be slight or energetic, calm or turbulent.179

Here, Peirce committed himself to the position that one can actively problematize
one’s own beliefs, without a direct and immediate need to do so. But this is perfectly in
keeping with his method of inquiry and in no way undermines his critique of Descartes.
In Descartes’ fourth meditation, he makes clear that to allow the will to outpace
the intellect is the surest way to fall into error but, in so doing, does not make clear how
our knowledge is meant to increase if we are limited only to what we already know
clearly and distinctly. But the scientific method is based precisely on allowing the will to
outpace the intellect, to imagine, to innovate, to guess: “let me say to the student, that if
he wishes his thought about abstract subjects to get anywhere, and not merely spin on an
practice, but not practice in genera, nor the analytic reconstruction of the scientific method now familiar in
philosophy of science,” Rockmore, “Hegel, Peirce, and Knowledge,” Op. Cit., 173.
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immovable axis, he must let his fancy take wing, while he holds fast to the string by
which he controls it.”180 As Peirce said: “the truth is that the whole fabric of our
knowledge is one matted felt of pure hypothesis confirmed and refined by induction. Not
the smallest advance can be made in knowledge beyond the state of vacant staring,
without making an abduction at every step.”181 Creativity, imagination, and
hypothesizing are fundamental aspects of the process of inquiry itself, of science itself,
but not a whimsical, random doubt-for-doubt’s sake, but towards some specific goal,
some specific doubt, while keeping the rest of our web of beliefs intact. Our knowledge
grows by starting off with the beliefs we have and attempting to learn something new.
This point may be further clarified by Royce and Kernan who note that as “knowledge
grows toward perfection, the discrepancy between theory and fact grows less. That is
simply because the better we know nature, the more we can discover how to adjust theory
and fact, one to the other.”182
For Peirce, knowledge growth was a coordination of both the analyzing and
postulating of goals for inquiry and the assessment of the means by which to achieve the
goals desired. Instrumentalism, broadly construed and as Horkheimer defined it, focused
solely on the latter at the expense of the former (where means were assessed solely to
achieve ends prescribed by some socio-economic-political coordination external to the
inquirer him or herself). But Peirce specifically separated the study of ethics (a
foundation for logic in his normative sciences) from that of “practics.” “Practics,” 183 as
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he called it, “is the theory of the conformity of action to an ideal,”184 whereas
“ethics…involves more than the theory of such conformity; namely, it involves the
theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum bonum.”185 Precisely because
Horkheimer was dismissive of Peirce’s Kantian heritage,186 he failed to appreciate this
Kantian strain in Peirce’s thought.187 Even the name “pragmatism” is derived from a
Kantian distinction between “praktisch and pragmatisch,”188 which “were as far apart as
the two poles, the former belonging in a region of thought where no mind of the
experimentalist type can ever make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter
expressing relation to some definite human purpose.”189 Peirce distanced himself from
the common charge against pragmatism that it was a wholly “practical” affair, desiring
“practical” effects without so much as a constitutive theory in sight. By co-opting this
Kantian distinction, the “pragmatic” became “virtually synonymous with the purposeful,
where the purposeful is not bound to selfish ends, but consists in an intersubjective and
general process that makes signs grow in a social undertaking” devoid of “any utilitarian
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view of purposes.”190 Ethics, for Peirce, was more than just practical activity; it was the
creation of ideals in the long run, a “summum bonum.”191
“Purposefulness” is the “orientation toward an end involved in a thought process,
distinguishing it from the more specific concept of purposiveness” which is “conformity
to an end.”192 It was Peirce’s use of “purposefulness” that is central to his ethics and
distances him from the charge of instrumentalism. “From Kant, Peirce inherited the ideal
of human reason holding itself accountable in a strict, severe sense not only for its claims
about reality but also for its ideals, goals, and purposes.”193
Abduction and induction are the means by which thought grows. Abduction “can
introduce a new idea, or use a past idea in a new context”194 and “makes its start from the
facts, without, at the outset, having any particular theory in view, though it is motivated
by the feeling that a theory is needed to explain the surprising facts.”195 Both abduction
and induction “lead to the acceptance of a hypothesis because observed facts are such as
would necessarily or probably result as consequences of that hypothesis.”196 Whereas
abduction makes it start from the facts, “induction makes its start from a hypothesis
which seems to recommend itself, without at the outset having any particular facts in
view, though it feels the need of facts to support the theory” 197 and thus “suggests the
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experiments which bring to light the very facts to which the hypothesis had pointed.”198
Abduction takes the disparate facts of experience and seeks a unifying theory to make
sense of those experiences in a larger context. Induction takes the theory generated by
abduction and seeks to find facts that correlate with the hypothesis suggested. As such,
abduction (“motivated by the feeling that a theory is needed to explain the surprising
facts”)199 correlates with Practics (“the theory of the conformity of action to an ideal”200)
and with purposiveness (“conformity to an end.”201). Induction (which “makes its start
from a hypothesis…without at the outset having any particular facts in view”)202
correlates with Ethics (“involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum
bonum”203) and with purposefulness (“orientation toward an end involved in a thought
process”204). The coordination of abduction and induction, Practics and Ethics,
purposiveness and purposefulness, is integral to Peirce’s method of inquiry as it provides
us with an end (vague and indeterminate as it may be) as well as a means to get there.
Of course, the source of doubt (the problem we must engage in inquiry)
sometimes forces itself upon us involuntarily. This would be a kind of reactivity to
environmental circumstances and we, organisms in transaction with it, must respond in
kind to reestablish our homeostatic equilibrium. As Cooke notes,
We see that the environment affects what is investigated, unlike
Descartes’ model of inquiry which is solely a matter for the will of the
individual. The environment, including its social and natural aspects,
influences what the individual sees or experiences as doubt. The irritation
198
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of doubt is caused by a ‘brute shock’ (what Peirce later calls
‘Secondness’) from the environment…in this model, inquiry is a dynamic
interplay between organism and environment.205
However, with Peirce’s emphasis on the creative hypothesizing of abduction and
the inductive process that leads us from what we already know to what we do not yet
know (but have hazarded a controlled, reasonable guess by hanging tight to the wire that
lets our imagination take wing), likewise allowed him to focus on a proactive form of
inquiry, as well. For example, Peirce said:
We imagine ourselves in various situations and animated by various
motives; and we proceed to trace out the alternative lines of conduct which
the conjectures would leave open to us. We are, moreover, led, by the
same inward activity, to remark different ways in which our conjectures
could be slightly modified. The logical interpretent must, therefore, be in a
relatively future tense.206
There are shades of this “being” in a relatively “future tense” embedded within his
definition of “belief” which, as a guiding principle or premise, comes laden with future
expectations as to the results of inquiries that have not yet been made. The very nature of
abduction (hypothesis) is creative, imaginative, and future oriented, postulating the
“might be’s” prior to the inductive process of discovering the veracity of those initial
speculations. We see here that rather than awaiting a problematic situation to assault us
from the outside, Peirce articulated the common occurrence wherein we hypothetically
postulate, through an act of imagination, various potential outcomes, “conjectures,” open
to a future of varying possibilities. This imaginative process is not in the least merely
reactive but, indeed, proactively problematizes beliefs by imagining myriad alternative
possible outcomes, each of which may be tested to gain more knowledge about the world,
205
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knowledge that would not have otherwise been readily available if the inquirer was only
ever waiting to encounter problems and react accordingly. Kent, for example, in
comparing Peirce with Einstein, notes, “both maintained that inquiry advances in reaction
to experiences that conflict with established thought patterns and, in doing so, create
surprise or wonder.”207 Doubt is also “wonder” and “surprise,” something that should
only ideally be negated over the long run of inquiry but, practically, in the here and now,
wonder is the engine for inquiry and cognitive development and must, on this model, be
embraced. But the source of this “reaction to experiences that conflict with established
thought patterns” may be external or internal, that is, may be the result of something
happening to the inquiring organism or the active problematizing of some belief by the
inquirying organism. Further, reactivity alone limits the potential growth of knowledge
(Peirce rejects any form of limitation on inquiry according to his first rule of reason)
because the how and when of the problem is dictated from without whereas in a proactive
stance towards the scientific method, the inquirer has the power to determine the terms of
the inquiry, and is not merely a victim of them.
Peirce noted that the inquirer may make “in his imagination a sort of skeleton
diagram, or outline sketch” considering “what modifications the hypothetical state of
things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines it, that is observes
what he has imagined” not of what “is” the case but of “what would be.”208 In terms of
the growth of knowledge, of the three modes of logical notation, “abduction,” as Peirce
207
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defined it, is geared almost specifically to this form of “active” pragmatism. As he noted,
“deduction proves that something must be; induction shows that something actually is
operative; abduction merely suggests that something may be.”209 Indeed, it is the
coordination of all three modes, with abduction taking the lead, that makes the growth of
knowledge possible: “its [i.e., abduction’s] only justification is that from its suggestion
deduction can draw a prediction which can be tested by induction, and that, if we are ever
to learn anything or to understand phenomena at all, it must be by abduction that this is to
be brought about.”210 As Brent notes, central to Peirce’s method of inquiry, is that it must
“risk” a guess, that is, a “hypothetical inference,” as the “first step toward knowledge, a
step always subject to inductive test by the community of inquiry.”211
Smith was likewise aware of this phenomenon in Peirce and makes an interesting
study on the subject. He notes,
Peirce…was aware that the enterprise of natural science was not born of
genuine doubt in his sense at all. We did not, that is, wait until there arose
in the natural course of events the sort of vital, deeply felt struggle which
is characteristic of genuine doubt. Science requires a large dose of feigned
doubt and hesitancy; it depends, in short, on running ahead of our genuine
doubts, on making and tracing out the supposition that some former belief
or theory might be mistaken and in asking ‘theoretical’ questions for the
purpose of trying out the possibilities.212

Without question, science is often reactive in the sense we articulated above, namely, that
it is only after problems emerge from the environment is it instigated to inquiry to seek a
resolution. A new strain of virus, for example, could emerge quite suddenly in response
to some mutation and medicine will need to seek a new, stronger treatment to contain and
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combat it. However, science is also active or proactive in its striving towards innovation
and development, not waiting for “external” factors to determine its course of action.
There is always a human element in Peirce’s pragmatism, unlike Descartes’, whose
apodictic certainty is aimed at a disinterested sort of theoretical knowledge that provided
the impetus for feigned doubt as a method for determining the nature of knowledge and
what (if anything) of the external world we can know for certain. As Smith notes,
Quantum mechanics may demand doubts about universal causality, but it
is not likely that individual scientists harbor genuine doubt as to whether
they will fall to the bottom of an elevator shaft should they have the
misfortune to fall into one through an open door. They may muster doubts
about almost anything under the forced draft of the scientific enterprise;
this does not mean that they, as individual persons, actually have genuine
doubts about these things.213
In contrast to Descartes’ method, Peirce’s scientific method (which we will explore in
full) was a method of inquiry, not a method of doubt. For Peirce, doubt was neither the
method used nor was it sustained throughout the process, but retained its critical, albeit
partial, role in the method of inquiry.
In sum, against the skeptic, Peirce claimed that we do have knowledge, though
never perfect certainty that any one of our beliefs is beyond revision given new
information somewhere down the line. Against the dogmatist, Peirce claimed that
apodictic certainty is chimerical given the fallible nature of inquiry, but that does not
mean we do not know, only that we do not know for certain, which is not only an
acceptable proposition for Peirce but a necessary one if we are to progress in inquiry at
all. Peirce’s persistent fallibilism placed Truth as a goal-not-yet-achieved and only
hypothetically, that is ideally achievable, guiding inquiry and forming regularities out of
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chaos and chance, but was ever only approximated asymptotically. 214 As Myers notes,
“the Peircean view [is] that unending inquiry approaches the truth asymptotically in a
way analogous to the calculation of  where error,”215 in Peirce’s words, “will
indefinitely diminish as the calculation is carried to more and more places of decimals.
What we call  is an ideal limit to which no numerical expression can be perfectly
true.”216 Thus, “the pragmatic definition more carefully worded states that the real is the
ideal limit toward which indefinitely prolonged inquiry approaches asymptotically.”217
As Peirce said, “at present, the course of events is approximately determined by law. In
the past that approximation was less perfect: in the future it will be more perfect. The
tendency to obey laws has always been and always will be growing.” 218 Claiming to
know that  is “3.141” is both and indication we have knowledge (vs. the skeptic) but
that that knowledge is as yet incomplete (vs. the dogmatist). As I inquire further,
hypothetically guessing that there’s yet one more decimal point to fill in and inductively
finding it, I discover that  is now “3.1415.” My knowledge has grown and grown closer
to the ideal limit of absolute knowledge which, for , with its infinite number of decimal
places, will only ever be approximated and never wholly achieved. But, along the way,
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that does not make our inquiries “wrong” to conclude that  really is “3.14159265359,”
etc., nor do we lack knowledge of .
It might appear, at first glance, that so worded, Peirce was conflating the criteria
of Truth with Truth, itself. This is a valid concern, one that Habermas expressed in
Knowledge and Human Interests that I address towards the conclusion of this project.
Suffice it to say for now, however, that if a response could be given to such a charge, it
would seem to involve the distinction that Peirce made between “true beliefs” and
“Truth,” as I’ve hinted at above. Although it is the case that, for Peirce, beliefs are
considered “true” if the guiding principles inherent in the beliefs lead to the conclusions
they anticipate, this verifies and valides those beliefs only in the here and now. As Peirce
insisted, with the infinite multiplicity of potential future transactions between inquirers
and between inquirers and their nested social and natural environments, any one of our
current beliefs may be proven false or, at least, in need of further refinement with the
introduction of new information. This was the heart of his fallibilism. But unlike the
skeptic, who claims that certainty is a priori impossible and, consequently, we can never
claim to have knowledge if knowledge requires certainty, Peirce maintained that at the
ideal end of inquiry, all investigations will terminate in a “destined” conclusion, one
shared by all who inquire, an ultimate, irrevisable, apodictic Truth. The verificationism of
the “true beliefs” in the here and now is ever only provisional, fallible, and though we
may never encounter a problem that would require their reevaluation, nevertheless, we
must hold all such beliefs as fallible and potential revisable, given the infinite nature of
inquiry itself. Any one of our current “true beliefs” may well be already beyond future
revision, but such adjudication must be postponed, for Peirce, perhaps indefinitely so as
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never to close off potential avenues of further inquiry. Peirce had no definite proof that
such a conception of Truth existed, but clues, at least, in the form of increasing consensus
over time, our beliefs increasing efficacy to predict future results from inquiries not yet
performed, combined with a quasi-heuristic component to the theory insofar as
postponing, indefinitely, such finality as Truth and allocating it to the end of a potentially
infinite “long run,” we construct no blockades for further inquiry, the heart of his “first
rule of reason.”
As Anderson notes, the method of inquiry “did not lead directly and unerringly to
the truth. [Peirce] did indeed understand the method as self-correcting, but the process of
correction was always ongoing. Human inquirers, and the community they constitute, are
fallible.”219 To what degree, however, was Peirce’s commitment to fallibilism any more
than the kind of blind dogmatism that he critiqued in the a priori method adopted by the
likes of Descartes and Locke? Must every belief be fallible and without exception? As
we’ve seen, fallibilism is not skepticism: Peirce maintained that doubt was not the
obstacle to Truth but the impetus for its attainment, and that, though Truth will never be
wholly attained, the greater degrees of its approximation do grant us knowledge about our
encountered world. However, in one sense, Peirce’s fallibilism runs into a similar
problem that ancient skepticism engaged, namely, if we claim to know nothing, how can
that claim, itself, not be open to the same skepticism we are dedicated to? Isn’t the claim
“we can never have knowledge” a knowledge claim itself? In terms of Peirce’s
fallibilism, if he was dedicated to it wholly, would not the claim “all our knowledge is
fallible” be, itself, a fallible claim, opening the possibility that fallibilism, itself, is
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fallible, and apodictic certainty, the kind that Peirce admonished throughout his career,
was, indeed, attainable? Peirce admitted as much:
Only once, as far as I remember, in all my lifetime have I experienced the
pleasure of praise – not for what it might bring but in itself. That pleasure
was beatific; and the praise that conferred it was meant for blame. It was
that a critic said of me that I did not seem to be absolutely sure of my own
conclusions.220
In a way, Peirce’s fallibilism was, in fact, dogmatic, or, better still, a kind of antidogmatic dogmatism, relying primarily on his observations that previously “certain”
beliefs have been disrupted in the long run of history’s unfolding as new information
arose, forcing revisions to even the most apparently apodictic claims, leading to the belief
that this pattern would continue ad infinitum towards what is only a heuristically assumed
“Truth” lying at the far end of the road. As Hookway notes, “it is a regulative hope
adopted when we undertake inquiries in the Normative Sciences, that we can accept the
results of phenomenological reflection as having a form of objective validity.”221
According to Anderson, “this strategy is linked to Peirce’s fallibilism and his willingness
to postpone ‘certainty’ indefinitely.”222
If we have no transcendental guarantee that knowledge of reality is
possible, then, Peirce thinks, at least we have the best of grounds for
hoping that our cognitive strategies will put us into contact with noumenal
reality. Of course, this is not left as just a blind hope: metaphysics, the
bridge between the normative sciences and the special sciences, has the
task of constructing a plausible account of man and his place in nature
which both accords with the discoveries of the special sciences and shows
how the regulative hopes of the logician can be true.223
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Fallibilism, itself, becomes a type of regulative principle. As Margolis notes, “remember:
fallibilism is itself an abductive conjecture – in effect, a regulative optimism – presented
as yielding an open-ended realism answering to what Peirce takes to be the work of a
universal phenomenological instinct of inquiry!”224 Wishing to avoid the skeptical
problematic that “if it is in our nature to know nothing, there is no need to inquire any
further into other things,”225 both absolute skepticism as well as absolute certainty negate
the need for further inquiry, the cardinal sin according to Peirce’s “first rule of reason.”
Accordingly, Peirce took fallibilism as the middle-ground between the two opposing
poles, each negating the need for further inquiry, operating as a regulative principle to
compel inquiry’s perpetuation, akin to a Socratic definition of “wisdom” as a
conscientiousness that one’s current knowledge is limited and, thus, one must strive to
learn more.226 As Peirce said:
My book will have no instruction to impart to anybody. Like a
mathematical treatise, it will suggest certain ideas and certain reasons for
holding them true; but then, if you accept them, it must be because you
like my reasons, and the responsibility lies with you…my book is meant
for people who want to find out; and people who want philosophy ladled
out to them can go elsewhere. There are philosophical soup shops at every
corner, thank God!227
And just like Socrates’ iconic dictum that wisdom is the appreciation of one’s current
limits of knowledge, a recognition that results in the impetus to instigate further inquiry
and not languish in the security of false, but comfortable, beliefs, Peirce collected his …
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… ideas under the designation fallibilism; and indeed the first step toward
finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already; so
that no blight can so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of
cocksureness; and ninety-nine out of every hundred good heads are
reduced to impotence by that malady – of whose inroads they are most
strangely unaware!228
As I’ll demonstrate, Peirce explored four distinct methods of belief formation, three of
which were perennially counterproductive to ascertaining the Truth, and each of those
three, in one way or another, succumbed to a form of dogmatism that blocked the road of
inquiry, hence the need for a fallibilistic model instead.
What, then, is “Truth,” for Peirce? Now, Peirce’s pragmatism was dissimilar
enough from James’ adaptation that Peirce decided to rename his theory “pragmaticism,”
“a term that he describes as so ugly it would remain safe from those who kidnapped
‘pragmatism’.”229 James “made pragmatism…a theory of knowledge and truth”230
whereas Peirce was more concerned with the clarification of ideas in the context of their
use in guiding and refining inquiry towards conclusions that proved “true” in so far as the
conclusions postulated followed from the premises assumed in such a fashion as to
validate both the one and the other.231 In other words, a belief is “true” in so far as this
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belief, this “premise” or “guiding principle,” leads the inquirer to the expected conclusion
of that premise and not somewhere else.232
Peirce, as I will show throughout the course of this investigation, was critical of
any philosophy that eschewed the significance of objectivity and intersubjectivity
whereas James appeared to want to reduce Peirce’s insights into inquiry to the practical
effects it has for the inquirer in isolation from the greater community. As Dooley notes,
for example, “James amended Peirce’s position (that ideas mean general rules for
conduct) to his own stand that meanings can be reduced to a particular consequence.”233
Further, James put a greater “stress on individuality” rather than, as we’ll see in Peirce, “a
community of inquirers.”234 As Feibleman summarizes:
Peirce was concerned with the practicality of consequences to bear out
intellectual concepts, but…James was more concerned with particularity
of consequences…James’ outlook is that of the nominalistic psychologist;
Peirce’s that of the realistic logician. James was concerned chiefly with
This definition of a “true belief” seems quite circular: if there is some conclusion, x, we expect prior to
investigation, y, then the initial belief would seem to both already contain conclusion x and be seeking it at
the same time. In a sense, this is quite true for Peirce, and may well be born out in investigation y, for not
all investigations will result in a complete transmogrification of the initial belief. However, even though an
initial belief may not be radically transformed after an investigation that corroborates it, nevertheless, that
belief has changed, at least insofar as it has no incorporated a new data set (via this new investigation) into
the belief itself, thereby strengthening it further. Nevertheless, this type of circularity is potentially
problematic insofar as an individual may have some belief containing some expected conclusion x and
engage in some experiment y that will be tainted, from the outset, by the nascent expected conclusions in
the belief itself. That is to say, by this formula, the inquirer may lose objectivity in expecting a certain
outcome prior to inquiry itself. As I will demonstrate shortly, the communal component of the method of
inquiry (rather than, say, the method of tenacity) will offer a corrective for this problem by shifting the
forum of inquiry into a wider context where not only are distinct beliefs brought into tension with one
another from different inquirers but, too, different inquirers conducting different experiments who all hold
the same initial belief will be brought into tension, as well. Although such a corrective does not negate the
possibility that such experimental biases will continue, for Peirce, given the long run of inquiry’s
unfolding, in time such idiosynchracies, he expected, would be weeded out as the final conclusion is
reached not by any one inquirer, but by all inquiries engaged in tested a specific belief. Yet, even in the
most straightforward kind of deductive analysis, though conclusions may be anticipated as nascent in any
belief operating as a guiding principle, those conclusions are not determined, a priori, as absolutely certain
to play out. As Peirce noted, for example, though some beliefs may contain premises that “produce true
conclusions in the majority of cases, in the long run of experience,” that “conclusion” is not absolutely
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the effect of thoughts on the individual and his particular acts; Peirce was
concerned chiefly with the clarification of ideas.235

Nevertheless, Peirce did, indeed, have a theory of Truth, if only as a consequence of his
maxim for the clarification of ideas and a terminus (or regulatory principle) for his
method of inquiry. For Peirce, two manifestations of “T/truth” may be discerned in his
writing: first, the distinction between a “true belief” and a “false belief” and, second,
“Truth” as the end goal of all inquiry.236 As Mullin notes:
We call a belief true if the action that it produces leads us to what we
expect in reality. The scientific method serves to distinguish true from
false beliefs. Peirce believed that if scientific research were pushed far
enough on any problem, it would yield a solution on which all
investigators would agree. He defined truth as the opinion on which all
investigators are destined to agree. The object of that opinion is reality.237

Misak further clarifies this distinction in noting:
Peirce puts the distinction in another way, too, namely, that ‘Absolute
truth’ is the settled belief of the ultimate community of inquirers, and
‘indubitable propositions’ are the settled opinions of inquirers here and
now. No individual can be absolutely certain with respect to any
hypothesis, as she does not have the verdict of the ‘final’ scientific
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community. Since there is no assurance that this final opinion will ever be
reached, human knowledge is fallible. All we have is rational belief; the
best belief given the available evidence.238
“Truth,” in this nuanced sense, as I’ll explore in full throughout this investigation,
is the province of the whole community of inquirers whereas a “true belief,” qualified as
that which is the best we have with our current set of evidence, is fallible in so far as it is
ever open to revision upon the presentation of new, contradictory information, but
acceptable in the here and now in so far as this belief, as a “guiding principle,” leads
uproblematically to the conclusions expected. Unlike Descartes’ method that results in a
single individual determining the “Truth” independently of anyone else’s verification,
Peirce’s method demands public verification, adding in a social component notoriously
lacking in Descartes’ Meditations. If there could be an ultimate “Truth,” for Peirce, it
would be the nature of reality towards which all investigators, employing Peirce’s
scientific method of inquiry, would all arrive at and could communally verify, in what
Peirce called “the long run.” As he said, “a real object is that which will be represented in
the ultimate opinion about it. This implies that a series of opinions succeed one another,
and that it is hoped that they may ultimately tend more and more towards some limiting
opinion, even if they do not reach and rest in a last opinion.”239 Some commentators have
leapt immediately, upon reading this passage and numerous others, that Peirce must
therefore be a kind of metaphysical realist wherein there is a mind-independent world
with a determinate nature of its own and our flawed and fallible opinions about it are
closer and closer approximating it until, at last, there will be a perfect “correspondence”
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between this ultimate opinion (shared by all who inquire) and mind-independent
reality.240 Others, however, take the complete opposite reading: whatever the ultimate
opinion happens to be, that will determine what things actually are. That is to say, that
Peirce was an idealist who maintained a “consensus” theory of Truth wherein consensus
(forged of inquiry) dictated what the world actually is rather than a mind-independent
world transacting with inquirers to create consensus.
This is, by far, the thorniest aspect of Peirce’s philosophy. Indeed, even among
the cream of Peirce scholars there is (ironically?) no consensus as to ultimate
metaphysical commitments. However, the best guess at the riddle of Peirce’s
metaphysical commitments must observe that (a), they changed over time so we must
take care when Peirce said what, but, ultimately, that (b), Peirce was committed to a type
of realism (there is a component of externality in Peirce’s phenomenology and method of
inquiry) while concurrently committing himself to a type of idealism wherein reality is
constructed through inquiry at least as much as it is discovered. Like the method of
inquiry itself, as I will demonstrate, Peirce began with the beliefs we already have, in
Peirce’s case, drawing from a pool of great minds as diverse as Aristotle, Scotus, Hegel,
Berkeley, and Kant, to move forward and offer something wholly unique that defies easy
characterization and eschews any attempt at a quick-and-easy label. But as I attempt to
reconcile Peircean pragmatism with German critical theory, it is important to explain
what, precisely, “reality” was for Peirce, specifically, to what degree can reality be
constructed (a process easily coopted by the types of socio-political and economic
interests that the Frankfurt School critiqued) and to what degree reality is discovered, that
Susan Haack, for example, who notes that Reality is “independent of our beliefs about it” for Peirce and
that, for Peirce (and James, alike), “truth is correspondence” with that mind-independent reality. Haack,
“The Pragmatist Theory of Truth,” Op. Cit., p. 233.
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is, to what degree is there something over and beyond the control of any socio-political
power, beyond any indoctrination and belief-manipulation, a source, perhaps, of hope,
freedom, and autonomy untouched and unscathed by even the most insidious of sociopolitical interests.
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Chapter 2

Realism, Idealism, and Phenomenology

Peirce seemed, at first glance, to suffer “from a kind of philosophical
schizophrenia, which led him to hold two distinct positions with no connecting doctrines
between them.”241 At once, Peirce seemed to be a kind of idealist as well as a kind of
metaphysical realist.242 On the one hand, his method of inquiry appeared to lead inquiry
towards an “ultimate opinion” which we are destined to reach if we pursue this method
over the long run, and that what this ultimate opinion represents is Reality. As such, there
is the scent of metaphysical realism in the air, the conviction that our inquiries are leading
up to a perfect “correspondence” with a mind-independent Reality that is discovered not
constructed.

On the other hand, many passages seemed to indicate that what this

“ultimate opinion” ends up being will determine Reality, leading to a kind of idealism
wherein Reality is constructed rather than discovered, and “Truth” is this ultimate
“consensus” that determines Reality.
It is my contention that Peirce was neither wholly the one nor the wholly the
other (nor was he “schizophrenic”). As Mayorga notes, “all the parts of Peirce's grand
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construction interlock so snugly that it is difficult to separate them from each other in
order to examine them. As a result, any discussion of Peirce's realism has to be done in
the context of his idealism”243 and, conversely, any discussion of his idealism must, too,
be done in the context of his realism.
At base, I maintain that the confusions arise based on a categorical
misunderstanding, namely, what Peirce meant by “Reality” is not, by any means, the
common connotation (nor denotation) of the term. Stemming from his close reading of
Scotus, Peirce rejected nominalism in all its forms (certainly at the end of his career but
there is good evidence to suggest that even from the start, despite the nominalistic
undercurrent that appeared throughout his early writings, that he was never a nominalist).
As such, Peirce maintained the real existence of general kinds and, consequently, what
was “Real” was in no sense limited to what we can see, smell, taste, or touch. “Reality”
was part of our experience of the world but “existence,” the brute facticity of our
encountered environment, was something else entirely.
Peirce jokingly claimed to be afflicted with a kind of “triadomania.” He saw the
world in sets of threes. Although there was certainly the scent of Hegel in the mix, it was
Peirce’s engagement with Kant (what he claimed was the most challenging study of his
entire career244) that gave life to his triune system. Starting from Kant’s twelve
categories, Peirce maintained that they could be reduced to three. He then made an
exhaustive study on how they could be reduced no further and that all potential categories
greater than three could be reduced to those three. In the briefest possible terms, Peirce
Rosa Maria Perez-Teran Mayorga, From Realism to ‘Realicism’: The Metaphysics of Charles Sanders
Peirce (Lapham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 104.
244
Peirce, Charles S., The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, edited by Charles Hartshorne and
Paul Weiss, 8 Volumes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931 – 1936), CP 1.561. I will use the
standard designation “CP” from here on.
243

65

maintained, “anything that can possibly be thought of brings with it the idea of some
thing…the category of a first…of something that is entirely independent of any reference
to anything else.”245 But anything that can be thought of “can also be distinguished from
something else, albeit only by negation. This introduces the category of being a
second…that mode of being in virtue of which it has an impact on something else to
which it is second, but without regard to anything else.”246 Lastly, the relation of a first to
a second “bring with it the notion of mediation; that is, of setting two objects in relation
to one another. This introduces the third category, which is the mode of being that derives
its identity entirely from it relating two objects to one another.”247
Although I will explore his method of inquiry in full shortly, this triune system
has already been hinted at in our brief allusions to that discussion to come: (1) Beliefs
encounter problems that give rise to (2) doubts that stimulate inquiry until they are (3)
resolved. This resolution then creates a new belief (“new” either because it has changed
completely or else simply “new” in so far as it has survived and been strengthened by the
problematic ordeal). Peirce applied this triadic system to all philosophical inquiry: it
manifested in his semeiotics (Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness), his cosmology
(Tychism, Agapism, and Synechism), and in his phenomenology, perhaps most pertinent
here, as Quality (or Feeling),248 Fact (or Reaction),249 and Law (or Representation).250
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Commonly, the question is whether or not our beliefs “correspond” to a mindindependent reality. For Peirce, however, what we understand by “Reality” is distinct
from the brute facticity of the encountered environment, the experience of which
manifests as a kind of “tension” or “resistance” to our beliefs. In sum, the categorical
conflation is this: those who maintain that Peirce was a metaphysical realist and held a
“correspondence” theory of Truth, (inaccurately) maintain that “Reality” is Secondness
(existence, tension, resistance) rather than Thirdness (understanding, law). Conversely,
those who maintain that Peirce was an idealist and held a “consensus” theory of Truth
come closer to what I believe were Peirce’s commitments by situating Reality as
Thirdness but fail to fully appreciate the brute factity of Secondness. The result of this
reading is a bizarre “consensus” theory wherein the sum-total of our communal beliefs
construct Reality as if that “Reality” could be simply whatever we all (communally)
decide it is. As I will demonstrate, after briefly exploring some of the common readings
of Peirce, this latter camp comes much closer to what I believe were Peirce’s ultimate
metaphysical commitments, i.e., he was an idealist (and was not a metaphysical realist)
and did have a “consensus” theory of Truth (and did not have a “correspondence” theory
of Truth), but that that reading must be carefully laid out so as not to reduce Truth only to
a communal, ultimate opinion, as if the environment with which we transact plays no part
at all in determining that consensus to begin with. In sum, there is an objective, external
gauge (Secondness) which plays a pivotal role in creating consensus and determining
Externally, we call them “laws” though internally we call them “thoughts. Thoughts are neither qualities
nor facts. They are not qualities because they can be produced and grow…thoughts may have reasons, and
indeed, must have some reasons, good or bad. But to ask why a quality is as it is, why red is red and not
green, would be lunacy…no more is it a fact. For a thought is general. It had it. I imparted it to you…it is
also general in referring to all possible things, and not merely to those which happen to exist. No collection
of facts can constitute a law; for the law goes beyond any accomplished facts and determines how facts that
may be…as general, the law…concerns the potential world of quality, while as fact, it concerns the actual
world as actuality,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.420.
250

67

Reality (Thirdness), but that objective, external gauge is not, itself, what Peirce means by
“Reality.”
Though it’s true, and beyond question, that Peirce was averse to nominalism in all
its forms, maintaining the real existence of general kinds, it does not necessarily follow
that Peirce was likewise committed to the type of realism that postulates a wholly mindindependent reality with a determinate nature of its own. Nevertheless, a plethora of top
Peirce scholars situate Peirce clearly and distinctly in the camp of adherents to
metaphysical realism. Mullin says, for example, that for Peirce, “we understand reality
as that which exists independently of the mind and which causes a belief or habit of
action.”251 As Almeder notes quite bluntly, “there can be little doubt that Charles Peirce
was a metaphysical realist for the simple reason that there can be little doubt of his
commitment to the belief that there is a world of knowable objects the existence of which
is neither logically nor causally dependent upon the perceptual or noetic act.” 252 In short,
what determines the veracity of a belief must be based upon, as Peirce says, “nothing
human,” that is, some external permanency. As Cooke notes, for Peirce, “there are things
which do not depend upon our knowing them for their existence.”253 As Peirce himself
said, “there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative to the mind,
though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are, apart from that relation,”254 a
central claim of metaphysical realism.
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Yet, Peirce likewise seemed to be committed to a type of idealism255 in which we
have access only to coordinations of intricate webs of thought-signs and the limits of
phenomenological experience. As Almeder notes quite correctly, the problem becomes
how this apparent metaphysical realism can be “rendered compatible with his obvious
and frequent espousal of idealism.”256
The first point to clarify is that “Truth” correlates with “Reality” in parallel with
the correlation of “true beliefs” and “reality.” Whenever a belief leads to the conclusions
we expect, that belief can be said to be “true” but “always provisional”257 in keeping with
Peirce’s fallibilism. Consequently, the “reality” that a “true belief” is about is, likewise,
provisional. A complete knowledge (the Truth about Reality) is a goal not-yet-achieved.
As Cooke notes, “since we obviously do not have this knowledge now, Peirce’s solution
is to give it more time – a lot more time. Given enough time and given enough inquiry we
will know the objects better and better.258 This is Peirce’s famous formulation of the
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“long run”259 theory of inquiry as it applies to our metaphysical understanding of Reality.
As Peirce himself said:
The real, then, is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries
of me and you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows
that this conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY,
without definite limits, and capable of an indefinite increase of
knowledge.260
As Feibleman notes, “since the method of attaining to reality is that of an indefinitely
prolonged series of inductions,”261 so that, in Peirce’s words, “a sufficiently long
succession of inferences from parts to whole will lead men to knowledge of it,”262
consequently, Reality is “something which is constituted by an event indefinitely
future”263 which is not the actuality of Secondness but the “the idea of probability” in
Thirdness.264 Reality is the realm of real possibilities.265 In a sense, as Feibleman notes,
Peirce’s concept of Reality is “wider than”266 Truth because it includes, also, the reality
of falsity, as well. The false is real and a prime motivating force in our cognitive
growth,267 a point taken up by Eco in both Serendipities (especially in his treatise “The
Force of Falsity”) and its corresponding novel, Baudolino. Indeed, as Peirce said, it’s
“This idea that there are no incognizables, and that given enough time, and free inquiry, we can know
the real with increasingly greater approximation, is Peirce’s idea of the ‘long run,’” Ibid.
260
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“futile…to imagine that we were to clear up the idea of truth by the more occult idea of
reality.”268 For Peirce, Reality “is a potentiality; and its mode of being is esse in futuro.
The future is potential, not actual,”269 thus always necessarily vague, though chance and
error diminish over the long run as our inquiries continue to progress. If Reality is both in
futuro as well as something “wider” than Truth insofar as it includes actuality and
potentiality, truth and falsity, it becomes harder to claim that Peirce was in any way
dedicated to a “correspondence” theory of Truth.
Nevertheless, Peirce spoke often about this indefinite and ideal end of inquiry.
From the side of ontology, what “is” (ultimately) is the “object of the final opinion.”270
From the side of epistemology, what “we know” (ultimately), that is, “what is true,” is
the “final opinion” itself. As Cooke notes, “the real which exists now, can only be known
in the future.”271 Staab explores this notion further in noting:
Pure science can never attain the status of a full belief; scientific beliefs
are only hopes. They signify what would be the case in the infinite longrun if inquiry were taken sufficiently far by a sufficient number of
inquirers. Beliefs held by scientists today can at best provide us with a
vectorial indication of the general tendency in which the universe is
developing towards.272
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However, between Peirce’s commitment to fallibilism as well as his “first rule of
reason” which demands a rejection of any end of inquiry, even reality (as we know it)
and truth (as we conceive it) are ever and always revisable, making both Peirce’s
metaphysical commitments to realism as well as his methodological conception of the
“long run” far more regulative principles,273 guiding inquiry, than static, timeless and
essential certainties in themselves. Cooke agrees in her analysis in saying “the long run
can be conceived…as simply an ideal and not an actual state, that is, not a foundational
state.”274
If inquiry into the real were to go on forever, what we would all agree to –
provided we are critical and scientific – is the ‘final opinion.’ This final
opinion is an ideal state which serves to guide inquiry. And as an ideal it
also contains Peirce’s own pragmatic views of truth and the real. That is,
what is true and what is real are whatever is contained in the long run of
inquiry. So, effectively, we do not really have the truth in the here and
now, but the community of inquiry can track it closer and closer, into the
future. It is a limit we approach (as in the calculus), and for this reason
some refer to it as the limit theory of truth and knowledge.275
A true belief leads us to that expected conclusion; a false belief leads us astray.276
As Mullin notes, “Peirce defines truth as that which if acted on, leads us to the point at
which we aim and not astray” which is the key to distinguishing between “a true and a
false belief.”277

This is in the here and now, and thus nothing ever “cashes out”

permanently, for Peirce, but always only provisionally “true” as we progress towards
Truth (the ideal limit of inquiry) over the long run.

Cooke notes that many scholars of Peirce are uncertain as to the answer to this question: “is the long run
an actual state or a regulative ideal for inquiry?” Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry, Op. Cit.,
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As Mullin notes, “Peirce gives a pragmatic explanation of reality itself” in which
“we distinguish reality from fiction by defining the real as,”278 as Peirce himself said,
“that whose characters are independent of what anybody may think them to be.”279 As
Mullin continues, “we determine that the sensible effect of any real thing is to produce a
belief.”280 As such, on this reading of Peirce as a metaphysical realist, there exists a
“reciprocal relationship”281 between truth and reality: “we understand reality as that
which exists independently of the mind and which causes a belief or habit of action. We
call a belief true if the action that is produces leads us to what we expect in reality.”282
Alternatively, there are those Peirce scholars that locate him as an idealist of
sorts, relying upon the inductive inference of his theory of inquiry rather than an appeal
to an immediate perception of “Secondness” as indication of the existence of the external
world. Murphey, for example, says:
The possession of haecceity therefore confers upon its object individuality
and existence. But it does not necessarily confer externality (1.376) Peirce
usually gives three tests for externality (1) direct inward effort to suppress
the apparition (2) appeal to other observers (3) tests by physical
concomitants and effects (6.334). Thus the externality of an object is
inferred not perceived, whereas haecceity is perceived not inferred
(1.376). Nor is the experience of haecceity proof of reality.283

For Murphey, the achieved objective of inquiry via this inferential, inductive
process is the object of experience but an object that in no way necessitates the further
assumption that said object exists externally from the inquiring mind with a determinate
278
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nature of its own. This reading, however, eschews the significance of “Secondness” as
something that is not within the control of the inquirer him or herself, namely, that there
remains an aspect of the inductive inference which appears to be beyond the process of
induction itself. Almeder critiques Murphey’s reading on this point by citing the rest of
Peirce’s thoughts on the matter in the passages referred to by Murphey above:
Looking once more at activity, we observe that the only consciousness we
have of it is the sense of resistance. We are conscious of hitting or getting
hit, of meeting with a fact. But whether the activity is within or without we
know only by secondary signs and not by our original faculty of
recognizing facts.284
Indeed, Peirce called this “sense of resistance” an “external fact, of another
something.”285 For although Murphey is quite right in highlighting the significance of the
inductive inference of inquiry in determining the object of experience he doesn’t address
the “resistance” of Secondness thoroughly enough to unhinge Peirce’s phenomenological
idealism from an apparent commitment to metaphysical realism.
Some Peirce scholars, like Richard Bernstein, take the opposite stance as
Murphey, alleging, “Peirce’s phenomenological treatment of the category of Secondness
represents an attempt to overcome idealism and establish contact with the real external
world.”286 Bernstein’s insights, central to our discussion here, warrant a lengthy citation:
Part of the confusion of empiricism and phenomenalism results from the
way in which there is a wavering between thinking of an impression as a
small bit of stuff, and mistakenly thinking of an impression as
representational, as an impression of something, just as thought is ‘of’ or
‘about’ something. But even when we make the point that anything which
is a cognition or thought, must be about something, this does not help us to
escape idealism. Indeed, the problem of relating the intentional object –
the object of which we are conscious – to the so-called transcendental
284
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object becomes even more acute. But Peirce undercuts the idealist
tendencies implicit in both phenomenalism and phenomenology by
pointing out that there is an element of Secondness which can be
prescinded from perception. When we perceive something we are aware of
an essential duality in which there is something which stands against us
and is not exhausted in the act of perception. To perceive is to perceive
something external to the perceiver.287

The aspect of Secondness highlighted by Bernstein here is within phenomenological
experience but stands against our inquiry as a point of tension or resistance, as we’ve
noted above, and is never wholly “exhausted” in the act of perception itself. This squares
with Peirce’s insistence on the open-ended nature of inquiry, namely, that the objective of
inquiry as the achieved object of experience can only ever be increasingly approximated
and never wholly encompassed. As such, though our access to the externality of the
world is limited to our inductive inquiries, Secondess, itself, is testament to a world that
exists independent of that inquiry. As Peirce noted:
The percepts, could I make sure what they were, constitute experience
proper, that which I am forced to accept. But whether they are experience
of the real world or only experience of a dream, is a question which I have
no means of answering with absolute certainty. I have, however, three
tests which, though none of them is infallible, answer very well in
ordinary cases. The first test consists in trying to dismiss the percepts. A
Fancy or day-dream cancommonly be dismissed by a direct effort of the
will.288 If I should find that the flow of percepts persists consistently in
Richard Bernstein, “Peirce’s Theory of Perception,” in Studies in the Philosophy of Charles Sanders
Peirce, Second Series, eds. Moore and Robin (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1964), 179.
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spite of my own will. I am usually satisfied. Still it may be an
hallucination. If I have reason to suspect that it is so, I apply the second
test which consists in asking some other person whether he sees or hears
the same thing. If he does and if several people do, that will ordinarily be
taken as conclusive. Yet it is an established fact that some hallucinations
affect whole companies of people. There remains, however, a third test
that can be applied and it is far the surest of the three. Namely, I make use
of my knowledge of the laws of nature (very fallible knowledge
confessedly) to predict that if my percept has its cause in the real world, a
certain experiment must have a certain result – a result which in the
absence of that cause would not be a little surprising. I apply this test of
experiment. If the result does not occur, my percept is illusory, if it does it
receives strong confirmation.289
Peirce provided a further example of the “tension” or “resistance” of the experience of
Secondness:
I see an inkstand on the table. That is a percept. Moving my head I get a
different percept of the inkstand. It co-alesces with the other. What I call
the inkstand is a generalized percept, a quasi-inference from percepts,
perhaps I might say a composite photography of percepts. In this psychical
product is involved an element of resistance to me, which I am obscurely
conscious of from the first. Subsequently when I accept the hypothesis of
an inward subject for my thoughts, I must yield to that consciousness of
resistance and admit the inkstand to the standing of an external object.
Still later, I may call this in question. But as soon as I do that, I find the
inkstand appears there in spite of me. If I turn away my eyes, other
witnesses will tell me that it still remains. If we all leave the room and
dismiss the matter from our thoughts, still a photographic camera would
field of consciousness, sense of resistance, of an external fact, of another something; third, synthetic
consciousness, binding time together, sense of learning, thought,” (Ibid., CP 1.377). For Peirce, the “will”
manifested through transactions, both passive transactions and active transactions, between organisms and
their environment (an environment which included other organisms): “The sense of hitting and of getting
hit are nearly the same, and should be classed together. The common element is the sense of an actual
occurrence, of actual action and reaction. There is an intense reality about this kind of experience, a sharp
sundering of subject and object. While I am seated calmly in the dark, the lights are suddenly turned on,
and at that instant I am conscious, not of a process of change, but yet of something more than can be
contained in an instant. I have a sense of a saltus, of there being two sides to that instant. A consciousness
of polarity would be a tolerably good phrase to describe what occurs. For will, then, as one of the great
types of consciousness, we ought to substitute the polar sense,” (Ibid, CP 1.380). “Will,” then, most closely
resembled Peirce’s conception of Secondness, the resistance (polarity) experienced between conscious
activity and an encountered environment: it is neither “feeling” (Firstness) nor “learning” (Thirdness; see
ibid., CP 1.381). In sum, it is the experience of transaction itself during the component of inquiry where the
brute facticity of an encountered environment manifests as distinct from the inquiring organism itself
whether that be outward striving or whether that be inward reacting to external stimuli.
289
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show the inkstand still there…thus or otherwise I confirm myself in the
opinion that its characters are what they are, and persist at every
opportunity in revealing themselves regardless of what you or I, or any
man or any generation of men, may think that they are.290
As Almeder notes, “the first test consists in trying to suppress the apparition which
implies that the first criterion for externality is compulsiveness (Secondness), and
ordinarily the inability to suppress the apparition is taken as a sufficient indication that
the object perceived is external.”291 If, after this initial experience, should there remain
“real doubt about the externality of what is perceived after one cannot suppress the
apparition, then we must appeal to the criterion of inductive inference,”292 namely, the
method of inquiry itself, bringing to bear the tools and theories at our disposal in concert
with our fellow inquirers to validate the veracity of our beliefs.
Thus, a question arises: can a mind, limited to its contents, ever know with any
degree of certainty the nature of a reality necessarily independent of that mind? Peirce
addresses that concern as he continues, providing a list of reasons in support of his
position, beginning with a nod to his awareness of the potential charge of circularity in
his method as he says, “it may be asked how I know that there are any Reals. If this
hypothesis is the sole support of my method of inquiry, my method of inquiry must not
be used to support my hypothesis.”293
He replies to his own querry:
If investigation cannot be regarded as proving that there are Real things, it
at least does not lead to a contrary conclusion; but the method and the
conception on which it is based remain ever in harmony. No doubts of the
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method, therefore, necessarily arise from its practice, as is the case with all
the others.294

It is more than a mere assumption that Real things exist. For Peirce, the externality of the
encountered object is central to his entire method of inquiry, namely, that there must be
an environment for the organism to transact with. But key here is where in the pragmatic
circuit of inquiry this externality manifests. The externality of the encountered world is
not, itself, “Reality” but, rather, the midway point of Secondness. By discussing “Real
things,” Peirce obfuscates his claim, however, making it appear that externality is
manifest is Thirdness (the category of Reality) rather than Secondess (the category of
resistance) where I maintain externality properly belongs. If Peirce’s method of inquiry is
framed as organism/environment transaction it is unclear to what degree, if at all, this
differs from traditional epistemological frameworks of mind/body dualisms (and all the
philosophical problems of correspondance therein).
Eco is well aware of this tension and offers his own reading of Peircean realism,
noting, “Peirce was interested in objects not so much as ontological sets of properties but
as occasions and results of active experience. To discover an object means to discover the
way in which we operate on the world producing objects or producing practical uses of
them. Reality is not a datum but a Result.”295 Thus, the “object” of reality is none other
than the achieved “objective” of inquiry, further supporting the claim that Peirce’s
realism was far more akin to a form of idealism than classic metaphysical realism’s
claims to a mind-independent object. Reality is a “result” (something forged of inquiry)
not a “daturm” (something independent discovered by inquiry). As Altshuler notes,
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Peirce formulates his views of truth as the belief(s) affirmed as the ideal
end of scientific investigation. While Peirce did want to maintain an
idealistic epistemology, in the sense of a theory which only refers to
mental content in explaining knowledge, he certainty did not want this to
be a subjective idealism.296
As Altshuler notes, “Peirce’s theory of truth is thus presented as an attempt to preserve
objectivity within an epistemological idealism.”297 Committing Peirce to a form of
idealism would square with his semiotics and phenomenology and by finding some
kernal of objectivity within his idealism would help explain Peirce’s language about the
apparent permanence of Reals of experience. This will be the heart of my own
interpretation.
The very sensation of “doubt” as well as the sensation of having a “belief” is
contributes to Peirce’s position. As Peirce said:
The feeling which gives rise to any method of fixing belief is a
dissatisfaction at two repugnant propositions. But here already is a vague
concession that there is some one thing which a proposition should
represent. Nobody, therefore, can really doubt that there are Reals, for, if
he did, doubt would not be a source of dissatisfaction. The hypothesis,
therefore, is one which every mind admits. So that the social impulse does
not cause men to doubt it.298
If there weren’t something akin to an objective permanency (something mindindependent), then the sensation of doubt would be so ubiquitous that it would no longer
be a source of dissatisfaction, for dissatisfaction is experienced as dissatisfaction only in
contrast to an experience of satisfaction forged of a belief. If Peirce were correct, and
every mind experiences both sensations, likely, too, there exists some objectivity which
testifies to the veracity of a belief and its satisfaction which is precisely what gives doubt
Altshuler, “Peirce’s Theory of Truth and His Early Idealism,” Op. Cit., 120.
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such a dissatisfying taste. Unlike the other methods of fixing belief, “scientific
investigation has had the most wonderful triumphs in the way of settling opinion”299
precisely because there is some objective component lacking in the other methods which
helps “fix” belief. As Peirce said:
This is the only one of the four methods which presents any distinction of
a right and a wrong way. If I adopt the method of tenacity, and shut myself
out from all influences, whatever I think necessary to doing this, is
necessary according to that method. So with the method of authority: the
state may try to put down heresy by means which, from a scientific point
of view, seem very ill-calculated to accomplish its purposes; but the only
test on that method is what the state thinks; so that is cannot pursue the
method wrongly. So with the a priori method. The very essence of it is to
think as one is inclined to think…with the scientific method the case is
different…the test of whether I am truly following the method is not an
immediate appeal to my feelings and purposes, but, on the contrary, itself
involves an application of the method. Hence it is that bad reasoning as
well as good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the
practical side of logic.300
As Nagel notes, Peirce’s pragmatism “was offered to philosophers in order to bring to an
end disputes which no observation of facts could settle because they involved terms with
no definite meaning.”301 The application of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim, that the meaning
of anything is the experiences it elicits and the foreseeable consequences of its
application, clarifies the vagueries inherent in some philosophical terminology that Peirce
felt symptomatic of a priori philosophies. Only the scientific method of inquiry has the
ability to critique itself by virtue of its own method.
As I’ve shown, there is (ironically) no consensus among Peirce scholars as to his
ultimate epistemological-qua-metaphysical commitments. His language, especially in

299

Ibid.
Ibid., CP 5.385.
301
Ernest Nagel, “Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 7, no. 1
(1940): 69 – 80, 73.
300

80

“Fixation of Belief,” would seem to indicate a type of metaphysical realism. His language
throughout much of the rest of his work, especially his semiotics and phenomenology,
would indicate that he’s much more of an idealist, confined to the content of that semiotic
web of ideas. As Rockmore notes, “the interpretation of Peirce’s ambiguous view of
reality, or the mind-independent real, is delicate.”302
To begin, the key term to focus on which comes up time and again in his
discussion of his method for fixing belief is “objectivity,” namely, that the object of
inquiry must have some quality beyond what any single individual could say about it,
allowing for public scrutiny and communal verification. As Smith notes, “setting out
from the assumption that the truth must have a universal reach, Peirce cast suspicion on
any way of fixing belief which ultimately rests upon private insight or upon the authority
of any individual or group.”303 All three of the counterproductive methods rest on a
certain subjectivity that defies universal consensus (or even the potential for universal
consensus), as I’ll demonstrate in the following chapter. All three prove to be too
individualistic and, thus, for Peirce some objective standard must be achieved that would
undermine any singular individual’s belief, thereby providing a communal touchstone for
dialogue, instigating the interplay of different voices and different beliefs. Perhaps,
however, it would be more in keeping with Peirce’s method of inquiry to say that
although consensus, itself, does not determine Truth, an increasing consensus of beliefs
over time in an ever-expanding pool of inquirers engaged in Peirce’s recommended
method will yield an increasingly determinate consensus which, properly observed,
would be a good indication that our approximating ascent towards “Truth” is
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underway.304 The objective character in inquiry, as Peirce notes, is not beyond all human
experience qua experience. This sentiment is reflected in a particularly intriguing
passage:
That which any true proposition asserts is real, in the sense of being as it
is regardless of what you or I may think about it. Let this proposition be a
general conditional proposition as to the future, and it is a real general305
such as is calculated really to influence human conduct.306
The objective component that guides inquiry ensures that “Reality” and “Truth” are
beyond the influence and total monopoly of any finite number of individuals.307 It is a

As I will discuss throughout this project, Peirce maintained that “Truth” in an absolute sense of timeless
certainty was never wholly achievable due to the nature of inquiry itself. As an endless series of
transactions between one inquirer and another, and between inquirers and their social and natural
environments, the infinite multiplicity of possible future transactions postpones claims of apodictic
certainty indefinitely. However, this is not to say that Peirce succumbed to skepticism (the position that
knowledge requires certainty, we can never have certainty, therefore we can never claim to have
knowledge). The realization of fallibility is not a terminus of inquiry but its beginning: motivated by
perpetually incomplete knowledge we strive to learn more. And simply because we will never know “pi”
completely (i.e., to every decimal point it has) due to the infinite nature of the project, that is not to say that
the claim “pi is 3.1415” is not knowledge, merely incomplete knowledge. Provisionally, for Peirce, we may
claim that some belief is true provided it leads from the guiding premise to the conclusions expected of it,
and rest secure in the possibility that many of our beliefs are, in fact, true, though we will never know for
certain that any particular belief is beyond potential future revision or augmentation. As he noted: “but to
make believe one does not believe anything is an idle and self-deceptive pretence. Of the things which
seem to us clearly true, probably the majority are approximations to the truth. We never can attain absolute
certainty; but such clearness and evidence as a truth can acquire will consist in its appearing to form an
integral unbroken part of the great body of truth,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 4.71.
305
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“general” and “conditional” proposition, influencing human conduct by guiding inquiry
toward a common goal, thus acting as a regulative principle far more than a deterministic
conception of what, metaphysically, Reality ultimately must be. However, as Altshuler
notes, Peirce is ultimately and irrevocably an idealist:
The concept of reality is shown to be dependent on thought in two ways.
The first is rather obvious. As the object of the final opinion, reality
depends on the existence of some opinion…this thought of which reality is
not independent is thought in general (7.336) – for it must be purged of
the idiosyncrasies308 of particular individuals, so as to be the product of
reason alone. When Peirce says, in this context, that this ‘objective final
opinion is independent of the thoughts of any particular men’ (7.336), he
is not committing himself to the existence of thought apart from individual
thinkers. What he wants to be able to do is maintain his fallibilism while
still defining reality in terms of thought…his general point is that our
conceiving of reality as the object of the final opinion is to define reality in
terms of thought.309

Peirce was thoroughly committed to his fallibilism and, I would argue, a certain
form of idealism wherein “one cannot appeal to anything outside of the series of possible
cognitions.”310 If we could experience a thing fully, that is to say, know it completely,
there would be nothing left to learn about it, defying Peirce’s ultimate mandate, and thus
must be rejected by Peirce based on the principle of fallibilism of his own methodology.
As Peirce said:
You only puzzle yourself by talking of this metaphysical ‘truth’ and
metaphysical ‘falsity,’ that you know nothing about. All you have any
dealings with are your doubts and beliefs, with the course of life that
forces new beliefs upon you and gives you power to doubt old beliefs. If
your terms ‘truth’ and ‘falsity’ are taken in such senses as to be definable
308
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in terms of doubt and belief and the course of experience (as for example
they would be, if you were to define the ‘truth’ as that to a belief in which
belief would tend if it were to tend indefinitely toward absolute fixity),
well and good: in that case, you are talking about doubt and belief. But if
by truth and falsity you mean something not definable in terms of doubt
and belief in any way, then you are talking of entities of whose existence
you can know nothing, and which Ockham’s razor would clean shave off.
Your problems would be greatly simplified, if, instead of saying that you
want to know the ‘Truth,’ you were simply to say that you want to attain a
state of belief unassailable by doubt.311

As such, there must always remain something beyond human experience that
evades total capture. Yet, for Peirce, this does not result in hopeless skepticism nor fall
prey to the classic ego-centric predicament for we are not attempting a correspondence
between our own, private thoughts and the corresponding object of inquiry. As De Waal
says, “‘reality’ can mean nothing other than the object of permanently settled belief.”312
And Truth, subsequently, “is nothing more, and also nothing less, than permanently
settled opinion.”313 As Peirce himself concludes, “the opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real.”314
The problem, as Altshuler expertly points out, seems to be this: “the difficulty is
that reality is supposed to depend in some sense on the existence of a belief lying at the
ideal end of inquiry, but one would not want to say that things are not real until that belief
is held.”315 The problem, that is, is this question of “dependence”: to what degree does
Reality depend on thought and to what degree does thought depend on Reality?
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Rockmore summarizes the problem well in noting some of the features of the two
readings:
His writings about the concept of reality suggest two incompatible views,
which cannot clearly or simply be separated merely through textual
exegesis: on the one hand, he claims knowledge of the independent real as
it is to which we approximate, which is a version of realism, the modern
successor to Platonism, understood as a grasp of the mind-independent
world. On the other hand, he understands reality as that of which
increasing, finally satisfactory knowledge is given in experience, which is
Hegel’s view, or at least very close to Hegel’s view.316

The identification of the Real with thought (the final opinion) can be seen in several
passages from Peirce. He said, for example, “I do not say that any thinking process is the
reality; but I do say that that thought to which we struggle to have our thoughts coincide,
is the reality.”317 Further, Peirce said, “that which is believed in, in true knowledge, is
real. It appears then that the reality is something with which thought may be
identified.”318 Again, this grows out of his rejection of any form of subjective idealism in
conjunction with a necessary rejection of a type of infallible metaphysical commitment
that might allow the illusion (for it could only ever be an “illusion” for Peirce) of
epistemological finality.
Although Dewey maintains that Peirce was a “realist” whose philosophy depends
“upon the assumption of real things which really have effects or consequences,” 319 he
clarifies Peirce’s position, noting:
The fact that in philosophy at least we are dealing with the conception of
reality, with reality as a term having rational purport, and hence with
something whose meaning is itself to be determined in terms of
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consequences. That ‘reality’ means the object of those beliefs which have,
after prolonged and cooperative inquiry, become stable, and ‘truth’ the
quality of these beliefs is a logical consequence of this position.320
Dewey is quite right that it is the “conception” of Reality that is the end result and the
“object” of inquiry is none other than the achieved “objective” of that communal process,
not an entity separate from that communal conception. Take, for example, this curious
passage from Peirce:
The question is, ‘Whether corresponding to our thoughts and sensations,
and represented in some sense by them, there are realities, which are not
only independent of the thought of you, and me, and any number of men,
but which are absolutely independent of thought altogether.’ The objective
final opinion is independent of thoughts of any particular men, but it is not
independent of thought in general.321
As Potter notes, “the passage is curious because on the one hand it declares for
epistemological realism, and on the other for objective idealism.”322 I argue that Potter’s
reading is quite right, namely, that there is a component of epistemological323 realism
(though highly qualified and not at all like traditional views), as well as a kind of
objective idealism in sharp contrast to the subjective form as we’ve discussed above. As
Sheriff notes, “our situation,” for Peirce, “is that we never experience objects except
through previous signs.”324 Therefore, as Peirce said, “everything which is present to us is
a phenomenal manifestation of ourselves.”325 Nevertheless, “this does not prevent its
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being a phenomenon of something without us, just as a rainbow is at once a manifestation
both of the sun and the rain.”326 As Sheriff notes, “Peirce sees reality and thought as
interdependent, rather than incompatible,”327 allowing Peirce to claim that “there is
nothing…to prevent our knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely
that we do thus know them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely
certain of doing so in any special case.”328 Rather than apodictic certainty, as we’ve seen,
a belief about Reality is one that “if duly persisted in, must, in the very nature of things,
lead to a result indefinitely approximating to the truth in the long run.”329
As Potter rightly notes, “it is not a question…of the existence of a real ‘external’
world. Peirce never considered that to be a genuine problem. It is rather a fact of
everyday experience, doubts about which could be easily dispelled unless one is blinded
by some irrational scruple about the kind of evidence required or prejudiced by a
preconceived theory.”330 The fact of externality is never a question, for Peirce. The
critical question is where in Peirce’s circuit of inquiry does this externality manifest. As
Peirce said, we ought “to regard the appearances of sense as only signs of realities. Only,
the realities which they represent would…be…intellectual conceptions which are the last
products of the mental action which is set in motion” by inquiry. 331 The “last products”
mentioned here, the achieved objectives of inquiry, are “the final and definite
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opinions”332 to which, as Peirce says, “the mind of man is, on the whole and in the long
run, tending.”333 The real, Peirce said…
…is that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally
result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and
you. Thus, the very origin of the conception of reality shows that this
conception essentially involves the notion of a COMMUNITY, without
definite limits, and capable of a definite increase in knowledge.334

Thus, this does not lead to a type of Cartesian skepticism for all of the reasons we
discussed above but, rather, indicates an ongoing process of knowledge acquisition and
the strengthening and augmentation of the beliefs at hand. The Cartesian mind/body
dualism, alternatively manifest as mind/world, does not resurface in Peirce’s
organism/environment distinction. Externality is a part of inquiry, not its goal. “Reality,”
in the nuanced form Peirce conceives of it, is Thirdness of which Secondness (this
externality that philosophers traditionally view as “reality”) is but one phase or part.
As Peirce said of “truth,” for example, “there is…to every question a true answer,
a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating.” 335 As
Sheriff notes, “individuals may not live to reach the truth, and general agreement may be
postponed indefinitely”336 but, as Peirce concluded, “that cannot affect what the character
of that opinion shall be when it is reached.”337
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Peirce must commit himself to some form of objective externality from the outset
for, as Potter notes, “the very enterprise of science requires it.”338 In part, this hearkens
back to Peirce’s identification of “beliefs” with “guiding principles” in inquiry, predictive
of conclusions that may or may not be fulfilled. Over time, these predictions in science
run into fewer and fewer problems, namely, the guiding principles continue to lead to the
expected conclusions until, at last, science can claim that certain “truths” about the world
have been attained.339 However, even these truths, in keeping with Peirce’s fallibilism,
are never absolute. As Potter notes:
Science necessarily makes predictions which in the majority of cases are
fulfilled in the event (cf. [CP] 1.26, 1.343, 5.96, 8.212, etc.). A prediction
is essentially general and as such can never be completely fulfilled. It says
what would be the case whenever certain conditions are fulfilled. No
series of actual cases, however long, will exhaust the prediction. But when
a prediction shows a definite tendency to be fulfilled, that decided
tendency can only be due to the fact that the future event are governed by
a law, not be sheer chance.340

The fact that there is a decided tendency, over time, for the achieved objectives of inquiry
to coalesce into a type of consensus between different strands of inquiry is a good
indication that there is a determinate external world that conditions, in no small part, the
results of the inquiry, rather than sheer chance which could not, in itself, explain why
such a consensus is achieved over time.
338
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For example, an analysis of object X will be undertaken by a group of individuals,
their respective methods open and aboveboard to be analyzed by the other members of
the group. That group swells larger, a hundred investigators, a thousand, until at last a
massive number of investigators have analyzed the object X and consulted with their
peers, subsuming minority reports not through ignoring them (method of tenacity), not
through defying them on principles dictated from on high (method of authority), and not
through simply preferring one line of thinking to another based on taste or intuition (a
priori). The minority reports will be subsumed by a careful, communal analysis of the
methods of those individuals which will deviate somehow from the majority likely
through an unanalyzed premise or a flawed employment of the method of inquiry and,
ideally, those individuals would see their errors by reciprocally seeing the methods
employed by the majority, and “come around,” as it were and not tenaciously “sticking to
their guns” at all cost. I say “subsumed” rather than “weeded out” for, as we saw in the
individual employment of the method, problems and errors are not ignored, but
incorporated into the final solution, strengthening a position through their overcoming.
As such, the minority report is never wholly forgotten, but by being incorporated into the
majority consensus, is ever available for reassessment in light of new information if there
is something about that position that is worthy of revisiting. As Smith notes, “the selfcorrecting nature of the procedure is supposed to reside in the fact that any conclusion
reached is still subject to further review at the hands of those committed to following the
method.”341
Now, in this example, what object X is, ontologically, is determined through the
coordination of the concurrently employed method of inquiry of this massive group of
341
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investigators who reach a consensus as to what it is. Thus far, we note, the individual
processes are, on an individual level, limited, of course, to the content of each
individual’s own thoughts and experiences, for no single individual can go beyond what
humans are capable of experiencing (that is, they can’t know the object as it exists
outside of human experience, and thus there is always some surplus of meaning that
escapes an individual’s grasp). As De Waal notes, “the pragmatic conception of
truth…does not commit Peirce to maintain that there is one mammoth super story, ‘the
truth,’ which contains the last word on all there is to know about life, the universe, and
everything.”342 As Cooke notes, too:
The very goal of inquiry is to achieve the stable state of belief. Of course
the goal of achieving a settled belief is by no means a static state, since a
belief is a habit, a regular pattern of action…all our beliefs function as
certain; they are practically certain. Although, of course, no belief is
absolutely certain…and on Peirce’s model of inquiry, the inquirer is never
in a position to judge that a belief which is taken as true today will not be
called into doubt tomorrow.343
As Cooke notes, “when each witness testifies to the same occurrence, that belief
becomes more certain. Due to our methods and the self-corrective nature of reason, we
can achieve increasingly stable beliefs regardless of where we began our inquiry.”344 This
reflects Peirce’s fallibilism and his first rule of reason which demanded no stagnation to
inquiry for it is precisely because we can never know the total object, that the drive
towards that hypothetically possible goal instigates further inquiry. The information
gathered by the community ever-increases, and though the goal may be asymptotic (we’ll
never know the whole object X), that does not eschew the possibility of real progress and
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real growth through inquiry. Externality (Secondness) provides an objective gauge that
helps guide inquiry towards the achieved objective of that inquiry, namely, Reality
(Thirdness) but is not, itself, what Peirce means by “Reality.” The “existence” of the
external world is, as Brent rightly notes, not what Peirce ascribed to Thirdness (Reality)
but Secondness, the “Outward Clash.”345
As Hausman notes:
Peirce did propose the final goal as something more than a would-be, an
unactualizable ideal. He saw it as a hope.346 Hope is more than a purely
intellectual conception of possibility. This suggests that there is an actual,
concrete state to be expected. However, this expectation is thwarted by the
prospect of an infinite future. The Ultimate Would-be does not lose its
status as a would-be – that is, its instances are never exhausted. Its ideality
and its role in actuality as it takes its bite on the life of the inquirer are
merged.347

By adopting the first rule of reason, the inquirer allows for the possibility of revising his
or her beliefs in light of new information. As Staab notes, for Peirce, according to the
first rule of reason, “one has the responsibility both to learn from and to speak to fellow
inquirers within one’s social context.”348 Indeed, it is the very essence of Socratic349
elenchus and the definition of wisdom Plato forwarded through his iconic protagonist: “I
am wiser than this man; it is likely that neither of us knows anything worthwhile, but he
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thinks he knows something when he does not, whereas when I do not know, neither do I
think I know; so I am likely to be wiser than he to this small extent, that I do not think I
know what I do not know.”350 Similarly, Peirce said, “the first step toward finding out is
to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already; so that no blight can so surely
arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of cocksureness; and ninety-nine out of every
hundred good heads are reduced to impotence by that malady – of whose inroads they are
most strangely unaware!351 As soon as apodictic certainty has been achieved (only ever a
chimera, for Peirce), inquiry ends, for what reason does the inquirer still have to inquire
further if he or she believes that he or she already knows everything there is to know
(also an impossibility, for Peirce, in light of his semiotic theory of cognition and our
inability to know the whole object) about the topic at hand?352
Indeed, Peirce noted that even in failure there is productivity if the inquirer adopts
this attitude of openness to new experiences and embraces problems knowing that
through the onset of problematic situations the circuit of cognitive development can
begin. For even if the resolution achieved is less than satisfactory, the process itself (a
new problem encountered, a new doubt experienced, a new inquiry engaged) is an
experience in itself that denotes cognitive development. As Cooke notes, “because of the
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self-correcting features of inquiry and its ability to gain new knowledge, every inquiry
will be successful to some degree if the inquirer obeys this first rule of logic.”353 As
Peirce said:
Thus it is that inquiry every type, fully carried out, has the vital power of
self-correction and of growth. This is a property so deeply saturating its
inmost nature that it may truly be said that there is but one thing needful
for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and active desire to learn.354
As Cooke summarizes, “in order to learn, one must desire to learn.” 355 All three of the
counterproductive methods for fixing beliefs that Peirce rejects succumb to a failure, in
some way, of this desire to continue inquiry. The method of tenacity outright rejects it,
fearing problems and embracing antiquated beliefs at all cost. The method of authority
puts certainty in the hands of a governing power, actively constructed and imposed upon
a populace who are “encouraged” not to question the voice of that authority. And the a
priori method believes that apodictic certainty is achievable and, with it, all inquiry
ceases once the absolute, timeless “Truth” is achieved. As Nagel notes:
That is why Peirce found unacceptable theories of atomic facts and
sensory simples as indubitable objects of knowledge, or the pretensions of
philosophers to map the limits and possible objects of science – for each
of these illustrates a dogmatism which blocks the road to inquiry, and to
block this road was for Peirce the least forgivable and most dangerous
intellectual vice.356

The adoption of the first rule of reason, hand-in-hand with the principle of
fallibilism at the heart of Peirce’s philosophy, gives rise to what Peirce called the
“experimentalist” model of philosophy; an attitude of open-mindedness that embraces
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alternative beliefs and shuns claims to apodictic certainty that might derail the process of
inquiry. In one of his later essays, Peirce noted:
When you have found, or ideally constructed upon a basis of observation,
the typical experimentalist, you will find that whatever assertion you may
make to him, he will either understand as meaning that if a given
prescription for an experiment ever can be and ever is carried out in act, an
experience of a given description will result, or else he will see no sense at
all in what you say.357
As Cooke notes, “Peirce values the attitude with which one engages in inquiry. In fact,
success of the inquiry stands or falls with the inquirer’s desire to learn.”358 For Peirce,
though the success of the inquiry is not dependent on the attitude of the inquirer,
nevertheless, without this “active desire to learn,” notably absent to varying degrees in all
three counter-productive methods of belief formation, whether or not genuine inquiry is
even engaged at all is, at least, dependent on the requisite attitude of the inquirer.
Further, the desire to learn more implies its corollary, a certain dissatisfaction
with one’s current belief set in light of infinite room for cognitive growth through the
scientific method of inquiry. It is the irritation of doubt writ large: the tingling sensation
that there is more yet to learn which, in turn, compels us to embark upon new inquiries,
hence Peirce’s maxim: “do not block the way of inquiry.”359 If inquiry is the pragmatic
circuit of belief formation articulated above, then it is dependent upon the onset of
problems and the irritation of doubt requisite for the instigation of inquiry and cognitive
growth. Do not, therefore, allow yourself to tenaciously cling to old beliefs, for this
would block the way of inquiry. Do not allow an institution to dictate your beliefs for
you. Do not assume apodictic truth through an a priori method and rest on one’s
357
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cognitive laurels in a chimerical realm of supposed timeless certainty.360 As Talisse notes,
“not blocking the way of inquiry in turn requires that new reasons, unfamiliar
considerations, and countervailing evidence must be consulted and considered.”361 Thus,
as we noted earlier, not blocking the way of inquiry requires open dialogue and the
engagement with problems rather than their avoidance. Thus, conversely, the productive
method, the scientific method, embraces problems, stimulates doubt, instigates inquiry,
gives rise to cognitive growth and, all told, does nothing to block the way of inquiry, all
dependent upon the inquirer’s attitude to embrace that method (and not desire to embrace
one of the other three) in the first place. “The most central characteristic of the scientific
attitude,” characterized by the first rule of logic, is “its thoroughgoing fallibilism.”362 As
Smith notes:
We have no immediately certain and fully guaranteed access to reality; we
are finite and fallible beings subject to error and to the temptation to
intrude our own interests and prejudices into our results…outside of the
community of knowers we have no access to reality; he belonged in this
sense to the idealist tradition, which holds that all of our knowledge is
conditioned by our human capabilities and limitations. It is not that we
know only our own ideas, but that our knowledge of things is mediated by
our ideas.363
Peirce’s method is universal in itself, employed by all investigators in which both the
objective and the method of inquiry are available for public scrutiny and evaluation,
highlighting the shortcomings of methods of belief formation that Peirce critiques in
“Fixation.” As Smith notes,
As Cooke notes, “the method of tenacity is basically the claim that ‘I will not inquire.’ The method of
authority is the method by which ‘We will not allow you to inquire.’ And the a priori method is that by
which ‘you have no need to inquire: it is all self-evident,’” Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry,
Op. Cit., 34. I will discuss the three methods of belief formation that Peirce critiques shortly.
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Peirce’s answer is that such methods, if they can be called methods at all,
do not put us under any constraint; they cannot be called wrong because
the authority will always establish its own validity, and we can always
cling to a belief if that is our resolution…it goes against the requirement
that we have a standard upon which our thinking has no effect.364
Further, it has a “self-correcting character,” namely, that built into the method was
Peirce’s inherent fallibilism, allowing for revision and actively eschewing claims of
absolute certainty, and a universal standard born of both comparing one’s achieved
objectives of inquiry to those of other investigators as well as comparing one’s own
employment of the method to the employment of the method achieved by others. Finally,
unlike other methods, the method of scientific inquiry demands cooperation between
parties with varying beliefs. As Smith notes,
It means essentially that the one making a claim to truth does not put forth
the truth he has discovered in his own name and on his own authority, that
is, it is not true because he says it or because of any authority attaching to
him as an individual…in putting forth a claim to truth, the individual
following the method Peirce recommends puts forth simultaneously the
way in which he arrived at his result and the data on which it was based.365

Hence, we see both the self-correcting character of the method, the necessarily public
component, and the correctives to the problems in the more counterproductive methods
Peirce’s dismissed. Further, it highlighted Peirce’s unique twist on classical empiricism,
for though Peirce most certainly was an empiricist, as Smith notes, “the great empiricist
principle of ‘seeing for yourself’ is translated into a public method. Making the entire
procedure public means that others can follow along the same path and see whether it
leads to the same place.”366
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If the method of science is to provide us with a standard of truth which we
cannot manipulate according to our individual interests and if it is
designed so as to enable us to arrive at conclusions valid for all, we must
have a principle of intersubjectivity.367

This principle of intersubjectivity is integral to Peirce and, consequently, to all of his
pragmatic successors.368 As Smith notes, “the source of the inter-subjective principle for
Peirce, and for pragmatists generally, is the method of empirical inquiry which is binding
upon all members of the scientific community.”369
But it would be a mistake to oversimplify Peirce’s method to merely communal
consensus and majority rule.370 As Smith notes,
Peirce’s community of knowers is no democracy of opinion based on
conventional agreement or majority fiat. Instead he thought of the
Ibid., 26. Smith does not make it clear whether this principle of “intersubjectivity,” so necessary for
Peirce’s method of inquiry, is presumed from the start or acquired over time. As I’ll explore in my
discussion of Peirce’s three “counterproductive” methods of inquiry, the principle of intersubjectivity is
notorious lacking in all three and, consequently, is viewed as a necessary component of the only productive
method (productive of approximating the Truth over the long run). Of interest here is this (and scholars like
Anderson and Talisse will note this as well): if Peirce maintained that the Truth was “destined” to be
reached by all those who inquire, and if intersubjectivity (indeed, a hyperbolic form of intersubjectivity he
called the “unlimited community” of inquirers) is a necessary component of that “destined” arrival at Truth,
it would seem to follow that both Truth and this hyperbolic intersubjectivity are presumed from the start to
be achievable in the long run.
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community itself as destined to arrive at settled opinion if its members
continued to follow the path of empirical method. This is his version of the
famous ‘long run’ idea which played an important role in pragmatic
thinking. Truth and reality are the limits to which the opinion of the
community must converge. The community is under a constraint beyond
itself; it is subject to the dictates of ‘reality,’ but no individual or even
community of individuals has immediate access to that reality. It must be
approached through the method…and the faithful prosecution of this
method will lead to a convergence of opinion.371

The fundamental agreement between members of the community of inquirers must be
based on more than sheer consensus since, too, a certain “consensus” exists in a
totalitarian state where all members are forced to believe whatever is conducive to the
power interests hold on power.372 As DeMarco notes, “further unification of thought in
agreement, Peirce claims, is inherent in the nature of the thought process. He believes
that final agreement on any single issue is destined to be reached.”373 Since the process of
inquiry is used, communally, “over and over again they would perfected, being self
corrective, and thus truth will be reached. Thus, Peirce is confident that the community
will stand as the definition of all reality.”374
Peirce noted that, given enough time (in the long run, as it were), the community
of inquirers were “destined” to arrive at the Truth. But in noting the lack of “immediate”
access to such a reality, Peirce holds off from committing to metaphysical realism. In our
previous example of object X, Peirce would, therefore, suggest that there really is, in
reality, some object X that we have no immediate access to, nor can ever be completely
known due to the fallible nature of the inquirers in general, but that this X operates as a
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beacon or magnet (or, as De Waal calls it, “a truly centripetal force upon our
thoughts”375) drawing the community towards it in an asymptotic, true, but ever
developing understanding of its meaning and existence, manifest primarily as
“Secondness,” the brute facticity of the external world experience, often, as “tension” or
“resistance.” Smith explains further:
In one sense, the community does define both truth and reality, for we
have no access to either except through its co-operative efforts. Finite
thinkers have no infallible rule of certainty. We may be condemned to
have no more than what the community of knowers can attain and its
results may seem poor indeed, but there is no other way and no further
alternative; the other ways of fixing belief are even more precarious. On
the other hand, the community of knowers does not define truth and reality
by fiat; its members are under constraint from beyond their private selves,
and the method which guides their activity is at the same time the extrahuman standard which keeps them from entering their private opinions
and predilections in the book of knowledge.376

The achieved objective of inquiry by the community is more than mere consensus or
majority fiat but is, instead, achieved through a cooperative, self-correcting method that
engages in communal transactin with an encountered environment. As De Waal notes,
“Peirce acknowledged that there might be important questions that remain, in the end,
unanswered. But that does not take away the need that should always proceed,”377 as
Peirce himself said, on the “hope that the particular question into which we are inquiring
is susceptible of an approximate answer in a reasonable378 time.”379
Meyers summarizes the complementary nature of Peirce’s idealism and realism
succinctly, drawing together the various themes we’ve explored throughout this analysis:
375
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The problem traditionally is that, if we go too far in making the real
independent, we run the risk of making it incognizable. Peirce is aware of
this, and, as a result, holds that independence is only a partial
characterization of reality. Based on the pragmatic theory of meaning, he
proposes to supplement it with the doctrine that ‘The opinion which is
fated to be ultimated agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by
the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is real’ (5.407, 1878).
This preserves the notion that reality is independent of you or me or any
finite number of humans, but it does not lead us to an unknowable since
the real can be shown to depend on long-run thought, i.e. on the ultimate
community. What we have here is a compromise. The real is independent,
but it is not independent of the infinite community of the future; it is just
independent of you or me or any finite number of minds. It is thus ultimate
dependent on mind, and so the doctrine is a version of existential idealism
rather than realism. [Yet], the source of the idealism here is Peirce’s
pragmatic stricture on reality, namely, that the real is the result of the
ultimate community; it should come as no surprise then that problems
defending this pragmatic account tended to push him toward realism.380
Ultimately, as Almeder right notes, though a great “number of Peirce
scholars…simply choose one criterion over the other,”381 I believe the solution lies
somewhere in between traditional notions of “idealism” and “realism” precisely because
Peirce’s conception of “Reality” was anything but “traditional.”
It is my contention that Peirce was neither a metaphysical realist (in the
epistemological sense of postulating a mind-independent Reality with a determinate
nature of its own) nor a traditional idealist. Peirce neither believed that Reality was
wholly discovered (he eschewed all “spectator” theories of knowledge) nor was Reality
wholly constructed through inquiry (as if consensus actually determined what things are).
Consequently, I maintain that Peirce had neither a correspondence nor a consensus theory
of Truth, at least in so far as they are traditionally conceived.
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If I had to provide Peirce with a “label” for his metaphysical-qua-epistemological
commitments, it would be this: Peirce was an “objective phenomenological idealist.” So
far there is nothing particularly controversial about such a reading since Peirce had a
phenomenology and called himself an objective idealist.382 Peirce’s theory was
phenomenological insofar as all human experience occurs through the three, basic
phenomenological categories of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. Humans are
limited to their semiotic-cum-phenomenological experience of the world. Peirce was an
idealist insofar as our beliefs do contribute to how Reality is structured. But he was an
“objectivist” in the sense that our beliefs, as he says, are determined by nothing human:
we cannot believe anything we want if we adopt the method of inquiry, but our beliefs
must conform, to no small degree, to the existence of the raw stuff of the world that is the
way it is regardless of you, I, or any finite number of individuals have to say about it.
The key to this interpretation of Peirce’s commitments lies in his distinction
between the phenomenological categories of Secondness and Thirdness. This distinction,
I argue, is also central to many misinterpretations of Peirce by his critics and will become
important to my discussion of the Frankfurt School’s critiques of pragmatism.
“Reality,” for Peirce, was, as we’ve seen, a highly nuanced term. What
metaphysical realists (in an epistemological sense) traditionally mean by “Reality” is that
which is independent of human cognition with a determine nature of its own and has
more in common with Peirce’s conception of Secondness, that is, with his
phenomenological category of “existence” and “resistance.” “Reality” or “Nature,” for
Peirce, fall into the category of Thirdness and had a very different denotation.383 Let me
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begin by offering the following diagrammatic to clearly illustrate my interpretation of
Peirce’s three categories of phenomenological experience and how they inform my
reading of his metaphysical-qua-epistemological commitments:

(1) Beliefs  (2) Existence  (3) Reality

As we recall, our beliefs are laden with nascent expectations. As “guiding principles,”
our beliefs are hypotheses with expected conclusions. If they are “true beliefs” they pass
unproblematically through “existence” (the category of doubt, tension, resistance) to
terminate in our conception of Reality.384 “Existence,” the experience of interaction with
the brute facticity of the encountered world, is barely recognized as anything more than
the most evanescent and transitory “blip” in our cognitive apparatus. If, however, they
prove to be “false beliefs,” the beliefs will run headlong into the existence of the external
world like a car plowing into a brick wall: we’ll be forced to reformulate those beliefs
that fail to lead us to the expected conclusions. In that moment of cognitive dissonance,
part of “Reality” itself becomes nebulous, uncertain, and problematic, instilling in us a
repugnant sense of “doubt” that stimulates us to inquire further precisely because our
very Reality is in jeopardy (in the schema above, we have failed to get past (2) in order to
arrive at (3) and have to return to (1)).
What determines the veracity of our beliefs (whether they be “true” or “false”) is
not a failure of our beliefs to “correspond” to “Reality.” Rather (and this is key), it is a
failure of our beliefs to lead unproblematically through existence to construct Reality. As

“Termination” in the sense of a single cycle of inquiry. Thirdness, our conception of Reality, thus
becomes the foundation of our new beliefs, our new guiding principles.
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Peirce said, although “Thirdness cannot be understood without Secondness” (our
conception of Reality cannot be divorced from the externality we experience) “Secondess
cannot compass Thirdness”385 (Reality is not reducible to externality only). “Reality,” as
Thirdness, is the combination of the both Firstness and Secondness, namely, a
combination of our beliefs and the existence we encounter. Indeed, “Secondness is so
inferior to Thirdness as to be in that aspect quite in a different world” for “even in the
most degenerate form of Thirdness, and thirdness has two grades of degeneracy,
something may be detected which is not mere secondness. If you take any ordinary
triadic relation, you will always find a mental element in it. Brute action is secondness,
any mentality involves thirdness.”386 As Peirce said:
Now Reality is an affair of Thirdness as Thirdness, that is, in its mediation
between Secondness and Firstness. Most, if not all of you, are, I doubt not,
Nominalists; and I beg you will not take offence at a truth which is just as
plain and undeniable to me as is the truth that children do not understand
human life. To be a nominalist consists in the undeveloped state in one's
mind of the apprehension of Thirdness as Thirdness. The remedy for it
consists in allowing ideas of human life to play a greater part in one's
philosophy. Metaphysics is the science of Reality.387

There are both objective and subjective components to each of the three
phenomenological categories. Firstness is the category of our subjective beliefs, true, but
they are beliefs forged of previous inquiries that, themselves, interacted with an objective
environment. So, too, are our beliefs objective in another sense: they are forged through
our participation in our communities and thus extend beyond merely what I, subjectively,
may believe. Secondness is the experience of our beliefs (which are already both
subjective and objective in the aforementioned sense) interacting with existent externality
385
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as it is encountered. What is encountered is determined in no small part by our beliefs,
that is, our expectations of what we will find and the conclusions we expect in our
beliefs, and thus there is a subjective component of Secondness (a subjectivity already
tinged with objectivity in Firstness). But we cannot believe just anything we wish to
believe if we earnestly adopt the method of inquiry: we will encounter a tension,
resistance and recalcitrance that is wholly undetermined by our beliefs (as if the belief
that fire will not burn us can be maintained for longer than the few seconds it takes for
fire to do its objective work on our flesh). Thus, though existence (Secondness) is
partially determined by nothing human, that is, has a determinate nature of its own
independent of our beliefs about it, it is also partially the transaction of our beliefs
(Firstness) with that encountered existence, making Secondness at least partially
determined by the inquirers themselves (therefore, this existence of externality does not
exclusively have a determine nature of its own independent of inquiring minds).388
Lastly, Thirdness is the Reality we construct in inquiry: our beliefs (Firstness) have lead
unproblematically through encountered existence (Secondness). However, Thirdness
(Reality) is not wholly constructed by our beliefs. If Firstness (a coordination of
subjectivity and objectivity) and Secondness (another coordination of subjectivity and
objectivity) are combined to construct Reality (Thirdness), then a substantial part of that
“constructed” Reality is based on discovery and objectivity. Reality cannot be whatever
we want it to be.
Thus, objectivity runs throughout each of the three phenomenological categories
of experience, culminating in a Reality that is neither wholly constructed nor wholly
As Brent notes, Peirce may well have been influced by Thomas Reid who “proposed that, while the
existence of external objects is mediated in the mind, sensation, as the raw data of experience, is given
diretly and undeniably by physical objects,” Brent, Charles S. Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 52.
388
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discovered. There is no “correspondence” between belief and Reality but nor is there
merely “consensus.” If consensus determined the Truth about that Reality, it would
require no objective component of inquiry and whatever we, communally, decide is the
fact of the matter, thereby becomes the fact of the matter, as if the earth being spherical is
a product of consensus rather than the consensus that the world is round is a product of
the world actually being round, independent of what you, I, or any finite number of
inquirers has to say about it. The only “hint” of correspondence lies in Secondness
(existence, that is, not “Reality”) wherein our beliefs, if true, will “correspond” to the
existence we encounter so perfectly that no resistance, tension, or recalcitrance is
encountered worthy of our attention. A failure of this “correspondence” results in a false
belief that must, immediately, be reformulated. The only “hint” of consensus lies in
Thirdness (Reality, as Peirce conceives it) wherein a consensus of beliefs between
different inquiring parties is a good criterion that Truth, to a relative degree, has been
achieved but is not, itself, grounds for Truth.
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Chapter 3

The Formation of Belief

In “Fixation of Belief,” Peirce explored four methods of belief formation that I’ve
already alluded to in passing: tenacity, authority, a priority, and the scientific method of
inquiry. Each of the three counterproductive methods, in their own way, was a critique of
dogmatism and a continuation of his adamant stance of fallibilism stemming from his
unbridled disgust with any obstacle that blocks the way of further inquiry.
Like Descartes, Peirce framed his exploration of inquiry as an oscillation between
doubt and belief. But unlike Descartes, as I’ve discussed already, Peirce did not begin
with universal doubt but with universal belief, that is, to assume that one’s overall pool of
beliefs are true (“it is most likely that we do know them [i.e., things as they really are] in
numberless cases”389) but that any one of those beliefs may be called into doubt and none
beyond the possibility of revision (“we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any
special case”390). When a problem presents itself, a specific belief is challenged and is
thrown into doubt, a state so repugnant to the human organism (“an uneasy and
dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of
belief”391) that inquiry (deploying the abductive, deductive, and inductive applications of
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logic) is immediately engaged until some viable resolution is achieved and a new belief is
forged (either a different belief or the “same” belief strengthened by the overcoming of
the problem).
However, precisely because of doubt’s “uneasiness,” individuals often take the
path of least resistance: if a state of belief is a “calm and satisfactory state which we do
not wish to avoid,”392 then the fastest way in which to find oneself in a state of belief is to
“cling tenaciously, not merely to believing, but to believing just what we believe.” 393 In
short, to avoid, at all costs, the problematic situations that would give rise to doubts in
our minds. We merely find ourselves “constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on
all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from
anything that might disturb it.”394 “This simple and direct method…pursued by many
men,”395 involves acknowledging a belief, “constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling
on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred
from anything that might disturb it.”396 Motivated by an “instinctive dislike of an
undecided state of mind, exaggerated into a vague dread of doubt, makes men cling
spasmodically to the views they already take.”397
Although impartial environmental (external) factors often create or contribute to
the problems our beliefs face (“as if a man should resolutely continue to believe that fire
would not burn him”398), so, too, does basic human interaction: my beliefs may be thrown
into doubt when I encounter an individual (one that I acknowledge and respect,
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especially) with a different belief than the one I maintain on a given subject. Peirce
provided a practical example: “I remember once being entreated not to read a certain
newspaper lest it might change my opinion on free-trade.”399 If I, for example, have a
certain liberal or democratic leaning, I encourage myself not to listen to the media
programs for a conservative or republican base (a desire to avoid raising my ire, perhaps,
or a fear of having my own beliefs disrupted). Granted, by relying upon this method,
Peirce acknowledged that it will lead to a certain “peace of mind”400 (as any state of
belief brings), but in blockading social avenues that would otherwise disrupt my beliefs
by throwing them into doubt, I will likewise never inquire, never reach a resolution, and
thus never intellectually develop. Like “when an ostrich buries its head in the sand as
danger approaches, it very likely takes the happiest course. It hides the danger, and then
calmly says there is no danger; and, if it feels perfectly sure there is none, why should it
raise its head to see?”401 As De Waal says, “the first and most primitive method is the
method of tenacity. On this method, opinion is settled purely by obstinately holding on to
one’s beliefs with all one’s might.”402 This correlates with Peirce’s earlier example of
being warned off reading a certain newspaper by a colleague in that, like the ostrich,
Peirce could have chosen to bury his head in only newspaper articles that reflect his
current belief, ignoring those to the contrary, but in no way does that mean that the
potential problems that contrary newspaper may have contained “vanish.”
But this method for fixing belief, which may be called the method of
tenacity, will be unable to hold its ground in practice. The social impulse
is against it. The man who adopts it will find that other men think
differently from him, and it will be apt to occur to him, in some saner
399
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moment, that their opinions are quite as good as his own, and this will
shake his confidence in his belief.403

Perhaps stemming from his early experiences with the Coast Survey, the Metaphysical
Club, or any number of consortiums of great minds of which he had been a member,
Peirce knew all too well the significance of the “social impulse” and the critical
dimension of “Otherness” in belief formation. The tenacious individual will inevitably
run into an Other, and “unless we make ourselves hermits, we shall necessarily influence
each other’s opinions.”404 The realization that “another man’s thought or sentiment may
be equivalent to one’s own,”405 is the problem that leads to doubt that, in turn, leads to the
unfolding of inquiry and cognitive development. Here is your Socratic “gadfly,” stinging
the tenacious individual into cognitive motion. Thus, as De Waal notes, this first method
“only works up to a point. Our confidence in our own beliefs is too easily shaken when
interacting with others, or when we are confronted with brute facts.”406
Note, however, that Peirce was not advocating the method of tenacity’s
abandonment in favor of a prescribed method of inquiry like a doctor changing a
patient’s medications. Peirce was describing inquiry as it really happens and,
consequently, describing the method of tenacity as the type of blockade of inquiry that
violates his first rule of reason. Once tenacity crumbles, there’s no cognitive decision to
take up the method of inquiry, it simply is the method that materializes once the obstacle
(adhering to the method of tenacity) is dissolved.
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If the method of tenacity cannot hold in the long run precisely because it is
impossible to isolate oneself wholly from either the “brute facts” of externality which
could countermand one’s beliefs, or else run into another individual with a different
belief, then “the problem becomes how to fix belief, not in the individual merely, but in
the community,”407 bringing us to the second of the counterproductive methods which
Peirce called “the method of authority.” If the ultimate downfall of the method of tenacity
lay in renewed dialogical engagement with an Other holding a different belief, then
perhaps if we can find a method where everyone within a given community has precisely
the same beliefs, then we don’t need to worry about living a wholly hermetic life:
everyone we encounter will have the same beliefs that we have and, thus, no problems
would emerge and we can stay, safe and secure, in the “peace of mind” of our initial state
of belief. As Peirce said:
Let the will of the state act, then, instead of the individual. Let an
institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct
doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually,
and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent
contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed.408
An “institution” may be created to effectively accomplish what the first method could not
by eliminating the problem the method of tenacity ultimately faced: the beliefs of other
people. As Talisse notes, “we might say that the method of authority is simply the
method of tenacity writ large.”409 Rather than the individual blockading any conceivable
problem (effectively, the beliefs of other people) from transforming that state of belief
into a state of doubt and forcing the pragmatic circuit of development to advance, in the
407
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method of authority, a governing power or institution does so for the individuals within
its jurisdiction. As De Waal notes, “the individual no longer needs to shield itself from
contrary evidence, as with the method of tenacity, but contrary evidence is here purposely
withheld from people by a regulating institution through censorship and the oppression,
or even elimination, of so-called subversive elements.”410
The institution mentioned in the method of authority has a two-fold procedure of
achieving this insidious end. It will, on the one hand, effectively tell its citizens what to
believe, reiterating whatever doctrines it deems “correct” over and again and teaching
these doctrines to the young. On the other hand, the institution, simultaneous with its
forwarding its own doctrines to its people, repels any potentially different doctrines that
could undermine their hegemonic dominion over the beliefs of its citizens. In this way, in
ensuring all of its citizens effectively believe the same, those that adopt this method of
authority are not exposed to the problem that undermined those who adopt the method of
tenacity.
The word “adopt” here is a bit problematic. Certainly it may be the case that an
individual willingly submits to authority, and thereby actively adopts this method.
However, the implication is strong here that, in light of no knowledge of alternative
possibilities of discourse or belief, the individuals within the authoritarian society would
only “adopt” this method in a nominal sense and it might be more accurate to say that
they are “indoctrinated” into simply living with the method of authority as their primary
mode of belief formation. Continuing with his profoundly sardonic description of this
method of belief formation, Peirce said:
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Let all possible causes of a change of mind be removed from men’s
apprehensions. Let them be kept ignorant, lest they should learn of some
reason to think otherwise than they do. Let their passions be enlisted, so
that they may regard private and unusual opinions with hatred and horror.
Then, let all men who reject the established belief be terrified into silence.
Let the people turn out and tar-and-feather such men, or let inquisitions be
made into the manner of thinking of suspected person, and when they are
found guilty of forbidden beliefs, let them be subjected to some signal
punishment.411

Part of the mechanism employed by the institution to invoke this method of authority is
not only to keep the populace ignorant of any doctrine that would conflict with whatever
it paraded before its citizens but, too, to instill in its citizens something even greater than
the “vague dread of an undecided mind” in the method of tenacity: outright hostility
towards any member of that populace that would dare to question the status quo by the
other members of that same populace. In this way, a mechanism is in place for selfregulation by the citizens themselves, namely, that their hostility towards alternative
doctrines, an hostility itself imparted by the institution, will deter even the desire to seek
out alternative possibilities for fear of retribution not only from the institution itself but
from one’s own neighbors. A type of Orwellian dystopia is conjured in the images here of
a single institution forwarding a monolithic design of “one truth,” namely, its truth, and a
populace willingly accepting that “truth” and spying upon one another to ensure that not
even one’s own neighbors, one’s own family, perhaps, would dare undermine that
“truth.”
Thus, once again, cognitive progress in the form of the pragmatic circuit of belief
formation is unable to get off the ground, as it was in the method of tenacity: without the
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onset of a problem to disrupt the initial belief, there is no irritation of doubt to stimulate
the inquiry requisite for resolution and development.
Yet this is not the end of what Peirce’s institution was capable of in terms of
ensuring synchronicity of beliefs: “when complete agreement could not otherwise be
reached, a general massacre of all who have not thought in a certain way has proved a
very effective means of settling opinion in a country.”412
If it would seem, at first, that this is a mere contrivance conjured through smoke
and mirrors of a vision of a totalitarian hegemony that could have no place in waking
reality, Peirce granted us an (albeit general) exploration of its historical efficacy. “This
method has, from the earliest times, been one of the chief means of upholding correct
theological and political doctrines.”413 In Rome, for example, “from the days of Numa
Pompilius to those of Pius Nonus. This is the most perfect example in history; but
wherever there is a priesthood – and no religion has been without one – this method has
been more or less made use of.”414 Indeed, “wherever there is an aristocracy, or a guild,
or any association of a class of men whose interests depend…on certain propositions,
there will be inevitably found some traces of this natural product of social feeling.” 415 His
attack is upon any system of power that would adopt this method, be it social, political or
religious, accusing each of having, at the very least, “traces” of this method of
governance and control, noting that “cruelties always accompany this system; and when
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it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes
of any rational man.”416
Peirce readily acknowledged the superiority of this method for fixing belief for,
compared to the method of tenacity which he demonstrated cannot hold in practice even
for a single individual for any great period of time, the method of authority has, in fact,
been utilitized to great success time and again throughout the course of human history.417
Indeed, the historical fact of its efficacy lead Peirce to a grim (possibly sardonic) outlook
on humanity in general as he said, “for the mass of mankind, then, there is perhaps no
better method than this. If it is their highest impulse to be intellectual slaves, then slaves
they ought to remain.”418
And yet, as with the method of tenacity, despite the vast superiority in efficacy
that the method of authority maintained, it is ultimately doomed to failure by virtue of its
own fundamental principles, if given enough time (in the “long run”). He noted:
But no institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject.
Only the most important ones can be attended to, and on the rest men’s
minds must be left to the action of natural causes. This imperfection will
be no source of weakness so long as men are in such a state of culture that
one opinion does not influence another – that is, so long as they cannot put
two and two together.419
If no institution can “undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject,” it would follow
that the pragmatic mechanism for belief formation continues to play out within each
individual citizen, though perhaps not on the most “important” issues, presumably those
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that keep the members of the institution in power. As such, the first crack in the armor of
the method of authority is revealed: the individual citizens are familiar with the pragmatic
circuit of belief formation, the experiencing and overcoming of problems, the irritation of
doubt, and the attainment of resolution, just not on the issues of most importance. It
would follow, then, that if they are familiar with the process of belief formation through
their experience with the lesser issues of every day life, it would require only the
experience of that key problem to disrupt one of those all-important beliefs for the
method of authority to be undone. As Peirce noted, this is hardly a weakness for the
method of authority (as it was the central weakness for the method of tenacity) so long as
all of the individuals within a society maintain the same beliefs on these more important
topics. Nevertheless, beginning with the familiarity each citizen has with the process of
belief formation as Peirce articulated it, all that remains is the ability or opportunity to
experience some beliefs distinct from that which the institution forces upon its citizens.
But in the most priest-ridden states some individuals will be found who
are raised above that condition. These men possess a wider sort of social
feeling; they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held to
very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been
brought up to believe; and they cannot help seeing that it is the mere
accident of their having been taught as they have, and of their having been
surrounded with the manners and associations they have, that has caused
them to believe as they do and not far differently…thus giving rise to
doubts in their minds.420

At first, there seems something somewhat occult about the solution, namely, that
some unique individuals are capable of this “wider sort of social feeling,” able to
somehow sense that that their beliefs are being imparted upon them purposefully by the
power interests of the institution. But there is nothing occult in this solution, rather,
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something all too common: this “wider sort of social feeling” need extend only so far as
the realization that the way the current society is structured, namely, the beliefs forced
upon the individuals within that polis, are not the same beliefs held by other nations (in
space) or even that same community under previous administrations (in time). If the
method of tenacity is undermined by the experience of contrary beliefs within one’s own
society, and if the method of authority is more efficient precisely because it ensures no
two individual’s within that society will have contrary viewpoints, that which undermines
the method of authority is that which undermined the method of tenacity, only on a larger
scale, available to those with a “wider” socio-political vision. That is to say, if one cannot
turn to one’s immediate neighbor for a contrary belief that would problematize his or her
own, then one needs simply look to another nation entirely or, failing that, simply one’s
own nation’s past for societal structures and beliefs distinct from one’s own. As a result,
the institution, to guard against such a possibility, would not only need to (as we’ve seen)
employ its two-fold method of ensuring all of its citizens have the exact same beliefs (at
least on the “important” issues) as well as demonizing those who would dare transgress
that mandate, but would likewise have to find a way to completely isolate the entire
nation (in space) and cut off all contact to a nation’s own history (in time). The result
would be such an extreme form of national isolationism in conjunction with extreme
historical revisionism and rampant censorship.
Another key point developed in the aforementioned passage is that of the
distinction between “necessity” and “contingency” in societies governed by some
institution adhering to the method of authority. Implicitly, these institutions could only
hold such power over its citizens on these key issues if the beliefs they proliferate are
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passed off as historically necessary and not merely the contingent construction of that
institution, in that time, in that place. If the latter were the case, if they proliferated
contigent beliefs, then inherent in those beliefs would be the tension requisite for their
being brought into doubt. That is to say, if the power structures didn’t express the beliefs
they demanded their populace to uniformly adopt in terms of timeless necessity, but
actually presented them as historically contingent, built into any contingent belief is the
potential for revisability and the realization that that belief is but one among many and
may or may not be the best belief to maintain. That is to say, it represents Peirce’s
distinction between the chimerical apodictic beliefs of dogmatism vs. the fallibilism of
revisable beliefs inherent in pragmatism. Since the construction of contingnent
(dubitable) beliefs is clearly not the goal of the institution in Peirce’s example, we may
safely assume that whatever important beliefs were being conveyed to the populace were
certainly played off as timelessly necessary, that is, as if they were not being actively
constructed by those invested interests but were merely being conveyed to the populace
through the medium of the institution as timeless truths being “discovered” rather than
“created.” Such a critique would square with my analysis of Peirce’s conception of
Reality in the previous chapter. Reality is in no small part “constructed” by the
community of inquirers for although there is an external, objective component of inquiry,
Reality is not, itself, that external permanence (Secondness) but a Thirdness of flux,
potentiality, in futuro. The authority would have us believe that Reality is stable, actual,
and established in the here and now as true, certain, “discovered,” and thus, necessary
(rather than contingent or in any way created). Peirce made this distinction between
contingency and necessity more explicit in saying that these individuals with a wider
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social awareness “cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been
taught as they have, and of their having been surrounded with the manners and
associations they have, that has caused them to believe as they do and not far
differently.”421
The ability to look back to the past is central to Peirce’s work in myriad ways.422
As Brent notes, Peirce, the “historian,” teaches us that “we are practicing semeioticians,
whether we know it or not. We study the past to find out what happened and what it
meant, using the plethora of signs that was left behind. In studying the past we depend on
three kinds of sources or texts: documentary, artifactual, and oral, and combinations of
these.”423 These are precisely the avenues the authority would cut off from the inquiries
in the present, not only conditioning the results of inquiry to its own ends but, too,
effectively stultifying the ongoing process of inquiry for all who would engage in it by
severing that necessary connection with the community of inquirers of the past and their
subsequent discoveries.
This pawning off of historical contingency (beliefs created by the institution at a
certain time in a certain place) as timeless necessity (beliefs supposedly “discovered” by
the institution, that exist independently of the institution, which the institution is merely
“transmitting” to its citizens) is a method that has been utilized time and again by
institutions attempting to remain in power through the proliferation of beliefs that,
invariably, support the continued reign of the institutions in question. One key example
421
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of the efficacy of this technique (and the inevitable undermining of the method) can be
seen in the historical development of the African-American citizenry from slaves to free
participants in America’s political system. Let us consider, for example, a sample from A
Tempest, Amie Cesaire’s reinterpretation of Shakespeare’s classic tale of the slave
Caliban and his master, the magus Prospero:
Prospero, you’re a great magician:
You’re an old hand at deception.
And you lied to me so much,
About the world, about myself
That you ended up imposing on me
An image of myself:
Underdeveloped, in your words, undercompetent
That’s how you made me see myself!
And I hate that image . . .
But now I know you, you old cancer,
And I also know myself! And I know that one day
My bare fist, just that,
Will be enough to crush your world!
The old world is crumbling down!424

Cesaire, one of the most influential voices in the negritude movement, attempted to
reestablish a firm black identity in the face of post-colonial racism and an increasingly
expanding black Diaspora. As I note elsewhere:
What is so intriguing about the aforementioned passage is that this
moment of resistance and disruption presupposes a significant period of
time in which the image that Prospero purposively constructed and
imposed upon his servant had real efficacy and in a very real sense
determined how Caliban identified himself. At some point,
Prospero…replaced Caliban’s otherwise free, autonomous process of selfdetermination with an artificially constructed “imago.”425
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The key to Prospero’s domination over Caliban (and, consequently, the maintaining of
his power) relied upon his implanting in Caliban the belief that Caliban was,
necessarily,426 a slave, “undercompetent,” and predetermined as precisely what he was.
Obfuscating the contingency of such a belief (as something that Prospero constructed), it
was pawned off as timeless necessity, making Caliban self-identify with this false selfimage or “imago.”
This example, artfully created here by Cesaire, is paradigmatic of the attitude
constructed in the cultural milieu of early America in which a false sort of necessary
belief, namely that blacks were naturally or “inherently” slave-like, was forced upon
them in an attempt to maintain their servility and break their desire for something other
than what the system established. This is the very heart of Peirce’s method of authority.
As Yancy notes:
Within the context of an anti-Black racist world, the lived experience of
the Black is under the constant threat of being collapsed into the
phenomenological or lived experience of the nigger. Once collapsed into
the one-dimensional mode of niggerhood, as it were, it is easy to undergo
a certain ontological resignation, a capitulation in the face of a reality
whose past, present, and future seem fixed and stacked against any
possibility of historical breach.427

What Yancy is directing our attention to here is precisely what is reflected in this key
aspect of Peirce’s method of authority. Supplanting the free, autonomous selfdetermination of the black individual with the constructed “imago” of “niggerhood,” as it
was in Cesaire, the individual is duped into believing that he or she is inherently slaveThe efficacy of the “imago” lies in its manifestation as a belief, proliferated by an authority in a manner
akin to Peirce’s insights in “Fixation,” as necessary and timeless. By this I mean the belief (the imago)
couldn’t be other than than it and those that come to identify with it come to see themselves as predetermined as such. If the belief, itself, held even a hint of contingency in its proliferation, it would come
laden with the requisite doubt necessary to challenge it and, if needs be, dissolve it through inquiry.
427
George Yancy, Black Bodies, White Gazes (New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2008), 109.
426

121

like, “undercompetent,” and the result is a certain “ontological resignation” once this
belief has been successfully implanted. The imago must necessarily be something
timeless, necessary and “essential,” attempting to define the very essence of the black
individual as something, as Yancy notes, whose “past, present and future seem fixed and
stacked against any possibility of historical breach.” Thus, as in Peirce’s method of
authority, we see a set of important beliefs imparted by the institution onto its populace
that appears necessary or essential and purposefully obfuscates its contingent origins so
as to ensure its efficacy.
Yet, as Yancy notes, “the significant point here is that the needed slippage did
occur.”428 In Caliban’s vehement proclamation that he now sees the once seemingly
powerful magus as an “old cancer,” that is, sees past the attempted essentializing of his
nature to the truth of the contingency of Prospero’s claims, he is now capable of
undermining them and asserting his own will to self-determination and autonomy. For
Peirce, to counteract the method of authority, Caliban would need to seek out the beliefs
that exist in nations far separated in space or, when possible, look back to his own
heritage and the history of his own people as one that was, at one time, not essentially
enslaved. Perhaps he had recourse to this through the visitation of the strangers who
landed on the island after Prospero’s storm and who carry with them the social practices
of a world far removed from his own, a world that could breed fruitful comparison that
could be the catalyst for the irritation of doubt requisite for cognitive development and
the breaking of these old beliefs.
Thus, “the arbitrary forcing of it [a belief] up others, must, therefore…be given
up. A different new method of settling opinions must be adopted, that shall not only
428
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produce an impulse to believe, but shall also decide what proposition it is which is to be
believed.”429 The method of authority, like that of tenacity, cannot hold in the long run.
In the method of authority, as we saw, beliefs were constructed by the institution
as they needed to appear to the populace in order to keep those in power in power. Put
another way, the guiding principles and premises with which individuals use to navigate
their way through the world are not only warped to suit the interests of the institution but,
too, are not autonomously developed by the individuals themselves through processes of
communal verification. In short, Peirce’s critique of the method of authority was a
critique of “instrumentalism,” broadly construed and as Horkheimer defined it, as the
relegation of human cognitive capacities to the role of ascertaining the means to ends
prescribed independently of the inquiring individuals themselves. This brings us to the
third and final counterproductive method Peirce analyzes here, what he calls the a priori
method:
Let the action of natural preference be unimpeded, then, and under their
influence let men, conversing together and regarding matters in different
lights, gradually develop beliefs in harmony with natural causes…the most
perfect example of it is to be found in the history of metaphysical
philosophy. Systems of this sort have not usually rested upon any
observed facts, at least not in any great degree. They have been chiefly
adopted because their fundamental propositions seemed ‘agreeable to
reason.’430

Looking specifically at the problematic in the method of authority in which guiding
principles were given by an institution rather than developed for oneself in communal
discourse, this third method attempts to improve upon that deficiency by allowing their
choice of guiding principles to remain “unimpeded” and allowing, further, the ability for
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them to converse together and bring together “different lights” to “develop beliefs in
harmony with natural causes.” The emphasis here, however, is on fixing those guiding
principles, those beliefs, as “fundamental propositions” that are “agreeable to reason” but
do not (on the whole) rest on any necessarily “observable facts” and not relying up
“dialogue” as such. Peirce continued by fleshing out what he meant by “agreeable to
reason” more fully:
This is an apt expression; it does not mean that which agrees with
experience, but that which we find ourselves inclined to believe. Plato, for
example, finds it agreeable to reason that the distances to the celestial
spheres from one another should be proportional to the different lengths of
strings which produce harmonious chords. Many philosophers have been
led to their main conclusions by considers like this; but this is the lowest
and least developed form which the method takes, for it is clear that
another man might find Kepler’s theory, that the celestial spheres are
proportional to the inscribed and circumscribed spheres of the different
regular solids, more agreeable to his reason.431
Key here is the use of the word “experience.” Peirce’s conception of “experience” is
fundamental to his methodology of belief formation. This conception of experience
maintains that there is a false dichotomy between the rigid distinctions of rationalism and
empiricism, articulating a coordination of aspects of both without succumbing to the
foundationalism of either. Here, specifically, by hinting at Descartes and invoking Plato,
Peirce was attacking rationalism’s reliance on agreed upon hypotheses as the basis for
belief formation in the absence of hard, empirical evidence, those beliefs, as he says, “not
usually rested upon any observed facts” are consequently, for Peirce, reduced merely to
what premises we are merely inclined to believe.
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Peirce expressed the superiority432 of this third method over the previous two. Our
instincts to adopt a rational set of beliefs remain unimpeded precisely because we are not
burying our proverbial heads in the sand ala the method of tenacity to stifle cognitive
growth out of fear of doubt, nor are they impeded by some governing power that dictates
our beliefs for us. However, this only amounts to barely more than whatever set of beliefs
is most appealing to the individual at the time which may well be discussed openly with
others within a society (another difference and advantage of this method over the
previous two) but which amounts to little more than some form of instinctual reaction and
immediate inclination.433
Interesting here was Peirce’s use of the term “instinct.” Peirce accused those who
adopt this method of drawing upon an underdeveloped and unrefined (albeit natural and
unimpeded) “instinctual” pull towards one set of propositions over another. But
beginning with the unrefined and pre-critical instincts rather than beliefs forged of a
rigorous and systematized problematizing,434 it was a method that was ultimately
counterproductive. As he noted, of all three methods, “its failure has been the most
manifest.”435
It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but
taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion, and
accordingly metaphysicians have never come to any fixed agreement, but
the pendulum has swung backward and forward between a more material
and a more spiritual philosophy, from the earliest times to the latest. And
“This method is far more intellectual and respectable from the point of view of reason than either of the
others which we have noticed. Indeed, as long as no better method can be applied, it ought to be followed,
since it is then the expression of instinct which must be the ultimate cause of belief in all cases,” Ibid., CP
5.383.
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so from this, which has been called the a priori method, we are driven, in
Lord Bacon’s phrase, to a true induction.436

Peirce attacked the foundationalism of both empiricism and rationalism in their classic
forms, a foundationalism forged not from a robust system of beliefs achieved through
communal inquiry, but more from an instinctive (that is, unrefined, uncritical) reaction to
one set of premises rather than another as a matter of taste. His evidence as to its lack of
ultimate efficacy was his appeal to the seemingly unending debate between both
epistemological camps.
Smith maintains that though Peirce’s philosophical allegiance is “essentially
empiricism,” it comes with “some subtle and novel twists.”437 For “although Peirce
criticized the narrowness of traditional empiricism,438 he was ready to maintain that our
idea of anything is the idea of the sensible effects which it manifests.”439 It is the term
“effects” in Smith’s analysis that is central and that, ultimately, separates Peirce’s
empiricism from that of more traditional strains. For the term “effects,” as Smith notes:
… points to the behavior of the object in question, to the ways in which it
will respond when set in relation to other things and especially when it is
manipulated in certain predetermined ways designed for the purpose of
testing its properties. Instead of regarding the properties of things as inert
qualities possessed by them in an essentially timeless way, Peirce wanted
to interpret them as effects of interactions.440
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Rejecting any so-called passive, or “spectator” theories of knowledge, Peirce maintained
a dynamic interactivity (or, better still, “transactivity”) between the inquiring organism
and its environment. As Rosenthal notes, this rejection of a “spectator” approach to
knowledge is a fundamental component in Peirce’s pragmatism, informing many of the
major themes we’ll be exploring throughout this investigation:
Peirce, in rejecting the role of man as spectator, in understanding
experience as a unity of interaction between man and that facticity which
gives itself within experience, can hold at once that the real world is the
perceived world, that the real world has an independent from mind, and
yet that the perceived world is partially dependent upon the noetic act and
is thus relative in its nature ot the mind. Indeed, the supposed
incompatibility of these three characteristics of the relation of thought to
the real world stems from a failure to radically and once and for all reject
the presuppositions of a spectator theory of knowledge.441
Properties of objects, for Peirce, are not “inert qualities” but are, themselves, the effects
of our specific transactions with those objects, responding in predictable (or
nonpredictable, depending on the merit of one’s guiding premises) ways. The
epistemological implications of this position are profound. As Smith says,
Meaning is being removed from exclusive residence in the ‘mind’ and is
now identified with events in the world, including actions which the
individual himself may perform. Instead of intuiting directly certain
properties or characteristics of things, we are to direct our attention
outward to actions and reactions in the physical world, to a series of
operations which we can perform for the purpose of seeing how the object
in question will behave. The meaning of an idea expressing a property of
something will be found in the effects it reveals when we carry out tests.442
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In short, Peirce modified the traditional empiricist view “by insisting that the
sensible qualities of things be understood as dynamic behavior and not as static and
timeless qualities.”443 As Peirce himself noted, “consider what effects, which might
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception of have.
Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”444 Of
course, this must not be misunderstood as what effects we find now, but all possible
effects in an unending sequence of future inferences, effectively making the
phenomenological experience of the inquirer (ideally, the community of inquirers) central
to any dynamic conception of “meaning.”445
Peirce likewise distanced himself from the prevalent position that the goal of
philosophy ought to be theoretical knowledge divorced from practical concerns. As Smith
notes, “the human self was conceived, by the empiricists and rationalists alike, as
essentially a spectator, and it was taken for granted that the human mind could be
understood as an instrument concerned solely with the acquisition of theoretical
knowledge.”446 To further emphasize the revolutionary nature of his philosophy against
this spectator-ridden backdrop, Peirce maintained that thought is never in isolation from
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certainties, nor is the meaning of any object of inquiry static or timeless.
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practical concerns and inquiry is always contextually situated and driven by the real,
living purposes of human beings. As Smith notes,
Peirce started with the conception of man as a being capable of thinking;
he started with the concrete individual and with the fact that thinking is
always localized and called for on specific occasions within the life span
of the self. The why, where, when, and how of thinking become essential;
thought comes to be understood in terms of its purpose in the life of the
thinker himself. The mind is no longer a timeless spectator and its function
in thinking is no longer taken as the disinterested pursuit of truth.447
Peirce’s conception of “belief,” especially as it relates to “habit,” was a predisposition to
act in certain ways when novel stimuli are encountered.448 As Smith notes, for Peirce
“thought becomes…the means of producing belief” and “belief must lead to action”449 in
precisely the way we explored in Peirce’s opening sections of “Fixation.” Thus, if the
purpose of thought is the construction of belief through the settlement of doubt and
resolution of inquiry, and if belief’s central function is that it must and does lead to
action, what follows is a robust and dynamic refutation of all spectator theories of
knowledge, representative in the passivity of the receptor mind in both traditional strains
of rationalism as well as empiricism. Of course, as Peirce explicitly claimed, “but the end
of thought is action only in so far as the end of action is another thought,” 450 thus
dissolving the traditional distinction between theory and practice without reducing theory
to practice.

For Peirce, the “Theoretical” has its purpose as “simply and solely
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knowledge of God’s truth” whereas the “Practical” be reserved “for the uses of life.”451
As Feibleman notes, “the development of philosophical theory and the applications of
such theories to practice, while closely related, should be maintained as two separate and
distinct departments of philosophical activity.”452 Indeed, Peirce condemned “with the
whole strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency to mingle philosophy [as theory] with
practice.”453 The “application of theory to practice,” for Peirce, should be “purely for the
purpose of verifying or validating theory.”454 As he admitted himself, “the peculiarity of
my philosophy is that it leads to positive predictions comparable with observation” 455 for
“a theory cannot be sound unless it be susceptible of applications, immediate or remote,
whether it be good economy so to apply it or not.”456 Feibleman maintains that Peirce’s
position on the theory/practice relation is in no small part a “refutation of the contentions
of the positivists”457 and is perhaps best illustrated by his attack on the work of Auguste
Comte. This point is key, too, insofar as Peirce was often accused of being a positivist,
himself, though I would argue, nothing could be further from the truth. As he said:
Auguste Comte…would condemn every theory that was not ‘verifiable.’
Like the majority of Comte’s ideas, this is a bad interpretation of a truth.
An explanatory hypothesis, that is to say, a conception which does not
limit its purpose to enabling the mind to grasp into one [of] a variety of
facts, but which seeks to connect those facts with our general conceptions
of the universe, ought, in one sense, to be verifiable; that is to say, it ought
to be little more than a ligament of numberless possible predictions
concerning future experience, so that if they fail, it fails.458
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A theory, or “explanatory hypothesis,” seeks to “connect” the facts (the conclusion of
inquiry) with those “general conceptions of the universe” (the belief) as “possible
predictions concerning future experience.” But it begins with a guess, a hypothesis, an
abductive “stab” at the riddle, a creative and imaginative beginning to any inquiry. 459
Peirce continued:
Thus when Schliemann entertained the hypothesis that there really had
been a city of Troy…this meant to his mind among other things that when
he should come to make excavations at Hissarlik he would probably find
remains of a city with evidences of a civilization more or less answering to
the descriptions of the Illiad...thus understood, Comte’s maxim is sound.
Nothing but that is an explanatory hypothesis. But Comte’s own notion of
a verifiable hypothesis was that it must not suppose anything that you are
not able to directly observe. From such a rule it would be fair to infer that
he would permit Mr. Schliemann he was going to find arms and utensils at
Hissarlik, but would forbid him to suppose that they were either made or
used by any human being, since no such beings could ever be detected by
direct percept.460
By associating “theory” with belief (or a set of beliefs) as that which guide inquiry and
are verified through practical pursuits, rather than a verificationist theory that
presupposes the necessity of immediate sense experience of the object of that inquiry,
Peirce dissolved some of these positivist problematics. This distinction further holds
direct import to Peirce’s exploration of the a priori method in question. He noted:
Philosophers there have been who have said that such [and such] a thing is
inconceivable; but it is perfectly conceivable to a mind which takes up
intelligently and seriously the task of forming the conception. Men who
are ready to pronounce a thing impossible before they have seriously
studied out the proper way of doing it, and especially without having
submitted to a course of training in making the requisite exertion of will,
merit contempt. When a man tells us something is inconceivable, he ought
to accompany the assertion with a full narrative of all he has done in these
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two ways to see if it could not be conceived. If he fails to do that, he may
be set down as a trifler.461
The assumption that anything is a priori inconceivable is antithetical to Peirce’s theory of
belief formation. Further, it is antithetical to the spirit of philosophy as Peirce conceived
it, represented by his “first rule of reason” which states that no obstacle should ever be
constructed that blocks the way to further inquiry. For Peirce, inquiry itself was
inexhaustible, as we noted from his conception of “Truth” as the ideal terminus at the end
of a long run of inquiry that we can asymptotically approximate over time. To assume
prior to inquiry, or indeed at any point in inquiry, that something is “inconceivable” is to
succumb to the type of apodictic certainty (that it cannot be known) 462 that blocks further
inquiry from unfolding. How, then, might Peirce address the Comptean attack on
Schliemann’s inquiry (namely, that though Schliemann may find artifacts which may be
directly experienced, the hypothesis cannot be verified since the individuals he supposes
crafted such implements are lost to time)? The answer lies in an intriguing distinction
Peirce made between what he calls “perfect” and “sure” knowledge, pertinent to his
fallibilism as well as his theory of Truth.
Peirce established three criteria for “perfect knowledge,” namely, it must “hold
for true a proposition that really is true,”463 it must “be self-satisfied and free from the
uneasiness of doubt,” and it must be “such that it would be logically impossible that this
character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition that is not true.”464 In sum,
“suppose our opinion with reference to a given question to be quite settled, so that
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inquiry, no matter how far pushed, has no surprises for us on this point. Then we may be
said to have attained perfect knowledge about that question.”465 We may fit this definition
into our analysis of the triadic method of belief formation discussed above. Provided we
are not utilizing any of the three counter-productive methods of belief formation, “perfect
knowledge” would be manifest when all genuine inquiries, no matter how far pushed,
would never create the problematic doubt that force those beliefs to be reformulated. This
rings of the attained end of the long run of inquiry, the ever-elusive “Truth” absolute and
final. However, like “Truth” itself, such “perfect knowledge” is in practice never wholly
achievable but may be only approximated and acts as a good indication that, even if
inquiry does not end, belief may be safely tabled and assumed true to the best of our
knowledge. That isn’t to say it may not one day need to be reevaluated, only that, for the
time being, it is as certain as it can possibly be. This brings us to Peirce’s corresponding
definition of “sure knowledge”:
Perhaps we have already attained to perfect knowledge about a number of
questions; but we cannot have an unshakable opinion that we have
attained such perfect knowledge about any given question. That would be
not only perfectly to know, but perfectly to know that we do perfectly
know, which is what is called sure knowledge.466

That meta-level of evaluation, that we perfectly know that we perfectly know, violated
Peirce’s first rule of reason and would result in the type of apodictic certainty that blocks
further inquiry, if only the potential for such should future inquiries lead us to question
the “perfect knowledge” we currently seem to possess. “Perfect knowledge” may function
in our daily inquiries; a belief or set of beliefs that never run into the problematic doubt
that would necessitate their reevaluation. “Sure knowledge” would be “perfect
465
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knowledge” of the perfect knowledge of the belief in question that is, like truth itself,
only approximated more fully throughout the long run of inquiry. How may this apply to
the Comtean demand for direct verifiability? Peirce noted that the “past is the storehouse
of all our knowledge,”467 including those human beings beyond Schliemann’s immediate
investigative reach.468 To this, Peirce provided a lovely response:
I may be asked what I have to say to all the minute facts of history,
forgotten never to be recovered, to the lost books of the ancients, to the
buried secrets.
‘Full man a gem of purest ray serene
The dark, unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
And waste is sweetness on the desert air.’
Do these things not really exist because they are hopelessly beyond the
reach of our knowledge? And then, after the universe is dead (according to
the predictions of some scientists), and all life ceased forever, will not the
shock of atoms continue though there will be no mind to know it? To this I
reply that, though in no possible state of knowledge can any number be
great enough to express the relation between the amount of what rests
unknown to the amount of the known, yet it is unphilosophical to suppose
that, with regard to any given question (which has any clear meaning),
investigation would not bring forth a solution to it, if it were carried far
enough.469
The movement towards “perfect” and “sure” knowledge becomes relevant here to
Peirce’s critique of the a priori method. No matter the difficulties any particular inquiry
may present, it must never be admitted a priori that there is anything ultimately
“incognizable,” that is, beyond the reach of inquiry itself if given sufficient time, at least
in principle. As he said, “never allow yourself to think that any definite problem is
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incapable of being solved.”470 To do so would be “unphilosophical,” that is, to admit
defeat on a priori grounds despite Peirce’s insistence that inquiry itself is never fully
exhaustible. As Feibleman notes, for Peirce “the tendency of knowledge is to increase,
and of the ultimately irreducible fallibilism to be reduced. Thus does perfect knowledge
become surer, if not absolutely sure,”471 which echoes Peirce’s definition of truth as that
“opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate,” despite the fact
that “however much we know, more may come to be found out. Hence, all can never be
known.”472 In short, for Peirce, everything was (in principle) cognizable, nothing should
be admitted incognizable a priori, and even though everything was (in principle)
cognizable, nothing is ever fully cognized because inquiry, itself, is never wholly
exhausted. This sentiment draws together Peirce’s adamant fallibilism with his call to
never block the path to further inquiry all in light of his definition of Truth as an ideal to
which all inquiry aims and over time better approximates, thereby, as Feibleman notes,
making our knowledge “surer” if never “absolutely sure.” As Peirce said:
When we pass from the perusal of works upholding the method of
authority to those of the philosophers, we not only find ourselves in a
vastly higher intellectual atmosphere, but also in a clearer, freer, brighter
and more refreshing moral atmosphere.473 All this, however, is beside the
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one significant question of whether the method succeeds in fixing men’s
opinions. One dare swear they should succeed. But in point of fact, up to
date they decidedly do not…the difficulty is that the opinions which today
seem most unshakable are found tomorrow to be out of fashion.474

Although Peirce readily admitted the vast intellectual and moral superiority of the
a priori method over the previous two methods, he noted that it suffered from the defect
that it continued to fail to fix the opinions of men as the history of epistemology seemed
to bear out as the “pendulum” swings from rationalism to empiricism without a decisive
victor that all parties (rationalist, empiricist, philosopher and non-philosopher alike) can
utilize to coordinate their beliefs in some communal and publicly verifiable manner.
One key problem with the a priori method is the coordination of unfounded
suppositions and the reliance on information not found in experience which, for Peirce
(as with his pragmatic successors) was a communal arena open to all who would inquire
into it. For Descartes, the meditator need only be in a locked room, alone, stripped of all
of his senses, to arrive at the “Truth” based solely upon an act of introspection. Whatever

ibid., CP 5.36. Logic “is the theory of right reasoning, of what reasoning ought to be, not of what it is,”
ibid., CP 2.7, and thus for Peirce, there was a corrolation between right conduct (Ethics), right presentation
(Aesthetics), and right reasoning (Logic). The three divisions of the Normative Sciences “correspond to my
three categories, which in their psychological aspect, appear as Feeling, Reaction, Thought,” ibid., CP
8.256. Firstness is “Feeling” (Aesthetics), Secondness is Reaction and Transaction with the environment
and other organisms in that environment (Ethics), and Thirdness is Thought (Logic). Just like any
maniestation of Peirce’s three cateogies, none are wholly isolated from the other two: Logic is, such as it is,
only in so far as it is an admixture of both Aesthetics and Ethics. How we ought to think has both an ethical
as well as an aesthetic component, for Peirce. Thus, a higher intellectual atmosphere (a more logical world
in pursuit of Truth at the end of the long run of inquiry) is, likewise, a more moral atmosphere since the
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can be thought clearly and distinctly must, necessarily, be, for Descartes, which posed a
distinct problem for Peirce:
Because he is all the while doubting whether there are any such things as
shape and motion, Descartes thinks he must be persuaded that shape and
motion do not belong to his nature, or anything else but consciousness.
This is taking it for granted that nothing in his nature lies hidden beneath
the surface.475

All cognitions, for Peirce, were mediated by reference to previous cognitions and
reference to the external world. For, as Cooke notes,
The knowledge of ‘I exist’ is not given to one directly or immediately by
intuition, introspection, or any other faculty, but rather is inferred from
one’s knowledge of the external world. And knowledge of the external
world is always inferred and mediated, rather than immediately given. The
faculty of intuition is simply not needed to explain how the individual
comes to know that he exists.476

Peirce, in fact, offered an alternative, empirical explanation as to how an individual
comes to know his or her own existence.477 Further, although Descartes noted that
volitions, affects, and ideas were all immediately known and, to a certain degree,
absolutely certain without appeal to the external world (for whether or not a unicorn
exists in reality it remains true that the thought-image [idea] is occurring to the
meditator), not even these sorts of thought are immune to Peirce’s critique. Even
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emotions, like anger, are never completely separated from the external world and verified
wholly by appeal to thought alone. As Peirce said, “his anger consists in his saying to
himself, ‘this thing is vile, abominable, etc.’”478 As Cooke explains,
One might think that emotions serve as counter-examples since they do
not appear as predicates, but are referable to the mind alone. But Peirce
explains that even an emotion is a predication concerning some external
object. For example, one man’s anger implies that there is something in
the external world which makes him angry.479

Volitions, sensations, emotions of all kinds, as well judgments all succumb to the same
critique.480 As Peirce noted:
When our nervous system is excited in a complicated way, there being a
relation between the elements of the excitation, the result is a single
harmonious disturbance which I call an emotion. Thus, the various sounds
made by the instruments of an orchestra strike upon the ear, and the result
is a peculiar musical emotion, quite distinct from the sounds themselves.
This emotion is essentially the same thing as an hypothetic inference, and
every hypothetic inference involves the formation of such an emotion.481

Secondness (as I argued, a coordination of both subjective and objective qualities)
accounts for the external component of emotion to some degree. Secondness is the
tension482 experienced as our beliefs run into some obstacle on their way to terminating in
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an expected conclusion. In a sense, it represents the problematic that acts as the impetus
for cognitive development, the stage of “doubt” in the cyclical process. But it need not be
“problematic” in the most common sense of the term for, too, it may simply be that which
draws our attention to some specific facet of the world. Thus, “everything in which we
take the least interest creates in us its own particular emotion, however slight this may be.
This emotion is a sign and a predicate of the thing.”483 As Feibleman notes, “emotion,
then, is an energetic reaction to some outward object, or to some quality of an outward
object, which is capable of arousing an energetic interpretant.”484 By way of example:
If a man is angry, his anger implies, in general, no determinate and
constant character in its object. But, on the other hand, it can hardly be
questioned that there is some relative character in the outward thing which
makes him angry, and a little reflection will serve to show that his anger
consists in his saying to himself, ‘this thing is vile, abominable, etc.,’ and
that it is rather a mark of returning to reason to say, ‘I am angry.’ In the
same way any emotion is a predicate of some object.485
Nor was Peirce overly impressed with Descartes’ proofs for the existence of God
which operate along similar lines.486 There was something too fickle and transitory in this
method of fixing belief that has proven historically unsatisfactory and rings too much of
matters of taste and passing fancy born of instinctual leanings in one direct rather than
another. To further refute criticism of this controversial position, he noted:
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.308. The “thing” here is ambiguous, but may be referring to the object of external
stimuli that participates in the experience as a whole (where Thirdness is the cognitive component of the
emotion, not the emotion in its entirety).
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Many critics have told me that I misrepresent the a priori philosophers,
when I represent them as adopting whatever opinion there seems to be a
natural inclination to adopt. But nobody can say the above does not
accurately define the position of Descartes, and upon what does he repose
except natural ways of thinking?487

Instincts are unlike beliefs in that they are pre-refined proto-beliefs (if you will) that are
prior to the pragmatic circuit of belief formation as articulated by Peirce. In a sense, the a
priori philosophers fabricate what they maintain is an instinctual, natural way of thinking
into an entire philosophical system rather than form that philosophical system on the
basis of a refined belief having been refined through dialogical engagement, communal
inquiry, and public verification which (as we’ll see) will create the heart of the fourth and
final of Peirce’s methods of fixing belief. As Smith notes:
Descartes believed that the human mind is a wholly theoretical instrument,
that it is capable of operating out of context, and that it can apprehend the
naked character of things independently of the desires and interests of the
self who owns it. Allied with this belief is the further belief that meaning
is a wholly intuitive affair, that we just “grasp” meanings without the aid
of language or other symbolic devices.488

By tying the function of thought into the production of beliefs that necessarily guide
actions, Peirce clearly rejected the first principle, namely, that the human mind is a
wholly theoretical instrument divorced from our practical concerns. As Smith notes:
Life, insofar as it is informed by conscious experience, is a dynamic
interplay of belief, doubt, inquiry and action. When we fail to grasp the
truth or are inept in the carrying out of our aims, we find ourselves thrown
into a state of confusion; our minds are not at rest and we are unsure about
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what to do. The whole logical apparatus of man comes into play in order
to cope with the situation.489

Further, it was impossible, for Peirce, for our previous operations of thought,
which necessarily occur in an infinite continua (a principle he called “synechism”490) and
all new beliefs are only and ever forged of old beliefs suitably problematized and thrown
into doubt, to be wholly divorced from our “desires” and “interests” at the time of
inquiry, though certainly this was, at least, what Descartes thought he was doing. Lastly,
Peirce rejected the possibility that Truth can be “grasped” intuitively and directly without
the aid of a mediating force of language and signs. As Smith notes:
He did not believe that our minds can function apart from our own selves,
our interests and our plans, and he did not accept the view that thinking
takes place in a vacuum or that it has nothing to do with the circumstances
giving rise to reflective thought. In addition, he had doubts about our
power to grasp meanings intuitively without dependence upon language
and signs. Peirce’s pragmatic theory of meaning was directed against
Descartes’ reliance upon immediacy as the sure road to clarity, and his
theory of belief was directed against the Cartesian view that reason
operates in a vacuum.491
Thus, in a significant way, Peirce’s rejection of Cartesianism is the heart of his theory of
meaning and belief and, consequently, as we’ve explored previously, the heart of his
pragmatism and certainly the underlying counterproductivity of this third method of
fixing belief. For, as Cooke notes, “the reason that taking individual subjects as the
‘absolute judges of truth’ cannot work as a criterion for progress is that there is no way to
handle disagreement. Metaphysicians can never agree on just what is absolutely certain,
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self-evident, or indubitable for the individual subject”492 just a Peirce noted in his
articulation of the perpetual pendulum swing between rationalists and empiricists. His
solution was to dissolve the notions of absolute certainty, self-evident knowledge and
indubitable truths altogether.
Indeed, one of the primary reasons Peirce rejected the a priori method was a
fundamental logical fallacy at its base. As Cooke notes,
Peirce says one might be tempted to argue that humans have the intuitive
ability to judge that they have an intuition because they feel it. A cognition
present in the mind feels as if it is immediately given by something other
than another cognition. But to argue that humans have this faculty based
on this feeling is to beg the question since it presupposes the very faculty
Peirce is calling into question.493
The “feeling” may seem to present itself as “immediate” (as with Peirce’s notion of
Firstness) but every Firstness is borne of a previous Thirdness which is a necessarily
communal facet of inquiry (the laws, uniformities, and reality communally constituted
through one of the four methods of belief formation), thus our feelings may be ingrained
in us just as readily through processes of indoctrination and education as any other
source. As Cooke notes, “for all we know, the feeling may come from education or an old
association.”494 Lastly, there is the problem of infinite regress, a logical appeal that
Peirce, as a logician and semiotician, could clearly not stomach. As Cooke notes, “the
further problem with the appeal to feeling is that one must ask whether this feeling itself
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is infallible, and then ask whether the judgment that the feeling is infallible is infallible,
ad infinitum.”495
As Rockmore rightly notes, Peirce “denies truth in the sense that truth means the
direct, or even the indirect, grasp of independent reality.”496 As Cooke notes,
Peirce shows us that the mind actively constructs what seems to be given
in intuition. And the individual cannot discover the difference between
what seems presented to him from outside the mind and what is
determined by a previous cognition merely by internal examination of the
contents of mind.497
Ultimately, Peirce’s rejection of the a priori method was a forwarding of his own
unique brand of phenomenology that he called “phaneroscopy,” for as Smith notes,
Peirce had a “passion for finding things out, for seeing how they work and what they
actually show themselves to be; he had little patience with anyone who had decided prior
to experience that things must be this way or that. Peirce was a genuine empiricist.”498
Thus, none of the three counter-productive methods of belief formation can hold
in the long run. They are, each of them, missing critical components central to Peirce’s
philosophy: none is wholly fallible, none fully embraces experience as a central factor in
belief formation, none has a truly objective gauge (beyond the individual, beyond the
authority, or beyond our inclinations) by which to measure the efficacy of our beliefs, and
none appreciates the central role that authentic dialogue plays in inquiry, both in terms of
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problematizing our beliefs (the eternal need for a “gadfly” to our Euthyphro) and in terms
of resolving those produced doubts communally. Only one method incorporates all of
these facets of pragmatism: the scientific method of inquiry.
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Chapter 4

The Scientific Method of Inquiry

“A Socratic mind such as Peirce’s, which delighted in putting every idea to the
test and in following an argument irrespective of where it led, was bound to raise Eliot’s
suspicions.”499 Charles Eliot, the Harvard President who perennially denied Peirce the
ability to participate in the vaunted academic milieu of Cambridge, was ever irritated by
Peirce’s reticence to acquiesce to bureaucratic norms and regulations. There was always a
hint of the “gadfly” in Peirce’s pragmatism: a “threat to the dominant ideologies,”500
Peirce’s revolutionary philosophical insights sought to dismantle systematically the
entrenched doctrines of the past, dissolve the instrumentalism encouraged by authority,
and sting the tenacious belief-clinger into authentic (and autonomous) inquiry. As such,
dialogue became a central facet in Peirce’s philosophical method: the active challenging,
problematizing, and analyzing of beliefs.
Peirce’s first principle of reason follows from his observations about the nature of
inquiry itself. As De Waal notes, “from the circumstance that inquiry has the vital powers
of self-correction and growth, Peirce draws the conclusion that,”501 in Peirce’s own
words, “there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and that is a hearty and
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active desire to learn what is true.”502 As Debrock notes, for Peirce, philosophy was
intimately related “to a passionate pursuit” of the answers to “basic issues” that are not
faced by an elite scientific community, but by “every man, woman, and child.”503 Indeed,
as Fitzgerald notes, Peirce’s method of inquiry, far from being an “abnormal veneration
of science” or scientists, was meant to be “wide enough to include all kinds of
procedures”504 in all walks of life. As Brent notes, the “scientific” method of inquiry was
just as applicable for Peirce to matters of religion, noting that Peirce “denied that any
barrier should exist between religion and science in their nature as inquiries after
truth.”505 This was critical for Peirce and follows from everything we have thus far
examined, reflecting his dedication to fallibilism and rejecting the inherent problems of
all three counterproductive beliefs, from tenacity to authority to claims of apodictic
certainty, all of which block the way for further inquiry by making chimerical claims to
timeless certainty,506 thereby negating (incorrectly) the need for further investigation. As
Rockmore notes, “for Peirce, knowledge is the result of an ongoing process that has
neither an absolute beginning nor an absolute end, that is always subject to rational
criticism, whose results are hence always provisional.”507 As De Waal notes,
Blocking the way of inquiry is, for Peirce, the worst sin one can commit in
inquiry, as it obstructs the self-correctiveness of reasoning. Classical
obstructions include the claim that certain facts can never be known, that
502
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certain facts are ultimate (meaning that they cannot be explained in terms
of anything else), and that certain facts have already attained their final
and perfect formulation.508

Rather than being repulsed by doubt universally (though we are repulsed by specific,
individual doubts), we should always be open to revise our beliefs since the irritation of
doubt is the stimulus to inquiry and the genesis of all cognitive development. As De Waal
notes, “inquiry always takes place against a backdrop of beliefs that are taken for
granted.”509 New beliefs, indeed, are only ever forged of the reassessment of previously
held beliefs, a process stretching back over a lifetime of ongoing inquiry and cognitive
development. Indeed, contra the method of tenacity that shuns problems at all cost, Peirce
wished for us to embrace the possibility that we, as fallibile inquirers, must, on occasion,
revise our position. As Cooke notes,
Realizing that even the best methods produce knowledge which could be
wrong, inquirers should remain open to error in their beliefs…by virtue of
recognizing their own fallibility, inquirers also open the way to further
inquiry. This is the specifically positive aspect of fallibilism, which entails
a commitment to fallibilism in our beliefs because it is required for the
growth of knowledge.510

In order to rectify the problems of the a priori method (up to this point, the best of
the three counterproductive methods), “it is necessary that a method should be found by
which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external
permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect.”511 As Smith notes,
Since we all have the capacity to deceive ourselves as well as others,
belief must have some overt and public signs attached to it; it must be
subject to a test. It cannot exist only in the inner and private recesses of
508
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consciousness; we need to have some public way of finding out whether
we really do believe a given idea or doctrine.512
The method of tenacity relied on an individual’s pre-established beliefs that were
assumed true, inequivocably, come what may; the method of authority maintained that
those in power dictated the gauge of belief efficacy but that this was easily reducible to
whatever they deemed most conducive to the perpetuation of their hold on power; and the
a priori method rested on assumed epistemological foundations that were agreeable to
whim and fancy resulting in the monologue-infused-stalement of some of the most timehonored philosophical deadlocks of all time where those with different foundations,
unwilling to call into question the foundations themselves, continue to speak past one
another on issues of greatest significance. As Brodsky notes:
[Peirce] argues that the scientific method is superior to its alternatives
because in it the concept of reality is operative. It alone contains as a
‘fundamental hypothesis’ the belief that there are real things (5.384) and it
alone has the prerogative of bringing about the coincidence of our beliefs
and the facts (5.387).513
Brodsky hints at the type of correspondence theory that I’ve already suggested is a bit off
the mark. Nevertheless, his fundamental point rings true: only the scientific method of
inquiry assumes there are real facts-of-the-matter that are experienced by all qho inquire
into them, an external gauge beyond the tenacious clinging to beliefs, beyond what any
authority may have to say about the matter, and beyond the whims of the a priori
philosophers. As Peirce said:
Some mystics imagine that they have such a method in a private
inspiration from on high. But that is only a form of the method of tenacity,
512
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in which the conception of truth as something public is not yet developed.
Our external permanency would not be external, in our sense, if it was
restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which
affects, or might affect, every man.514

We see shades of the fundamental recipe for the one and only productive method for
fixing belief that Peirce will advocate: whatever else it may be, it must be “something
public,” not “restricted in its influence to one individual,” and it must be something
which affects, or could affect, “every man.” As such, it repudiates the fundamental
principles of the method of tenacity, in particular, with its emphasis on individual
isolationism, as well as harkens back to his critique of Descartes’ method wherein the
meditator was capable of finding “Truth” in the isolation of his own bedchambers.
Likewise, it hints at the disruption of the fundamental principle of the method of
authority in its call for a necessarily “public” form of truth, strongly implying a demand
for communal inquiry and debate within a public forum (what was clearly lacking in the
method of authority). As Dewey notes:
The appeal in Peirce is essentially to the consensus of those who have
investigated, using methods which are capable of employment by all. It is
the need for social agreement, and the fact that in its absence ‘the method
of tenacity’ will be exposed to disintegration from without, which finally
forces upon mankind the wider and wider utilization of the scientific
method.515

Consensus is, however, as I discussed previously, not the terminus of inquiry, but an
integral factor in its beginning: we begin with the beliefs we have, beliefs best forged in
communion with the beliefs held by most people, any one of which is corrigible, but not
all of which are beyond a priori doubt. Further, it is a good metric by which to measure
514
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the efficacy of any particular belief but is not, itself, generative of Truth: our beliefs are
not the Truth simply because consensus has been reached but, conversely, consensus has
been reached because we have a good indication that Truth, to a relative degree, has been
attained. Consensus, then, is a criterion of Truth, but not equivalent with Truth itself.
Peirce, thus, suggested, “the method must be such that the ultimate conclusion of
every man shall be the same. Such is the method of science.” 516 First, the object of
inquiry must be something that affects every inquirer, that is, something public,
communally accessible, and open to public debate and verification. Yet, what Peirce was
advocating was not a sort of epistemic relativism, for he maintained that the ultimate
conclusion of every inquirer, in the long run, “shall be the same.” Given enough time,
debate, discourse, inquiry and communal investigation, the same conclusion about reality
can be discovered by each individual inquirer in conjunction with the community at large.
Indeed, as some commentators note, the hypothetical end of the “long run” is the
culmination of both the epistemological quest for truth as it is the ideal unification of the
community itself. As Mahowald notes, for example:
Absolute truth or fulness of reality is the gauge of the degree to which the
community approaches unity, and in fact the continuing investigation
presupposes the "hope, or calm and cheerful wish, that the community
may last beyond any assignable date" (2.654). In other words, this
community is the means to the perfect unity which is also a community of
ideas and of inquirers. It is the means through which the ideal community
is realized.517
Ernest Nagel once summarized Peirce’s method of inquiry as the surest way of
establishing the requisite confidence in the results of science itself, noting:
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It is characteristic of the best established sciences that though individuals
may pursue researches in them independently of one another, the
conclusions reached tend to support each other and to converge toward a
common stream of sound beliefs; and such convergence is indeed the sole
identifiable warrant for the confidence that some measure of the truth has
been attained.518
From the method of tenacity, we learn that in barricading oneself off from one’s fellows,
one guards against problems, true, but in guarding against opposing beliefs that would
problematize one’s own and throw one into doubt, one likewise guards against cognitive
progress. It would follow, then, that the scientific method of inquiry doesn’t counsel us to
avoid problems, rather, it would counsel us to embrace them. The method of authority, in
order to answer the problems of the method of tenacity, is founded on the authoritarian
dictation of beliefs to ensure that all individuals within a given polis maintain precisely
the same beliefs, beliefs that swap their contingency with a false sense of essentialism
and necessity and are to the benefit of the institution rather than an authentic seeking of
the truth. Conversely, then, a productive method for fixing beliefs would encourage
dialogue between individuals with opposing viewpoints (a speedy way to problematize a
belief is to encounter an individual with a different belief than one’s own, as Peirce noted
in the undermining of the method of tenacity). Indeed, this method can even be of use of
ending the stalemate that Peirce saw in the philosophical doctrines of rationalism and
empiricism, the classical models both steeped in the a priori method. As he noted,
addressing the other students of philosophy, like himself, who…
…deplore the present state of that study, and who are intent upon rescuing
it therefrom and bringing it to a condition like that of the natural sciences,
where investigators, instead of contemning each the work of most of the
others as misdirected from beginning to end, cooperate, stand upon one
Ernest Nagel, “Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 7, no. 1
(1940): 69 – 80, 69 – 70.
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another’s shoulders, and multiply incontestable results; where every
observation is repeated, and isolated observations go for little; where
every hypothesis that merits attention is subjected to severe but fair
examination, and only after the predictions to which it leads have been
remarkably borne out by experience is trusted at all, and even then only
provisionally.519
We see here a fine example of the coordination of Peirce’s various philosophical themes.
He noted his call to fallibilism, that even after consensus forged of open-minded inquiry
borne of initially discordant beliefs, our conclusions are, nevertheless, only ever
“provisional.” Further, the dialogical component is made clear here as individuals with
opposing beliefs find themselves, by each adopting the same method of inquiry,
eventually (and, for Peirce, inevitably) coming to cooperation and coordination of beliefs.
Further, the scientific method of inquiry would be capable of exposing the false
essentialism of the authority’s imposed beliefs, demonstrating the act of the imposition
itself for what it was, and encourage a free market of cognitive development unimpeded
by threat of retaliation for voicing one’s beliefs. Indeed, as Altshuler notes, “one need not
appeal to facts about anything other than thoughts to mark off the true from the false,
reality being defined as the object of those thoughts able to withstand (purportedly)
intersubjective scrutiny by an unlimited community of investigations.”520
Thus, the scientific method of inquiry is the pragmatic circuit of development as
Peirce articulated it, allowed to develop freely, communally and openly in dialogue with
other individuals of opposing beliefs. If, as Peirce maintained, the object of this inquiry is
a true belief about the encountered environment, that object should be the same for all
inquirers and, in the long run, should result in all individuals maintaining the same belief,
519
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not through ignorance, force or instinct, but as a the natural result of a communal inquiry,
constantly checked and balanced by other inquirers, as he said, “all the followers of
science are animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only
pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they apply
it.”521
Peirce used the example of nine different scientists all using different methods to
analyze the velocity of light:
They may at first obtain different results, but, as each perfects this method
and his processes, the results are found to move steadily together toward a
destined centre. So with all scientific research. Different minds may set
out with the most antagonistic views, but the progress of investigation
carries them by a force outside of themselves to one and the same
conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are carried, not where we
wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the operation of destiny. No
modification of the point of view taken, no selection of other facts for
study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable a man to escape the
predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in the conception of
truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by
all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I would explain
reality.522
We may visualize the transactions between these scientists with, initially, “antagonistic”
views, all coming to invariably reach the same conclusion which incorporates this social
aspect into Peirce’s original formulation of belief formation as we’ve discussed.
It’s important to note that Peirce was not advocating an elite class of scientists, as
I’ve said, and limiting the community to such a small pool. As H.H. Liebhafsky notes:
The reader should not make the mistake, as some writers have, of thinking
that Peirce called for the replacement of Plato’s philosopher-kings by
‘scientist-kings.’ Careful reading…clearly discloses that he assigned the
role of ‘fixation of belief’ to scientific method, not to scientists or to an
521
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elite scientific community. The method is impersonal and objective and
involves the experimental verification of predictions contained in
theories.523
This “unlimited community constituted the environment within which unlimited
intellectual activity could occur.”524 The individual scientists are not the measure of the
success of the method but it is the method, itself, as self-correcting and informed by
fallibilism and the first rule of reason that guards against the monopolization of Truth by
any individual or specific social group for, as Talisse notes, Peirce “denies that
proper…deliberation could be exercised by a small group of experts.” 525 DeMarco notes
of some Peirce scholars that “they seem to assume that for Peirce the community is a
group of individuals dedicated to scientific pursuits…that this is not what Peirce means
should be apparent from the denial of the positive status of individuality that is pervasive
throughout his writings.”526
What Peirce claimed here is that, to provide a practical example, if all nine
scientists begin with the same goal for inquiry and nine different beliefs about that goal,
invariably their opinions will be drawn closer and closer together as their beliefs continue
to challenge one another, instigating inquiry after inquiry with new, better, more dynamic
beliefs, until at least a consensus is achieved.527 Key here, too, was the movement in
Peirce from chaos towards order: from the disparate beliefs of a wide variety of different
perspectives, eventually, through this process of inquiry available to all who participate in
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it, a community is formed and a more unified belief is accepted universally. As DeMarco
notes, it generates “unity from disunity” and “at the same time, the ideal starting point
indicates that the direction of thought is toward unity.”528 This movement towards unity
that DeMarco discusses here is the increasing consensus found in the beliefs of a
community of inquirers if they engage in the method of inquiry over the long run.
Initially antagonistic parties with divergent beliefs will submit their findings to their
fellow inquirers, pitting their beliefs against the beliefs of others, as problem after
problem with one or many or all of the initial beliefs of the community are unearthed and
overcome, resulting ideally in an accepted belief for all members of the inquiring party,
the achieved objective which is, ultimately, the object of knowledge. Again it is
important to note that consensus does not determine Truth (for consensus may be found
in the method of authority as readily as it’s found in the method of inquiry), but
consensus, if achieved via Peirce’s recommended method, is a good indication that Truth,
to a relative degree, has been achieved (though ever revisable in an open-ended future).
This point may be further clarified by Royce and Kernan who note that as
“knowledge grows toward perfection, the discrepancy between theory and fact grows
less. That is simply because the better we know nature, the more we can discover how to
adjust theory and fact, one to the other.”529 It is important to note, however, that the
adjustment of “theory” and “fact” is not a correspondence between “belief” and “reality.”
Reality, as I’ve discussed, is constructed in Thirdness as a coordination of beliefs and the
environment with which the inquirer is transacting. But that Reality of Thirdness cannot
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be just anything we want it to be, for the external permanency we experience is the way it
is regardless “of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and that,
on the other hand, though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is,
yet what that opinion is does not depend on what you or I or any man thinks.”530 If a
community of individuals creates the consensus that “fire will not burn flesh” that
consensus will not stop the brute facticity that fire will, indeed, burn flesh. Reality, the
object of the final opinion, does, indeed, depend on the opinion (it is constructed) but that
opinion does not depend upon what any finite number of inquirers may say about it (it is,
what it is, regardless of our beliefs). Reality, as I’ve argued previously, is constructed
through a coordination of our beliefs and an external permanency upon which our
thought has no effect. This harkens back to Peirce’s demand for some standard beyond
the tenacious beliefs of the individual, beyond the authoritarian ideologies of the
institution, and beyond the intuitions of the philosophers. As Smith notes,
Insofar as he took science to be a standard critical procedure to for fixing
belief, Peirce wanted to go beyond the habits or behavior of any one
individual. His theory of science as a self-correcting way of arriving at
beliefs goes beyond individual psychology; it points instead to a
community of investigators committed to a method of arriving at critical
conclusions.531
Peirce was attracted to the notion of the community of inquiry, “for both it provided a
means of taking individual beliefs into account at the same time that such belief is
subjected to a critical standard.”532 Thus, “all claims to truth and knowledge must have a
public character.”533 As Eco notes, this “process of verification” is “based on slow,
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collective, public performance by what Charles Sanders Peirce called ‘the Community.’
It is thanks to human faith in the work of this community”534 that genuine progress can be
achieved. This “public character” and “critical standard” has two components, separate
but intimately related. On the one hand, the standard is the method of inquiry itself: as the
most productive of the four methods for fixing beliefs, individual beliefs can be in part
communally tested, explored and verified as to what degree the investigator adhered to
the best possible method for attaining that belief. The investigator’s development of
thought, from previously held beliefs, to an encountered problem, to the doubt that
instigated a specific form of inquiry leading to a definitive resolution that established the
new belief in question, can be traced clearly and methodically. Indeed, as DeMarco notes
“the commonality of the community is cognitive, having nothing essential to do with
physical location, occupation, or practical concerns.”535 On the other hand, what is
likewise public, accessible to all, and used as a critical standard, is the belief that is
already held by the majority.536 This belief, an achieved objective of countless previous
inquiries from countless previous investigators all culminating in the accepted belief of
that entire inquiring community, is, effectively, Reality as we’ve defined it. As Nagel
notes, Peirce’s theory of inquiry “makes evident the continuity of knowledge-getting with
other organic activities.”537
It involves the conception of inquiry as occurring in a definite context,
instituted to settle specific doubts and problems, and terminating in an
equally definite way with the establishment of smoothly-working habits of
action which have mastered the difficulties for which the inquiry was
534
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initiated. Knowledge thus becomes identifiable as the product of overt
behavior involving cooperative effort in a community of inquirers, rather
than as the outcome of a purely subcutaneous mental activity. So
conceived, knowledge is in fact frequently obtained, for the claim to
possess it does not involve the preposterous requirement that the outcome
of one inquiry be incorrigible by further inquiry, or that unless it carries
the traits of absolute finality and all-inclusiveness the product of research
is not knowledge.538
Thus, both the method itself and objective reality (objective in the sense that it’s the
achieved “objective” of inquiry of a community of investigators complete with the
externality of Secondness encountered by all who inquire) act as standards of communal
measurement for the belief of this new inquiry. Of course, they are intimately related,
these two public standards, as the latter was forged of countless instances of the former.
Yet, the objective of communal inquiry, in the long run, results in an opinion “which
would finally result from investigation” that “does not depend on how anybody may
actually think.”539 Peirce noted that even if the human race should cease altogether, and
some alien race descended to earth and picked up a line of inquiry where humans left off,
the conclusion of that inquiry would remain the same.540
In sum, Peirce’s method of inquiry reflected all of the central facets of his
pragmatism: the true beliefs it generates are provisional (fallibilism); its adherence to the
first rule of reason highlights the stultifying effects of the other three methods by
championing open-mindedness and wonder; and the fusion of beliefs forged communally
through transactions with an externally existent reality reflect his unique fusion of
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rational and empirical strains as well as his qualified realism and phenomenological
idealism541 complete with his insistence on dialogue and social individualism.

541
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Chapter 5

The Socio-Political Implications of Peirce’s Pragmatism

Despite Peirce’s insistence that philosophy never be subjugated to socio-political
concerns, this adamant stance was clearly forged of a distrust and a distaste for the
bureaucratic and capitalistic ingression of values into what ought to otherwise be a free,
unfolding of radical inquiry. Even submission to the most liberal and benevolent values is
still submission to values, values not of one’s own making, and thus remains a form of
instrumentalism that Peirce ardently opposed. Nevertheless, by juxtaposing the
community of inquirers in his ideal method of inquiry with the “community” at the mercy
of an authoritarian power, Peirce implicitly began to construct a socio-political vision of
an ideal environment wherein inquiring organisms may flourish. As Talisse notes,
“Peirce’s insights regarding inquiry, truth, and community may contribute to current
debates about deliberative democracy.”542 As I’ll demonstrate, Peirce did not prescribe
values: he merely describes how inquiry (any inquiry, all inquiry) actually happens in its
quest for Truth. And if Truth is a goal in itself, and a means to no higher goal (as Peirce
proclaimed), then taking on the method of inquiry (not specific values forged a priori)
does not violate his first rule of reason but, in fact, is demanding by it.
It seems ambiguous, at first, precisely what sort of individualism Peirce
championed. On the one hand, within the method of authority, Peirce championed those
Robert Talisse, “Towards a Peircean Politics of Inquiry,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society
40, no. 1 (Winter 2004): 21 – 38, 21.
542
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individuals of “wider social feeling” that were capable of ruggedly (atomically)
transcending the indoctrinating milieu by distancing themselves from their fellows. On
the other hand, within the ideal community of inquirers, dialogue, solidarity and a distinct
form of social individualism seems prevalent. If we merge our interests with those of our
fellows, the productivity of such a move is relative to the socio-political situation that the
individual finds him or herself in. This was, after all, how Peirce defined the Gospel of
Christ as opposed to the Gospel of Greed which was clearly an attack on the rugged,
atomic individualism of a Horatio Alger American ideal of capital. We ought to merge
our endeavors with our neighbors rather than trampling all over them on our way to the
top of the capitalistic mountain. However, in the method of authority, this merging of
one’s interests with one’s neirghbor actually perpetuates the indoctrination proliferated
by the authority, itself, and thus within the method of authority, at least, Peirce does
advocate a kind of radical individualism, those with a “wider sort of social feeling,” that
not only actively defy the interests of the authority (which have become the interests of
their neighbors) but, too, become a sort of “gadfly” to reinvigorate inquiry on a social
scale.
However, with the exception of this specific case (championing rugged
individualism to break free from the method of authority), Peirce was unequivocally
(even hyperbolically) a champion of social individualism. This is ubiquitously apparent
in his critique of the Gospel of Greed (and, conversely, his championing of the Gospel of
Christ); his critique of Cartesian solipsism and introspection that a man alone can find
Truth (and, conversely, his insistence that only working together, in concert, can Truth be
approximated); and his critique of each of the three counterproductive methods of belief
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formation (in the method of tenacity there is individual self-isolation, the method of
authority sees individuals streamlined into automatons where no authentic dialogue is
possible, and even the a priori method, resting safe on unanalyzed premises borne of
what statements appear agreeable to reason, fail to engage in authentic dialogue).
Further, our use of signs and language condition our engagement of the world
(and the “world” includes other inquiring selves). For Peirce, all thoughts are expressed
as thought-signs, interconnected, none isolated, and all informed in some way by our
interactions with our social and natural environments. As Nagel notes,
Pragmatism does not supply a formula which states once and for all what
the meaning of a statement is; for when its maxim is taken seriously, it
excludes the assumption that the meaning of a sentence can be determined
in isolation from the system of sentences in which it occurs, the rules
governing its acceptance, and the kind of behavior associated with it.543
This summation by Nagel highlights Peirce’s fallibilism with the claim that pragmatism
does not find any sort of ultimate, timeless meaning, but views the inherent revisability in
the ongoing use and changing structures of the language of signs that gives rise to the
meaning of statements in the first place.
Transactions with the world (including other selves) constitute an ongoing,
unfolding process without terminal end. As such, as we’ve seen, there is a practical as
well as theoretical component to knowledge: we are beings of the world and in the world
and these transactions forge the experiences that, in turn, forge our understanding. Beliefs
forged of these processes are likewise “rules of action” as Peirce might call them, as
we’ve seen, the very purpose of thought has a practical dimension (though, as we’ve
seen, it would be a mistake to conclude that Peirce was a reductionist in this sense as
Ernest Nagel, “Charles S. Peirce, Pioneer of Modern Empiricism,” Philosophy of Science 7, no. 1
(1940): 69 – 80, 74.
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beliefs are not reducible to actions and nor is “the only essential result of successful
inquiry…successful action,”544 as Russell incorrectly charged). As Hickman notes:
Both Peirce and Dewey in fact located their own positions well outside of
this cognitivist-praxicalist struggle, arguing that the positions of both
camps are defective because they are incomplete. Peirce and Dewey did
this by subordinating both theory and practice (cognition and action,
thinking and doing), to production or making; to what the Greeks had
called poietike. It is not that they ignored either cognition or praxis, for
they did not: it is just that neither Peirce nor Dewey thought cognition or
praxis to be the end of inquiry.545

Indeed, as Peirce noted,
The pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to consist in action,
but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent
comes more and more to embody those generals which were just now said
to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them
reasonable.546
According to Peirce’s long run theory, as we’ve seen, the idealized belief was that which
the unlimited community of inquirers is “destined” to achieve at the end of this
hypothetical long run of inquiry’s unfolding over time if the prescribed method is
persistently engaged. Thus, though beliefs culminate in actions, those actions are not at
all divorced from thought; actions resulting from more and more dynamic beliefs are only
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Bertrand Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969), 304.
Larry Hickman, Pragmatism as Post-Postmodernism (New York: Fordham University Press, 2007), 243
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and ever forged of successful experiment and inquiry as “act” and “thought” evolve in the
organisms in concert.
So ingrained is the human individual within his/her nested natural and social
environments that a complete separation was impossible, for Peirce. There is unique
haecceity, of this there is no doubt, but individuation is borne of Peirce’s more primal,
more fundamental conception of the whole from which we break free and seek to return
(rather than the traditional, “additive” view that “society” is the sum-total of the atomic
parts that comprise it). This parallels Peirce’s triadic categories, especially those
represented in his phenomenology (phaneroscopy): as Firstness represents an immediacy
of experience, an unproblematic background gestalt of experience prior to any
individuation wherein mind and world, self and other, are not yet divided, named, and
compartmentalized, there are no absolute “individuals” on this most primal level of
immediacy, there is only the whole, a kind of ultimate organism, as Peirce will call it,
wherein we individual cells have no yet distinguished ourselves. Secondness, the
experience of externality, of resistance and tension, demarcates “self” from “other” with
the onset of some form of problematic situation, nominal as the problem may be, enough
to distinguish the “I” from the “that” or the “you.” It is in Secondness, to follow this
analogy, that individuation first emerges, not Firstness. Thirdness, then, the cognitive
rationalizing and categorizing of experience into a systemic unity is how we then engage
our individuality, what we make of it, and how we then re-engage the world of
environment and Other exposed and expressed in Secondness. As I discussed above, the
“how” of our re-engagement with Other and environment will be determined in no small
part by the method of belief formation we engage in. Are we, as unique individuals,

164

encouraged to re-unite or diverge further? The individual operating with the method of
tenacity is barely more than a hermit. The individual within the milieu of authority is “reunited,” to be sure, but an enforced and indoctrinated heteronymous manner by the
authority itself, culminating in a kind of “mass mentality,” and the individuals operating
under the a priori method find themselves aligning with foundational theories in one
camp or another divorced from authentic dialogue with individuals ensconsed in some
opposing philosophical-qua-ideological camp. Only the method of inquiry, as Peirce
described it, encouraged authentic dialogue with the goal to seek Truth and forge
consensus, re-uniting the scatters fragments of this primal unity without forcing or
coercing individuals to come together.
As Mullin notes, “Peirce asserted that the individual self, apart from other selves
is an illusion.”547 Implicitly, Peirce rejected the conception of the self as “atomic”548 or
“rugged,” advocating, instead, a “social individualism” that he felt better reflected the
reality of his semiotic conception of cognition as well as the necessarily communal aspect
of inquiry.
The genesis of the conception of the self as “atomic,” isolated and self-sustaining
may well be traced back to the rise of modern conceptions of democracy and modern
forms of capitalism. As Mullin observes,
Political democracy and the system of capitalism and private ownership
developed on the assumption that the individual first subsists, and then
enters into arrangements with other individuals for their mutual benefit.
The preeminence that each of us bestows on our separate selves bolsters
547
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the belief in the reality of separate individuals. Each of us seems to be
self-contained and self-centered, and our cooperation and communication
take place among ready-made selves.549

Thus, for Peirce to claim that the separate self is nothing more than an illusion in light of
its preeminence throughout western political democracies and systems of capitalism, he
must both convince his readers of the alternative while simultaneously accounting for the
prevalence and popularity of the illusion itself:
A person is not absolutely an individual. His thoughts are what he is
‘saying to himself,’ that is, is saying to that other self that is just coming
into life in the flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that
one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is
mostly of the nature of language. The second thing to remember is that the
man’s circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be
understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of
higher rank than the person of an individual organism.550
A person is not “absolutely an individual,” that is, for Peirce, a person is not atomically
isolated from the rest of his or her society. We note that the conception of “dialogue,” so
fundamental to Peirce’s method of inquiry, runs deep; even an individual in conversation
with him or herself is in some internal manifestation of dialogue which necessarily is
thought in signs and language which, in turn, is forged of communal engagement to grant
those signs and language meaning and purpose (the notion of a private language is
chimerical, for Peirce).
Indeed, Peirce saw the entirety of a society (“however widely” one wants to
understand this, that is, to include even all of humanity if one wishes) as a whole
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organism551 of which the individual is but one aspect or cell, defined only in coordination
with the whole, though nevertheless unique and distinct.552
Consider Peirce’s exploration of the gospel of Christ as it reflects, in no small
part, his position on social individualism in general:
Here, then, is the issue. The gospel of Christ says that progress comes
from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy with his
neighbours. On the other side, the conviction of the nineteenth century is
that progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for
himself with all his might and trampling his neighbour under foot
whenever he gets a chance to do so. This may accurately be called the
Gospel of Greed.553

For Peirce, the gospel reflected an inherent quality of love, not for oneself, but for others,
and that it taught “that growth comes only from love, from – I will not say self-sacrifice,
but from the ardent impulse to fulfill another’s highest impulse.”554 It is this unitary
vision of a humanity in which individuals achieve their highest impulses not through the
“Gospel of Greed,” but in helping others achieve their own and, in turn, receiving the aid
of others in the achieving of one’s own ends. Further, as Anderson suggests, Peirce’s
Altshuler, however, notes the following: “while there is a clear sense in which Peirce’s view of truth is
anti-individualistic, it does not seem essentially to depend on a community of different individuals. For if
we define truth as the limit of opinions resulting from repeated applications of the scientific method of
‘fixing beliefs,’ the there does not seem to be any theoretical reason for preferring a community of distinct
people to a single individual with an infinite lifespan and resources,” even citing a few passages from an
1871 article in which Peirce seems to “admit that this distinction between individual and community is not
crucial for his theory” on these grounds. I would argue against such a reading of Peirce, however, noting
that humans are not, in fact, immortal with limitless resources and, as a good scientifically-minded
individual, this is clearly not what Peirce had in mind, even if it does logically follow in some sense.
Further, this reading eschews the significance of his conception of the community as a kind of “megaorganism,” wherein the individual plays an integral, social role as a cell that makes up a larger body. That
community therefore is, in a sense, Altshuler’s immortal with limitless resources, without the need to even
consider an actual individual possessing of both. Bruce Altshuler, “Peirce’s Theory of Truth and His Early
Idealism,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 16, no. 2 (Spring 1980): 118 – 140, 121.
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critique of the “Gospel of Greed” seems to demonstrate that Peirce “was not an advocate
of what seem to many to be the worst demons of American capitalism,” 555 which will be
of great significance in our attempt to bring Peirce into conversation with German critical
theory in the chapters to follow.
As I discussed earlier, contrary to Descartes’ insistence on universal doubt as a
starting point for inquiry, Peirce maintained that we must begin with the beliefs we have
at the start. These beliefs (most of which are likely true but any one of which may be
false based on Peirce’s fallibilism) have been forged from a wide array of sources: culture
and community, textbooks and experts, individual inquiry, dialogue, indoctrination, and
so forth. Thus, there is at every moment a continua between my beliefs556 and yours, your
beliefs with those around you, and so on, extending out in an ever-changing, infinitely
intricate web of thought-signs without definite beginning and without definite end. As
Mullin notes, “Peirce, by contrast, held that no idea stands isolated from others. Each idea
is signified by some things and in turn signifies others.”557
The self must be no more than an illusion of isolation. Thoughts connected with
other thoughts which in turn are informed by the external environment in terms of signs,
communally constructed and conveyed through socially constructed language, all within
a massive continuum in which mind and body, self and others, exist by varying in degree
of reality rather than kind. As Mullin notes:
Douglas R. Anderson, “A Political Dimension of Fixing Belief,” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy
Charles S. Peirce, edited by Jacqueline Brunning and Paul Forster (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997), 223.
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The embodied human self exists in communion with other selves, and only
in illusion does the self exist separately from other embodied selves.
According to this view, I do not completely constitute myself; my
neighbor, to some extent, is myself, and I am my neighbor’s self.558

If our characters are in no small part provisionally determined by the sum total of our
beliefs and if those beliefs are communally formulated to the point where our very
cognition is ever through thought-signs which are, in turn, influenced by the language
and use of the community, in no small part are we influenced by the beliefs of our
immediate social environment. In a very real sense, an individual’s participation within a
community determines the conception of “self” for that individual as well as for all others
within that community of inquirers, and vice versa. Indeed, rather than atomic individuals
entering into a community additively, Peirce took the opposite stance: our conception of
self is determined by subtracting ourselves as individuated from a more fundamental
conception of the community itself. As Mullin notes,
According to Peirce’s theory, each of us consists of a cell in a social
organism. Before any other characteristic, our particular array of faults and
limitations distinguishes us, as individuals, from the social organism …
common childhood experience reminds us that we most easily call
attention to ourselves by being out of step with social expectations.559

Individuation does not take place prior to the construct of the community, the inverse of
the standard conception of individuality in which individuals are prior. Our very
thoughts, for Peirce, are, after all, sign-thoughts given meaning through use and language
constructed not by ourselves in isolation but through our participation in the greater
community. We draw attention to ourselves by being “out of step” with that community
through fault, error or general limitation, thereby defining individualism only secondarily
558
559
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through subtracted one particular cell of a great social organism from the whole of that
organism. Nor is error the sole constituant of individuality, merely as aspect of it. As
Muoio notes, “Peirce states that man’s separate existence is manifested by ignorance and
error, not that it consists of them.”560
The self is distinct from others but does not exist separately from
them…we discover ourselves through our own ignorance and error, but
ignorance and error do not constitute the self. We err if we think of the self
as a separate entity, but not if we think that the self is distinct. An aspect
of the self stands out as unique.561
We distinguish ourselves from the community through error or by being somehow “out
of step.” However, that does not mean that there is not something, some “self,” that is
unique and irreducible to the whole. As Mullin notes, “we derive self-consciousness from
interacting with other minds.”562 In start contrast to a solipsistic conception of the self, for
Peirce, consciousness of one’s own self requires the recognition of an “other,” in a move
that he no doubt acquired from his understanding of Hegel. Mullin gives us a practical
example of how this discovery of self-consciousness unfolds:
The child perceives itself as being distinct from others by being aware of
the differences in perception between itself and other people. This mostly
occurs as a result of errors on the part of the child. For example, if parents
tell the child that the stove is hot, he might not believe it until he learns
from a painful experience. Then he discovers the error of his own
judgment and the truth in the words that that adults expressed. The child
therefore discovers itself through communication with others.563
Colapietro confirms this aspect of Peirce’s conception of the self in saying, “the self is
truly something unique and irreducible in itself, but what it is in itself is only revealed or,
Patricia A. Muoio, “Peirce on the Person,” Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 20, no. 2
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more accurately, realized through its relation to others.”564 Although there is an aspect of
the self that is unique, and necessarily so, for Peirce this did not constitute the “essence”
of the self lest we succumb to the “illusion” of atomic individualism. Although there is
something unique about each individual self, more fundamental is its engagement with,
and relation to, others.
When we consider Peirce’s pragmatic circuit of inquiry, it becomes increasingly
clear how this individuation takes place. If we are, to a great degree, the total of our
beliefs and if those beliefs are conditioned by encountered problems, ensuing doubts, and
subsequent inquiries, it follows that, since no two individuals encounter the exact same
problems in the exact same way, don’t experience the same doubt, and don’t engage in
precisely the same inquiry, the cyclical unfolding of our beliefs are processes unique to
every individual. Nevertheless, every aspect of that process, from our beliefs through our
inquiries, are conditioned by the community prior to our individuation: our social
environments influence what problems we face, what beliefs we have, what we have at
our disposal to inquire, to the very thoughts we have and express through signs
conditioned by language and use. As DeMarco notes:
The structure of the early community begins to become clear. The
community is linked to reality because it provides unity to the manifold
through agreed upon general information. Peirce is claiming that reality is
the idealistic unity of the signs that are manipulated in thought. Since
unified cognitions are the only reality, his…thought is a brand of
cognitionism.565
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This unification of sign-thoughts complements Peirce’s conception of the individual, as
we’ve seen, as a sort of “subtraction” from the whole and the subsequent relationship to
that whole from which it is subtracted. As DeMarco notes:
Where does Peirce locate the significative thought process? Peirce
answers that it is located in the minds of men. But how does Peirce define
man? He distinguishes two aspects of man’s nature; one is essential and
the other is negative: man is both essentially communal and negatively
individual. Accordingly, Peirce attempts to show that man is identified, by
nature, with the thought process as it moves to increasingly unified
information. When men are in agreement, they derive their communal
nature from the reality of the agreement.566

Further, this relationship between the ideal community and the individual reflects
Peirce’s quest to discover the pure, rational inquirer freed from his or her individual
biases and idiosyncracies567:
The chaotic impressions belonging to the private man are unified in
agreement through the necessary operation of thought. Insofar as
impressions are private and part of the chaos to be unified, man is a
limitation on the final, communal reality of Peirce’s…cognitionism. And
as a participant in the community…man finds his positive nature. Thus
man’s concept of himself as an individual is an illusion.568

to have a hint of Peirce’s evolutionary theory of belief formation, with doubt serving as the impetus for
growth and development and the catalyst for the evolution of beliefs.
566
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As Peirce noted, “ideas tend to spread continuously and to affect certain others
which stand to them in a peculiar relation of affectability.”569 The more we develop
through engaging in inquiry the more our ideas spread to those other within that
community of inquirers as their ideas, in turn, spread to infect of our own. As Mullin
notes, “this law explains the development of personality. For example, “as we develop
from childhood toward adulthood, our various and sometimes conflicting feelings,
thoughts and desires become more integrated to form a sense of personal identity.”570
As we discussed in our analysis of Peirce’s positive theory of inquiry, feelings,
thoughts and desires in conflict are tested and resolved successfully only in relation to the
feelings, thoughts and desires of others. As Mullin says, “the self remains always in
dialogue…thinking involves dialogue.”571 Thus, “the self cannot be understood as an
entity apart from other selves and apart from its future and the future of other selves.”572
All this serves to reinforce Peirce’s maintenance of synechism that admits of no strict and
unbridgeable gap between oneself and others. Quite the opposite, in fact, we see here that
Peirce’s conception of self was necessarily bound up with other selves, a more primary
“social self” which is individuated only secondarily. In essence, then, the self is, itself, a
sign573: never in isolation but only and always necessarily in communion with not only
other selves but, too, the world beyond.
Thus, we gain a clear understanding of Peirce’s social psychology, a pragmatic
theory of belief formation and character development as an integrally social self,
influenced in no small part by its transactions with its nested social and natural
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environments. It follows that socio-political influences are integral to the development of
the individual, through language and the use of signs, through engaging in the necessarily
dialogical component of Peirce’s method of inquiry, this will invariably influence how
the individual self-identifies and how the individual’s formation of beliefs is played out
by supplying the conditions for problems to emerge and the tools which the individual
may or may not have at his or her disposal to bring to bear upon the resolution of those
problems.
However, this brings us back to the dilemma at the heart of the faux “solidarity”
in the method of authority, akin to a kind of Sartrean “seriality” as opposed to an
authentic “group in fusion” found in an ideal community of inquirers in a truly
democratic socio-political milieu. I explored briefly one of the reasons why Peirce did not
(indeed, could not) maintain a correspondence theory of Truth was precisely because the
idea of Reality was far more “occult,” in his words, and “wider” in Feibleman’s words,
than Truth precisely because it included “falsity” itself. Falsity is real and every bit as
real as Truth. Eco, one of the greatest Peircean semeioticans, made a close study of this
“Force of Falsity” in Serendipities. By advocating that we expose ourselves to our
cultural milieu, to merge our interests with our neighbors, we run the risk of exposing
ourselves to the virus of falsity proliferated by the authority. Eco relates the story of
Frederick the Great and the infamous “Letter of Prester John,” a falsehood, Eco notes,
that undeniably “changed world history.”574
Eco begins his account of the force of falsity in the unfolding of human history by
conjuring Aquinas’ question as to which is the more powerful, binding, influential and
constructive; “the power of the king, the influence of wine, the charms of woman, or the
574
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strength of truth”575? Eco notes that Aquinas’ response “respected the king, at whose
table he did not, I believe, reject a few good glasses of wine, though he proved he could
resist woman’s charms.”576 Ultimately, though Aquinas concluded “non sunt unius
generis (they do not belong to the same category)” 577 and thus beyond direct compare,
Eco maintains that, nevertheless, “all can stir the human heart to some action”578 and, in
this sense are, indeed, comparable. Eco finds of note Aquinas’ deference to the power of
the king and readily agrees that “as for the practical intellect, it is obvious that the king’s
will has power over it, the command of law.”579 Yet, mightier even than the practical
concerns that the king’s will may sway, “the only force that moves the speculative
intellect is truth….and thus truth is stronger than anything else.”580
In Peirce’s scientific method of inquiry, Truth is the goal of the universal
coordinated efforts of the ideal community of inquirers. In the method of authority,
however, “truth” is whatever beliefs the power interests seek to perpetuate by imposing
them forcibly upon its populace, beliefs that, undoubtedly, are to the benefit of the power
interests themselves. Thus, the line between practical and theoretical concerns is not a
distinct as it might initially seem: for if Truth, as Eco here notes, holds sway over
speculative intellect, how easily it is that “Truth” can be actively manipulated by the
“king” whose authority may clearly extend past the practical concerns of the individual
by usurping the province of truth itself. As Eco notes, “such is the power of truth. But
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experience teaches us that often the imposition of truth has been delayed, and its
acceptance has come at the price of blood and tears.”581
As a good Peircian, Eco notes that every notion “is subject to revision on the basis
of new discoveries”582 but at any specific historical moment, a slew of beliefs, culturally
accepted, are true and “until proved otherwise we believe, as factual truth”583 that they
remain the reality of things.
At this point it can be said that, over the course of history, beliefs and
affirmations that today’s encyclopedia categorically denies have been
given credence and indeed believed so completely as to subjugate the
learned, generate and destroy empires, inspire poets (not always witnesses
to the truth)584, and drive human beings to heroic sacrifices, intolerance,
massacre, the quest for knowledge. If this is true, how can we not assert
that a Force of the False exists?585

Eco gives us several historical examples of the method of authority in action. Although
Peirce had faith that, over the long run, false beliefs would be challenged and
reformulated, that process may be delayed for any number of reasons all stemming from
the adaptation of one or another (or several at once) of the counterproductive methods of
belief formation, especially if the Truth is not conducive to some authority’s agenda. For
example, there was the reticence of the Church to accept a heliocentric model of the
universe, effectively hamstringing the method of inquiry by demanding its interpretation,
based on Scripture, of the make-up of the cosmos. From the perspective of the Church
itself, Peirce might argue that it, itself, was subject to the method of tenacity: clinging
against all evidence to the contrary to a geocentric model. From the perspective of the
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people under the sway of the Church, however, they were clearly under the sway of the
method of authority perpetuated by that institution as scientists were persuaded, under
threat, to alter their findings and, when this was not possible, to sweep these findings
under the proverbial carpet.
One historical example that Eco provides is that of the Donation of Constantine.
As he notes:
Today, thanks to Lorenzo Valla, we know that the Document was not
authentic. And yet, without that document, without a profound belief in its
authenticity, European history would have followed a different course: no
conflict over investitures, no mortal struggle for the Holy Roman Empire,
no temporal power of the popes, no slap at Agnani, but also no Sistine
Chapel, which was created after the Donation was called into question but
could still be constructed because for centuries the Donation continued to
be thought genuine.586

Eco adds a new wrinkle to the method of authority: under its rule, positive (beneficial)
results may occur. The fact that false beliefs in some way contributed to the construction
of the Sistine Chapel in no way diminishes its very real beauty and the very real
inspiration it perpetuated for the centuries since its construction.
But not all fabrications perpetuated under the method of authority have such
benevolent side effects. Consider his central example, the Letter of Prester John. It was
the second half of the twelfth century that found Frederick the Great, the Holy Roman
Emperor, anxious to expand his kingdom east and conquer the lands of the Muslims that
had so often been taken and taken back to the point where men tired of conflict populated
his kingdom. Miraculously, a letter arrived at his course that spoke of a mystical land, a
true Eden, ruled by Prester John (“Presbyter Johannes,” “priest John”), a paragon of
Christian virtue. Coincidentally, in order to get to this land, as per John’s kind invitation,
586
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the Muslim territories would have to be traversed - precisely (coincidentally?) as
Frederick had desired all along.
In the course of the following centuries – until the seventeenth – translated
and paraphrased many times into various languages and versions, the letter
had a decisive importance in the expansion of the Christian West toward
the Orient. The idea that beyond the Moslem territories there could be a
Christian kingdom justified all ventures of expansion and exploration.587
The letter itself was a work of exceptional genius,588 riddled with fancies and fairytales
that pushed the boundaries of what any human being could rationally accept as factual. It
spoke of manna falling from the sky, diamonds the size of a man’s hand sitting idle along
riverbanks, and creatures of every description roaming the lands: from white bears to
phoenixes, centaurs to cyclopses. Even in the twelfth century, it pushes the boundaries of
possibility that anyone could have possibly believed the letter was genuine, so extreme
were its claims of a paradise on earth, free from sin, where men and women lived in
perpetual youth and happiness.589 Nevertheless, it was taken as genuine; the reason
Frederick needed was given, and the political landscape of Europe was changed at the
price of countless lives, Christian, Jew, and Muslim alike.
Where did Prester John’s letter come from? What was its purpose?
Perhaps it was a document of anti-Byzantine propaganda, produced in the
scriptoria of Frederick I. But the problem is not so much its origin (fakes
of every description were abundant at that time) as its reception. The
geographical fantasy gradually generated a political project. In other
words, the phantom called up by some scribe with a knack for
counterfeiting documents (a highly respected literary activity of the
period) served as an alibi for the expansion of the Christian world toward
Africa and Asia, a welcome argument favoring the white man’s burden.590
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As significant as its reception was, I disagree with Eco, from a Peircian perspective, that
its origins were of less importance than its reception. The origins were not, clearly, in
accord with the method of inquiry but, rather, the method of authority, since “inquiries”
hence have yielded no such kingdom, it follows that the letter was most assuredly an
artificial construct created for the purpose of eastern expansion to the benefit of the ruling
power. As Eco notes in an essay he published on Peirce’s philosophy some years before
Serendipities:
The self-sufficiency of the universe of content, provided by a given
culture, explains why signs can be used to lie. We have a sign-function
when something can be used in order to lie (and therefore to elaborate
ideologies, works of art and so on). What Peirce calls signs (which stand
to somebody for something else in some respect or capacity) are
constituted in my mere use of a representamen in order to refer to a
fictitious state of the world. Even an index591 can be falsified in order to
signify an event that is not detectable and in fact has never caused its
supposed representamen.592
The people believed. For, as Eco rightly notes, “false tales are, first of all, tales, and tales,
like myths, are always persuasive.”593

Peirce defined an “index” in the following way: “An Index or Seme†1 ({séma}) is a Representamen
whose Representative character consists in its being an individual second. If the Secondness is an
existential relation, the Index is genuine. If the Secondness is a reference, the Index is degenerate. A
genuine Index and its Object must be existent individuals (whether things or facts), and its immediate
Interpretant must be of the same character. But since every individual must have characters, it follows that
a genuine Index may contain a Firstness, and so an Icon as a constituent part of it. Any individual is a
degenerate Index of its own characters,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 2.283. Since an “index” is associated with
Secondness, for Peirce, it would follow that it would be an encountered object or fact that is juxtaposed to
the Icon, or “Firstness.” Whatever is an index itself is likewise an object or fact in its own right, and thus
there is, as Peirce states, something of Firstness in this Secondness, for the encountered object or fact is
itself an Icon in its on right and an Index in relation to the Icon which encounters it. What Eco illuminates
here is the possibility that that which is encountered in a moment of Secondness may itself be wholly
fabricated (that is, refer to nothing existent beyond the relation to the Icon). A human being, for example,
may react to a fact that is false (without knowing it’s false, initially) just as an individual may react to a fact
that is true (in the Peircean sense of a “true” belief, at least). Whether the index corresponds to anything
existent in reality does not negate its very real impact on the experience of the individual encountering it.
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Let us forget for a moment that some of these false tales produced positive
effects, while others produced horror and shame. All created something,
for better or worse. Nothing in their success is inexplicable. What
represents a problem is rather the way they managed to replace other tales
that today we consider true.594

Peirce provided us with the answer in his articulation of the method of authority. Indeed,
Eco himself concludes his analysis of the force of falsity with a reference to Peirce and
his community of inquirers, clearly not in play in the perpetuation of the Prester John
myth. And these are but a smattering of examples in which power interests have actively
manipulated the “true” so significantly that these fabrications changed the course of
human history.
Eco does grant us one Peircian positive consequence of the realization, years later,
that these “truths” and the beliefs that they created and the beliefs that perpetuated that
“truth” in the face of growing evidence to their contrary. He says:
At most, recognizing that our history was inspired by many tales we now
recognize as false should make us alert, ready to call constantly into
question the very tales we believe true, because the criterion of the
wisdom of the community is based on constant awareness of the fallibility
of our learning…after all, the cultivated person’s first duty is to be always
prepared to rewrite the encyclopedia.595

The method itself is a safeguard against the method of authority, reminding us that all
truths, all beliefs, must be subjected to communal discourse and experimentation and any
claim made by a power interest, any claim of timeless certainty or essentialism, must be
treated with the suspicion it’s due.
With the method of inquiry, there is no entity separate from the community itself,
that is, no institution generating the rules of inquiry and indoctrinating citizens with
594
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specific, pre-established beliefs. In other words, as a method, it is necessarily free from
the narrow confines of instrumentalism as Horkheimer defines it. The community, itself,
cannot be a replacement “authority,” a swapping of some totalitarian monarch for a more
benevolent dictator, for the method of inquiry ascribes no values, truths, and goals of
inquiry (save for seeking Truth itself)596 a priori, which would thereby relegate human
cognition to the seeking of means (instrumentalism) to goals externally prescribed. The
community (and each free-participant therein) is the goal-setter, not the means-finder.
The method seeks a Truth external to any finite number of individual beliefs (as the
culmination of inquiry at the end of the long run) and by playing against a Secondness
that is, itself, external to the beliefs of the inquirers themselves. Peirce’s fallibilism, his
first rule of reason, his rejection of dogmatism, all conspire to safeguard inquiry against
the blockades that an authority would seek to erect and narrow the channels of inquiry
which ought otherwise be as a wide and diverse as the human imagination; channels that,
of course, reify the beliefs proliferated by the authority, setting goals and values for the
inquirers, external to them, in a purely instrumental fashion. There is solidarity in both
communities under the aegis of authority as well as within the ideal community of
inquirers. The former is inauthentic, forged of indoctrination to pre-established beliefs,
immersed in instrumentalism (where reason is deployed solely to discover the means to
ends prescribed by some power external to the inquirer him or herself), and solidified
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with fear, oppression, and alienation. In such a milieu, Peirce was the first to advocate a
radical form of atomic individualism, his individuals of wider social feeling, that do not
submit to the beliefs they are exposed to but rise above them through critique. The latter
is an authentic solidarity forged of merging one’s interests with one’s neighbor in the
absence of an authoritarian power: with that blockade removed, and in a milieu wherein
the method of inquiry may flourish, Peirce advocated a radical form of social
individualism, of solidarity, wherein only together may we all progress further towards
the Truth at the end of the long run.
By pitting his ideal method of inquirers against the community in the method of
authority and by supplying us with a robust and dynamic social psychology in which
human flourishing demands open dialogue,597 communication in community, and nothing
to block the path of inquiry, Peirce effectively fleshed out all of the signs we must look
for that might indicate whether we are living under the repressive regime of authority. As
such, Peirce’s robust social psychology, his rule of reason, his metaphysical
commitments, his semiotics, all coalesce to provide us with a most unique and dynamic
form of critical theory,598 exposing the structures of authority the institution would rather
keep invisible demonstrating the ways in which such an institution blocks inquiry and,
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ultimately, stagnates human cognitive development and dissolves any pretense of
authentic, autonomous human freedom.
As Talisse notes, only the method of inquiry leads “to a democratic political
context.”599 What separates the community in the method of inquiry from the community
within the method of authority is precisely this difference between dogmatism and the
necessary call to fallibilism and revisionism. No elite group of individuals may determine
truth (this manifests both in the method of authority as well as the a priori method and
undermines any critic’s claim that Peirce was simply replacing Plato’s “philosopher
kings” with “scientist kings”). As Talisse notes, the method of science involves, at least
potentially, “the participation of the entire community”600:
Unlike the methods of authority and a priority, which depend upon a
community of doctrine, the method of science depends upon a community
of inquiry. A community of inquiry is committed not to any particular set
of beliefs, but rather to continuing inquiry…whereas the non-scientific
methods are aimed at preserving some particular set of beliefs, the
community of inquiry is committed to preserving the worthiness of its
beliefs.601

Dogmatism has no place in the method of science save for a strict adherence to the
method itself that, as we’ve seen, is self-correcting and perpetually open to revision
(indeed, revision is encouraged602). The difference between the non-scientific methods
and the method of inquiry is the difference between “belief preservation” and “belief
correction,”603 respectively. The former implies apodictic claims to truth, essentialism,
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the end of inquiry, wherein the latter implies the constant engagement with others, the
testing of beliefs in communal dialogue, and the perpetual growth of knowledge.
With this in mind, “the relation countenanced by pragmatists between the selfcorrective method of scientific inquiry and the self-governing processes of democratic
politics can now be stated.”604 Indeed, the possibility of an ideal Peircean community of
inquirers relies upon the reality of a true democratic state 605 for “the essence of
democracy lies in its non-dogmatic, participatory, public, and experimental processes of
decision.”606 This is clear from the failure of the method of inquiry to thrive in
authoritarian communities for, as Peirce noted, though in general the method of authority
will ultimately not hold on a case-by-case, community-by-community basis, nevertheless
it may endure for countless centuries in one form or another and, even when dissolved
(ostensibly) in one community, may well just crop up in another. As Putnam notes,
“democracy is a requirement for experimental inquiry in any area. To reject democracy is
to reject the idea of being experimental.”607 Similarly, Misak notes “the requirements of
genuine belief show that we must, broadly speaking, be democratic inquirers.”608 For just
as proper inquiry could not unfold under the totalitarian grasp of the method of authority,
nor the elitist a priori method, “proper political inquiry cannot occur in isolation or
among only a small group of pre-selected elites. A properly deliberative community must
be a democratic community,”609 and vice versa.
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A genuinely democratic arena, requisite for the flourishing of the method of
inquiry, must be as “inclusive, open, and egalitarian as possible”610 to eschew the
problems of the previous three methods (individual isolationism, dogmatism, etc.) as well
as maintain “a self-critical and experimentalist posture towards its own processes”611 in
accord with the demands of the method’s fallibilism, revisionism and the first rule of
reason. As Misak notes,
The pragmatist…supports a kind of radical democracy in inquiry. Belief
involves being prepared to try to justify one’s views to others and being
prepared to test one’s beliefs against the experience of others. Thus the
differences of inquirers – their different perspectives, sensibilities, and
experiences – must be taken seriously. If they are not, reaching the best or
the true belief is not on the cards.612

Eschewing the possibility of dogmatism, the pragmatist, in support of a radical
democracy of inquiry, demands the necessary interplay of different beliefs, the genesis of
the undermining of the method of tenacity.
It is important to note that there is no authority within the ideal community of
inquirers. As I, and others, have highlighted before, Peirce was not advocating any sort of
abnormal veneration of scientists nor claiming that Truth was confined only to the realm
of science, nor advocating any form of scientism. He was not, as others have noted,
attempting to replace a Platonic legion of philosopher kings with a new entourage of
scientist kings. Expert testimony certainly matters, of course, but fallibilism obtains even
in the realm of the most advanced laboratories. Nor is “consensus” the new authority in
the ideal community of inquirers for, as I noted above, consensus did not determine
Truth, for Peirce, it is merely a good indication that Truth, to that ever-relative degree,
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may well have been achieved.613 As I discussed, there is an objective component of
inquiry, an external gauge, that guides (though doesn’t absolutely determine) the
unfolding process of investigation.614 Although beliefs do contribute to the construction
of Reality (in Thirdness), an individual operating within the method of inquiry simply
cannot believe whatever he or she desires for some beliefs will invariably run into the
resistance of Secondness, an external world that simply won’t budge no matter how hard
we wish to believe it otherwise (which explains the method of tenacity’s inability to last
in the long run). As Peirce said, “Secondness” is the mode of “existence” in so far as it is
that “mode of being which lies in opposition to another…A thing without opposition ipso

There remains, however, the question of “power,” namely, does the individual who understands that the
method of inquiry (rather than any of the other methods his/her neighbors may subscribe to) leads more
unerringly towards Truth in the long run, have power over the individuals enmeshed in other methods of
belief formation? Peirce did not address this explicitly, as far as I’ve seen, but given his somewhat
disgusted dismissal of those individuals who may well just be better off “intellectual slaves” if they so
insist on living their lives submissive to authority, I would speculate that Peirce would say that the
individual who understands how best to approproximate Truth would, indeed, have some power over those
who do not. How this power would manifest is equally unclear, if it would manifest at all. Dialogically, the
individual operating with the method of inquiry would likely have some power over an individual who is
merely clinging tenaciously to some belief or one who passively submits, unquestioningly, to the beliefs of
an authority, as Socrates always appeared to have the advantage over his interlocutors, whether or not he
actually possessed the definitions of the universal ethical terms he proposed to be seeking. In terms of a
political power, since the objects of inquiry are objective for Peirce, that is, open to all to inquire, no single
individual nor group of individuals could ever have some sacred monopoly on Truth, or the approximation
thereof.
614
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freeze, permanently, in place. The general thrust of Peirce’s metaphysical speculation on the movement of
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run, where doubts and problematic situations occur less and less often and the adaptation to changing
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their disposal, until, at least, hypothetically, we arrive at an ultimate consensus of beliefs that are so “true”
they are unassailable by future doubt, effectively ending inquiry with the arrival at Truth. But precisely
because inquiry was open-ended, for Peirce, this arrival was only ever hypothetical, and the more likely
situation was an increasing approximation, asymptotically, which nevertheless would reflect that increasing
concretization of beliefs, more and more unassailable by doubt, though perhaps never entirely so.
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facto does not exist.”615 Further, “when we say that a thing exists what we mean is that it
reacts upon other things.”616 As Almeder notes, “Peirce, in his treatment of the category
of Secondness, maintained that the compulsiveness (or Secondness) of our perceptual
experience guarantees the externality of the object which we perceive.”617 It is the
“brutality or haecceity”618 of the encroachment of a world that resists inquiry if the
guiding principles are faulty and that aligns with it when our beliefs are accurate.
Without such an objective standard there would be no rubric, no measuring stick,
against which to judge the efficacy of our beliefs and bring contrary beliefs into tension
in such a way as to relieve that tension dialogically. Precisely because our guiding
principles are often foiled, this experience of “Secondness,” though experienced
subjectively as a category of phenomenological experience, is not generated by the
unique inquirer but has its source in something external to that specific inquiring mind,
for we experience the pain of fire lashing our skin whether or not we desire it. As Potter
notes, it is “to recognize that we cannot think whatever we want and that wishing will not
necessarily make it so.”619
As inquiry progresses, over time, initially divergent beliefs, playing off of the
same externality for all inquirers, will, invariably, converge more and more. True, as I’ve
argued, Secondness is not wholly objective: it is, after all, a phenomenological category
of experience (the experience of resistance) and thus the beliefs that a specific inquirer
has will in some way inform the experience of this resistance. Nevertheless, as Peirce
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.435. Further, “the mode of being of an individual thing (Secondness) is existence
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insisted, there is an aspect of inquiry that is over and above what any number of finite
inquirers has to say about it. Consensus does happen, has happened, on a variety of topics
throughout our long intellectual history: arguments about geocentricity vs. heliocentricity
are obsolete and concerns about global warming, in our own time, are no longer a
problem of scientific consensus but, rather, a problem only of the tenacious or
authoritarian-influenced clinging to beliefs out of sync of the consensus of the
community of authentic inquirers. Indeed, recent publications on the topic by members of
that community of inquirers reveal a distinctly Peircean tone and approach to inquiry in
general:
There is a strong, credible body of evidence, based on multiple lines of
research, documenting that climate is changing and that these changes are
in large part caused by human activities. While much remains to be
learned, the core phenomenon, scientific questions, and hypotheses have
been examined thoroughly and have stood firm in the face of serious
scientific debate and careful evaluation of alternative explanations.620
The strength and credibility of this consensus view is “based on multiple lines of
research” rather than a uni-dimensional line of inquiry; a diverse array of different
techniques and approaches all culminating in the same, general conclusion over long
spans of time. Further, in good scientific fashion, the consensus, itself, admits of
fallibilism and incompleteness, noting, “much remains to be learned.” Nevertheless, the
“hypotheses,” the Peircean “beliefs” or “guiding principles” have “stood firm in the face
of serious debate,” that is, serious challenging problematizing those beliefs including the
engagement of radically “alternative explanations.” Further:
Some scientific conclusions or theories have been so thoroughly examined
and tested, and supported by so many independent observations and
620
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results, that their likelihood of subsequently being found to be wrong is
vanishingly small. Such conclusions and theories are then regarded as
settled facts. This is the case for the conclusions that the Earth system is
warming and that much of this warming is very likely due to human
activities.621
As Peirce noted, a “true belief” is one that has been tested so thoroughly that it no longer
encounters any problem that disrupts its trajectory towards its expected conclusion and,
though the possibility always remains for its revision in the future, the likelihood of its
reversal is “vanishingly small,” giving us good reason to accept its truth value, at least
provisionally. As the study here says, precisely as Peirce would say himself, “such
conclusions and theories are then regarded as settled facts,” “a finally compulsory
belief,”622 “a state of belief unassailable by doubt,”623 and “not a matter of arbitrary
choice.”624 None of this would be possible if some objective conditions did not exist,
independent of our diverse, individual beliefs at the onset of inquiry, that eventually lead
to the data, the analysis, the debate, and the conclusions agreed upon by the majority of
inquirers on this specific topic. As Peirce said, the “peripheral excitations” of the
encountered world lead, “in the long run, toward certain predestinate conclusions which
are the same for all men”625 if the method of inquiry is adopted throughout a community
of inquirers. “Belief gradually tends to fix itself under the influence of inquiry,”626 not
arbitrarily, but according to the very real tension inquiry experiences in its pursuit of the
Truth. As Feibleman notes, “subjective belief is the result of objective truth…the
compulsion must come from without, for we are not free to believe whatever we wish to
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believe; we can believe only what we must”627 so long as we’re not succumbing to the
method of tenacity.
Because of this objective gauge, only within the method of inquiry itself does
consensus create a good reason to assume that, to a relative degree, Truth has been
discovered. As we recall, the method of authority’s efficacy relies on consensus as well:
individuals are conditioned to have the same belief-set, beliefs conducive to the
perpetuation of that authoritarian power. As we’ll explore in full in the following
chapters, in no small part this was what Marcuse meant by “one-dimensionality”: a
monolithic belief-set, not forged of inquiry, but forged of indoctrination to a cultural
milieu conditioned by those in power for the perpetuation of that hold on power.
However, Peirce’s designs on Truth, even though it exists only as a goal not-yetachieved at the ideal end of the long run, lends itself to a hint of a monolithic design all
its own. If there is one Truth, asymptotically approximated, Peirce’s method of inquiry
runs headlong in into the problem of pluralism, namely, can multiple voices, multiple
perspectives, diverse beliefs, co-exist and flourish side-by-side. What happens to those
minority voices that dissent from the consensus view? Are they silenced like those in the
method of authority?
Pluralism, as Tallise notes, “roughly stated…is the thesis that at least some, and
perhaps many, disagreements over Big Questions are inevitable, irresolvable, noncontingent, and permanent. In other words, the pluralist denies that when such
disagreement endures it is necessarily because some of us are misinformed, obstinate,
irrational, or wicked.”628 Talisse explores why Dewey, despite his application of
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pragmatism to, specifically, democratic concerns, ultimately comes up short in offering a
robust pluralism that I unfortunately can’t engage here.629 It would seem, at first glance,
that precisely because of the objectivism and realism in Peirce, there’s an even more
diminished likelihood he could forward a robust pluralism. If the goal of inquiry is a
unified, “ultimate opinion” shared by all inquirers, what possibility is there for a mutually
compatible, but ultimate distinct, belief-systems and ideologies living side by side in a
single nation?630
Peirce prescribed no beliefs, ideologies, nor truths in his manifestation of
pragmaticism. To prescribe a belief would be little more than succumbing to the a priori
method of belief formation or, in its proliferation to others, assuming the position of
authority. Whereas Dewey prescribes a theory of democracy, Peirce gave us a method by
which to form democracy or, rather, a method that demands democracy in order to
flourish at all. What Talisse calls “epistemic pluralism,” Peirce’s pragmatism did not
adjudicate as to the answers to any of the “Big Questions” precisely because those
inquiries are still ongoing. What he did provide, however, was a hyperbolically inclusive
method by which those Big Questions may be engaged by the widest breadth of inquiries
imaginable. Further, although “Truth” may exist down the long run of inquiry, a unified
opinion that all are destined to share, precisely because this “Truth” has not yet been
achieved, and may well never be achieved apodictically, in the here and now Peirce’s
pragmatism not only allowed for pluralism but demanded it as the only way by which
these distinct beliefs may encounter one another in authentic dialogue. If some beliefs
629
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should prove more conducive to democratic values than others, that is a consequence of
inquiry, not something assumed from its start. Precisely because the Truth will only ever
hypothetically be achieved somewhere down the long run of inquiry’s unfolding, until
that destined moment, by his first rule of reason, no blockade of inquiry is permitted and
thus pluralism may flourish far more fully than a manifestation of pragmatism wherein
democratic ideals, benevolent as they may be, are prescribed from the get-go.
As Goudge notes, “Peirce makes frequent references to the co-operative nature of
inquiry.”631 For example, Peirce said, “the progress of science cannot go far except by
collaboration; or, to speak more accurately, no mind can take one step without the aid of
other minds.”632 As we’ve seen, Peirce did not mean abnormally to venerate scientists
over intellectuals in other fields, rather, as Groudge notes, “a true scientist,” for Peirce,
“attaches positive value to the view of every man as competent as himself,”633 regardless
of his or her intellectual pedigree. “For Peirce, the pursuit of knowledge…was not an
individual concern. It was, in fact, the opposite: it was social praxis, the creation of a
community of inquirers.”634 Although the member of this community of inquirers will
regard “wide divergence from the convictions of the great body of scientific men as
tending of itself to argue incompetence,”635 for a wide variety of reasons, that inquirer
cannot discount contrary beliefs a priori. To do so would violate Peirce’s first rule of
reason (never block the path of inquiry),636 would succumb to the method of tenacity (the
refusal to engage in dialogue with this particular contrary belief) and, in a sense, succumb
631
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to the method of authority, if “authority” has become the scientific community itself and
all beliefs passed along to a populace from such a community become unquestioned
dogma. That is all to say, the minority voice within the community of inquirers must, on
principle, be engaged by the rest of the community, tested, and either validated (bringing
about a paradigmatic shift in thought for the entire community) or else rejected, but at
least for some positive, demonstrable reason forged of inquiry itself.
For example, we may take Peirce’s critique of Comte’s “assertion that men would
never be able to discover the chemical composition of the stars.”637 Auguste Comte
certainly possessed the intellectual capacities to engage in the community of inquirers.
However, no sooner did Comte make his belief manifest, that “the ink was scarcely dry
upon the printed page before the spectroscope was discovered and that which he had
deemed absolutely unknowable was well on the way of getting ascertained.” 638 In
Peirce’s critique of a priori unknowables, a “bar which philosophers often set up across
the roadway of inquiry,” violating his first rule of reason, “in maintaining that this, that,
and the other never can be known,”639 Comte’s belief was quickly integrated into the
community and just as quickly overturned, not on the a priori grounds Comte, himself,
utilized to make his belief clear but, rather, through rigorous scientific engagement and
inquiry by the whole of the community at large. As Peirce said, “it is easy enough to
mention a question the answer to which is not known to me today. But to aver that that
answer will not be known tomorrow is somewhat risky; for oftentimes it is precisely the
least expected truth which is turned up under the ploughshare of research.”640
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Peirce’s critique of Comte offered a good example of a member of the community
with a viable belief641 being incorporated into the ongoing inquiry, “extending” that
inquiry to encapsulate his position. Drawing on what Peirce would likely call an example
of the a priori method of belief formation, however, Comte’s position was unable to hold
“in the long run.” Indeed, his position didn’t even hold “in the short run.” To say that
Comte’s position was “overturned” might irresponsibly imply that absolute certainty as to
the nature of stars had been achieved which, for Peirce, fails his first rule of reason and
violates his commitment to fallibilism. However, it is not so much with his conclusion
that Peirce took issue but, rather, the method by which he came to that conclusion and the
speed and efficiency with which the greater community engaged it, offering proof to the
contrary, is a testament to the counterproductivity of the a priori method at play. Science,
for Peirce, was a “living process,” one that was “busied mainly with conjectures, which
are either getting framed or getting tested.”642 For Peirce, “all propositions in philosophy
must be held tentatively, (6.181) in the same way that scientific hypotheses are held, that
is to say, always ready to be abandoned whenever the evidence of reason or of fact
demands that they should be.”643 For, at base, though science strives towards Truth and
certainty, it is a “pursuit of living men,” fallible and flawed, and “the life of science is in
the desire to learn.”644 Comte’s position, according, at least, to Peirce’s critique of it,
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made no such tentative claim but, rather, made a definitive claim which didn’t extend the
desire to learn so much as slam the door shut on future avenues of inquiry in maintaining
that we would never know, nor could ever know, the composition of stars. It would be no
exaggeration to say that such a position is the antithesis of Peirce’s entire philosophical
enterprise and it is to Comte’s method, more than his conclusion, which Peirce took to
task.
For an example of the converse, namely, a belief from an individual inquirer
being accepted by the majority of inquirers, we might turn to Charles Darwin, whom
Peirce greatly admired.645 There remain, even today, tensions over Darwin’s theory and
in the late 19th century, all the more so. Even Peirce was unconvinced of its long-term
efficacy, noting in 1893, “to a sober mind its case looks less hopeful now than it did
twenty years ago.”646 Nevertheless, over time (in the long run, as it were), Darwin’s
theory (or, at least, substantial parts of it) has gone from a minority belief within the
scientific community to a relatively established norm.
Mounce notes, as inquiry proceeds, “it will adopt perspectives wider than that of
ordinary practice, which it may cause us to alter or amend. But it will never eliminate that
perspective.”647 Should the need arise to revisit a previously marginalized belief, which
may occur in light of new information in the future, that belief will be ready-at-hand as
which, presumably, is precisely what organisms, naturalistically, desire. The method of tenacity will
crumble over time since we cannot all be hermits; the method authority, too, will collapse given enough
time, but in the interim, and for vast stretches of time, these methods may hold sway, effectively offering
the organism (inquirer) the equilibrium it desires, negating the need for the desire to learn. But though that
desire is not always operative, over the long run, the desire to learn inherent in the method of inquiry is the
only means to achieve the permanent equilibrium that the organism seeks. Thus, I would speculate on
Peirce’s behalf, that this desire to learn is an essentially human quality in the long run, the
counterproductive methods of belief formation, for as long as they prove efficient in establishing some
temporary equilibrium, may repress this desire for a time.
645
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already part of the accepted belief, having been incorporated into the trajectory of inquiry
leading to the present moment.
But we are speaking of minority and majority beliefs within an egalitarian
community of inquirers. Indeed, it is an ideal community of inquirers, as Peirce has said.
But within a nation governed to some degree by the method of authority, it is not merely
minority and majority beliefs that must be engaged but power majorities and minorities
that contribute to the trajectory of inquiry in all of the debilitating ways Peirce
enumerated in “Fixation of Belief.” Distinct from numerical majorities, a power majority
is the authority of Peirce’s critique. Consider Martin Luther King, Jr.’s “Letter from a
Birmingham Jail” in which he says:
You are quite right in calling for negotiation. Indeed, this is the very
purpose of direct action. Nonviolent direct action seeks to create such a
crisis and foster such a tension that a community which has constantly
refused to negotiate is forced to confront the issue. It seeks so to dramatize
the issue that it can no longer be ignored. My citing the creation of tension
as part of the work of the nonviolent resister may sound rather shocking.
But I must confess that I am not afraid of the word ‘tension.’ I have
earnestly opposed violent tension, but there is a type of constructive,
nonviolent tension which is necessary for growth. Just as Socrates felt that
it was necessary to create a tension in the mind so that individuals could
rise from the bondage of myths and half truths to the unfettered realm of
creative analysis and objective appraisal, so must we see the need for
nonviolent gadflies to create the kind of tension in society that will help
men rise from the dark depths of prejudice and racism to the majestic
heights of understanding and brotherhood. The purpose of our direct
action program is to create a situation so crisis packed that it will
inevitably open the door to negotiation. I therefore concur with you in
your call for negotiation. Too long has our beloved Southland been
bogged down in a tragic effort to live in monologue rather than
dialogue.648
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The “tension” that King advocates, a non-violent sort of tension, is precisely the tension
that arises from the meeting of mutually opposing beliefs in dialogue, the very thing that
ends the method of tenacity, according to Peirce. As Talisse notes,
Open mindedness, willingness to listen to others respectfully, ability to
challenge views responsibly, readiness to change one’s mind when
considerations so require, and, more generally, the disposition to critically
engage in cooperative and constructive dialogue – these are the virtues of
inquiry.649
As Cooke and others have indicated through their analyses of Peirce’s fallibilism in
conjunction with his first rule of reason, “open mindedness” and the attitude that one
possesses before engaging in inquiry is critical to inquiry’s success to some degree. The
“open mindedness” that Talisse is referring to here is in respect to the necessary
“cooperative” and dialogical engagement requisite for the flourishing of the method of
inquiry in stark opposition to the method of tenacity which, as we’ve seen, is not at all
conducive to knowledge acquisition. To never let anything block the road of inquiry, as
the first rule of reason demands, would include one’s own preexisting close-mindedness,
often manifesting in the tacit assumption that one is right and, conversely and
subsequently, the other must be wrong. This rings of Peirce’s method of tenacity and
negates the potential for genuine participation in a community of inquirers whose goal
should not be to prove the other wrong but, rather, to communally strive towards the
Truth. It is a condition of inquiry in the sense that the method he advocated necessarily
entailed a fallibilism and openness to the revisability of one’s beliefs.650 It is a
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precondition of engaging in the method at all for, as can be seen subtly throughout
Peirce’s critique of the three counterproductive methods, within each is a distinct
unwillingness to engage fully with the beliefs of others within that community of
inquirers either through ignoring them entirely (tenacity), succumbing to the will of the
state (authority), or leaning too heavily on fundamental premises not forged of the
method itself (a priority).
As a precondition to inquiry, it is not easy to see how one acquires such an
attitude to begin with. For Peirce, the answer lies in the nature of doubt itself, a state of
disequilibrium out of which we struggle to free ourselves instinctively. None of the three
counterproductive methods of belief formation mitigate against doubt over the long run
and since each of the counterproductive beliefs entail a certain closed-mindedness it
would follow that, ideally, individuals will come to make the connection between their
adoption of a counterproductive method of belief formation, the inescapability of doubt
by deploying that counterproductive method, and the closed-mindedness that is central to
said method. Now, there is nothing to prevent an individual (let us take the tenacious
individual) from simply receding back into his or her tenaciously held beliefs even after
the inevitable exodus from intellectual hermitage unfolds. Likewise, there is nothing to
prevent this for those individuals without that wider sort of social feeling within the
method of authority, who would thereby remain condemned to such a structure of belief
inquiry. Though we may never know if any of our current beliefs are beyond future revision, as Peirce
claimed, it is likely that many of them are already beyond any future doubt. Simply put, for Peirce, he
would caution us to never make the meta-claim of apodictic certainty (“I am certain that my belief is true”)
though the claim “my belief is true” is acceptable and offers a modicum of stasis and comfort until (or even
“if”) some reason for doubting that belief emerges (either through external, environmental stimuli or the
purposeful hypothesizing of some potential alternative). Thus “practically” speaking, in the here and now,
if beliefs continue to obtain day to day, that is, are demonstrably “true beliefs,” we may rest secure (though
never entirely secure) in their efficacy and some stability can be enjoyed so long as we remember that, by
adhering to the first rule of reason, that we must not succumb to the temptation of dogmatically claiming
that we have, ultimately, arrived at beliefs that will never be revised.
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formation throughout their entire lives. Yet this resigned response does not negate the
necessity of open-mindedness for the method of inquiry to flourish, nor does it undermine
Peirce’s insistence that of the four methods of belief formation, only the prescribed
method is championed as both the most democratic and the most conducive to the
(ideally) desired goal of attaining the Truth at the end of the long run.
This point is of great concern for Habermas who was profoundly influenced by
Peirce’s method of inquiry. In his Truth and Justification, for example, he provides a
critique of Christina’s Lafont’s observations on precisely this point. Lafont maintained
that moral questions operate in a fashion similar to ontological or epistemological
questions when engaged in inquiry, namely, that if a single, specific correct answer was
not presupposed to exist, inquiry would never (could never) be engaged in the first place:
Just as the presupposition of the existence of states of affairs in the
objective world is the condition of possibility for a meaningful discussion
about the truth of statements, the presupposition of the existence of a
domain of generalizable interests is the condition of possibility for a
meaningful discussion about the moral rightness of norms. The existence
presupposition is unavoidable in practical discourse not because it is
necessarily the case that there is such a domain among all human beings,
but because if we came to the conclusion that this presupposition makes
no sense (which is, obviously, an open empirical question) the discussion
about the moral rightness of social norms would become meaningless.651

Habermas was critical of the assumption of a single correct answer prior to the
engagement in inquiry and suggested, instead, that the answer is forged in inquiry itself.
As Habermas notes:
With the orientation toward a “single correct answer” we presuppose a
principle of bivalence that we interpret ontologically keeping in mind the
pair “true” and “false”; a statement’s truth depends on whether the state of
affairs it represents obtains or not. Lafont claims that we schematize the
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same principle in a similar fashion with regard to the rightness or
wrongness of moral statements: the rightness of a norm is supposed to
depend on whether it is equally in everyone’s interest.652
Peirce would initially agree with both the presupposition of a “single correct answer”
(Truth in the long run) as well as the bivalence of both “true” and “false” beliefs (in the
here and now) insofar as the former “obtain,” as Habermas says here, as beliefs that lead
to the expected conclusions when tested. In keeping with Peirce’s fallibilism, however, as
we’ve seen, “true” beliefs only asymptotically approximate the Truth and become
increasingly efficacious over time as fewer and fewer problems emerge to challenge the
belief in question that, in turn, would force a return to inquiry on the matter in question.
The “single correct answer” which Lafont seeks would be tantamount to a “permanently
settled belief” for Peirce, the type that Peirce only postulated as the goal of inquiry over
the long run. However, as I hinted at above, there is a difference between a general goal
of inquiry and a specific one. Although Peirce would certainly claim the former (the
general goal of inquiry is the permanently settled belief established by the unlimited
community of inquirers over the long run), there is no specific belief that exists prior to
that inquiry that must inevitably be established as the correct answer to inquiry’s
question. The specific belief that obtains, that is, that seems to be a permanently settled
belief, is forged of inquiry itself and although it may be held by one or more of the initial
inquiring parties prior to inquiry, it need not be necessarily so and is only established as
the achieved goal of inquiry through inquiry itself, and not before. And, as ever for
Peirce, that belief, no matter how apparently secure, is always only provisional.
Let us take one example from Habermas’ critique of Lafont:
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The explication of justice as the “equal consideration of everyone’s
interests” lies not at the beginning, but at the end. The procedural sense of
the “worthiness of recognition” is initially explained in terms of the
discourse principle according to which only those norms may claim to be
valid that could command the assent of all those affected in their role as
participants in discourse.653

For Peirce, if the goal of inquiry on this question is to establish what justice, actually, is,
the belief that it is “equal consideration of everyone’s interests” may be a position taken
up at the start of inquiry by one or more parties engaged in the dialogue, but it is only
established as a viable belief through inquiry itself. Indeed, the far more likely scenario is
as Habermas maintains, namely, that the belief that justice is “equal consideration of
everyone’s interests” is a belief that is come upon through inquiry and not an assumed
“right” answer prior to the onset of inquiry as a conclusion that must be reached but,
rather, simply as a hypothetical possibility considered potentially “right” enough to
motivate inquiry.
In taking seriously Habermas’ critique of Lafont, the method itself may still prove
remarkably useful654 for the establishment of beliefs that have practical, ethical and
socio-political import. King, by way of example, sought to promote just such a Peircean
“problematic situation” that created doubt, instigated inquiry, and moved towards a
resolution that would not have otherwise been possible if the Southland remained
irrevocably bogged down in monologue which is the very essence of Peirce’s method of
tenacity, the ostrich with its head ever in the sand. As Young notes, giving us a
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thoroughly Peircean rejection of the methods of tenacity, authority and a priority all at
once:
Reasonable participants in democratic discussion must have an open mind.
They cannot come to the discussion of a collective problem with
commitments that bind them to the authority of prior norms or
unquestionable beliefs. Nor can they assert their own interests above all
others’ or insist that their initial opinion about what is right or just cannot
be subject to revision. To be reasonable is to be willing to change our
opinions or preferences because others persuade us that our initial
opinions or preferences…are incorrect…Being open thus also refers to a
disposition to listen to others, treat them with respect, make an effort to
understand them by asking questions, and not judge them too quickly.655
Thus, like Socrates and King, we see the need for non-violent “gadflies” who are, to a
great degree, agents of change and the emergence out of methods of tenacity and
authority, in a Peircian sense, and towards a more democratic community of open
inquiry.
However, as I’ve explored, Peirce was adamant that philosophy not be subjugated
to socio-political concerns. No doubt, in part, stemming from his lifelong struggle against
a puritanical academia and government oversight stifling his innovations in logic and
science, Peirce was critical of any form of what Horkheimer would call
“instrumentalism,” the deployment of human rational capacities to the sole goal
ascertaining the means to arrive at goals prescribed external to the inquirer him or
herself, goals prescribed, instead, by some sort of authority (be it state, church, or
capital). Horkheimer, as I’ll explore later, actually accused Peirce of advocating
instrumentalism but it appears to me patently clear that the opposite is the case. To have
goals set prior to inquiry narrows the channels of potential inquiry (which ought to be as
wide and varied as the human imagination itself), channels that necessarily feed into the
655
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basin of “truths,” beliefs, and values imposed upon individuals, effectively alienating
them from the process of inquiry itself. This was patently clear in Peirce’s critique of the
method of authority and any authority, no matter how benevolent or apparently
benevolent, falls prey to this form of instrumentalism, namely, that inquiry is encouraged
to be nothing but reifying and apologetic of a status quo not of their own making.
Nevertheless, “Fixation,” as we’ve seen, deals not only with how an individual
inquirer forms his or her beliefs, but how a community, in total, grows and develops,
concerned, as it is, with “the structure and health of the polis.”656 In this sense it is
undoubtedly a work of socio-political philosophy. As Anderson notes, “in asking how a
community should govern the processes and contexts of fixing its beliefs, we ask not only
about a specific kind of political action, but also about how we might envision the
constituency of a healthy community.”657 But in advocating the method of inquiry and,
specifically, rejecting the method of authority as a viable method of knowledge
acquisition, it was Truth, not the good of the community, that was Peirce’s ultimate goal.
Resisting the impulse to subordinate philosophy to socio-political goals, Peirce went so
far as to say:
To declare that the sole reason for scientific research is the good of society
is to encourage those pseudo-scientists to claim, and the general public to
admit, that they, who deal with the applications of knowledge, are the true
men of science, and that the theoreticians are little better than idlers.658

And although Peirce was adamantly opposed to the injection of capitalistic motivations
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others, are men whose chief interest in science is as a means of gaining money, and who
have a contempt, or half-contempt, for pure science,”659 his central concern was the
subordination of science (and the scientific method) to the interests of society, in general:
Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it or
not -- and that the notion that we must deny what it is not conducive to the
stability of British society to affirm is the mainspring of the mendacity and
hypocrisy which Englishmen so commonly regard as virtues. I must
confess that I belong to that class of scallawags who purpose, with God's
help, to look the truth in the face, whether doing so be conducive to the
interests of society or not.660
Ultimately, “the road to truth need not always follow what were perceived to be the
immediate needs of any given society,”661 for two reasons we have already discussed at
length: (a) the long run theory of truth cannot be limited to the “immediate” needs of a
community and (b) the ideal community is, itself, unlimited, and not a specific
community in time and place. The ongoing quest for Truth supercedes a specific
community in a specific time, and thus should not (must not) be subordinated to
immediate socio-political concerns.
Although, for Peirce, the aims of philosophy and the good of the community were
independent goals, and though they might prove mutually exclusive, they need not
necessarily prove so. Those aspects of the counterproductive methods of belief formation
that hinder the philosophical quest for Truth quite often hinder socio-political concerns
for equality and democracy, as well. There is no clearer example of this than Peirce’s
critique of the method of authority, as we’ve seen. Although Peirce claimed there are
positive aspects to this method, and that it’s a method quite historically efficient in that
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“except the geological epochs, there are no periods of time so vast as those which are
measured by some of these organized faiths,”662 individuals are, and remain, little more
than “intellectual slaves”663 under such a system of authority. As Anderson notes, Peirce,
despite being the more conservative and traditionalist of the pragmatists, shared with
Dewey and others the “common belief that philosophy-science, whatever its aim, needs
to be relatively free from traditional forms of authority in order to carry out its work.”664
That, “whether one wants to articulate an evolutionary cosmology or make a critical
assessment of particular social institutions, there is no way to be effective if authorities
such as churches or political parties stand in the way and manipulate one’s failure.” 665
Those whose goal is the flourishing of a community in a non-totalitarian state likewise
champion such democratic values.
As Anderson suggests, “the best political community, in [Peirce’s] eyes, is a
democratic republic that keeps the possibility of this deeper liberalism most alive.”666 In
adhering to his fallibilism, Peirce rejected dogmatism in all its forms, be it philosophical
or political. In adhering to his first rule of reason, Peirce demanded a radical form of
socio-political freedom to inquire. And in critiquing the method of authority, and
advocating those individuals with wider social feeling, Peirce nascently constructed a
proto-critical theory that, as I will now explore, resonated profoundly with Herbert
Marcuse’s own critique of what he called “one-dimensional society” which reflected
almost all of Peirce’s insights into the mechanisms of indoctrination and alienation within
the method of authority.
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Chapter 6

Technics and Technology

Eleven years after Peirce published “The Fixation of Belief,” half a world away,
Herbert Marcuse was born.667 Upon completion of his studies at the Gymnasium, and a
brief stint in the military, Marcuse went on to study at the universities of Berlin and
Freiburg from 1919 until 1922. From those early years, Marcuse revealed interests as vast
and boundless as Peirce’s own, focusing not only on philosophy, but on literature and
economics, as well. After the completion of his dissertation,668 and a brief stint in
publishing, Marcuse returned to Freiburg where he worked with two of the greatest
German thinkers of the 20th century, Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. It was here
that his appreciation for Hegelian and post-Hegelian phenomenology was born.669
Marcuse’s first book not only reflected a fervent Heideggerian influence670 on
“Hegel’s less systematic and more historical strains,”671 but, moreover, “evinced one of
Marcuse’s greatest talents – his synthetic, speculative imagination, his ability to bring
together the insights of many thinkers and traditions in startlingly new ways.”672 Just as
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Peirce was able to draw from his vast knowledge of the history of philosophy, weaving in
an out of Kant, Hegel, Scotus and countless others to create something wholly new, so,
too, did Marcuse draw on his unique exposure to various strains of socio-political
thought, history, literature, art and the phenomenology of his mentors, to weave together
something truly groundbreaking.
Not long after the publication of this first text, helped in no small part by a
commendation on its scope and rigor by none other than Theodor Adorno himself,
Marcuse became a member of the Institute for Social Research, a diverse array of sociopolitical philosophers including the likes of Max Horkheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Friedrich
Pollock, Erich Fromm, Franz Neumann and, of course, Adorno, himself. The members of
this Frankfurt School were proponents of what they called “critical theory,” “the
theoretical position…which sought to revise Marxist social theory while remaining,
according to their way of thinking, faithful to the Marxist spirit.”673 Marcuse’s own
definition of critical theory can be found scattered throughout his early work but is
perhaps most succinctly formulated in his most iconic text, One-Dimensional Man:
Any critical theory of society is thus confronted with the problem of
historical objectivity, a problem which arises at the two points where the
analysis implies value judgments: (1) the judgment human life is worth
living, or rather can be and ought to be made worth living. This judgment
underlies all intellectual effort; it is the a priori of social theory, and its
rejection…rejects theory itself; (2) the judgment that, in a given society,
specific possibilities exist for the amelioration of human life and specific
ways and means of realizing these possibilities.674
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These defining characteristics will recur throughout his work and form the bedrock of his
critical endeavors.
Just as Peirce had done in the company of his “Metaphysical Club,” Marcuse’s
thought flourished in the company of the Frankfurt School and he began to develop “his
own highly original interpretation, synthesis, and critique of phenomenology, Hegel,
Marx, and the Freudian psychoanalytic theory.”675 These initial strains of thought and
philosophical interests would find their way into the very heart of some of his most
enduring texts, not the least of which were One-Dimensional Man and Eros and
Civilization, the focal points for my investigation here.
Marcuse’s greatest achievement during this early period with the Frankfurt School
was Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social Theory676 that sought to
unearth radical strains in what most critics of Hegel maintained was a thoroughly
conservative shell. Beneath this shell, “Marcuse discovered a radical kernel – the
dialectical theory of negativity – and spent the rest of his life making use of this approach
in an attempt to analyze and criticize existing ideologies and social institutions.”677 As
Bronner notes, Marcuse felt that “progress,” for Hegel, “always implied an ability to
shape the world in terms of its unrealized potentiality for freedom.” 678 As Robinson
notes, “Marcuse supported this thesis by pointing to Hegel’s distinction between reality
and actuality, the former representing what in fact exists, the latter a reality which has
overcome the discrepancy between the possible and the existent.”679 This theory of
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“negativity,” so prominent throughout the course of Marcuse’s long career, will be
explored thoroughly throughout this investigation, as well as themes of “contradiction
and the relation of theory to practice – motifs central to Frankfurt School critical
theory,”680 all of which were explored in that early text.
As an anti-totalitarian author, and a Jew, Marcuse’s best recourse was to flee
Germany during the Nazi rise to power and he found a home in the United States, first
working for the Office of Strategic Services,681 then teaching at Columbia University,
Harvard University and Brandeis until his quasi-retirement in 1965. Towards the end of
his tenure at Brandeis, the University of California San Diego took interest in his work
and invited him to teach there for a series of short contracts until 1970. Due to the stellar
success and popularity of One-Dimensional Man682 and Eros and Civilization,683 in
conjunction with his very public anti-war efforts, Marcuse became known to a new
generation of critical theorists as the acknowledged “Father of the New Left.”
Passing away at the age of 81 in 1979, Marcuse was exposed to such “epochal
events as World War I, the Russian Revolution, fascism, exile, World War II, the civil
rights, anti-war, and student movements, Watergate, and the nuclear arms race.” 684 At
one point or another in his career, Marcuse responded to, or was influenced by, each and
every major historical event of the better part of the 20th century, and bringing to bear his
vast array of philosophical interests, from Marx to Freud, from Hegel to Heidegger, just
as it was in Peirce, the difficulty arose as to whether or not it was possible to construct a
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systematic overview of his work. As Pippin and others have noted, “as the preceding
sketch makes clear, any attempt to compile and organize a comprehensive series of
essays on the thought of Herbert Marcuse immediately encounters an obvious and
difficult problem,”685 namely, that “the range of his interests throughout his long life was
so wide that, at first glance, it seems to defeat any attempt at a view of the whole.”686 A
nearly identical problem presented itself to us in our analysis of Peirce and, just as with
Peirce, this project will endeavor to unearth a unifying strain of thought throughout
Marcuse’s multifaceted explorations as not only pivotal to his own position but, too,
capable of being brought into direct conversation with the insights of Peirce. For as
Pippin and others note, “in the face of this gallimaufry of concerns, it is important not to
lose sight of the unity Marcuse himself would have insisted upon, a unity necessary to
keep in mind when understanding and assessing his work.”687
Of key interest to this particular project are the socio-political ramifications of
Peirce’s various positions, most notably the detrimental ways in which various
counterproductive forms of belief formation have negatively impacted cultural and
individual development. Peirce provided his own immanent critique of each of the three
counterproductive methods, demonstrating ways in which, unlike the method of inquiry,
these three do not hold in the “long run.” One of the most enduring methods, by Peirce’s
own admission, was the method of authority wherein a power structure, through various
means of historical revisionism, cultural isolationism, censorship, and the proliferation of
propaganda, dictates the cultural beliefs for a given populace rather than allow them to
engage in the prescribed method of inquiry. These beliefs, invariably, are to the benefit of
685
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the power elite, aiding them in retaining their hold on power by eliminating viable
alternatives and convincing their populace of the timeless, apodictic necessity of the
beliefs they proliferate. In 1972, Marcuse released his own Study of Authority wherein he
explored many of the same themes inherent in Peirce’s own critique, though in far more
depth and historical scope than Peirce, in such a limited space, was able to articulate.
Moreover, the form of the authoritarian power in Peirce, as well as the means of
its perpetuation of power and belief manipulation, resonate throughout the various
periods of Marcuse’s long career. Note Marcuse’s language, for example, in his Essay on
Liberation, reflecting many of the same themes he developed earlier in One-Dimensional
Man:
The mass democracy developed by monopoly capitalism has shaped the
rights and liberties which it grants in its own image and interest; the
majority of the people is the majority of their masters; deviations are
easily ‘contained’; and concentrated power can afford to tolerate (perhaps
even defend) radical dissent as long as the latter complies with the
established rules and manners…the opposition is thus sucked into the very
world which it opposes.688

The authority, which here takes the form of democracy under the sway of monopoly
capitalism, grants rights and liberties to its citizens only in so far as they reinforce the
authority’s own “image and interest.” Further, just as we saw in Peirce’s exploration of
the ways in which dissenters are handled by the authority, “deviations,” as Marcuse notes
here, are “easily ‘contained.’” Lastly, as with Peirce, the authority was unable to manage
all of the beliefs of its citizens, but, in fact, did not need to, so long as the more critical
beliefs, those which keep the authority in power, were secured. Here, as well, Marcuse
notes that the authority may allow a certain form of dissent, just enough dissent along
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with just enough rights and liberties, to obfuscate the efficacy of their hold on power by
appearing to grant avenues of dissent and the rights and liberties to engage in dissent,
negating the possibility of any radical dissent to change the authoritarian system on a
more fundamental level.689 Those individuals that attempt to undermine the most
fundamental beliefs proliferated by the authority, that engage in this unacceptable radical
form of dissent, are labeled as “criminal” or “Enemy,” as Marcuse notes. In this way,
even language is mobilized in the authority’s “counterrevolutionary” efforts:
In the established vocabulary, ‘violence’ is a term which one does
apply to the action of the police, the National Guard, the Marshals,
Marines, the bombers. The ‘bad’ words are a priori reserved for
Enemy, and their meaning is defined and validated by the actions of
Enemy regardless of their motivation and goal.690

not
the
the
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The “Enemy,” here, refers to those who would undermine the authority’s hold on power,
akin to Peirce’s individual of “wider social feeling.” The term, “Enemy,” mobilized by
the authority, is used to describe in a blanketing way all those who would undermine the
established law and order of society, regardless, as he says, “of their motivation and
goal,” lumping wanton criminality in with those that would see a better, freer society.
Look no further than the criminalizing of the activities of those involved in the Civil
Rights movement as an example of this phenomenon, those who fought for equality
equated with wanton criminals. The authority guards against individuals with this “wider
social feeling,” those capable of bringing about radical social change and engaging in
radical dissent, by labeling them “Enemy” and thus convincing their own populace to
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turn against their neighbors in support of their prescribed way of life: a self-policing, selfregulating policy that Peirce explicitly warned against.
Consequently, the struggle for changes beyond the system becomes, by
virtue of its own dynamic, undemocratic in the terms of the system, and
counterviolence is from the beginning inherent in this dynamic. Thus the
radical is guilty – either of surrendering to the power of the status quo, or
of violating the Law and Order of the status quo.691
The “radical,” for Peirce, the individual of “wider social feeling,” is guilty no matter
what: either this individual surrenders to the indoctrinating status quo of the system or
else, precisely because this individual’s transgressions are a radical form of dissent, and
not the inconsequential forms that the authority permits, are guilty of criminality, of
violating this status quo.
In the mobilization of this aggressiveness, ancient psychical forces are
activated to serve the economic-political needs of the system: the Enemy
are those who are unclear, infested; they are animals rather than humans;
they are contagious…and threaten the clean, anesthetized, healthy free
world. They must be liquidated, smoked out, and burned out like
venom.692
Marcuse’s language eloquently resonated with Peirce’s own in his critique of the method
of authority; the means by which the authority seeks to criminalize, marginalize and
condemn as contagions all those with this wider sort of social feeling.
Yet, for Peirce, despite the historic efficacy of the method of authority, despite the
centuries of domination it has borne, it cannot hold “in the long run.” Eventually, those
with a wider sense of social feeling will seek abroad, or to the past, or some potential
avenue for the fruitful comparison to stimulate the doubt requisite for the unfolding of
inquiry and radical social change. Marcuse called this phenomenon “sublimation,” the
691
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transcendence beyond the established universe of beliefs perpetuated by the authority,
achieved through what Marcuse called the reengagement of “critical” or “negative”
thinking, leading to a “Great Refusal,” the rejection of what is from the higher
perspective of what might otherwise be. These were the tools of Peirce’s individual of
wider social feeling. So, too, was it the basis of both philosophers’ attack on “positive”
thinking or “positivism,” especially that of Auguste Comte and others of his ilk who
marginalized negative thinking (the doubt, tension and comparison between possibilities
forged of dialogue and inquiry) in favor of a study of the bare facts of what is, relegating
the philosophy of what ought to be or what is not to idle speculation; a “speculation” that
is anything but “idle” and is precisely what is needed for radical social change to
manifest. Positivism divorced from negative thinking is nothing more than an analysis of
what is and, so being, is little more than reaffirmation of the authoritarian structures
already in place, “apologetic,” “justificatory,”693 and nothing more.
“Critical” or “negative thinking” was requisite for progress towards a better
society in both Marcuse and Peirce, though the language is Marcuse’s alone. For Peirce it
was the language of “belief” and of “doubt;” the beliefs formed and proliferated by the
authority and the doubt that the authority would not permit its citizens to experience that
would otherwise propel inquiry and instigate radical social change.
Marcuse was profoundly optimistic throughout much of his career as to the very
real potential for radical social change even from the seemingly totalizing, self-insulating,
self-perpetuating structures of authority. Indeed, Marcuse even made direct reference to a
“long run” in his later work, Counterrevolution and Revolt:
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A Marxian analysis cannot seek comfort ‘in the long run.’ In this ‘long
run,’ the system will indeed collapse, but Marxian theory cannot prophesy
which form of society (if any) will replace it. Within the framework of the
objective conditions, the alternatives (fascism or socialism) depend on the
intelligence and the will, the consciousness and the sensibility, of human
beings. It depends on their still-existing freedom.694

Marcuse was convinced that the technological apparatus of capital would, indeed,
collapse given enough time, that is, “in the long run,” but warned against an acquiescent
acceptance of this distant historical moment. Peirce, too, would agree, especially in terms
of the necessity for the “still-existing freedom,” the “intelligence,” and the “will,” of
those in the community of inquirers to buck trends towards conformity. Nevertheless,
Marcuse was well aware of the time-consuming prospects of realizing radical social
change, noting in various places throughout his work that there was a “long march”695
ahead of us towards an ideal future society. As Bronner notes, “Utopia…thus becomes a
legitimate object of inquiry”696 and, as such, in a Peircean sense, may guide us into the
future.
Further, Marcuse presented the authority’s ability to obfuscate Truth, blockade
individual inquiry towards it, and replace Truth with whatever was conducive to the
perpetuation of its hold on power, in a manner quite complementary to the way in which
Peirce described these phenomena. For example, Marcuse noted in Counterrevolution
and Revolt, that we seek an “idea” purified from the “mutilated experience which is the
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work of society” wherein it is “given” in a “false” and “distorted” form. 697 This is the job
of “negative” thinking which “negates”698 the false, distorted and manipulated beliefs
perpetuated by the apparatus of capital, revealing them for what they are and thus freeing
the inquiring mind to seek Truth through means other than reliance on authority. I would
argue that Peirce’s individual of wider social feeling, those that see the structures of
authority for what they are by comparing them to what they are not, was engaged in
precisely this form of negative thinking that Marcuse described here.
For Marcuse, the necessary component of such truth-seeking was radical
individual freedom: freedom from the totalizing system of indoctrination forged of
capital and, in essence, freedom from what Max Weber called “technological rationality”
which provides its own forms of “truth” and “values.” Technological rationality, in this
sense, creates the kind of rational instrumentalism that Peirce railed against in his critique
of the method of authority: beliefs and values prescribed externally to the inquirer him or
herself that all inquiry must be channeled to reify and validate a priori. Like Peirce,
Marcuse saw freedom itself as a “regulative concept,” freedom to inquire without
blockade or constraint, which guides “the practice of changing reality in accordance with
its ‘idea,’ i.e., its own potentialities – to make reality free for its truth.”699 “Reality has to
be discovered and projected,”700 Marcuse said, “projected” in so far as it is postulated as
existing beyond or behind the stultifying confines of capital’s discourse and commodity
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fetishism, and thus “discovered” via negative thinking, that which is not the ideology of
exploitation and toil.701 As Marcuse noted:
Knowledge is transcendent (toward the object world, toward reality) not
only in an epistemological sense – as against repressive forms of life – it is
political. Denial of the right to political activity in the university
perpetuates the separation between theoretical and practical reason and
reduces the effectives and the scope of intelligence.702

Whether it was the denial of the right to engage in political activity or the denial of the
right to inquire any which way the individual saw fit, the scope of intelligence is
narrowed to the closed confines of the instrumental avenues dictated by the authority.
Knowledge seeks to discover the Truth, a realm “transcendent” beyond the beliefs
proliferated by these invested interests, a reality once embraced that illuminates the
contingency of the beliefs and values proliferated and would reinitiate non-instrumental
inquiry once more.
Marcuse, on occasion, even framed the relationship between the individual and
society in a manner akin to Peirce’s “organic” relationship between organism and
environment and the stimuli that the organism reacts to which subsequently condition the
habits and beliefs forged of those transactions. As Marcuse said in An Essay on
Liberation, for example:
Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of social behavior,
it is not only introjected – it also operates as a norm of ‘organic’ behavior:
the organism receives and reacts to stimuli and ‘ignores’ or repels others
in accord with the introjected morality, which is thus promoting or
impeding the function of the organism as a living cell in the respective
society.703
“The senses must learn not to see things anymore in the medium of that law and order which has formed
them; the bad functionalism which organizes our sensibility must be smashed.” Ibid.
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As Peirce noted, the cycle of belief formation is stimulated by the onset of specific
problematic situations that threw the initial belief into a state of doubt that, in turn,
became the genesis of inquiry. The problems that an individual encounters are
substantially altered depending upon both that individual’s surrounding natural and social
environment as well as the method of belief formation he or she maintains. Key to
Marcuse’s point here, the individuals within a system of authority will likewise be
stimulated by a very unique problem set conditioned by the authority itself. As such, the
beliefs forged of inquiry, the doubt that stimulates inquiry, are all traced back to the
preconditioned problems that an individual faces such that the trajectory of the cycle of
inquiry terminates in precisely those beliefs that are conducive to the authority’s hold on
power.
Further, “it is precisely this excessive adaptability of the human organism which
propels the perpetuation and extension of the commodity form and, with it, the
perpetuation and extension of the social controls over behavior and satisfaction.”704
Peirce’s naturalistic conception of the inquirer as “organism” adapting to problematic
situations is the basis for indoctrination within the method of authority and central to
Marcuse’s entire critical project. Within the one-dimensional society, the human
organism adapts to the changing climate’s increase in commodity fetishism, increase in
standard of living, the capitalistic drive to succeed at the expense of others (the defining
characteristic of the “Gospel of Greed” for Peirce), and thus the successfully adaptive
organism within such a society is the best sort of cog in the machine of technological

704

Ibid., 17.

218

rationality and industry. Adaptation becomes assimilation in the advanced industrial
society.
Indeed, Marcuse even referenced the manipulation of beliefs, explicitly, as part of
the indoctrinating function of the bureaucratic apparatus of authority: “a society also
demands to a considerable extent belief in one’s beliefs (which is part of the required
sanity); belief in the operative value of society’s values.”705 The adaptive organism
within the advanced industrial society acquiesces to the values and beliefs of the
authority, just as Peirce noted in his own critique. Indeed, as we will explore shortly, this
is the key corrective that Marcuse contributes to Marx’s social theory: a social
psychology of the working class within such an advanced industrial authoritarian system
that adapts the values and beliefs of commodity and capital to survive, placated by just
enough euphoric indulgences that the motivation for genuine revolutionary change is
negated.
Marcuse even expressed the distinction between authentic and inauthentic forms
of solidarity and social individualism. As Peirce noted, there is solidarity and social
individualism in both the ideal community of inquirers as well as the citizens in an
authoritarian state. The former championed authentic democratic ideals of dialogue,
belief revision, and communal inquiry. The latter, by contrast, was merely a legion of
“intellectual slaves,” somnambulists, all working together, yes, but not for the sake of
Truth, knowledge or freedom, but merely for the perpetuation of the authority that
governs them:
These new relationships would be the result of a ‘biological’ solidarity in
work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and
individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free
705
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development – the exact opposite of the administered and enforced
harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?)
countries…solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating.
Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity.
Socialist solidarity is autonomy: self-determination begins at home – and
that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses.706

Just as Peirce noted, the defining distinction between the solidarity and social
individualism of the community of inquiry and the community of authority is one of
autonomy and non-instrumental rationality (the freedom to self-govern and dictate for
themselves the trajectory of inquiry) vs. heteronomy and instrumental rationality (the
passive acceptance of beliefs pre-packaged to the benefit of the governing power).
Despite the Frankfurt School’s general aversion to capitalism, Marcuse had great
hope for America, calling it the only “land of the future.”707 Nevertheless, Marcuse saw a
subtle form of totalitarianism manifest in America’s so-called democracy, a form of
totalitarianism based not upon force and coercion, but upon the perpetuation of beliefs,
values and desires conducive only to those in power under the sway of market capitalism.
And the foundation of all this, Marcuse maintained, was the indoctrinating and alienating
uses of an increasingly wide proliferation of technology:
By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary
industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For ‘totalitarian’ is not only a
terroristic political coordination of society, but also a nonterroristic
economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation
of needs by vested interests.708

Marcuse saw, in the very substructure of capitalism in advanced industrial societies, the
creation and manipulation of needs and desires (and, consequently, the very ways in
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which human beings develop) that invariably benefit those “vested interests” in places of
socio-political or economic seats of power and technology is the engine for the
promulgation of this indoctrination.
Technology plays a key role in the type of instrumentalism that Peirce highlighted
in his critique of the method of authority, illuminated throughout Marcuse’s career. If
instrumentalism, in this specific sense, is defined as the mobilization of human cognitive
capacities to ascertain the means to externally prescribed ends, creating rigid channels
through which inquiry must conform, technology was, for Marcuse, a prime contributor
to this phenomenon. Rather than diminishing scarcity, sickness, and suffering, technology
has created new avenues of control, conditioning the ways in which we may inquire and
dictating the goals of that inquiry for the inquirers themselves. However, several decades
prior to One-Dimensional Man, Marcuse held a more dynamic and dialectical conception
of technology, seeing it as not only a means of indoctrination but, too, a potential source
for the most profound emancipation from precisely the sorts of structures an advanced
society maintains.709
This dynamic position is most succinctly encapsulated in his 1941 paper “Some
Social Implications of Modern Technology,” published in the Institute’s Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science. That early essay serves as an illuminating precursor to the
critique that would come later in One-Dimensional Man,710 demonstrating the
connections between “technology and potent forms of cultural domination”711 and
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offering a penetrating critique of “technology and analyses of the ways that modern
technology is producing novel forms of society and culture with new modes of social
control.”712 Technology, as we will see, aids the administration in dissolving the potential
for “negative thinking” which, for Marcuse, is central to even the possibility of radical
social change and the dissolution of the indoctrinating and alienating tendencies of the
technology, itself. 713
In this early essay, Marcuse marked a distinction between “technology” “taken as
a social process”714 with “technics,” “the technical apparatus of industry, transportation,
communication.”715 Although technology as a social process has, for Marcuse, taken on a
decidedly negative connotation, associated with modes of control and domination,
technics is a far more neutral entity maintaining the potential both for the perpetration of
authoritarian dominion as well as the potential for becoming an engine of liberation.
Technology, as a mode of production, as the totality of instruments,
devices and contrivances which characterize the machine age is thus at the
same time a mode of organizing and perpetuating (or changing) social
relationships, a manifestation of prevalent thought and behavior patterns,
an instrument for control and domination.716
Characteristic of the “machine age,” what Marcuse will refer to as the “advanced
industrial society” throughout One-Dimensional Man, technology “as a mode of
production” is the instrument for “control and domination” and the leading factor in
social arrangements to the point of influencing individuals down to their very thoughts
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and behavior patterns, by what he will eventually refer to in that later book as the vested
interests’, that is, the “administrative-bureaucratic apparatus which organizes, manages,
and stabilizes capitalist society,”717 ability to utilize the advanced forms of technology
and its proliferation to “invade” the individual’s “private space” until it is “whittled down
by technological reality.”718
Conversely, “technics by itself can promote authoritarianism as well as liberty,
scarcity as well as abundance, the extension as well as the abolition of toil.”719 The initial
rise of the technological age offered such potential for liberation. Whereas individuals
might spend all day toiling to create a certain set number of goods, technology could,
theoretically, permit those individuals to create more products over less time utilizing less
toil. The proliferation of products could then (theoretically) aid in the alleviation of
scarcity rather than its perpetuation. The reality, however, proved to be quite different.
For although Marcuse’s “critical theory of technics/technology” does well to differentiate
“negative features with positive potentials that could be used to democratize and enhance
human life,”720 the emphasis is clearly on the former, the ways in which technology has
indoctrinated and manipulated citizens of advanced industrial societies. The integration
of technology into the factory did nothing to alleviate toil or time, merely allowing more
products to be created for increased profits for the owners of this technology.
Indeed, technology has its own form of instrumentalism separate from that of the
instrumentalism of human rationality. Technological instrumentalism is the utilization of
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technology as a means to ends we prescribe, that is to say, technology is “neutral: as a
transparent medium, it adds nothing substantive to the activities it serves but merely
accelerates those activities, or realizes them on a larger scale or under new conditions.”721
For Marcuse, ideally, human rational capacities ought to be freed from the instrumental
rigidity of the modern age and instrumentalism ought to be allocated to technology itself:
we ought not to be the means to ends dictated by technology but, conversely, we ought to
dictate the ends for technology which technology, in turn, instrumentally, ascertains the
means to achieve the goals we demand of it. In the advanced industrial society, Marcuse
argued, this revolution of Frankenstein’s monster, establishing its own autonomy over its
creator, has created new forms of social control, indoctrination, and alienation as
technology has lost this instrumental bent.
Technological instrumentalism, the view “that humanity was in control of its
technologies,”722 allows for its employment on “purely rational grounds, such as
measurable, verifiable improvements in efficiency.”723 Although Marcuse admitted to
technics’ potential for either emancipation or indoctrination, by the time it takes the form
of “technology,” in a Marcusean sense, a problem arises: technology becomes the new
rationality. If rationality employs technology, but has likewise become technology (what
Marcuse, taking a cue from Max Weber,724 will call “technological rationality”725), then
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technology, in essence, comes to employ itself. It takes on a life of its own apart from
humanity’s employment of it. And this is a central concern for Marcuse’s critical theory,
for if “rationality has always been considered a basis for truly free association; when
common goals emerge from debate and argument” (as Peirce would advocate) and
wherein “people cooperate without coercion” (that is, not within a Peircean authority),
that capacity for radical autonomous inquiry, in an authentically free and open
community of inquirers, is negated by the conditions and employment of technology by
technology, and “rationality” is transmuted into “efficiency,” serving the ends of the
technocratic rationality of the modernized age. Indeed, this “technological rationality” is
the “culprit” of the “opiating tendencies of modern technological society,” the central
theme of One-Dimensional Man; a technological rationality which, as Lukes notes,
“involves populace acceptance of the belief that the given technology, without any
serious restructuring, can solve any problems with which it is confronted.”726 This
passive receptivity by a populace of a fundamental belief (namely, the efficacy and
emancipatory power of technology) is in keeping with a Peircean critique of authority in
the ways in which I have discussed. The merger of technology and rationality in this
Weberian sense creates a most atrocious sort of chimera: technology, which ought to be
the means to achieve ends prescribed autonomously by human beings, is now the guiding
force for what is considered rational to begin with and reason, which ought to be
deployed for ascertaining the goals technology ought to have and then relegate
Feenburg suggests that Marcuse was influenced here by his reading of Max Weber who “defined
modernity in terms of the spread of markets, formal law, democracy, beaurocracy and technology. He
called these ‘rationalized’ institutions because they share certain qualities normally associated with reason:
they appear more abstract, more exact, more value- and context-free, better grounded in scientific
knowledge, and more efficient than traditional institutions,” Ibid., Op. Cit., 215.
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technology to finding the means to fulfill goals posed by humanity, is now reduced to
finding the means to the goals set by technology itself.
Marcuse, however, was not wholly consistent on this distinction, as Ingram notes,
for although he “sometimes suggests that only political ends would be transformed while
technology, conceived as a neutral instrument for efficiently realizing ends, would remain
the same727…elsewhere728 he says that the very structure of science and technology
would be transformed.”729 Only the former view retains technology in its instrumental
form. In either case, however, Marcuse was consistent on his call for a fundamental
change in the uses of technology and the eradication of this technological rationality. For
in the advanced, one-dimensional society, technology, as Farr notes, “perpetuates the
erase of the individual” and “is viewed as a panacea which stands above the values of
individuals in society. Technology…becomes the ultimate value.”730 As such, the only
path to liberation from the stultifying effects of technical rationality was, as Marcuse
noted, “only by a revolution which makes technology and technique subservient to the
needs and goals of free men: in this sense, and in this sense only, it would be a revolution
against technocracy.”731
Technological rationality infiltrates every facet of modern life, even the ways in
which we take our leisure. It is so all-pervasive that, as Marcuse will offer later in his
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career, it must be supplanted by a new, “aesthetic” rationality732 if radical social change is
to emerge as a live possibility, freeing creativity and the freeplay of the imagination to
conceive alternative potentialities to the current status quo. In the interim, however,
citizens are indoctrinated to the very core of their being, down to their very desires and
needs, as is the predominant theme of both One-Dimensional Man as well as Eros and
Civilization, in a totalizing system wherein escape seems impossible. As Offe notes, “the
domain of culture is also industrialized; esthetic expressions are robbed of their critical
function and circulate as mediators of affirmative contents of consciousness,” 733 that is,
even the traditionally conceived autonomy and free play of imaginative ideas in the
aesthetic realm are co-opted and utilized by the technical apparatus to perpetuate itself
and the vested interests in positions of power.734
Using Weber’s definition, Marcuse came to distance himself from the traditional
technological-instrumentalist view in noting the all-consuming nature of the technocracy
both in terms of the means of societal development as well as the ends which, no longer
prescribed the citizens themselves, come to be prescribed by the technology. He said, “in
the face of the totalitarian features of this society, the traditional notion of the ‘neutrality’
of technology can no longer be maintained.”735 As Offe notes, there was “no longer a
purely ‘neutral’ potential” as instrumentalism would maintain but, rather, this new
technological rationality “expands into the total structure of society; the dominant
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technological system no longer possess the transparency it once derived from its definite
orientation towards the interests of certain social classes or groups.”736
Thus negating the possibility that rationality could be in any way divorced from
technology sufficiently to employ it, technology, in a sense, employs itself and the “ends”
to which human rationality would otherwise utilize technology are now dictated by the
technology itself. It has escaped the combined will of its creators and taken on a “life” of
its own, a life that then turns to condition not only its own trajectory but also the lived
conditions of its creators. As Feenburg notes:
Modern means already change the world ‘immanently,’ independent of the
purpose for which they are employed. Our tools have become the
environment in which we live; increasingly, we are incorporated into the
apparatus that we have created, and we are subordinated to its rhythms and
demands. Heidegger called this the ‘peril’ of the age.737

This conception of technology effectively taking on a life of its own, transcending the
purposes of its human creators to then turn back to dictate the lived reality for all is
foreshadowed by Marx and studied closely in Marcuse’s Counterrevolution and Revolt.
As Marx said:
No longer the individual laborer but rather the socially combined labor
power becomes the actual agent of the collective work process. The
various competing labor powers which constitute the productive machine
as a whole participate in very different ways in the immediate production
of commodities…one individual works with his hands, another with his
head, one as a manager, engineer, technologist, et cetera…they are directly
exploited by capital…[the combined activity of the collective laborer
results] immediately in a collective product which is at the same time a
sum-total of commodities, and it is a matter of indifference whether the
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function of the individual worker, who is only a member of this collective
laborer, is more remote or close to immediate manual labor.738

Each participant in labor adds to the sum-total praxes that, itself, takes on a momentum
of production all its own, beyond the control of any of the unique, individual laborers
engaged in the process of manufacturing under the control of the machine-age. As
Marcuse said, “the enlarged universe of exploitation is a totality of machines – human,
economic, political, military, educational…the nation as capital, imperialist capital.”739
This Marxian concept of the totality of the machine age taking on, in effect, a life
of its own, is beautifully expressed in the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. Like Marcuse, Sartre
drew from his combined interest in Hegel, phenomenology and Marxism but infused his
own unique brand of existentialism, culminating in his epic treatise, The Critique of
Dialectical Reason. All too aware of technology’s oppressive role in modern society,
Sartre argued that the combined practical activities, or “praxes,” of unique individuals are
taken up in the miasma of what he termed “the practico-inert,” the sum-total of all praxes
that is, itself, over and above all of them, taking on a life of its own, resisting change and
relatively immune to alterations in its momentum. “Sartre...never doubted that the
multiplicity of individual praxes produced the world,”740 and the sum-total of these
praxes, ““the practico-inert, however well worked, continues to manifest an ‘active
inertia’ that resists human projects.”741
All individual freedoms are finally bogged down in what Sartre calls the
‘practico-inert,’ the thing-iness of the social organization, to which
everyone is subject as if it were a form of physical necessity; it is a
Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Op. Cit., 12 – 13 citing Karl Marx, Resultate des unmittelbaren
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necessity which remains intelligible because it derives from the free
praxes of individuals, but it is, in a way, a negation of that liberty.742
As Aronson notes, “[the practico-inert] entails the thesis that, regardless of its
intended positive results, our praxis is thwarted or confounded. We become dominated
by unintended features of our product.”743 The practico-inert, in a very real sense,
represents the transcendental conditions for all lived experience, the backdrop, frequently
passing unnoticed and unquestioned, against which all lived experience must necessarily
unfold. As Marcuse said, too:
As a technological universe, advanced industrial society is a political
universe, the latest stage in the realization of a specific historical project –
namely, the experience, transformation, and organization of nature as the
mere stuff of domination. As the project unfolds, it shares the entire
universe of discourse and action, intellectual and material culture. In the
medium of technology, culture, politics, and the economy merge into an
omnipresent system which swallows up or repulses all alternatives.744
Similar to Sartre’s position, Marcuse saw a political project (the sum total of all
“praxes” as Sartre might say) taking on a life of its own, creating an “entire universe,” an
“omnipresent system,” which in turn creates its own demands for its own perpetuation.
At first this may sound somewhat esoteric but, quite the contrary, there is nothing
at all occult about such a phenomenon. If we consider the capitalistic market, for
example, the consumer’s choices do, indeed, participate in the market’s overall trajectory.
But that trajectory is the sum total of all consumer choices and beyond the direct
manipulation of any single individual that participates in such a totalizing system. In turn,
the entire capitalistic infrastructure is metastasized into every aspect of our lives, no
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single product isolated from the rest, just as the invention of the car necessitated the
creation of a new transportation infrastructure, the transmutation of neighborhoods into
waystops along highways, the creation of new billboards for the proliferation of new
forms of advertising for products only tangentially (if at all) related to the driving
experience itself, and so forth. Indeed, for Marcuse, an integral component to radical
social change was precisely the injection of a “new sensibility” into this practico-inert of
technical rationality, a new sensibility which is, itself, a “praxis” taken up into the
miasma of the practico-inert to change it from within. As he said:
The new sensibility has become, by this very token, praxis: it emerges in
the struggle against violence and exploitation where this struggle is waged
for essentially new ways and forms of life: negation of the entire
Establishment, its morality, culture; affirmation of the right to build a
society in which the abolition of poverty and toil terminates in a universe
where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful become forms
of existence and thereby the Form of the society itself.745

Further:
They can emerge only in the collective practice of creating an
environment: level by level, step by step – in the material and intellectual
production, an environment in which the nonaggressive, erotic, receptive
faculties of man, in harmony with the consciousness of freedom, strive for
the pacification of man and nature.746
Feenburg notes that long before Marcuse’s or Sartre’s critiques, the genre of
science fiction literature anticipated the Dystopian vision of the technocratic future
wherein technology effectively enslaved the human agents that created it, taking on, in
essence, a life of its own, human goals and individuality enslaved to the will of the
machine, seeking the fulfillment of a perfectly technological society which, concurrently,
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is by Marcuse’s association likewise “a perfectly rationalized society.” 747 From A Brave
New World to 1984, this theme has become the predominant trope of the entire genre,
manifesting countless times since Marcuse, as well, testifying to the enduring concern.
From HAL in Kubrik’s iconic tale 2001: A Space Odyssey to the rise of the machine age
in Terminator, in these tales the best way to ensure a perfectly rational society is to
associate it with the perfectly technological society, precisely as Marcuse articulated; a
process which often entails the enslavement or eradication of humanity itself, viewed
from the lens of the technology as the greatest threat to pure rationality and “the isolated
individualistic hero of these tales,” the Peircean individual of wider social feeling,
“stands for the human values inevitably ground under foot by the march of reason.”748
For “the fetishism of the commodity world…can be destroyed only by men and women
who have torn aside the technological and ideological veil which conceals what is going
on, which covers the insane rationality of the whole – men and women who have become
free to develop their own needs, to build, in solidarity, their own world.”749 Presented in
Marcuse’s own unique idiom, these are the Peircean individuals of a wider social feeling,
those that have found a way to transcend and dissolve the stultifying and nearly
overwhelming nexus of beliefs perpetuated by authority to seek new horizons, new
possibilities, to find the requisite alternatives to the current milieu in which to create the
tension necessary for inquiry, growth and radical social change. Since the cause of
indoctrination is a totalizing system of technological indoctrination (this “technical
rationality”), Peircean individuals of wider sorts of social feeling must be able to
overcome the forces that “have shaped the very instincts and needs of men” and thus
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these unique individuals must be “physiologically and psychologically able to experience
things, and each other, outside the context of violence and exploitation,”750 that is, in a
Peircean sense, outside the totalizing belief-nexus perpetuated by the authority (which,
for Marcuse, would be identified with technical rationality itself).
It is here that Marcuse fully departed from the traditional instrumental vision of
technology as inherently neutral. “From this dystopian standpoint, technical progress is
not just a value-neutral increase in efficiency but a whole new way of life.”751 This
position, what Feenburg terms “substantive theories of technology,” rejected the valueneutral view of the instrumentalists arguing, instead, “it is actually a distinct cultural
framework embodying its own particular values.”752 This critique is likewise present in
Heidegger (one of Marcuse’s most prestigious mentors) saying “the outstanding feature
of modern technology lies in the fact that it is not at all any longer merely ‘means’ and no
longer merely stands in ‘service’ for others, but instead…unfolds a specific character of
domination,”753 effectively creating a “new kind of society, not simply a streamlined
version of the old.”754 Feenburg grants us a practical example to illustrate this point
further:
A city traversed by freeways is not the same place as the old preautomotive urban center. This obvious fact indicates the limits of the
neutrality of technology. Of course, he automobile is indifferent to its
driver’s destination, but it requires infrastructural preconditions in order to
be operated at all. Supplying those preconditions actually reshapes the
world in which destinations are chosen, transforming fields and
neighborhoods into roadbeds. This example is characteristic: what in
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modern societies we call progress in efficiency is precisely the
employment of means with such massive impacts.755

The practical activity of the unique individuals constructing more efficient modes of
transport is taken up by the collective project of the technocracy, not an isolated event,
but the catalyst for an overhaul of an entire nation’s infrastructure. Nor is this the end of
the cycle, for the technocracy moves on from Feenburg’s example ever-forward, everprogressing, making the world more rational, more technological, more efficient, and the
world changes beyond what any unique individual’s participation in that march to
progress initially entailed. We are “inside the machine, that technology is not merely a
tool extending our capabilities.”756
Nevertheless, technology has been employed to great positive benefit, minimizing
scarcity for some and taking substantial steps to minimize death and suffering through
medical innovations. It takes, as Feenburg notes, an “astonishing nerve to persist in
radical social criticism” against a society that has used technology, to a some degree, “in
feeding its members.”757 But as Marcuse himself said, “obstinacy [is] a genuine quality of
philosophical thought”758 and thus his critique comes as no surprise. “To be obstinate,”
Feenberg continues, “means to reject the easy reconciliation with society, to keep a sense
of reality based on longer time spans, deeper tensions, higher expectations and goals.”759
For Feenburg, the heart of Marcuse’s enterprise, and the justification for his critique of
the technological apparatus in a society that, nevertheless, provides countless amenities
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and pleasures to its people, was based upon what appears to be a very Peircean
conception of a longer run view of the issues at play. Marcuse did not merely look to the
past and the present in noting the historical development of capital and technology but,
like Marx himself, looked, too, to the future. Within a much wider vision, “longer time
spans” that reveal “deeper tensions” and “higher expectations,” Marcuse could find a
more objective footing in his critique, not limiting himself to merely pitting the
advantages against the disadvantages in the modern technological milieu but placing
those advantages and disadvantages in the context of a continuously unfolding narrative
into the future. With this perspective, Marcuse justified his obstinacy: simply because the
technocracy has positive side-effects to its hegemonic dominion over the lives of its
populace now in no way invalidates the need for a critical theory that may maintain the
advantages while at the same time elevating the disadvantages, given enough time, that
is, in the long run. Marcuse…
… was not merely complaining about a system he didn’t like. He was
imagining how it will appear to a backward glance rooted in the wider
context of values evolved over past centuries and destined to achieve
realization in the very technology of a future society. The obsolescence of
the present system will be obvious in this hypothetical future, justifying
the obstinacy of those who persisted in critique through these critical
times.760
This somewhat Utopian notion of “pacifying”761 technology, as Marcuse will call it, is a
point of great contention and controversy in his later work for it is unclear if Marcuse
ever provided a decisive method for achieving these ends. For “despite his success in
reviving critical Marxism and undermining rationalistic justifications of social hierarchy,
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Marcuse lacked an adequate account of how change might be brought about.”762 As Offe
notes, “the details of this program…remain so unclear that it is not easy to see how
Marcuse can escape the reproach of obscuritanism” for it “remains to be seen whether a
change in the ‘direction of technical progress’763 would suffice to concretize the concept
of a revolutionary technology.”764
Nevertheless, in providing a substantive critique of technology, Marcuse at least
illuminated the otherwise obfuscated exploitative and indoctrinating tendencies of the
machine-age, a key first step in the production of a positive alternative. One central
example Marcuse drew upon was the utilization of technics (implicitly, its transformation
into “technology” as he defined it above) by National Socialism in Germany during the
Third Reich:
National Socialism is a striking example of the ways in which a highly
rationalized and mechanized economy with the utmost efficiency in
production can also operate in the interest of totalitarian oppression and
continued scarcity. The Third Reich is indeed a form of “technocracy”: the
technical considerations of imperialistic efficiency and rationality
supersede the traditional standards of profitability and general welfare. In
National Socialist Germany, the reign of terror is sustained…by the
ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the
intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers,
the organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy—
all of which constitute the daily implements of terror—follow the lines of
greatest technological efficiency.765
We see all of the primary trappings of Peirce’s method of authority: from the
indoctrination of the young to the proliferation of propaganda to reify the beliefs of the
power majority. The transformation of technics to technology through the utilization of
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the machinery towards the end of domination bears direct and immediate import to the
ways in which individualism is both defined and expressed within such a society.
Marcuse noted the impact the technological age has had upon the concept of
individualism as it was understood in the 16th and 17th centuries and the rapid decline in
the fundamental values that sense of individualism maintained. He noted:
If we try to assemble in one guiding concept the various religious, political
and economic tendencies which shaped the idea of the individual in the
sixteenth and seventeenth century, we may define the individual as the
subject of certain fundamental standards and values which no external
authority was supposed to encroach upon. These standards and values
pertained to the forms of life, social as well as personal, which were most
adequate to the full development of man’s faculties and abilities. By the
same token, they were the “truth” of his individual and social existence.
The individual, as a rational being, was deemed capable of finding these
forms by his own thinking and, once he had acquired freedom of thought,
pursuing the course of action which would actualize them. Society’s task
was to grant him such freedom and to remove all restrictions upon his
rational course of action.766

In this idealized form of pre-technological society, we see shades of the type of autonomy
of inquiry championed by Peirce, precisely the same sort of autonomous inquiry that the
method of authority sought to dissolve in order to perpetuate its own beliefs and agenda.
Nevertheless, even this pre-industrial sense of individualism was influenced deeply by
the societal norms and expectations of what virtuous conduct entailed. In this sense,
Marcuse distinguished between “rational self-interest” and “immediate self-interest”:
The principle of individualism, the pursuit of self-interest, was
conditioned upon the proposition that self-interest was rational, that is to
say, that it resulted from and was constantly guided and controlled by
autonomous thinking. The rational self-interest did not coincide with the
individual’s immediate self-interest, for the latter depended upon the
standards and requirements of the prevailing social order, placed there not
by his autonomous thought and conscience but by external authorities. In
the context of radical Puritanism, the principle of individualism thus set
766
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the individual against his society. Men had to break through the whole
system of ideas and values imposed upon them, and to find and seize the
ideas and values that conformed to their rational interest. They had to live
in a state of constant vigilance, apprehension, and criticism, to reject
everything that was not true, not justified by free reason. This, in a society
which was not yet rational, constituted a principle of permanent unrest and
opposition. For false standards still governed the life of men, and the free
individual was therefore he who criticized these standards, searched for
the true ones and advanced their realization.767
“Rational self-interest,” the principle of autonomous individualism and freedom to
engage in inquiry unconstrained, was thus pitted against “immediate self-interest” to
conform to the mores, rules and ideologies of one’s immediate social community, just as
the individual was pitted against society itself. The limitations of immediate self-interest
were dictated not by one’s own rational inquiry, but by the prevailing “standards and
requirements of the prevailing social order.” In order to break through such confines,
individualism had to manifest in opposition to, and by overcoming, the social order that
set such limitations upon otherwise free, autonomous inquiry, for “false standards still
governed the life of men.”
In the Puritanical association that Marcuse invoked as an example here, we see
shades of all three of Peirce’s counterproductive methods of belief formation in play. The
governing social power, dictating the norms and standards to its members, utilized both
tenacity in clinging to those beliefs at all costs, beliefs that are the fundamental and
unquestioned guiding principles of that community (a priority), and proliferating them to
its citizens under the threat of persecution and excommunication (authority).
Individualism could emerge only in opposition to those mores, the type of individualism
that may be see in those with a “wider sort of social feeling” articulated in Peirce’s
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prescribed dissolution of the method of authority, itself. The search for “true” standards,
idealized in the method of inquiry, is here, too, the goal of such individuals striving in the
face of opposition at every turn. Marcuse even invoked a lovely passage from Milton that
not only expressed his point thoroughly but, too, reflected a decidedly Peircean
sentiment, as well, an image of a…
…wicked race of deceivers, who... took the virgin Truth, hewd her lovely
form into a thousand peeces, and scatter’d them to the four winds. From
that time ever since, the sad friends of Truth, such as durst appear,
imitating the careful search that Isis made for the mangl’d body of Osiris,
went up and down gathering up limb by limb still as they could find them.
We have not yet found them all,...nor ever shall do, till her Master’s
second coming...— To be still searching what we know not, by what we
know, still closing up truth to truth as we find it (for all her body is
homogeneal and proportional.768
Such was the “principle of individualistic rationality”769 at the time, for Marcuse, the
drive to find Truth after it had been scattered by the prevailing social mores more
interested in their own ideologies than Truth proper. The process is hard, potentially
impossible to fully achieve (“we have not yet found them all…nor ever shall do”) just as
Peirce’s “long run” implied. Indeed, in Counterrevolution and Revolt, Marcuse warned
that even the categories of “true and false, good and bad, openly become categories of the
political economy; they define the market value of men and things.”770 Just as Peirce
warned in his critique of the method of authority, forces beyond the autonomous inquiry
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of individuals dictate values of “truth” and “falsity,” as much as they do moral categories
such as “good” and “bad.”771
The movement to a more rational and technological society ought to have
provided the corrective for this constant battle of rational self-interest and immediate selfinterest by doing away with the majority of these irrational presuppositions and limits on
both our freedom and capability to engage in free inquiry and achieve a genuine sort of
autonomy. Again, just as I mentioned above, the reality of the situation did not unfold in
that way.
Liberalist society was held to be the adequate setting for individualistic
rationality. In the sphere of free competition, the tangible achievements of
the individual which made his products and performances a part of
society’s need, were the marks of his individuality. In the course of time,
however, the process of commodity production undermined the economic
basis on which individualistic rationality was built. Mechanization and
rationalization forced the weaker competitor under the dominion of the
giant enterprises of machine industry which, in establishing society’s
dominion over nature, abolished the free economic subject.772

Effectively, the dominion of a pre-technological system via the ideologies of a social
arrangement which had pitted one’s rational self-interest (autonomy and free inquiry)
against one’s immediate self-interest (acquiescence and submission) was not overcome
but, rather, merely supplanted by a new form of domination. Rather than submitting to
the ideological presuppositions of one’s immediate community, weaker competitors and
those in the work force had to submit, if they wished to survive, to the “giant enterprises
of machine industry” which dictated the new mores of society. As Marcuse noted,
technology “steadily increases the power at the command of giant concerns by creating
“According to Marcuse the ethical element was ever more surely in danger of being eradicated by an
advanced industrial society seeking to render progress commensurate with the commodity form and the
alienating logic of instrumental rationality,” Bronner, Of Critical Theory and its Theorists, Op. Cit., 237.
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new tools, processes and products”773 for “the principle of competitive efficiency favors
the enterprises with the most highly mechanized and rationalized industrial
equipment.”774
The apparatus and the products it produces influence the autonomy of every
member of that society, from those in power who control the flow of those products, to
the workers and consumers who make and purchase them. A reciprocal relation emerges
in which the consumers, to some extent, dictate the flow of the market and the direction
of the utilization of the technological apparatus that creates these products but so, too, do
the vested interests in command of this technology attempt to create the needs and desires
in the citizens for the goods they wish to profitably sell. As Marcuse noted:
Under these circumstances, profitable employment of the apparatus
dictates to a great extent the quantity, form and kind of commodities to be
produced, and through this mode of production and distribution, the
technological power of the apparatus affects the entire rationality of those
whom it serves. Under the impact of this apparatus, individualistic
rationality has been transformed into technological rationality. It is by no
means confined to the subjects and objects of large scale enterprises but
characterizes the pervasive mode of thought and even the manifold forms
of protest and rebellion. This rationality establishes standards of judgment
and fosters attitudes which make men ready to accept…the dictates of the
apparatus. 775

Thus, a seemingly totalizing, self-perpetuating system of indoctrination was established,
inflitrating every facet of human activity and altering the trajectory of human
development within the advanced industrial society. The following chapter will deal with
several of these key facets of human activity and the ways in which technology (and this
this Weberian notion of technical rationality) has infiltrated the realms of higher
773
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education and consumer culture as means of perpetuating itself and furthering its
dominion.
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Chapter 7

Technology, Individualism and Radical Pedagogy

Peirce distinguished between a call for social individualism in a free, democratic
community of inquirers and a demand for radical, atomic individualism in a community
living under the aegis of authority. In the former, beliefs ought to flourish and individuals
ought to expose themselves to the beliefs of others (else we all become tenacious
hermits). In the latter, however, should we immerse ourselves to the same radical degree,
for the beliefs we expose ourselves to are not those forged of inquiry, are not fallible, are
not contingent, are not open to revision, but are those that must be accepted under the
norms and values of a profoundly instrumental attitude towards rationality and an
extremely indoctrinating status quo. In essence, if we adopt social individualism within
the method of authority, we expose ourselves to the contagion of indoctrination, and the
social individualism that leads to Truth and freedom in a radically democratic milieu will
lead, under the aegis of authority, to the contamination of the individuals as they are
exposed to the beliefs proliferated by the authority. Marcuse was suspicious of social
individualism for precisely this reason: to immerse ourselves in the zeitgeist is to
immerse ourselves in the milieu of technical rationality, where what is “rational” is what
is “efficient,” and the beliefs stemming from this technocracy perpetuate only alienation
and indoctrination to the status quo. This will become the prime motivating force behind
Marcuse’s radical pedagogy: his demand for institutions of higher education to be freed
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from instrumentalism (such institutions wherein inquiry ought to flourish, just as Peirce
desired, rather than being transformed into degree mills churning out freshly minted
slaves of industry), and wherein the humanities ought to be championed above all as sites
of what he called “critical” or “negative” thinking: the free-play of the imagination
utilized to excavate the contingency of beliefs proliferated as necessary by placing them
in tension with an alternative perspective, effectively “negating” what is by pitting it
against what is not.776
It is not merely the desire for the products and those products themselves that
influences human individuality, but the entire apparatus of such a society that dictates
what is deemed “profitable” in terms of human achievement and what, in essence, the
goals should be for human development. Again, there is no evolution from the pretechnological stage, but transference of one form of domination for another. Whereas the
Puritanical pre-technological coordination dictated the virtues that its members must
embody so, too, does the rational or “technological” epoch dictate the virtues of
productivity that citizens “ought” to possess in order to thrive. Any form of “quest for
wisdom or Truth” is summarily supplanted with an educational path of “training” for the
contribution that individual must make to the technological apparatus of production for,
as Marcuse said, “individual achievement has been transformed into standardized
efficiency.”777 The individual …
… has learned to transfer all subjective spontaneity to the machinery
which he serves, to subordinate his life to the “matter-of-factness” of a
776

Though this moves beyond the scope of this current investigation, considering the fact that one of
Marcuse’s mentors was none other than Edmund Husserl, one might be able to detect a similarity here
between Marcuse’s theoretical “negation” and Husserl’s deployment of “bracketing” in his
phenomenology.
777
Herbert Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of Modern Technology,” in Collected Papers, vol. 1,
Technology, War and Fascism, ed. Douglas Kellner (New York: Routledge, 1998), 44.

244

world in which the machine is the factor and he the factum. Individual
distinctions in the aptitude, insight and knowledge are transformed into
different quanta of skill and training, to be coordinated at any time within
the common framework of standardized performances.778

As the external motivations change in the technological era, so too are the goals altered
for the individual and thus the ways in which that individual must adapt and develop in
order to serve the needs of that culture and flourish. “Virtue” has become synonymous
with “efficiency” in a culture of goals not of the individual’s own making to which that
individual must summarily conform.
The individual’s performance is motivated, guided and measured by
standards external to him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks and
functions. The efficient individual is the one whose performance is an
action only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements
of the apparatus, and his liberty is confined to the selection of the most
adequate means for reaching a goal which he did not set.779
Indeed, Marcuse invoked a concept very similar to the type of “imago” that Yancy notes
in the suppression of minorities: a false self-image created by the power majority to help
ensure the perpetuation of their hold on power. Marcuse said, for example, that the
efficiency and complacency in the workers required by the factory owners was in no
small part created through the self-identification of the worker with the image of him or
herself as efficient, as complacent, as a good, functional cog in the machine—an image
they are encouraged to champion. He said, “the functioning of capitalism depended
largely on the responsible identification of the person with his job, his function—an
identification forced upon the worker, but an integral part of good business for the
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bourgeois.”780 Indeed, just as it is for Yancy, Marcuse noted that a critical aspect of the
dissolution of technological rationality was precisely the dissolution of such an assumed
imago.781 He said, “the only counterforce is the development of an effectively organized
radical Left, assuming the vast task of political education, dispelling the false and
mutilated consciousness of the people so that they themselves experience their
condition.”782 Thus, Marcuse connected the radical transformation of consciousness,
specifically in this sense the dissolution of the complacent imago, with the general aims
of education itself. As he noted:
I have stressed the key role which the universities play in the present
period: they can still function as institutions for the training of countercadres. The “restructuring” necessary for the attainment of this goal means
more than decisive student participation and nonauthoritarian learning.
Making the university ‘relevant’ for today and tomorrows means, instead,
presenting the facts and forces that made civilization what it is today and
what it could be tomorrow—and that is political education. For history
indeed repeats itself; and it is this repetition of domination and submission
that must be halted, and halting it presupposes knowledge of its genesis
and of the ways in which it is reproduced: critical thinking.783
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Indeed, though his pedagogical insights remain “relatively unacknowledged,” so,
too, do they represent “a core element” of his “overall theory and practice.” 784 The
“counterrevolution” of capitalism against such liberating trends is nowhere more apparent
than in the transmutation of education (its goals and methods) to align with the demands
of the technocracy. Just as Peirce warned, a primary tool utilized by the authority was the
indoctrination of the young. As I will discuss in the following chapters, Marcuse noted
that even the most democratic states might still be “totalitarian” in their processes of
indoctrination and manipulation, not necessarily towards a specific socio-political
ideology, but through conformation to the technical base itself.
One of the most significant studies performed by the Frankfurt School in its
ongoing study of the indoctrinating tendencies of fascism culminated in The
Authoritarian Personality in 1950. Though directed by Horkheimer, it was a project that
Marcuse was intimately familiar, and its results most certainly contributed to his ongoing
analysis of indoctrination, especially in the realm of education, and especially in the
realm of education of the young. As Ingram summarizes:
The study concluded that the roots of authoritarianism lie in early
childhood development. Children raised by parents who enforce rigid
discipline and submission to authority are likely to feel helpless and
inferior, while projecting their repressed hostility onto out-groups.785

As we recall, Peirce recognized not only that one of the central methods of indoctrination
by authority was the education of the young but, too, the internal self-regulation of the
citizens themselves against their compatriots: learning to turn in hatred and fear from
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anything that deviated from the prescribed beliefs of the status quo. This phenomenon,
described by Peirce, is explained and, to a great degree, validated by this study conducted
by the Frankfurt School some seventy years after Peirce’s initial observations.786
No doubt stemming from his close reading of Hegel, Marcuse pitted the German
conception of Bildung, “the growth, development, and formation of human beings,”
against the type of efficiency training requisite and championed in the advanced
industrial society as the individual is subsumed into (and aligns with) the technical base
and its requirements.787 As Bildung aims at “autonomous self learning/self-formation
which concerns the whole individual for the purpose of liberating the self and society,”
necessitating what Marcuse called “dialectical” or “negative” thinking as a prerequisite
for Bildung, this idea remains “antithetical to any sense of standardization in education
and instead embraces education of the body and mind against passive skill
acquisition.”788 As Marcuse said:
Once upon a time, it was the proclaimed principle of great bourgeois
philosophy that the youth “ought to be educated not for the present but for
a better future condition of the human race, that is, for the idea of
humanity.” Now the council for Higher Education is called upon to study
the “detailed needs” of the established society so that the colleges know
“what kinds of graduates to produce.”789

Intriguingly, Peirce’s own upbringing was radically free from authority, culminating in a perpetually
rebellious attitude through Peirce’s adult life. As Brent notes, “Peirce men were self-consciously
unconvential and unique. Benjamin saw to the education of each personally. Individualism was encouraged
in the Peirce home by a lack of all discipline, except that which fostered the intellect” (Brent, Charles
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Thus, “Marcuse builds his theory of education from a basic contradiction between
Bildung as the cultivation of fully developed individuality and what he would famously
describe as ‘one-dimensional man’ and society.”790 As Reitz notes, “Marcuse believed
that the humanities may make us more profoundly human by making us aware of the
deepest contradictions of life … this is because the humanities are thought to be the
preserve of … transcendence or sublimation. They engender the radical kind of
knowledge that is thought to be nonempirical, speculative, and dialectical.”791
“Dialectical thinking” is synonymous with “negative thinking,” the ability to think
otherwise than the established system of discourse, which, as we have seen, is thoroughly
integrated with this Weberian notion of “technical rationality,” conditioning the trajectory
of higher education towards efficiency, productivity and capital.792 As Reitz and Spartan
note, “with uncanny prescience then (and immense relevance now) Marcuse broke
through the paralysis of criticism in the U. S. making it possible for many students to
reframe social circumstances theoretically and to learn as they had not been able to learn
before.”793 Marcuse, himself, and his fellow members of the Frankfurt School, through
the integration of their own work, offered a forum through which this type of negative
thinking, the ability to “reframe social circumstances” from a theoretical perspective
opposed to the current milieu, in the realm of higher education. The emphasis on critical
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or negative thinking is a fundamental aspect of the humanities, and, as we will see in the
concluding chapter on Marcuse, immanent in art and its study, and thus it is no surprise
that Marcuse’s radical pedagogy emphasized the necessity of the humanities against a
rising tide of productivity and efficiency in the sciences. Higher education, in this sense,
parallels Marcuse’s critique of positivism and its insistence on relegating metaphysics
and abstract theory to the dustbin of philosophy by focusing merely on what is rather than
what is not or what ought to be. His was a “profound challenge” to the “systems of
schooling and higher education in the U. S., specifically opposing the displacement of the
humanities in the ‘60s by Clark Kerr’s vision of higher education that had become mainly
scientific and technical and that primarily stood in service to the needs of commerce,
industry, and the military.”794 Education, under technical rationality, takes on the new
form of training for integration into the status quo of capitalism in the advanced
technological society: students are encouraged to become efficient and productive cogs in
the machine of labor, and universities become little more than degree-factories churning
out the next generation of said alienated labor. As Marcuse noted:
To create the subjective conditions for a free society [it is] no longer
sufficient to educate individuals to perform more or less happily the
functions they are supposed to perform in this society or extend
“vocational” education to the “masses.” Rather … [we must] educate men
and women who are incapable of tolerating what is going on, who have
really learned what is going on, has always been going on, and why, and
who are educated to resist and to fight for a new way of life.795
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If what is is a profoundly unfree society, it is, of course, for Marcuse, never content to
educate individuals to acquiescence and integratation into such a society. Rather,
negative thinking must be the central focus in higher education; it is the ability to: (a)
understand what actually is (rather than accept the indoctrinating arguments of the
Establishment), and (b) to postulate a better possibility from a higher, theoretical
perspective.
It is important to note that Marcuse championed the humanities as a site of
negative thinking that threw a suspicious eye on technical training and science as
anything more than reifications and apologetics of the status quo. Peirce would have
certainly agreed with Marcuse on the first part of the claim: individuals of wider social
feeling must draw from the past (history), seek other beliefs in other lands
(anthropology), walk alongside literary heroes of imagined vistas (literature, poetry), to
conjure the beliefs, ideas, and virtues disparate enough from those proliferated by the
authority to create the constructive tension requisite for the flourishing of inquiry. But, as
to the latter part of the claim, Peirce would have championed science as the ultimate
discipline for radical thinking—a discipline that has no place for conservativism, that has
always been forwarded by radicals, that has perennially been stifled by authorities for fear
that its discoveries would bear witness to the contingency of their proliferated beliefs: it
is a radicalism, as he said, that tries experiments. Of course Peirce recognized how
science could be (and has been) coopted by the authority—bearing witness, himself, to
scientists whose chief concern was money and who cared not at all for Truth, submitting
to the instrumentalism of the age. But science in itself was radical, for Peirce, and the
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method it utilizes was the method of radicalism (when purified from the clutches of the
Gospel of Greed, at least), and thus was the method that breaks the hold of the authority.
For Marcuse, this disparity between education as Bildung and education as
prescribed by the technological apparatus of capital was a potential chink in the armor of
technological

rationality’s

hold

over

culture

itself.

As

Marcuse

noted

in

Counterrevolution and Revolt:
The “people” speak a language which is all but closed to the concepts and
propositions of Marxian theory. Their aversion to its foreign words, “big
words,” et cetera, not only is the result of their education but also
expresses the extent of their commitment to the Establishment and,
consequently, to the language of the Establishment. To break the hold of
this language means breaking the “false consciousness”: becoming
conscious of the need for liberation and of the ways to approach this
goal.796

The language used by the Establishment is antithetical to the language of Marxian theory
or any theory that is not conducive to the perpetuation of the beliefs the Establishment
needs to promulgate. Education—the exposure to these alternative languages, systems
and theories—is antagonistic to those who have succumbed to authority and provides the
potential for radical social change in granting an alternative to the system as it is in favor
of what it might otherwise be, granting the type of “wider social feeling” that Peirce
discussed in “Fixation of Belief.”
Further, this technological apparatus extends to encompass every aspect of the
individual’s life, requires a “consistent training in the mechanical apprehension of
things,” and promotes a “conformity to the schedule of living.”797 Such an apparatus
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demands efficiency, thus demonstrates how the “‘mechanics of conformity’ spread from
the technological to the social order; they govern performance not only in the factories
and shops, but also in the offices, schools, assemblies and, finally, in the realm of
relaxation and entertainment.”798 In sum, “everything cooperates to turn human instincts,
desires and thoughts into channels that feed the apparatus.”799 On the topic of “virtues” in
this technological rationality, Rose notes,
The continuously expanding utilization of technology in production
initiates a pervasive and totalizing social logic (technological rationality)
in which potential challenges to the purposes and goals of the productive
system are subordinated to, and silenced by, the presumed virtues of ever
greater technical efficiency, technological expediency, and material
growth.800

Thus, pre-rational individualism, with all the conflict and tension that it entails, is
transmuted into a rational individualism better conceived of as a “technological”
individualism wherein the individual submits to a new authority: the authority of the
technology itself. Freedom, such as it was prior, “was gradually submerged in the
efficiency with which he performed services assigned to him.”801 The potential for
autonomous development becomes reduced to barely more than adaptation and
assimilation to the technological status quo in a world that has been “rationalized to such
an extent, and this rationality had become such a social power that the individual could
do no better than adjust himself without reservation.”802
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One of the most troubling aspects of the association between the “rational” and
the “technological,” and one key factor in accounting for its efficacy and historical
endurance, is precisely this notion that the technological is the rational and, as such,
becomes the desired object of inquiry, masquerading as fact and “Truth.” Marcuse will
delve into this relationship between the technological and rational more deeply in OneDimensional Man, articulating the ways in which “false needs” masquerade as “true
needs” and authentic alternatives to the technocratic apparatus are dissolved as
undesirable or implausible.803 Precisely because the technological era replaced the prerational apparatus, emphasizing technics’ ability to replace the superstition and
presuppositions of the previous age with a freedom from such hindrances to autonomous
inquiry, the new technological age was seen as rational, as the means and culmination of
the goals of the rational self-interest along with the dissolution of immediate self-interest.
As we have seen in Marcuse, of course, it was anything but. Just as in Peirce, authority’s
hold on power was in no small part conditioned by their need to present their beliefs as
timeless and necessary rather than historically contingent (a contingency which would
necessarily involve comparison, doubt and the engine for radial social change through the
reinstigation of inquiry). So, too, do we see here the tacit assumption that technology was
rationality itself, that “modernity was said to be rational in the strong sense that its

As I will demonstrate in my analysis of One-Dimensional Man, the conflation between the “technical”
and the “rational” will be a primary impetus for the rise of the proliferation of “false needs,” as Marcuse
described them: those needs so above and beyond the “vital” or “true needs” that they are wholly
superfluous to human flourishing, yet deeply and ubiquitously desired. Technological innovation will give
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cognitive foundations—science and technology—were superior to those of any earlier
society.”804 As Marcuse said:
The facts directing man’s thought and action are not those of nature which
must be accepted in order to be mastered, or those of society which must
be changed because they no longer correspond to human needs and
potentialities. Rather are they those of the machine process, which itself
appears as the embodiment of rationality and expediency.805

Submission to what amounts to little more than a new apparatus of domination came to
be seen, instead, as an alignment with a finally rational structure against which there
seemed no positive reason to rebel: “all protest is senseless”—for it was not nature that
needed to be mastered, nor irrational mores than no longer corresponded to human needs,
but a world systematized and structured to the apparent benefit of the rational human
agent, and aligning with his or her own unique rationality.806 As Marcuse affirmed and
advised, “business, technics, human needs and nature are welded together into one
rational and expedient mechanism. He will fare best who follows its directions,
subordinating his spontaneity to the anonymous wisdom which ordered everything for
him.”807
What sort of individual would wish to rebel against such an apparatus? Only a
lunatic, a “crank,” would turn his or her nose up at the ease and expediency the
technological era of “rationality” affords.808 A society riddled with euphoric indulgences
at every turn, perpetuating ease and leisure (for some), eradicating disease and sickness
(for those who can afford it), are all products of the technological epoch. But just as
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Marcuse would go on to note in One-Dimensional, as “advanced industrial society
becomes richer, bigger, and better … the defense structure makes life easier for a greater
number of people and extends man’s mastery of nature,” it comes at the price of the
dissolution of autonomous individualism.809 Even within a far more pessimistic
conception of technics as reduced to the domineering role of technology in OneDimensional Man, Marcuse noted:
The technological processes of mechanization and standardization might
release individual energy into a yet uncharted realm of freedom … the
very structure of human existence would be altered; the individual would
be liberated from the work world’s imposing upon him alien needs and
aliens possibilities. The individual would be free to exert autonomy over a
life that would be his own. If the productive apparatus could be organized
and directed toward the satisfaction of the vital needs, its control might
well be centralized; such control would not prevent individual autonomy,
but render it possible … in actual fact, however, the contrary trend
operates: the apparatus imposes its economic and political requirements
for defense and expansion on labor time and free time, on the material and
intellectual culture. By virtue of the way it has organized its technological
base, contemporary industrial society to be totalitarian.810

Technology within the advanced industrial society does, indeed, fulfill miraculously the
various “vital needs”—which Marcuse delineates in One-Dimensional Man as including
“nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of culture”811—but, too, is utilized
by the technological apparatus to coerce individuals into repressing their need for only
those desires and adds, too, a slew of “false desires,” that is, false consumer needs, so far
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and above what the vital needs demand that a new form of “surplus repression” is born.
As Malinovich explains:
Advances in technology had made it possible to produce all necessary
goods and commodities in a faction of the time it used to take. It was no
longer necessary for human beings to repress their natural desires in order
to devote most of their time to providing for the necessities of life. The
continued surplus repression in capitalist society was due to the fact that
the economic monopolies which dominate advanced capitalist society—to
increase their gains and maintain their position—had created through
advertisement and mass media a series of false consumerist needs, the
satisfaction of which required continued toil and repression.812
In conjunction with the technological era’s association with the post-irrational era,
presenting itself as the rational itself, comes the very real side-effect of the numerous
indulgences and positive benefits that come with that technological proliferation. It
becomes all the more absurd, it would seem, to rebel against it. However, as Marcuse
noted in the passage above, while technics inherently possesses the potential for genuine
emancipation, the opposite occurs: for although the individual conceives him or herself to
be “emancipated” from the irrationality of the pre-industrial era, from the superstition and
imposed societal norms, even from the oppressive force of nature itself, that
emancipation is limited to, and conditioned by, the terms of a new administrative
apparatus. This same sentiment is reflected in the earlier essay:
At first glance, the technological attitude rather seems to imply the
opposite of resignation. Teleological and theological dogmas no longer
interfere with man’s struggle with matter; he develops his experimental
energies without inhibition. There is no constellation of matter which he
does not try to break up, to manipulate and to change according to his will
and interest. This experimentalism, however, frequently serves the effort
to develop a higher efficiency of hierarchical control over men.813
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Again, the potential for technics to free humankind from the dogmas of a pre-rational era
are co-opted by the technological apparatus to serve its own ends, where all apparently
autonomous inquiry (“experimentalism”) serves only “the effort to develop a higher
efficiency of hierarchical control over men.” In short, one master is overcome only to be
replaced by another. As Farr expresses it:
For Marcuse, technology should be a means to an end, that end being
liberation, the end of useless toil and labor. The burden of labor should be
attenuated so that human beings have more time to cultivate other talents
that they may have and enjoy life to a greater degree. However, in many
cases technology is not the means to an end but an end in itself.814

Thus technology, in this sense, is both the means and the end; it dictates both what we
value and desire and how we procure the objects of our values and desires. In this sense,
as Marcuse noted exhaustively, technology becomes a totalizing apparatus:
There is no personal escape from the apparatus which has mechanized and
standardized the world. It is a rational apparatus, combining utmost
expediency with utmost convenience, saving time and energy, removing
waste, adapting all means to the end, anticipating consequences, sustaining
calculability and security.815

The structure of the advanced industrial society is thus so totalizing that it becomes
totalitarian—self-contained and self-perpetuating by the very conditions of its structure.
“Totalitarian,” at first glance, seems an odd terminological choice to describe a society
that provides a certain type of liberty (indeed, prides itself on this) and induces, at the
least, a pleasant sort of euphoria in its citizens. But this precisely is the paradox of
advanced industrial societies, and such further obfuscates the irrationality of their nature
as they offer both satisfaction and a certain form of apparent liberty, while remaining
814
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totalitarian in the very structures that perpetuate them at the cost of human autonomy. As
Marcuse explained in One-Dimensional Man, “‘totalitarian’ is not only a terroristic
political coordination of society, but also a nonterroristic economic-technical
coordination which operates through the manipulation of needs by vested interests.”816 As
Feenburg elaborates, “the danger is not merely nuclear weapons or some similar threat to
survival, but the obliteration of humanity’s special status and dignity as the being through
which the world takes on intelligibility and meaning.”817
Needs, desires, thoughts, aspirations—all are conditioned by these vested interests
with technology as the base for its dominion. So, too, can we add “Truth” itself to the list
of the conditionals in such an advanced industrial society. As noted above, if the
“technological” and “rational” have become synonymous in the minds of the citizenry,
the culmination of the technological world of innovation and exploration must, too, be a
good indicator of the approximation to “Truth”—at least, far more so than the previously
conceived pre-technological epoch:
As the laws and mechanisms of technological rationality spread over the
whole society, they develop a set of truth values of their own which hold
good for the functioning of the apparatus—and for that alone. Propositions
concerning competitive or collusive behavior, business methods,
principles of effective organization and control, fair play, the use of
science and technics are true or false in terms of this value system, that is
to say, in terms of instrumentalities that dictate their own ends. These truth
values are tested and perpetuated by experience and must guide the
thoughts and actions of all who wish to survive. Rationality here calls for
unconditional compliance and coordination, and consequently, the truth
values related to this rationality imply the subordination of thought to
pregiven external standards. We may call this set of truth values the
technological truth.818
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As we recall from the exploration of Peirce’s “method of authority,” one of the
fundamental aspects of that totalitarian method was the proliferation of beliefs conducive
to the administration’s perpetuation of its own power. These beliefs were necessarily
pawned off as timeless truth, not the “Truth” generated by a communal engagement in
the method of inquiry. The synchronity with Peirce’s insights here is profound. Consider
how the “truths” proliferated by the technocracy, according to Marcuse here, are “truth
values of their own which hold good for the functioning of the apparatus—and for that
alone” dictating “their own ends;” how rationality becomes “compliance” rather than
autonomous inquiry; and how authentic “Truth,” or its approximation, is supplanted with
the truth of the authority itself, what Marcuse called here “technological truth.”819
This technological reality is juxtaposed with what Marcuse called “critical
rationality,” which is central to his critical theory, and defined generally in terms of
“principles of autonomy,” “whose values can be fulfilled only if it has itself shaped all
personal and social relationships.”820 This “critical” form of rationality may well be
associated with the “wider sort of social feeling” borne of those individuals capable of
assessing the otherwise obfuscated structures of authority and seeking radical alternative
structures. The problem of actually achieving such a wider sort of social feeling is that
“the growth of the industrial apparatus and of its all-embracing control over all spheres of
life” is seemingly without bounds.821 Technological rationality as been so “inculcated” in
such citizens that any potential for slippage has already been minimized or outright
negated.822 As Peirce noted, the beliefs proliferated by the authority are necessarily taught
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to the young. Here, too, Marcuse noted that these beliefs are so all-pervasive that
individuals are brought up in the milieu of technological truth where the greatest
employment of their otherwise autonomous rationality is to “follow those who put their
reason to profitable use.”823
As such, Marcuse’s critique of technical rationality, as we have seen, bears not
only upon his critique of higher education in America but, too, went on to influence the
radical pedagogy of countless others in his wake.824 For example, as Davis notes:
In the classroom and through his writings and lectures, Marcuse defended
the radical activism of the ‘60s. The emergence of an international student
movement, the social movements of people of color, the rise of feminist
activism brought a new, more optimistic dimension to Marcuse’s ideas.
The seduction of the ‘one-dimensional society’ could be resisted …
working so closely with him during that period, I learned that while
teaching and agitation were very different practices, students need to be
assured that politics and intellectual life are not two entirely separate
modes of existence.825

As will be developed throughout the course of the following chapters, Marcuse had a
distinct utopian vision of a society in stark contrast to the technical milieu of the current
advanced industrial society, one that may be brought about by highlighting several key
cites of potential radical change, not the least of which was a student movement that
Marcuse always championed. The humanities needs not have a direct political
application, as Davis points out here, but, rather, inherent in its structure is the type of
negative thinking requisite to bring about radical social change in the political realm.
Thus, as Davis astutely shows, though the political and the pedagogical were “different
823
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practices,” the latter certainly inspired students to suggest radical alternatives in the realm
of the former. This necessities a break from higher education “as it stands,” namely, that
“the major purpose of education is to make the world safe for global capitalism.”826
Rather than generate students who are little more than “supplicants of corporate America
and to work at the behest of the corporate bottom line,” Marcuse insisted that higher
education create the free intellectual space where negative thinking may flourish and
offer a radical break from the current, indoctrinating milieu.827 This free intellectual space
where negative thinking may flourish is a thoroughly democratic ideal, a space where
students are not barred from entering into ongoing intellectual dialogues and are not
conditioned to submit to a certain enforced and widely proliferated status quo offered by
the Establishment—precisely as Peirce warned against in his critique of authority and
precisely as he advocated in his conception of the ideal community of inquirers where
inquiry may go where it may, free and uninhibited by indoctrinating beliefs. As such, as
Reitz and Spartan note, Marcuse thus demonstrated not only the incompatibility of
advanced industrial capitalism (complete with its technical rationality) and higher
education, but also “capitalism’s incompatibility with democracy” in general.828
Technical rationality, in conjunction with commodity fetishism in advanced capitalism,
demands efficiency and productivity and thus closes off those avenues, traditionally
located in the humanities, that engage in the type of negative thinking which could, in
turn, lead to radical social change beyond the classroom and into the realm of political
praxis.
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If success via technological rationality is more a matter of assimilation and
adaptation to the mores of the technocracy, genuine human autonomy gives way to a
society-wide heteronomy wherein the highest possible goal to be pursued would be such
successful adaptation to the technocracy that one finds oneself as one of the vested
interests. “The pursuit of self-interest now appears to be conditioned upon heteronomy,
and autonomy as an obstacle rather than stimulus for rational action.”829 Autonomy
present in such a heteronymous society presents itself as so anomalous that it is shunned,
its agents viewed as (as Marcuse names them) “cranks” to be summarily marginalized
from the status quo. Just as those individuals with a wider sort of social feeling risked
retribution and ostritization, not merely by the authority itself but by one’s own
neighbors, so, too, was autonomy viewed in Marcuse’s technocracy as an “obstacle rather
than a stimulus” to rationality, a rationality presumed as embodied in precisely the
administration they’d rebel again making their autonomy appear, thus, the inverse of
rational, namely, irrational.
The relationship, then, between the individual and the community becomes far
more complex. “It seems to be self-evident that mass and individual are contradictory
concepts and incompatible facts.”830 Marcuse was inspired by, and invokes here, the
insights of Lederer who observes that the “crowd”:
is, to be sure, composed of individuals—but of individuals who cease to
be isolated, who cease thinking. The isolated individual within the crowd
cannot help thinking, criticizing the emotions. The others, on the other
hand, cease to think: they are moved, they are carried away, they are
elated; they feel united with their fellow members in the crowd, released
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from all inhibitions; they are changed and feel no connection with their
former state of mind.831

Peirce noted the efficacy of the method of authority throughout history, and conceded
that that method was, perhaps, the best for most people: for if intellectual slavery is what
the mass of humankind desires, then intellectual slaves they ought to remain. Here, too,
we see that the “crowd” is not a population of “isolated individuals,” but a homogeneous
mass who have ceased to think for themselves and feel a sense of unity and solidarity
with “their fellow members in the crowd” for no reason beyond indoctrination and
submission to the mores of the technocracy. This is the manifestation of what Sartre
called “seriality” in his Critique of Dialectical Reason: the solidarity of otherwise
disparate individuals, for example, lining up at a bus stop, rather than the authentic
“group-in-fusion” forged of common purpose against the mores of a given hegemony.
For Marcuse, the “isolated individual” was thus championed as over and beyond this
mass of unthinking humanity as a rarity and represented in stark contrast to the rest.
An initial problem seems to arise given the scope of this current project. It would
seem that Marcuse (and Lederer before him) was not admonishing “atomic
individualism” but, rather, was championing it as a productive alternative to a type of
“social individualism” forged of solidarity-via-indoctrination. Marcuse was aware of a
certain type of atomic individualism that is forged of technological rationality that has, as
he calls it, an “atomizing” effect on individual autonomy. As he noted in
Counterrevolution and Revolt, “at the base of the pyramid atomization prevails. It
converts the entire individual—body and mind—into an instrument, or even part of an
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instrument: active or passive, productive or receptive, in working time and free time, he
serves the system.”832 In this sense of technological rationality’s ability to reduce the
individual to a mere cog in the vast mechanized network, Marcuse did, indeed, lament the
type of “atomized” individual produced by such an apparatus. Further, the “new
individualism” that Marcuse championed was not a solipsistically cocooned individual,
akin to the individual of tenacity in Peirce, who recedes from the indoctrinating effects of
consumer culture.833 For, as Marcuse noted, “the bourgeois individual is not overcome by
simply refusing social performance, by dropping out and living one’s own style of life.
To be sure, no revolution without individual liberation, but also no individual liberation
without the liberation of society.”834 This “dialectic of liberation” entails that the
“individual liberation (refusal) must incorporate the universal in particular protest, and
the images and values of a future free society must appear in the personal relationships
within the unfree society.”835 Thus, a strict sort of “atomic” individualism was antithetical
to radical social change for Marcuse, as it was, too, for Peirce’s ideal community of
inquirers.
As will be discussed throughout the following chapters, Marcuse, too, had an
utopian vision wherein individualism necessarily takes on quite a different tone when the
backdrop milieu of the oppressive technocracy no longer dictates the lived conditions for
its populace or demands a faux “solidarity” via indoctrination of their fundamental
mores. In such an ideal vision, technology would be reformulated and “pacified” back to
its technic form where, instead of indoctrination, its potential for emancipation would be
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invoked. For Marcuse “did not despair of the future in technological societies,” and rather
than “identifying an essence of technology that condemned human beings eternally to
servitude,” he “sought historical causes for the undesirable effects of technical progress”
in hopes of shedding those effects in favor of the emancipatory potential inherent in his
view of “technics.”836 As Feenburg further expands:
Despite his sharp criticism of “technological rationality,” [Marcuse] still
maintains the old Marxist faith in the ultimate liberating potential of
technology. Technology still represents for Marcuse the hypothetical
possibility of overcoming scarcity and the conflict to which it gives rise,
but capitalism “represses” this technical potential for emancipation by
casting society in the form of an ever renewed struggle for existence.837
Indeed, in various places throughout his work, Marcuse made such claims as “technology
has become the great vehicle for reification,” as well as that “science and technology are
the great vehicles for liberation.”838 And was, thus, “obliged to offer correctives to his
strong critical claims, asserting the neutrality, validity and instrumental effectiveness of
science and technology despite their ‘ideological’ character.”839 In essence, Marcuse took
a “substantive” view of technology in the present but professed an underlying ideal
potential for an “instrumental” view in the future—for he ultimately did not call “for the
dismantling of modern industrial society.”840 Instead, he suggested:
If the completion of the technological project involves a break with the
prevailing technological rationality, the break in turn depends on the
continued existence of the technical base itself. For it is the base which has
rendered possible the satisfaction of needs and the reduction of toil—it
remains the very base of all forms of human freedom. The qualitative
change rather lies in the reconstruction of this base—that is, in its
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development with a view of different ends … the new ends, as technical
ends, would then operate in the project and in the construction of the
machinery, and not only in its utilization.841
Thus, he would conclude, “technology-based domination is contingent and might be
overthrown in a process involving not only political change but also fundamental shifts in
the form of rationality.”842 The realization of this “contingency” over the purported
“necessity” that rationality would dictate is in Peirce’s critique as well when individuals
of wider social feeling must first and foremost find some way to establish a viable
alternative to the present status quo, which thereby reveals the muddled contingency of
the apparatus and again frees potential for radical social change. For Marcuse, as we will
explore in subsequent chapters, the transmutation of this technical base of modern
societies took the form of a type of “reduction” to the aesthetic realm, wherein
“technology … undergoes a reduction since it would be free of the unessential burden of
resisting nature,” and thus “released from these external impositions, technology could
return to its origins” of aiding in emancipation rather than negating its potential.843 OneDimensional Man elaborates how “the rationality of domination has separated the Reason
of science and the Reason of art, or, it has falsified the Reason of art by integrating art
into the universe of domination” and that the Reason of art, that is, “aesthetic Reason,”
“from the beginning … contained … the free play and even the folly of imagination, the
fantast of transformation,” opening up new vistas heretofore unseen and inexperienced,
viable alternatives to the status quo.844
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As Agger observes, “Marcuse links what he calls the ‘new sensibility’ to the
development of a pacified technology.”845 By “pacification,” Marcuse meant “a mastery
of nature which would liberate nature from its own violence and cruelty.”846 For
Marcuse:
The liberated consciousness would promote the development of a science
and technology free to discover and realize the possibilities of things and
men in the protection and gratification of life, playing with the
potentialities of form and matter for the attainment of this goal.847

In One-Dimensional Man, for example, Marcuse noted, “cultivation of the soil is
qualitatively different from destruction of the soil, extraction of natural resources from
wasteful exploitation, clearing of forests from wholesale deforestation” just as “poverty,
disease, and cancerous growth are natural as well as human ills—their reduction and
removal is liberation of life.”848 But beyond “these small, protected areas, it [the pacified
technology] has treated Nature as it has treated man—as an instrument of destructive
productivity.”849
The resistance lies in the technocracy’s tenacious (to invoke a very Peircean
conception) ability to endure through its totalizing omnipresence and the citizen’s equally
tenacious clinging to the beliefs of technology’s emancipatory power (in its current
indoctrinating manifestation) and the goods and euphoric pleasures that result from it. As
Lukes notes, “the needless constrictions of individual members” in an advanced industrial
society, a theme Marcuse will refer to as “surplus repression” in Eros and Civilization
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which we will explore in full shortly, is called “one-dimensionality (the catch-phrase for
this constriction)” which “is encouraged not because the allowance of alternativethinking and acting would plunge humanity back into the depths of rampant scarcity.”850
Rather:
Alternative-thinking might stimulate a popular recognition of the fact that
technology, having provided the means for the elimination of scarcity,
may now be ready for subservience to a newer, more advanced goal: a
“pacified existence,” in which the universe of objects is seen as
complementary to human life.851

The domination and indoctrination of a populace, the acquiescence to a universe of
indulge at the price of radical autonomy, must necessarily be kept obfuscated in light of
technology’s very real capacity to end (or significantly limit) the effects of scarcity. If
not, the authority runs the risk of allowing that populace to understand in full the
contingency of such an apparatus and potentially desire something new: all clearly
antagonistic to the vested interests who profit so magnificently from the system as it is. 852
This would herald the end of the age where technology was rationality, and a new age
wherein “technological rationality would be replaced by a human rationality, in which the
uses of human productivity and technology would be seriously and continuously
evaluated.”853
Indeed, there is, too, a place within such a system as it is (rather than in an
idealized utopian vision) for such social individualism and authentic solidarity to bring
about the radical social change that Marcuse sought. Such a place would have groups
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forged not of indoctrination and submission, but of individuals of like mind and purpose
striving against such heterogeneity, having arrived at that proposed course of action
autonomously.854 As Schoolman notes, for example, “technics does not impose a single
collective interest that simply cuts across class cleavages … technological rationality
materially reconstitutes class society into a single homogeneous mass … a monolithic
technical class.”855 As with Peirce, the state under the reign of authority did, indeed,
provide a certain form of unity. But this unity was not to be championed for it was not
based upon autonomous associations for a common goal but, for Marcuse and Peirce
both, was forged of an indoctrinating process wherein a single, homogenous mass is
created by the vested interests via the perpetuation of beliefs stemming from the
omnipresent technological base of advanced industrial societies, the dissolution of “all
social classes into one atomized mass of happy consumer-slaves.”856 As Brunkhorst
explains, Marcuse saw a dominent tendency in advanced industrial societies:
The dominant tendency of late capitalism is towards a system of identity
that makes everything that is not already assimilated to it become so, and
that effectively prevents any deviation or any resistance. The new media
of mass culture that achieve this assimilation include sound film, radio,
magazines, photography, short stories, cartoons, automobiles, stunt films,
popular biographies, box office hits, movie stars, pop songs, soap operas,
sports, air raid drills, modern propaganda, totalitarian sloganeering, closeups, functional architecture, television, jazz, advertising, and easy
listening music.857
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Critics have noted that Marcuse failed to provide a clear path out from the
totalizing indoctrination of technical rationality, but he did, nevertheless, at least point to
the sites of potential emancipation. For example, as Offe notes, this totalizing effect of
industrialization:
brings critical thought to a point where there is no longer any hope of
finding a social group or institutional sector that could be the starting point
for the progressive unfolding of contradictions. However, when it is no
longer possible to identify the social-structural locus of the contradictions
that nevertheless continue objectively to exist, when critique, hope and
need for change are no longer represented socially, then the critical theory
of industrial society is forced to safeguard the objectivity of its
pronouncements on a psychological and anthropological level. The system
of needs, the essential starting point of Marcuse’s critical theory, as of
every other, shifts its sources from political economy to psychoanalysis.858

Like Peirce, for Marcuse, Offe notes, the genesis for the potential for radical social
change lied in the “unfolding of contradictions” requisite to bring about the tension
between society as it is and society as it may be—but with technology masquerading as
rationality and infiltrating every sector of the socio-economic-political realm, Marcuse
turned to Freudian psychoanalysis to delve into the ways in which such a technocracy
manipulates the needs and desires of its citizens in the hopes of finding an emancipatory
seed within the individual him or herself. This excavation of human needs and desires
formed the bedrock of his most iconic treatises, Eros and Civilization and OneDimensional Man, which both warrant individual chapters. To these two texts, we turn.
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In sum, for Marcuse, technics, initially a neutral entity with the potential for
emancipation or indoctrination, became corrupted and co-opted by the technological
society’s authoritarian apparatus that reaches into the most intimate thoughts of the
individual, dictating beliefs and desires as well as truth itself, transforming the individual
from autonomous to heteronymous and dissolving authentic individuality into the
indoctrinated throngs of the “masses.” As he noted, “the spreading hierarchy of large
scale enterprise and the precipitation of individuals into masses determine the trends of
technological rationality today.”859 Associating technology with rationality as the
advanced industrial society does, resistance to the mores indoctrinated into the citizenry
by the fundamental need for this apparatus to self-perpetuate is viewed as “irrational,” in
comparison to the numerous indulgences, pleasures and quasi-“freedoms” such a society
affords. As Agger encapsulates it: “his view is that domination infiltrates the psyche,
changing the person into an automaton charged with the infinite consumption of
unneeded goods.”860 Technology, in short, becomes the engine not of emancipation but of
indoctrination, it erodes individual autonomy, and thus became a central target for all of
Marcuse’s critical endeavors throughout his long career.
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Chapter 8

One-Dimensional Thought, Self and Society

With the rise of fascism in Germany, and the enduring tenacity of capitalism’s
ability to retain its efficacy, Marcuse provided a succinct social psychology of the
working class within the advanced industrial society, exploring why it is, as Ocay
expresses it, “when the Marxist script for the world drama required a European working
class to emerge as the agent of historical change, the working class turned out to be
quiescent and helpless.”861 Through various means of technological domination, as
explored in the previous chapters, capitalism effectively altered the desires of its
populace so completely that the drive for radical social change—to engage in what
Marcuse called “The Great Refusal”—was negated, and replaced by an endless series of
euphoric indulgences supplanting the drive to true happiness and authentic freedom. “The
fundamental thesis of One-Dimensional Man is that the technology of advanced
industrial societies has enabled them to eliminate conflict by assimilating all those who in
earlier forms of social order provided either voices or forces of dissent.”862 As Marcuse
asked:
If the individuals are satisfied to the point of happiness with the goods and
services handed down to them by the administration ... and if the
individuals are pre-conditioned so that the satisfying goods also include
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thoughts, feelings, aspirations, why should they wish to think, feel and
imagine for themselves?863
The individual has “become a willing subject” of the technological proliferation that has
granted innumerable minor pleasures, satisfying the needs that often the technology,
itself, created: a totalizing, insular system of self-perpetuation that has so deeply
penetrated into the daily needs and desires of its citizens that their willingness to even
envision alternative discourses is compromised, if not outright dissolved.864
The inner, private space of the individual “has been invaded and whittled down by
technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire
individual.”865 It is in this realm of the inner, private space that “negative” thinking is
capable of taking place, that is, the envisioning of entirely alternative modes of discourse
and society. “Naming the ‘things that are absent’ is breaking the spell of the things that
are, it is the ingression of a different order of things into the established one.”866 As
Kellner notes, negative thinking “‘negates’ existing forms of thought and reality from the
perspective of higher possibilities.”867
The eradication of negative thinking is a paradigmatic symptom of what Marcuse
called “one-dimensional thought.” Without the ability to envision alternative discourses,
perhaps even without the will to do so, the industrial society effectively negates the
possibility of negation, killing the potential to refute the current status quo and strive
towards a potential alternative. This is the negation of the very possibility of what
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Marcuse called the “Great Refusal,”868 “the protest against that which is,”869 the “refusal
of the structures and dynamics of capital appropriation … including the patterns of
workforce remuneration and reproduction.”870 Without a Great Refusal resulting from
negative thinking, the advanced industrial society successfully perpetuates itself and
negates the possibility of radical social change.
Arguably Marcuse’s most iconic text, One-Dimensional Man represented the
culmination of his earlier investigations into the indoctrinating role of technology and
technical rationality and presented a powerful explanation for why the Marxist script
failed to unfold in these societies by providing a social psychology of the working class
in such a stultifying milieu. Expanding on his critique of the omnipresence of technical
rationality within every facet of our lives, Marcuse demonstrated the ways in which the
technocracy perpetuated itself through the creation and manipulation of what he called
“false needs” through various means of advertising and media proliferation. Further,
One-Dimensional Man articulated the insular, self-sustaining nature of such a society
through its ability to either repel or subsume all possible contrary doctrines to terms the
technocracy, itself, finds conducive to its own perpetuation. Having discussed Marcuse’s
critique of technological rationality in the previous chapters, we are now in a good place
to explore this central text in detail: from the creation of “false needs” to the dissolution
of individuality, the technical base of advanced industrial societies will factor into every
aspect of the technocracy’s hold on power and the indoctrination of its citizens:
“The term ‘Great Refusal’ was inspired by Andre Breton, who defended the total refusal of the
institutions, values and way of life in bourgeois society. It is this notion of individualistic refusal and revolt
that characterizes Marcuse’s political conception in ODM” (Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the
Crisis of Marxism [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], 279).
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One-dimensional society is a society that lacks negativity, critique, and
transformative practice. It is a society without opposition. Citing trends
toward conformity, Marcuse describes one-dimensional society as creating
“false” consumer needs that integrate individuals into the existing system
of production and consumption via mass media, advertising, industrial
management, and uncritical modes of thought. In other words, current
society and culture and purely “affirmative,” legitimating the on-going
existence of material poverty, injustice, and inequality.871

Throughout, I will endeavor to lay bare some of the parallels that exist between
Marcuse and Peirce, especially the false sense of solidarity forged of belief manipulation
and indoctrination, as well as the reduction of autonomous inquiry to the heteronymous,
passive acceptance of the terms of the technocracy itself. Though Peirce concerned
himself more with the method by which beliefs are formed under the rule of such a
totalitarian authority, the means by which the vested interests accomplish this reflect
many of the same concerns Marcuse exposed in his own critique. From the manipulation
of needs and desires in Marcuse to the manipulation of beliefs in Peirce, from the
repulsion and/or appropriation of contrary doctrines that would undermine the efficacy of
the one-dimensional society in Marcuse to the various means of historical revisionism
and proliferation of propaganda in Peirce, the indoctrination, destruction of authenticity
and autonomy in the individual, and self-perpetuating structures of the objects of both
philosophers’ critiques will be made plain.
It was a social psychology that Marcuse was providing in One-Dimensional Man,
a project that acted as a kind of addendum to Marx’s project. There were two primary
facets of the transition from capitalism to communism that Marx imagined. The first, the
breakdown of the capitalistic system, he went into at length. The second, the change in
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consciousness of the proletariat, Marx did not account for as thoroughly as he did the
other. Indeed, commentators like Macintyre suggest that so little was said about the
growth of political consciousness in the working class that Marx failed to provide an
adequate social psychology, a failure that, Macintyre contends, prompted Marcuse to pick
up where Marx, effectively, left off.872
The question becomes, of course, what happened to the individuals in these
modern societies when the moment came for action, for disruption, for revolutionary
change, and there was only passivity and acquiescence? As Habermas confirms, “history
had taken a course quite contrary to the predictions of Marxist theory”—as demonstrated
not only by the rise of fascism and Stalinism but, too, the tenacity of capitalism to
maintain its dominion.873 Further, as Ocay notes, instead of the transition from capitalism
to socialism, what happened was the “integration of the proletariat into the status quo,”
and “the absence of a revolutionary agent for progressive social change”—that is,
according to Habermas, “the stifling of the proletariat” and “its lack of a revolutionary
consciousness.”874 What cognitive effect did these societies have over their citizens to
quell revolution, not exclusively through external means, but primarily through diluting
the conscious desire for change? “The suggestion, therefore, that under capitalism men
are dominated and exploited not merely by external oppressors, by those who own and
those who rule, but by forms of consciousness which prevent them from liberating
themselves.”875
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The primary thrust of One-Dimensional Man was an investigation into this very
phenomenon, a social psychology at the heart of advanced industrial societies whose
technological proliferation has so whittled down the individual’s private space that the
individual is no longer capable (perhaps, no longer willing) to envision alternative
structures, societies and discourses.876 The individual has “become a willing subject” of
the technological proliferation that has granted that individual innumerable minor
pleasures that satisfy the needs that often the technology, itself, created. 877 A totalizing,
insular system of self-perpetuation that has so deeply penetrated into the daily needs and
desires of its citizens that their willingness to even envision alternative discourses is
compromised if not outright dissolved. This is the annihilation of what Marcuse called
“negative thinking” and without negative thinking there can be no Great Refusal.
The inner, private space of the individual “has been invaded and whittled down by
technological reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire
individual.”878 It is in this realm of the inner, private space that negative thinking could
otherwise manifest, the envisioning of entirely alternative modes of discourse and
society. “Naming the ‘things that are absent’ is breaking the spell of the things that are, it
is the ingression of a different order of things into the established one.”879 As

Kellner

elucidates, negative thinking “‘negates’ existing forms of thought and reality from the
perspective of higher possibilities.”880
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The eradication of negative thinking is a paradigmatic symptom of onedimensional thought. As Newman proposes, “negative thinking, in Marcuse’s view, is the
sole source of creative social criticism, and he feared the obliteration of creativity in
social life.”881 Without the ability to envision alternative discourses, perhaps even
without the will to do so, the advanced industrial society effectively negates the
possibility of negation, killing the potential to refute the current status quo and strive
towards a potential alternative discourse. This negates the possibility of Marcuse’s “Great
Refusal,” “the protest against that which is.”882

Without a Great Refusal resulting

from negative thinking, the advanced industrial society successfully perpetuates itself and
negates the possibility of radical social change.
Profoundly disturbing is the necessity for technological proliferation to penetrate
so deeply into the individual consciousness that the ability to envision and desire
alternative discourses becomes a near impossibility. In order to perpetuate themselves,
industrial societies have to sedate individual citizens into a state of acquiescence; they do
so through the proliferation of minor pleasures that effectively masquerade as true
happiness and thus provide no incentive for radical social change. For Marcuse, the result
was a conformist, one-dimensional, inauthentic society.883
The complacency Marcuse saw as a reasonable explanation for the failure of the
historical moment of transition from capitalism to socialism was one of the primary foci
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of his Eros and Civilization, picked up again in One-Dimensional Man.884 Complacency,
Marcuse argued, was fundamentally an issue of desire satisfaction, namely, that without
the desire for something more than what the current status quo was offering its citizens,
the citizens had no viable reason to engage in the negative thinking that could lead to a
Great Refusal and the onset of radical social change.
“If the individuals find themselves in the things which shape their life, they do
so, not by giving, but by accepting the law of things—not the law of physics but the law
of their society.”885 To “give” the law of things would be to demonstrate the type of
autonomy so prized in Kant’s moral theory and re-imagined in Sartre’s existentialism.
Autonomy would therefore be a “self-governing,” as opposed to the heteronomy886
suggested here lying at the heart of advanced industrial societies in which individuals
find themselves shaped by the things in their society rather than taking an active role in
shaping themselves.887 “The inner subjectivity of the individual,” Ingram notes, “is
absorbed into, and obliterated by, the impersonal mechanism of the system.”888 As Farr
captures it, “the loss of freedom in so-called democratic societies is not necessarily the
result of force, but rather, it results from a smooth, systemic, systematic, reshaping of the
human psyche so that freedom is given up voluntarily.”889 Consider, for example,
Marcuse’s distinction between true and false needs:
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False are those which are superimposed upon the individual by particular
social interests in his repression: the needs which perpetuate toil,
aggressiveness, misery and injustice. Their satisfaction might be more
gratifying to the individual, but this happiness is not a condition which has
to be maintained and protected if it serves to arrest the development of the
ability (his own and others) to recognize the disease of the whole and
grasp the chances of curing the disease. The result then is euphoria in
unhappiness.890
What can it mean to have a “superimposed” need? Needs, by nature, well up from within
the individual’s consciousness reflecting some sort of lack that “needs” to be fulfilled.
For a need to be superimposed is a subtle notion, indeed. The superimposition of false
needs arise within, and well up from, an individual’s consciousness as if they were true,
non-superimposed needs. And this is the crucial point, something indicative of many
aspects of industrial society: the perpetration of the structures of the system go unnoticed,
passing as if they were the natural discourse, the natural order, of events. By doing so,
Marcuse noted, industrial societies guard themselves against critique (for there appears
there is nothing amiss that needs to be critiqued if false needs pass as true needs and what
is artificial and superimposed passes as natural and good, especially when a genuine sort
of euphoria is the result). As he said above, it arrests the “development of the ability … to
recognize the disease.”
We have seen shades of this in Peirce—though his is a subtle nod to an implicit
mechanism utilized by the authority, it is one critical to our investigation here. For Peirce,
the realization of the contingency of a societal apparatus was enough to at least open the
door to radical social change by bringing different socio-political possibilities into
tension, hence resulting in doubt that the current milieu was the best choice, and opening
inquiry to get cognitive progress unfolding once more. To combat this, as we saw, the
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authority had to guard against such a creation of tension by pawning off the beliefs they
would have their citizens maintain (invariably to the authority’s advantage) as historically
necessary and apodictically certain. Such an authority would have to do so, for
contingency comes tension-laden in the realization that one’s societal structure is but one
among several and may well not be the best one to maintain. The interplay between “false
needs” and what Marcuse will call “true” or “vital needs” carries the same effect:
precisely because false needs go unrecognized as “false” by those who maintain them,
critical self-reflection becomes impossible, for Marcuse, and the realization of the
contingency of their desires (not to mention the indoctrinating method of the desires’
creation) goes unnoticed.891
“Most of the prevailing needs to relax, to have fun, to behave and consume in
accordance with the advertisements, to love and hate what others love and hate, belong to
this category of false needs.”892 As appropriate an observation as this may have been in
the nineteen-sixties, its relevance has blossomed proportionately into the twenty-first
century. The barrage of advertisements contemporary society endures is nearly beyond
belief: ubiquitous billboards, commercials on radio and television, in movie theaters prior
to the main attraction, and every webpage on computers and hand-held portable devices.
We are inundated with such advertisements, instilling needs in us that were not there
before, needs superimposed upon us not in isolation from our fellow man but in accord
with him. What is loved, what is popular, what must be had, is constantly changing in a
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protean universe of needs not of our own making. Industrial societies must “create the
need for buying the goods that must be profitably sold.”893 As he said:
No matter how much such needs may have become the individual’s own,
reproduced and fortified by the conditions of his existence; no matter how
much he identifies himself with them and finds himself in their
satisfaction, they continue to be what they were from the beginning—
products of a society whose dominant interest demands repression.894
The true or “vital” needs—“nourishment, clothing, lodging at the attainable level of
culture”895—are “the prerequisite for the realization of all needs,” but the superimposed
false needs manifest in the same fashion as the vital needs for the individuals in a onedimensional society, mixing and melding into an indiscernible mess as the social
structure of the advanced society replaces a wholly autonomous individual with the
heteronomy born of the society’s need to perpetuate itself through its production of items
and, in so doing, the production of false needs for items that they naturally, vitally, truly
would otherwise not need at all.
The significance of distinguishing the false needs from the true is quite profound.
As Marcuse noted, if our needs, our desires, our very instincts are superimposed upon us,
and this superimposition is actively perpetrated by a structured society bent on
perpetuating itself, the individual loses his or her freedom of autonomous selfdevelopment. Further, the individual loses sight of what is lost as a type of artificial
euphoria permeates his or her life within the advanced industrial society. False needs
supplant true needs, even as just masquerading as true needs, and efficacy for critique is
compromised. As long as individuals “are kept incapable of being autonomous, as long as
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they are indoctrinated and manipulated (down to their very instincts), their answer to this
question” of which needs are true and which needs are false “cannot be taken as their
own.”896
The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false
consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these
beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social
classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a
way of life. It is a good way of life—much better than before—and as a
good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a
pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas,
aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established
universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms
of this universe.897
The vested interests, the “administrative-bureaucratic apparatus which organizes,
manages, and stabilizes capitalist society,” utilize the advanced forms of technology and
its proliferation of advertising and media control to “invade” the individual’s “private
space” until it is “whittled down by technological reality.” 898 Thus proliferated, it is
capable of advancing whatever agenda it deems most profitable, both in a literal sense,
and in the sense of the “profitability” of perpetuating its own structure. The creation of
false needs is a key component to this agenda, creating needs for products for the sole
purpose of profiting from their sale. In creating needs that the vested interests then fulfill,
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euphoria overcomes the individual whose “needs” have been fulfilled—a type of
drugged-stupor, like an addict receiving a fix (that is, a false need for the drug is fulfilled
by the otherwise-unnecessary fix and results in a temporary, but very real, euphoria). For,
as Ingram notes, “One-Dimensional Man contains one of the strongest indictments of the
narcotic effects of advanced capitalism ever written.”899
In the one-dimensional society, the sensual needs of desire, pleasure, and
play seem to coincide with a world of commodities that creates a new
biological foundation in our sensual and institutional structures through
more advanced forms of capitalism. In other words, the pleasure principle
is superficially satiated by the very society that is in fact responsible for
the on-going degradation of real, vital needs.900
This “drugging rhythm” promotes a type of “one-dimensional thought” that is
“systematically promoted by the makers of politics and their purveyors of mass
information. Their universe of discourse is populated by self-validating hypotheses
which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become hypnotic definitions or
dictations.”901 The result is that, within “the mental apparatus, the tension between that
which is desired and that which is permitted seems considerably lowered.”902 The Reality
Principle (which I will discuss in the next chapter) “no longer seems to require a …
painful transformation of instictual needs.”903 As with Peirce, Marcuse framed the
individual’s relationship with his or her society as that of organism/environment
transaction. Specifically, in such a milieu, the individual must merely “adapt himself to a
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world which does not seem to demand the denial of his innermost needs—a world which
is not essentially hostile.”904 Further:
The organism is thus being preconditioned for the spontaneous acceptance
of what is offered. Inasmuch as the greater liberty involves a contraction
rather than extension and development of instinctual needs, it works for
rather than against the status quo of general repression.905

If technical rationality is, as Marcuse insisted, ubiquitously proliferated throughout every
avenue of advanced society, then any disparity that ever existed between “the desire for
goods” and the “permission to indulge in those desires” is minimized or outright
dissolved to the obvious benefit of the perpetuation of the technical apparatus. It would
make little sense if built into the creation of the goods that must be profitably sold that
there wasn’t also a concurrent permissiveness to indulge in precisely those goods and the
euphoria they produce. As such, “the organism is thus preconditioned for the spontaneous
acceptance of what is offered” both because of its desire to align oneself with rationality
(here, technical rationality) as well as the dissolution of any pre-existing taboos or
restrictions for those indulgences. Key here, too, is Marcuse’s invocation of the term
“tension,” noting how it has been lessened in the milieu of advanced society, specifically,
the tension between what is desired and what is permitted, allowing for euphoric
indulgences that help perpetuate commodity festishism. Dr. King cited the need for a
constructive, non-violent “tension,” a concept that was central, too, to Peirce’s critique of
the counterproductive methods of belief formation, noting that “tension” was the
“Secondness” of the encountered world, that which throws our beliefs into doubt
precisely because they encounter some resistance and do not unfold as expected, our

904
905

Ibid.
Ibid.

286

guiding principles no longer leading to the expected conclusions, a process requisite for
reevaluation, inquiry and cognitive development. As Bronner notes, Marcuse was aware
that:
Resistance has many sources. It can result from the friction created by
economic contradictions; it can emerge in response to the arbitrary
exercise of political power. Ideas can inspire it; the aesthetic imagination
can inflame it. Its sources might even lie deeper within the psychological
infrastructure of the individual or species.906

Whatever the source of resistance or tension, for Peirce, it was the necessary precondition
for cognitive development, the onset of some problematic situation that instigated the
cycle of belief formation. For Marcuse, too, it was the requisite underpinning for radical
social change, the essence of “negative” or “critical” thinking that called into question
precisely those substructures of technology and capital that would prefer to remain
obfuscated and keep their citizens in a state of euphoric ignorance in order to successfully
perpetuate their agendas. Without tension, specifically, the tension between what is
desired and what is permitted, a culture of indulgence is created, precisely the sort of
consciousness that aids the flourishing of capital, technology and commodity.
Marcuse called this new disposition of euphoria the “happy consciousness,” free
from the negativity and critique of an “unhappy consciousness,” that is nevertheless
autonomous and dialectical.907 The happy consciousness “accepts the given as an
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absolute and undeniable good” rather than engaging in the “negative” thinking of seeing
what is concurrent with what it is not, namely.908
In Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit the unhappy consciousness is a
distinct phase of thought that develops within the odyssey of human
consciousness in history where human identity is paralyzed through its
own growth and education. Despite achieving a new level of knowledge of
reality, the unhappy consciousness fails to achieve a greater, reconciliatory
relationship with reality. Drawing on Hegel’s construct of the unhappy
consciousness, Marcuse’s happy consciousness retains the same symptom
of paralysis of educational striving yet with an importance difference:
instead of a sense of incompleteness, the happy consciousness is a pacified
mode of thought that is content with its material and historical situation.909
The notion of the unhappy consciousness’s sense of “incompleteness” is a subtle but
profoundly important one. From Socrates’ definition of wisdom as the incompleteness of
his knowledge requisite for the motivation for educational growth, the realization of
limitation has ever been the impetus for cognitive development. This theme of
“incompleteness” manifested in Peirce, as well, as “doubt,” as his adamant fallibilism, as
the tension requisite for inquiry’s instigation and engine for educational development.
The “method of authority” strove to negate that sense of incompleteness by forwarding
beliefs that the populace passively accepted as absolute, beliefs to the benefit of that
authority’s hold on power, creating, as Marcuse called a kind of “happy consciousness,”
free from the repulsive sensation of doubt and disequilibrium (in a Peircean sense), thus
negating the potential for radical social change or any form of autonomous cognitive
development: “Happy consciousness signifies the loss of critical thought.”910
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Thus, if “false needs” are a major component of indoctrination, it follows that the
reformulation of needs became central to Marcuse’s prescribed ascension out of the
indoctrination of the technocracy. As he asserts towards the end of One-Dimensional
Man:
The attainment of autonomy demands conditions in which the repressed
dimensions of experience can come to life again; their liberation demands
repression of the heteronomous needs and satisfactions which organize life
in this society. The more they have become the individual’s own needs
and satisfactions, the more would their repression appear to be an all but
fatal deprivation. But precisely by virtue of this fatal character, it may
create the primary subjective prerequisite for qualitative change—namely,
the redefinition of needs.911

Technology has gotten to the point where it truly can alleviate scarcity and diminish
sickness and suffering, taking care of our true or “vital” needs. Thus, the deployment of
technology becomes intimately bound up with the very definition of needs. The “surplus
repression,” which I will explore in full in the following chapter on Eros and Civilization,
must be dissolved, the creation of false needs for the goods that are proliferated must be
dissolved and the entire technical base must be formulated for the singular goal of
tending to the vital needs in society, thereby freeing in the individual to lead a more
autonomous existence, no longer at the whim and mercy of fads, products and the desire
for social status. As with Peirce, Marcuse did not limit the indoctrinating powers to any
specific organization or ideology and expanded his critique to all forms of authority that
encouraged this sort of “surplus repression.” As Bronner elaborates:
Additional limits on gratification, well beyond the minimum level of
repression indispensable for human interaction, will also take institutional
form in the patriarchal-monogamic family, the church, the hierarchical
division of labor, the bureaucratic state, and a mass media inherently
desirous of subverting a genuinely private sphere of life. Institutions such
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as these will become the instruments through which “surplus repression”
is extracted and maintained for the benefit of the given order.912
“The optimal goal” becomes, then, as Marcuse said, “the replacement of false needs with
true ones, the abandonment of repressive satisfaction.”913 With the dissolution of the
cause of this “drugged stupor,” this “drugging rhythm” of fix and euphoria (namely, the
goods and false needs that drive us towards procuring those goods), citizens within the
advanced technocracy would no longer passively accept what is handed down to them by
the administration for they would no longer be content with the petty indulgences of the
oppressive apparatus of domination at the price of their autonomy. For “all liberation
depends on the consciousness of servitude, and the emergence of this consciousness is
always hampered by the predominance of needs and satisfactions which, to a great extent,
have become the individual’s own.”914 For Marcuse, despite the myriad euphoric
indulgences within nation’s that even pride themselves on their emphasis on liberty, the
citizens of such a technological apparatus have only the illusion of freedom. As he said,
even “liberty can be made into a powerful instrument of domination” wherein “free
choice among a wide variety of goods and services does not signify freedom if these
goods and services sustain social controls over a life of toil and fear—that is, if they
sustain alienation.”915 The illusion of choice is the “freedom” to choose from a variety of
goods, services and indulges all to the benefit of the overall technical base, rationality and
apparatus whose overall goal has been, and remains, alienation and oppression. As such,
Marcuse argued, such “freedom” cannot really be considered freedom at all.
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For Peirce, the method of authority created a society of “intellectual slaves” with
uniform beliefs not of their own making, beliefs passively accepted and administered by
the bureaucratic apparatus. This created solidarity forged not of autonomous inquiry
towards a common goal (as the prescribed method of inquiry permitted) but, rather,
solidarity of acquiescence in which autonomy and individuality were subsumed by the
administration. Marcuse, like Peirce, championed solidarity, but the authentic sort, forged
of autonomous inquiry towards a common goal, reminiscent, again, of a Sartrean groupin-fusion.916 One of Marcuse’s central concerns throughout his career was, as Bronner
casts it, the “rendering of critical theory capable of building solidarity and informing
radical practice.”917
Marcuse saw, from the identification of rationality with technology and the
manner by which “false” needs were created and proliferated by the vested interests, the
same dissolution of autonomy and individuality that Peirce critiqued, the result being a
kind of mass mentality, or as Peirce would say, a nation of intellectual slaves. As Kellner
notes in his introduction to the second edition:
By the 1950’s, Marcuse … perceived that the unparalleled affluence of the
consumer society and the apparatus of planning and management in
advanced capitalism had produced new forms of social administration and
a “society without opposition” that threatened individuality and that closed
off possibilities of radical social change.918

It would seem that Marcuse’s emphasis on individual autonomy within a milieu of the mass mentality of
an advanced one-dimensional society would be at odds with Peirce’s call for social individualism and a
communal push for a common goal. I will explore this in full in my concluding chapters but, in brief, I
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human autonomy (the individuals of wider social feeling) in a kind of “rugged” individualism, but within a
more democratic and egalitarian social coordination (within the method of inquiry or, for Marcuse, a
liberated rationality in a new aesthetic dimension within his utopian vision) both champion a greater sense
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Precisely because technical rationality infiltrates every aspect of life, the apparatus of
planning and management has “produced new forms of social administration” and control
through the perpetuation of false needs (the desire for the goods that must be profitably
sold) and their attainment (the euphoric, evanescent moments of purchasing those goods).
Media and advertising infiltrate every moment of life, not only altering what individuals
would otherwise come to desire but, too, streamlining desires in general uniformly such
that all individuals come to desire the same things as everyone else.
The structure of even the most purportedly democratic technocracy is, itself,
totalitarian, in so far as it is self-contained and self-perpetuating by the very conditions of
its structure via the indoctrination and manipulation of the desires, needs and
developmental processes of its citizenry. “Totalitarian,” at first glance, seems an odd
choice of term to describe a society that provides a certain type of liberty (indeed, prides
itself on a certain type of liberty) and induces, at least, a pleasant sort of euphoria in its
citizens. This paradox919 of industrial societies further obfuscates the irrationality of the
nature of this society as it offers both satisfaction and a certain form of apparent liberty
while remaining totalitarian in the structures that perpetuate themselves at the cost of
human autonomy.
By virtue of the way it has organized its technological base, contemporary
industrial society tends to be totalitarian. For “totalitarian” is not only a
terroristic political coordination of society, but also a nonterroristic
economic-technical coordination which operates through the manipulation
of needs by vested interests.920
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The coordination of commercial needs to perpetuate its growth and financial gain is
coupled with the technological era’s advanced forms of information and advertising
proliferation allowing it to completely inundate the individual with whatever product or
ideology it deems profitable to advance. “It thus precludes the emergence of an effective
opposition against the whole.”921 It is in this sense that the advanced industrial society,
despite its emphasis on some form of “freedom,” and despite the ubiquitous euphoric
indulges it affords its citizens, can still be considered “totalitarian”—for the structures in
place to perpetuate the system (the structures themselves) are such that they flatten
potentiality and streamline development towards their own ends, subsuming or repelling
any possible opposition. This is what Marcuse meant when he claimed the advanced
industrial society is “one-dimensional.”
The products indoctrinate and manipulate; they promote a false
consciousness which is immune against its falsehood. And as these
beneficial products become available to more individuals in more social
classes, the indoctrination they carry ceases to be publicity; it becomes a
way of life. It is a good way of life—much better than before—and as a
good way of life, it militates against qualitative change. Thus emerges a
pattern of one-dimensional thought and behavior in which ideas,
aspirations, and objectives that, by their content, transcend the established
universe of discourse and action are either repelled or reduced to the terms
of this universe.922
This type of “one-dimensional thought” is “systematically promoted by the makers of
politics and their purveyors of mass information. Their universe of discourse is populated
by self-validating hypotheses which, incessantly and monopolistically repeated, become
hypnotic definitions or dictations.”923 Key, too, is the society’s ability to “militate against
qualitative change” by flattening and reducing all content, material or idealistic, to its
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own, pre-established universe of discourse, a discourse that, as we’ve seen, is populated
by “self-validating hypotheses.” Any discourse that cannot be subsumed into this selfvalidating discourse is repelled. Implicitly here (and explicitly elsewhere) is the
dissolution of dialectics, of dichotomies, of opposition of any kind. The pivotal point is
that advanced industrial societies dissolve any form of opposition necessary for such
dialectical interplay to unfold. Indeed, without opposition, without a multi-dimensionality
of opposing universes of discourse, of different potentialities for actualization, of
different systems and structures, there is only the closed, heteronymous onedimensionality of the advanced industrial society.
This sort of “controlled” or “institutionalized desublimation” is the complete
“conquest and unification of opposites.”924 Without the threat of the entirely “other,”
without a threat from outside the established system, there is only the one-dimensionality
of the system itself, and whatever options are presented therein are compatible with the
totalizing system and, in so being, are only “options” in a very nominal sense without real
efficacy. As Katz intones, “this mobilization against conceptual and aesthetic
transcendence of one-dimensional thought is the ideological reflex of the mobilization
against political transcendence of one-dimensional society.”925 This “affirmative culture,”
one that identifies purportedly rational interests with the technical base that determines
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those interests for citizens heteronymously, “is for Marcuse a conservative formation
resisting any attempt to negate the social whole in the name of radical transformation.”926
The use of the term “desublimation” requires a modicum of explanation, as it
appears to deviate from its traditional usage in modern psychoanalytic theory. As Ingram
summarizes:
Sublimation was the term used by Freud to designate the rechanneling of
sexual energy away from its primary object toward a “substitute,” which
provides a more socially useful type of pleasure. The substitute
satisfaction Freud had in mind included professional (especially creative)
work and largely intellectual endeavors. Marcuse, following Freud, agrees
that the products of high culture and art, which exhibit imagination and
beauty, are sublimations … such products figuratively articulate a life of
harmony and fulfillment which is incompatible with the oppressive,
utilitarian features of technological society927 … Marcuse … deviates
from Freud in regarding sublimation as less a form of repression than a
source of liberation. For him, sublimation can serve to extend the principle
of pleasure … to include the full development of the subject’s powers,
faculties, and needs. It can also generate intense feelings of social
solidarity … so construed, sublimation would demand the creation of a
society without domination, oriented toward aesthetically pleasing forms
of work an receptivity.928
Conversely, then, for Marcuse, desublimation “can issue in forms of ‘freedom’ which are,
in fact, repressive,” the technical apparatus’ co-opting of the potentially emancipatory
objects of sublimation to reinforce its own interests, technical base, and technological
rationality.929
The dissolution of opposition appears, in many respects, to be a positive effect of
technologically advanced societies but, again, only so far as it supplants true happiness
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and freedom with a type of euphoria. The system’s dissolution of opposites through this
controlled, institutionalized desublimation, flattens real possibilities and reduces them to
mere options, pre-established, within a pre-established universe of discourse that is, itself,
comprised only of tautological hypotheses that are self-perpetuating. Further, “for
Marcuse … it is not just that consumer culture has assimilated potentially oppositional
realms of culture but also that these forms of negative and critical thought have been
replaced with an operationalized way of thinking and attendant set of values” including
“consumer attitudes and behavior” and an “increasing conformity to market logics.”930 As
Bronner reveals …
… socialization will subsequently emphasize competition as progress
becomes identified with instrumental rationality and the domination of
nature. Emancipatory alternatives concerning the “pacification of nature”
will thus fall by the wayside, fantasy will ever more surely become
circumscribed within the aesthetic dreams of the individual subject, and a
blunting of speculative reason will take place.931

Real difference is supplanted with false difference, real needs with false needs, real
freedom with media-controlled heteronomy, real potential for growth and development
with the pre-structured arenas where growth and development only come in preestablished frameworks and through pre-established terms. And always the latter
masquerading as the former, thus effectively denying the possibility for real critique as
the problems are obfuscated and euphoria pervades.
Institutionalized desublimation thus appears to be an aspect of the
“conquest of transcendence” achieved by the one-dimensional society.
Just as this society tends to reduce, and even absorb opposition … in the
realm of political and higher culture, so it does in the instinctual sphere.
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The result is the atrophy of the mental organs for grasping the
contradictions and the alternatives.932
As Kellner and others note, “one-dimensional language incorporates into its very form
its own position, again erasing the ability to think against the status quo.”933 Marks
explains that, “when a system ‘works,’ its consequences are taken by most people as its
validation. It does not occur to them that an alternative is possible, and that the alternative
may work better in the sense that it can provide more satisfactions, less labor, and fewer
dangers.”934 This is the direct association of technology and rationality that Marcuse
addressed, and is symptomatic of the instrumental rationality that both Peirce and
Marcuse railed against. Negative thinking, indeed, critical theory in general, “is what
generates a break with the logic of progress” and, for Marcuse specifically, utilizing “the
most radical utopian vision ever generated by the dialectical tradition” bringing about this
Great Refusal of all that is.935 Without a Great Refusal resulting from negative thinking,
the industrial society successfully perpetuates itself and negates the possibility of radical
social change.
Central throughout Marcuse’s critique of the omnipresence and efficacy of the
technical base of indoctrination is this “conquest of opposites” and a close study of the
positive (and negative) roles of negation in advanced industrial societies. Bernstein
diagnoses negativity to be “the deepest, most persistent, and most pervasive term in
Marcuse’s work.”936 But, for Marcuse, “negativity is a positive concept in that only
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through negation of social contradictions can conformity and oppression be overcome
and real freedom and individuality realized.”937 This prompts Farr to explain that
“positive negation is the recognition of the contradictions that permeate our society.”938
Negation, as we saw, was made manifest through “negative thinking” which could lead to
a “Great Refusal,” that is, to realize the contingency of the technocratic milieu and
develop the ability to postulate viable alternatives that challenge the vested interests’
dominion. It was the “negation” of what is. Farr proposes:
One might say negativity has a positive and a negative function …
negativity in its positive function is a negation of the present oppressive
and repressive reality … it is the negation of social forces and structures
which dehumanize and prohibit the growth, development, and happiness
of every individual in advanced capitalist society. Negativity in its
negative function is the negation of human potential. It represents a social
order that produces misery instead of happiness, domination instead of
freedom, it produces waste in the midst of poverty.939

Negation may be both the engine for radical social change, as well as its dissolution
under a repressive regime. The former demarks the potential for progressive development
whereas the latter dissolves the potential for development through the one-dimensional
homogeneity of a society without opposition. As Habermas argues, for Marcuse, “the
abstract and ahistorical concept of reason which is at the heart of idealistic philosophy
lends itself to all forms of ideology, but the bourgeois ideals, of cognitive and moral
universalism on the one hand, of expressive subjectivism on the other, carry also utopian
content which transcends the limits of false consciousness.”940 As Farr contends, this
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dialectical tension between the two forms of negation in Marcuse has lead some scholars
to believe Marcuse was far more inconsistent than perhaps he ultimately was, oscillating,
as he seemed to, between the optimism for the former and the pessimism of the latter.
Yet, as with Peirce, Marcuse differentiated between an idealized society and the
indoctrinating contemporary milieu. “As a dialectical thinker,” Farr suggests, “Marcuse
was very sensitive to the persistent interaction between these two forms of negativity,” a
sensitivity, he argues, that is indicative of Marcuse’s unique brand of critical theory. 941
For Marcuse’s critical theory reflected the “viscitudes, conflicts, and transformations” of
a specific society in a specific time, otherwise it would fail as a critical theory in
general.942 Kellner sketches Marcuse’s perspective on the Frankfurt School as “a critical
theory of society [that] is always a project underway; it is always partial, historical, and
subject to revision.”943 Thus, not only was Marcuse’s critical theory historically situated,
but reflected the kind of “fallibilism” inherent in the work of Peirce, namely, that as a
project always already “underway,” always “partial,” always “historically,” it is then
always “subject to revision.” Negation itself plays a role in this conception of critical
theory, namely, that a project not subject to revision reflects the kind of apodictic
necessity inherent in the stagnatory one-dimensionalizing of a hegemonic technocracy
that does not allow the sort of autonomous inquiry and individualism that is inherently
protean and evolving. In fact, even in Marcuse’s utopian vision (which I will explore in
full below), the society of his imagining is not one of stagnation but, on the contrary, is
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one that dissolves the stagnation born of the indoctrinating and one-dimensionalizing
aspects of the technical base.
As Habermas affirms, “no doubt, Herbert Marcuse claimed negation to be the
very essence of thinking—as did Adorno and Horkheimer,” but Marcuse, Habermas is
quick to add, was “the most affirmative among those who praised negativity. With him
negative thinking retained the dialectical trust in determinate negation, in the disclosure
of positive alternatives.”944 Schoolman seconds this, arguing that “reason,” properly
understood, “is negative thinking:”945
To think negatively, or dialectically, is to conceive of things as they
appear as being limited. Such conceptions spring from a recognition of
something’s potentiality. To think in this manner is to deny, cancel, or
‘negate’ a thing’s apparent form. And to think negatively, critically, there
must be freedom of thought. Rational faculties must be free from any sort
of conditioning by social and political factors that would blind reasoning
processes to the existence of possibilities for growth and development.946
“Negative thinking” may be properly understood as synomymous with “dialectical
thinking,” if we turn to consider Marcuse’s reading of Hegel:
Hegel’s philosophy is indeed what the subsequent reaction termed it, a
negative philosophy. It is originally motivated by the conviction that the
given facts that appear to common sense as the positive index of truth are
in reality the negation of truth, so that truth can only be established in their
destruction. The driving force of the dialectical method lies in this critical
conviction. Dialectic in its entirety is linked to the conception that all
forms of being are permeated by an essential negativity, and that this
negativity determines their content and movement. The dialectic
represents the counter-thrust to any for positivism.947
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We see here not only the sharp contrast between “dialectical rationality” and
“technical rationality,” but, too, the deep problems associated with the reemergence of
emancipatory dialectical rationality in a society where the technical base has so
thoroughly inundated the individual that even his or her thoughts, feelings, desires and
aspirations accord with those proliferated by the vested interests. So, too, do we see more
clearly Marcuse’s need to emphasize the desublimatory aspect of the technocracy’s
“conquest of opposites,” in essence, the dissolution of dialectical thinking itself in its
citizens. Without the ability to “negate” the present while concurrently positing the
potential for something to be “other,” as Schoolman notes above, technical rationality,
and its homogenizing and one-dimensionalizing, hold sway, negating (in the negative
sense) the potential for “growth and development.” Though Peirce did not use the term
“dialectical thinking,” it is clear that the ability to “negate” the present belief set
proliferated by the authority in conjunction with the ability to both recognize potential for
otherness and view things not as they are (handed down, packaged and constructed) but
as they are not, in their “limited” capacities, their contingency, in a sense, all this was the
necessary catalyst for the return of autonomous inquiry. Nowhere was this more apparent
than in Peirce’s critique of authority, not to mention his emphasis on the abductive,
hypothesizing, “guess” at the riddle, requisite for intellectual development (i.e., the
necessary positing of what is not).
Marcuse argues that thought is “purged from that ‘negative’ which loomed so
large at the origins of logic and philosophic thought—the experience of the denying,
deceptive, falsifying power of the established reality.”948 Further,

948

Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Op. Cit., 140.

301

With the elimination of this experience, the conceptual effort to sustain the
tension between “is” and “ought,” and to subvert the established universe
of discourse in the name of its own truth is likewise eliminated from
thought which is to be objective, exact, and scientific.949
Marcuse was well aware that the authoritarian apparatus has “its own” conception of
“truth” as it is proliferated throughout a populace. Ingram defines this as how “what
ought to be is no longer clearly distinguished from what is. Imagination of new
possibilities is increasingly truncated in favor of adaptive response.” 950 Of course, Peirce
associated the emancipation from this form of indoctrination with the “scientific” method
of inquiry, appealing to “objective” conditions that transcend the artificial constructs of
the authority itself. Marcuse (unsurprising given his critique of technology and
technological rationality) associates the false-truth of the administration with the
“objective” and the “scientific.” However, as we noted with Peirce’s critique of
positivism, it is not the bare reduction of theory to facts that motivates Peirce to adopt the
method of inquiry but, rather, the method itself, articulated in the specific way in which
he articulated it, necessarily undermines the indoctrinating effects of the authority and
frees autonomous inquiry to seek objective truth. Peirce, inspired by his friend Chauncey
Wright, maintained, “scientific laws do much more than summarize existing knowledge,
they lead to new knowledge. This idea that the scientific method is a means for arriving
at new experimental results was a starting point of Peirce’s pragmatism.”951 Certainly, the
authority in Peirce would claim that their truth was objective fact and in keeping with
Marcuse’s notion of “technological rationality,” ought to be accepted precisely on those
terms, namely, precisely because it is presented as objective and scientific. However, as
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we saw in Peirce, the presentation of something as objective and scientific (ways in
which the authority can convince a populace of the apodicticity of the beliefs they seek to
proliferate successfully) does not mean that those truths are objective and forged of an
autonomous, authentic method of inquiry.
As I hinted at above, Marcuse’s conception of negation in this positive sense (that
is, in the sense as an engine for progress rather than a means of stagnation) was forged of
his close reading of Hegel in his early years.952 In Reason and Revolution, for example,
he utilized his reading of Hegel in an attack upon positivism, illuminating the
significance of negation in a manner that, though distinct, certainly anticipated its use
later in One-Dimensional Man:
Positivism, the philosophy of common sense, appeals to the certainty of
facts, but, as Hegel shows, in a world where facts do not at all present
what reality can and ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up the real
potentialities of mankind for a false and alien world. The positivist attack
on universal concepts, on the ground they cannot be reduced to observable
facts, cancels from the domain of knowledge everything that may not yet
be a fact … when [Hegel] emphasizes time and again that the universal is
pre-eminent over the particular, he is struggling against limiting truth to
the particular ‘given.’ The universal is more than the particular. This
signifies in the concrete that the potentialities of men and things are not
exhausted in the given forms and relations in which they actually appears;
it means that men and things are all they have been and actually are, and
yet more than all this. Setting the truth in the universal expressed in
Hegel’s conviction that no given particular form, whether in nature or
society, embodies the whole truth.953

Contra the positivistic position, Hegel demonstrated that facts (the ultimate reductionistic
goal of positivism) represent neither what reality is nor, especially, what it ought to be. In
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essence, then, positivism limits, as he said, the Truth to a particular “given” and ignores
entirely the potentialities inherent in the universal. What men and things are is not
exhausted in how they appear but are over and above this through the potentialities yet to
be realized. As Marcuse said, Hegel’s system “could well be called a negative
philosophy, the name given to it by its contemporary opponents. To counteract its
destructive tendencies, there are, in the decade following Hegel’s death, a positive
philosophy which undertook to subordinate reason to the authority of establish fact.”954
Positivism for Marcuse, in sharp contrast to the (positive) negative philosophy he saw in
Hegel, merely feeding into the technical rationality of the advanced industrial society as
yet one more instantiation of the “flattening” of potentialities in the sense of a reduction
of alternatives to the bare “facts” of the matter. Positivism, in this Hegelian comparison,
might well be said to be more “negative negativism,” the negation of the potential for
negation, therefore, “positivism.” It was not a dialectical philosophy, for Marcuse, having
abandoned the concept of negation and taking the completely opposing stance: rather
than seeing things in their limited capacities, as what they are not, all positivism can see
is the world as it is reduced to demonstrable “facts.” As Katz describes it:
Philosophy has likewise succumbed to the one-dimensional technological
rationality, relinquishing its historical commitment to the hidden
dimension of unexperienced reality (potentiality) in favour of the
language, truth, and logic of the establishment. In its prevailing, neopositivist forms, contemporary philosophy repudiates all transgression
beyond empirical facts and rejects as “metaphysical” those modes of
thought which negate and transcend the established universe of
discourse.955
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Indeed, the direct association with positivism and technical rationality is appropriate for
commentators, like Bernstein, who note that, for Marcuse:
The battle between negativity and positivity is the most consequential and
decisive battle in the contemporary world. It is not only a battle that takes
place between competing philosophical or intellectual orientations. We are
threatened with the triumph of positivity which infects every aspect of
culture and social reality, as positivity that reflects a basic impotence in
the face of what is given, what appears as existing historical social fact.
Everything Marcuse said and did was motivated by he basic desire to
expose and combat the invidious consequences of positivity.956

Just as it was with technical rationality, through its myriad forms of repression,
indoctrination, proliferation of technology, and demand for homogeneity, positivity
“infects every aspect of culture and social reality,” placing the subject at the mercy of the
objective given, pure passivity, “impotence,” without the tools nor the desire for radical
social change in light of potential alternatives that are either repelled or reduced to the
terms of the apparatus. Indeed, as we discussed in the previous chapter, the infilration of
technical rationality extends into the realm of higher education and infects both the
“how” and “what” of university scholarship. As Rose confirms, for Marcuse, “the
mollifying powers of mass culture” powerfully influence “the orientation of educational
institutions.”957 The role of higher education is thus of paramount importance to the
conveyance of the need for, and ability to engage in, a type of negative or critical
thinking that remains in sharp contrast to the positiving thinking discussed here. As Leiss,
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Ober and Sherover note in their essay, “Marcuse as Teacher,” that “positive thinking …
reigns supreme in our time.”958
This way of thinking identifies truth with what exists and disdains any
attempt to investigate possible alternatives to the established reality or the
means by which these possibilities might be realized, denigrates reason to
the level of mere manipulation of facts, and refuses to judge established
conditions in the light of already existing possibilities for transcending
those conditions.959
Intriguingly, Peirce’s attack on positivism took a remarkably similar trajectory.
Both Marcuse and Peirce took time to critique Auguste Comte, in particular, as a
paradigmatic example of all that was wrong with positivism. For Marcuse, Comte was
guilty of severing “social theory from its connection with the negative philosophy and
placed it in the orbit of positivism.”960 The result was the transmutation of social theory
from the realm of philosophy (where critical or negative thinking still had a part to play)
to the purely positivistic realm of sociology that became “a science by renouncing the
transcendent point of view of the philosophical critique.”961 The result was unfortunate:
The concepts that explain this realm were to be derived from the facts that
constitute it, while the farther-reaching implications of philosophical
concepts were to be excluded. The term “positive” was a polemical term
that denoted this transformation from a philosophic theory … to be sure,
Comte wished to elaborate an all-embracing philosophy, as the title of his
principal work indicates, but it is readily visible that, in the context of
positivism, philosophy means something quite different from what it
meant previously, so much so that it repudiates the true content of
philosophy.962
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Peirce’s concern was that the reduction to “bare facts” reduced the terms of inquiry to
bare analysis rather than creative hypothetical postulation, resulting in the sort of selfperpetuating nature of the beliefs within an authoritarian system. Indeed, Peirce’s entire
philosophy of chance, inspired by Chauncey Wright’s notion of “cosmic weather,” held
“against the mechanists, that there is genuine novelty in nature which no knowledge of its
laws can predict or even foresee,” moving Peirce far beyond the reductivist tendencies of
the early positivists.963 Here, too, we see a similar concern from Marcuse where “negative
thinking” was excluded entirely from social analysis and replaced with the “positive”
analysis of merely what is such that “all opposition to social realities is obliterated from
philosophic discussion.”964
Comte summarizes the contrast between the positivist and the philosophic
theory as follows: positive sociology is to concern itself with the
investigation of facts instead of with transcendental illusions, with useful
knowledge instead of leisured contemplation, certainty instead of doubt
and indecision, organization instead of negation and destruction. In all
these cases, the new sociology is to tie itself to the facts of the existing
social order and … will exclude any move to overthrow or negate that
order.965
Just as Peirce was concerned with the negation of “doubt” in the method of authority, the
integral component of the ongoing movement of intellectual progress, Marcuse noted
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Comte’s relegation of all things “negative” to the realm of speculative philosophy which,
for Comte, has no place in positive “philosophy.” As Anderson notes, “to Marcuse,
positivism represents a theoretical counterrevolution against the heritage of Hegel and
Marx.”966 Certainly Peirce was averse to idle speculation, but not to speculation itself,
which was, as we have seen, a necessary part of the abductive component of inquiry
itself. Peirce’s advice to his students, let us not forget, was that though he must hold “fast
to the string by which he controls it,” so, too, must he “let his fancy take wing.”967
Beyond this attack on the most extreme manifestations of the movement which we
explored briefly above,968 Peirce took issue with the positivist’s insistence on the
reducibility of the ideal to the real, the thought to the act, in his thoroughgoing insistence
on the cyclic nature (and dialectical interplay) between theory and practice, thought and
action. Just as all thought terminates in action, all action instigates further cognitive
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inquiry and the production of new thoughts in the developmental cycle we’ve explored in
detail above. As he said, “if I had the choice between two hypotheses, the one more ideal
and the other more materialistic, I should prefer to take the ideal one … simply because
ideas are fruitful of consequences, wile mere sensations are not so; so that the idealistic
hypothesis would be the more verifiable, that is to say, would predict more.”969 Peirce’s
critique of the positivistic reduction to facts is akin to Marcuse’s in the sense that, like
Marcuse, Peirce’s philosophy was thoroughly forward-thinking and future-oriented, as
indicated by everything from his “long run” theory of Truth to his exploration of the
individuals within a system of authority capable of seeking the requisite doubt and
tension to instigate inquiry out of the stagnation of the current milieu and towards a more
autonomous society that has yet to be realized. As Feibleman notes, the positivistic
position forces us “to the conception of anything which we discover in practice” and
nothing more, and “to assert a priori that anything inconceivable” that is not represented
as bare fact is “hence not in accordance with … the true spirit of inquiry”970 as Peirce
defined it. In short, for both Marcuse and Peirce, the critique of positivism rests on
positivism’s insistence on defining terms according to what they are as observable and
verifiable “facts,” dissolving the wider inquiry which must include the negation (or the
potential negation should need arise in the form of doubt stimulating inquiry) of those
“facts,” thus likewise keeping open the possibility of defining things “as they are not,”
the sort of negative or dialectical thinking that Marcuse contrasted with technical
rationality and that Peirce insisted upon for the flourishing of the method of inquiry
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which never “rests” merely on observed facts but on hypotheses, tested and verified, but
never absolutely, with revisability ever a live possibility.
Individuals must be free to engage in negative or dialectical thinking, for
Marcuse, precisely the opposite of what technical rationality would have for its goal. He
warned: “truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the earlier state; it can be
set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men,” and, further, that “the realization
of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those who achieve it.”971 Thus,
autonomy is requisite for free rationality (juxtaposed with technical rationality), and the
ability to engage in negative or dialectical thinking is the autonomous act of the
individual, to which the technological apparatus of the one-dimensional society strives to
dissolve. For just as Peirce noted that free inquiry could not flourish under the dominion
of the authority, Marcuse, too, insisted that “truth does not … automatically grow out the
earlier state” but it must be “set free by an autonomous act.” Indeed, it may be simplified
in saying that one-dimensionality is the negation of negative thinking, that is the
“negative” conception of negation where what is negated is not the stultifying effects of
indoctrination but, rather, the potential to surmount those effects at all. As Kellner argues:
I interpret “one-dimensional” as a concept describing a state of affairs that
conforms to existing thought and behavior in which there is the lack of a
critical dimension and the dimension of alternatives and potentialities
which transcend the existing society … “one-dimensional” describes …
signifying practices that conform to pre-existing structures, norms and
behavior in thought and practice; and ‘bi-dimensional’ thought which
appraises values, ideas and behavior in terms of possibilities that transcend
the established state of affairs. This “bi-dimensional” thought presupposes
antagonism between subject and object so that the subject is free to
perceive possibilities in the world that do not yet exist but which can be
realized through human practice. In the one-dimensional society, the
subject is assimilated into the object and follows the dictates of external,
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objective structures, thus losing its ability to discern more liberating
possibilities and to engage in transformative practice to realize them.972
What Kellner refers to here as “bi-dimensional” thought is the type of dialectical or
negative thinking championed by Marcuse: one that sees beyond the positivistic facts and
can compare and contrast values, ideas and behavior over a longer historical span,
projecting into the future of possibilities, not merely acquiescing to the present. Bernstein
notes, too, the connection between bi-dimensionality (or, as he calls it, “twodimensionality”) and the concept of negativity. He says, within two-dimensional thought,
“there is negativity, opposition, critical judgment in the tension between the demands of
Reason (Vernunft) and the positivity of an untrue, distorted, existing social reality.” 973 As
with Peirce, “tension” is required for the possibility of authentic truth to reemerge as an
authentic (albeit asymptoptically approximated) goal, a tension that is denied within the
monolithic belief system forward by the authority where existing social reality is duly
“distorted” by the vested interests, themselves, making the “truth” discovered by such a
method nothing of the sort. Indeed, as Marcuse himself asserted: “the realization of
reason is not a fact but a task.”974 This is a process not reducible (as positivism would
make it) to a mere fact, a “task” as exemplified in Peirce’s ongoing quest of inquiry along
the “long run” of history’s unfolding. Indeed, later in his career, Marcuse already saw the
radical desublimation of what ought to be into what is as “wearing thin,” with hope for
emancipation from this technological rationality born of the tired, worn methods of the
vested interests finally losing its grip on key parts of the populace, perhaps giving rise to
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what Peirce referred to as the individual with a “wider sort of social feeling.” As he
noted:
It seems that this contradiction between that which is and that which is
possible and ought to be, penetrates, in very concrete forms, the mind of
the dependent population. The awareness of the irrationality of the whole
adversely affects the performance of the system. The fetishism of the
commodity world is wearing thin: people see the power structure behind
the alleged technocracy and its blessings. Outside the small radical
minorities, this awareness is still unpolitical, spontaneous; repressed time
and again; “ideological”—but it also finds expression at the very base of
society. In spreading wildcat strikes, in the militant strategy of factory
occupations, in the attitude and demands of young workers, the protest
reveals a rebellion against the whole of the working conditions imposed,
against the whole performance to which one is condemned.975

Even a few years earlier, in An Essay on Liberation, Marcuse was already showing some
optimism as to the faltering control of the technological apparatus:
Now, however, this threatening homogeneity has been loosening up, and
an alternative is beginning to break into the repressive continuum. This
alternative is not so much a different road to socialism as an emergence of
different goals and values, different aspirations in the men and women
who resist and deny the massive exploitative power of corporate
capitalism even in its most comfortable and liberal realization. The Great
Refusal takes a variety of forms.976
Just as Peirce demanded the rise of a class of men and women with this “wider social
feeling,” Marcuse noted, too, that:
The construction of such society presupposes a type of man with a
different sensitivity as well as consciousness: men who would speak a
different language, have different gestures, follow different impulses; men
who have developed an instinctual barrier against cruelty, brutality,
ugliness.977
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This “wider social feeling,” this “awareness,” in Marcuse’s words, “of the transcendent
possibilities of freedom must become a driving power in the consciousness and the
imagination which prepare the soil for this revolution.”978 Thus, Marcuse was at times far
more optimistic than some of his contemporaries, seeing not only the potential for radical
social change in an otherwise totalizing system of control, but seeing the nascent seeds of
that revolution already growing within society as it is now, with sublimation already well
underway to counteract the desublimating effects of the administration.979
We see, too, Hegelian strains in Kellner’s reading of Marcuse wherein onedimensionality sees the subsumption of the subject into the object so completely
(rationality is technology and infiltrates every aspect of the individual’s life) that no
dialectical tension requisite for constructive comparison nor even the desire for
something distinct can ever manifest whereas, on the other hand, bi-dimensionality980
presupposes a necessary and productive “tension” (the positive aspect of negation as the
engine and catalyst for progress and development) between subject and object wherein
the subject retains its autonomy. So, too, in one-dimensionality, if the “object” of
Kellner’s Hegelian analogy is the technical base itself, there is one object for all of the

978

Ibid., 22.
“This change is foreshadowed, in an ideological form, by the counterimages and countervalues with
which the New Left contradicts the image of the capitalist universe. The exhibition of a noncompetitive
behavior, the rejection of brutal ‘virility,’ the debunking of the capitalist productivity of work, the
affirmation of the sensibility, sensuality of the body, the ecological protest, the contempt for the false
heroism in outer space and colonial wars, the Women’s Liberation Movement (where it does not envisage
the liberated woman merely as having an equal share in the repressive features of male prerogatives), the
rejection of the anti-erotic, puritan cult of plastic beauty and cleanliness – all these tendencies contribute to
the weakening of the Performance Principle. They articulate a deep malaise prevalent among the people at
large” (Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Op. Cit., 31).
980
“Bi-dimensional” is a term utilized by Kellner to describe “thought which appraises values, ideas, and
behaviour in terms of possibilities that transcend the established states of affairs” (Douglas Kellner,
Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984], 235).
Marcuse often used the term “two-dimensional” in reference to “negativing thinking,” noting, for example:
“the transformation of ontological into historical dialectic retains the two-dimensionality of philosophic
thought as critical, negative thinking” (Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man, Op. Cit., 142).
979

313

otherwise distinct subjects that interact with it (and are ultimately subsumed into it),
which clearly accounts for the homogeneity and mass mentality of the populace: each
otherwise distinct subject is subsumed into the same, single object. It is only through the
reestablishment of negative, dialectical thinking that autonomy and individuality may
again emerge. As Bernstein notes, “the actualization of these potentialities demands the
destruction, the negation, of everything that inhibits them from their full realization. It is
only by negation that Reason and Freedom can be realized.”981
As we have seen, the dissolution of one-dimensionality and the fundamental
alteration of the uses of technology go hand in hand, for genuine emancipation requires
the dissolution of technological rationality. As Ingram insists, it must entail a “qualitative
transformation of technology itself.”982 Capitalism, as it manifests in advanced industrial
societies especially, is incompatible with this alteration of the uses of technology. “The
pacification of existence … would require cutting back on both population and economic
growth, since these latter tendencies, both inherent in the capitalist system of production,
create ever-greater pollution, waste, and environmental destruction.”983 In short, it would
take a fundamental and radical shift of values and social structures. And to understand
precisely how deep the problem goes, Marcuse, in Eros and Civilization, excavated the
fundamental site of indoctrination and illuminated just how deep the technocracy infects
the individual psyche.
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Chapter 9

Eros and Instinct

To reach the depths of critique that Marcuse required, as he said in OneDimensional Man, the manipulation of the working class down to their very instincts, it
was to psychology that Marcuse had to turn. To answer the question “in what way does
industrial society, with its technical rationality, with all its indulges and indoctrinations,
alter the psychological composition of the human mind?” we need, first, to understand
what that mind might otherwise be without, after, or prior to the indoctrinating effects of
one-dimensional society. Further, we must understand the evolving relationship between
the individual and society—to what degree must the individual suppress his or her desires
in order to function in civil society at all, and, further, to what degree does society
influence the trajectory of the manifestation of instinctual needs? To all these questions
Freud provided a stunningly comprehensive account and, as I will explore throughout this
chapter, greatly influenced Marcuse’s own reading of the ways in which advanced
society indoctrinates and manipulates its citizens.
“This essay employs psychological categories,” Marcuse said in the preface to the
first edition of Eros and Civilization, “because they have become political categories.”984
As we saw throughout the previous chapter, one of the chief consequences of the
technocratic apparatus of commodity capitalism is its ability to dissolve the otherwise
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progressive dialectical tension between alternative modes of discourse, expression and
governance, the heart of what Marcuse called “one-dimensionalizing.” This reduction of
otherwise distinct realms extends, too, to the traditionally divergent realms of “inner” and
“outer,” “self” and “society,” “private” and “public.” As Marks notes, “private disorder
today, reflects the disorder of society as a whole; and the cute of personal disorder
requires, more than ever before, a cure of the general disorder.”985 Consequently,
psychology can no longer be considered (if ever it could) as the realm of the purely
personal and private. Merged with the outer, public society, it is now reduced to yet one
more site of indoctrination and thus critical theory must follow where the problems lead.
As Marcuse said:
The traditional borderlines between psychology on the one side and
political and social philosophy on the other have been made obsolete by
the condition of man in the present era: formerly autonomous and
identifiable psychical processes are being absorbed by the function of the
individual in the state—by his public existence.986
As yet another example of the “conquest of opposites” and “desublimation,” the state
apparatus extends itself into the psyche of the individual and, as such, any clear-cut
distinctions between “self” and “society” are no longer tenable, if ever they were.
“Psychological problems therefore turn into political problems” as “private disorder
reflects more directly than before the disorder of the whole, and the cure of personal
disorder depends more directly than before on the cure to the general disorder.”987 As the
ills of society bleed into the ills of the individual, it becomes requisite, if a “cure” is to be
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found, for critical theory to delve into psychology and, conversely, for psychology to gain
insights into the socio-political sphere “beyond” the individual.
There is a further complication: precisely because the technological apparatus of
management and control has, as we’ve seen, extended itself into all walks of life through
its own version of “rationality,” there is a concern that even the terms and methods
utilized by psychology have succumbed to the desublimating, indoctrinating effects of the
Establishment. As Marcuse said:
Psychology could be elaborated and practiced as a special discipline as
long as the psyche could sustain itself against the public power, as long as
privacy was real, really desired, and self-shaped; if the individual has
neither the ability nor the possibility to be for himself, the terms of
psychology become the terms of the societal forces which define the
psyche.988

The concern, thus, is that the deployment of psychology to help the individual psyche
may well simply reify the indoctrinating tendencies of the authority. 989 What is
considered “normal” vs. “deviant,” as we have seen for example, is dictated by the terms
of a transcendental norm that is always to the benefit of the authority’s retention of
power. The very terms and language used by psychology in its efforts to emancipate and
liberate may well have become “the terms of the societal forces” which have already
defined the psyche, established its parameters, and created a baseline of “normalcy”
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under which all that opposes the “normal,” namely, all that opposes the status quo (the
artist, the deviant, the liberal thinker, the Peircean individual of wider social feeling)
becomes the label-bearer of “Otherness” and “abnormality.”
Thus, Marcuse must proceed cautiously given the traditional reading of Freud not
as a champion of emancipation but, rather, as a justifier of domination. As Agger notes:
Psychoanalysis had come to be seen by the mid-twentieth century as a
repressive tool of class society. At best, Freud was a biological
determinist; at worst, he was a dangerous metaphysician who in later
books like Civilization and its Discontents “justified” heightened
repression in defense of capitalism … Marcuse thus had first to show that
“his” Freud was a dialectical theorists of instincts and not a simplistic and
ultimately malevolent reductionist.990
Rather than beginning with an a priori991 acceptance of the terms of psychology in his
analysis, Marcuse began in an opposite fashion: developing “the political and
sociological substance of the psychological notions.”992 We have already seen a
manifestation of this with his reformulation of the psychological term “sublimation,”
becoming, in essence, the opposite of its normal utilization given the structure of the
advanced industrial society. As such, though Freud was a profound influence, Marcuse
amended and altered Freud on numerous occasions given Marcuse’s unique Marxian
background, fusing Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxism into something truly novel.
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Just as he attempted to excavate a revolutionary theme in Hegel from out of a
traditionally conservative shell, Marcuse embarked on a complementary project with
Freud.993 As Robinson notes:
Marcuse’s purpose in Eros and Civilization was to demonstrate that
beneath the apparent pessimism and conservatism of Freud’s thought was
an underlying critical tendency—Marcuse called it “the hidden trend in
psychoanalysis”—which contained both a crushing indictment of the
established civilization and a promise of ultimate liberation. He proposed
to reverse the prevailing interpretation of Freud which took as the central
message of psychoanalysis the notion that civilization was necessarily
repressive.994
By marrying Freud’s psychoanalytic theory to the socio-historical evolution of economic
and political coordinations in civilization,995 Marcuse saw that by Freud’s own terms,
despite Freud’s pessimism to the contrary, civilization does not, in fact, necessitate
anything more than the bare minimum sort of repression and pleasure deferral, moving
him closer to his utopian996 view of an aesthetic dimension where the artistic and the
erotic are freed from their confining mores and dissolve the technical rationality of
indoctrination and alienation that represent the modern milieu. As Marks notes:
Culture has brought with it consequences that negate its advantages.
Among these are concentration camps, world wars, and atom bombs.
These, Marcuse argues, are not relapses into barbarism. They are
outgrowths of modern science and technology. They occur at the height of
civilization. If these negative facts which threaten to destroy civilization
As Elliot notes, “Marcuse seeks to unfold the liberative potential in Freud’s work from the inside out, in
order to reveal its radical political edge” (Anthony Elliot, Social Theory Since Freud: Traversing Social
Imaginaries [New York: Routledge, 2004], 31). On Hegel, see Chapter Six of the current project.
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are the essence of civilization itself, then Freud’s point about the price of
civilization is meaningless. The sacrifices serve no purpose. Happiness is
given up not in the production of a better society, but of a society that
destroys itself.997
In essence, Eros and Civilization offers us a close-up of the predominant themes Marcuse
would later render explicit in One-Dimensional Man. So much hinged, in that later text,
on technical rationality’s ability to permeate into all walks of life, effectively closing off
the potential for radical social change through the dissolution of negative thinking; to
keep individuals complacent in the face of indoctrination and alienation by peppering
them with enough euphoric indulgences to pacify them against the desire for radical
social change which might otherwise bring about a genuine sort of happiness in
autonomy. This is the ingression of technical rationality into the realm of desires:
individuals within such societies are influenced as to what they ought to desire (false
needs) and when these desires are fulfilled to the advantage of market capitalism and
commodity fetishism, the requisite euphoria to pacify a populace washes over them,
effectively perpetuating the status quo and guarding against revolutionary change. The
desire for change is negated, as are the tools to achieve it (“negative” or “critical”
thinking). As he noted in the later “political preface” to Eros and Civilization in 1966,
“the very forces which rendered society capable of pacifying the struggle for existence
served to repress in the individuals the need for such a liberation.”998 The authorities do
not need to “justify their dominion” precisely because they “deliver the goods” and
“satisfy the sexual and the aggressive energy of their subjects” through the perpetuation
of goods and services that the major corporations created in the first place and profit
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precisely because they have successfully created the desire for the goods and services that
they then “deliver.”999
Further, since technical rationality is, as we have seen, all-pervasive, and extends
into all avenues of life, even leisure, the entire psychological make-up of the human
organism must “be adapted” to the milieu of “uninterrupted production and consumption
of waste, gadgets, planned obsolescence, and means of destruction.”1000 The avenues of
the libidinal satisfaction have been commodified to the benefit of the corporations and,
too, the avenues aggression have likewise been mustered to the benefit of the
Establishment and the prevalent social order, dictating who the “Enemy” is “who has to
be fought and hated,” namely, whatever is antagonistic to the status quo. 1001 Combined,
avenues of love and hate, life and death, are all streamlined to mitigate against radical
social change and perpetuate the agenda of the invested interests. Effectively, the Reality
Principle, the Freudian conception of the ego-governed description of reality that
demands the deferral of the instant gratification desired by the id, is a reality constructed
by the invested interests and dictated by capital and commodity: citizens are conditioned
to defer their libidinal drives in manners conducive to corporations benefit in a way that
obfuscates the indoctrinating means and agendas of those in power.1002 As he said:
Mass democracy provides the political paraphernalia for effectuating this
introjection of the Reality Principle; it not only permits the people (up to a
999
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point) to chose their own masters and to participate (up to a point) in the
government which governs them—it also allows the masters to disappear
behind the technological veil of the productive and destructive apparatus
which they control, and it conceals the human (and material) costs of the
benefits and comforts which it bestows upon those who collaborate. The
people, efficiently manipulated and organized, are free; ignorance and
impotence, introjected heteronomy is the price of their freedom.1003
This “euphoria in unhappiness” masks the alienation and indoctrination and the mirage of
having some say in the matter of creating the Reality Principle through a nominal amount
of permitted freedom and participation in governance is enough to pacify the populace
and perpetuate the myth of autonomy. “This union of freedom and servitude has become
‘natural’ and a vehicle of progress,” for “it makes no sense to talk about liberation to free
men.”1004 Under the misapprehension we have a controlling share in the creation of the
Reality Principle combined with the euphoria that permeates a society who are “delivered
the goods,” the tools and desire for negative thinking, the ability to consider alternative
possibilities, is effectively negated.
Marcuse took Freud’s fundamental relationship between satisfaction deferral and
civilization at face value, namely, “that civilization is based on the permanent subjugation
of the human instincts” and that “free gratification of man’s instinctual needs is
incompatible with civilized society: renunciation and delay in satisfaction are the
prerequisites of progress” and, indeed, of civilization itself.1005 Yet, Marcuse noted a
peculiar manifestation of this Reality Principle in the unique composition of the advanced
1003
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technological society: “intensified progress seems to be found up with intensified
unfreedom.”1006 Oddly, “the most effective subjugation and destruction of man by man
takes place at the height of civilization, when the material and intellectual attainments of
mankind seem to allow the creation of a truly free world.”1007 Technical rationality’s
ability to diminish scarcity and combat disease, to reach greater and greater heights of
knowledge and truth, instead of ushering in an age of peace and prosperity has achieved
quite the opposite, for “repressiveness is … more vigorously maintained the more
unnecessary it becomes.”1008 We repress our libidinal needs in order to work together to
combat scarcity and coexist peaceably and thus it ought to follow that the more
technology is capable of achieving these beneficent goals, the less we ought to repress the
drives that are repressed only so that we can achieve those ends. Although a modicum of
repression and satisfaction deferral is always necessary, the peculiar affect of the
technological age is that the less we need to engage in repression and deferral, the more it
is demanded of us. For although Freud, himself, was skeptical of a truly non-repressive
society, Marcuse saw in Freud’s own theory the seeds of this possibility and, through his
critical theory, the reasons for its deferral at the mercy of capital and commodity:
“Freud’s own theory provides reasons for rejecting his identification of civilization with
repression,” for “the very achievements of repressive civilization seem to create the
preconditions for the gradual abolition of repression.”1009 The more technological society
advances the less we need to be governed by repression and yet the more repression there
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seems to be, a kind of “surplus repression” conducive to the perpetuation of corporate
interests but antagonistic to genuine human autonomy. As Hyman explains:
The bourgeois notion of progress as a more or less uninterrupted ascent
toward greater freedom from necessity has been increasingly debunked in
the ashes of two world wars, concentration camps, genocide, the
prevailing threat of thermonuclear warfare, and more fundamentally by the
increasing, sustained, and nearly omnipresent social immiseration of
everyday life.1010
In One-Dimensional Man, we noted that what individuals “desire” is, likewise,
what they “value”—a universe of values created by technical rationality’s integration into
commodity and capital. In a universe of needs not of our own making, the avenues for
satisfaction deferral are created by the invested interests to their benefit, and universally
proliferated, that is, what is desired and valued by others we, individually, come to desire
and value ourselves. This is the origin of the “mass mentality” and heteronomy at the
heart of one-dimensional society and echoes Peirce’s concern that the authority creates
the beliefs for a populace universally such that all individuals believe (desire, value) the
same things and thus the tension borne of disagreement is alleviated so as to ensure peace
and the perpetuation of those in power. As Marcuse said, “the reality which shapes the
instincts as well as their needs and satisfaction is a socio-historical world … affecting not
only the instinctual aims but also the instinctual ‘values.’”1011 Historically, “the
unrestrained pleasure principle comes into conflict with the natural and human
environment.”1012 But, as we noted in One-Dimensional Man, the “conquest of opposites”
inherent in technical rationality’s dissolution of dialectical thinking one-dimensionalizes
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even this dichotomy, as the distinction between what one is permitted to have and what
one can have is minimized to the point of obscurity: the euphoric indulgences are
omnipresent and aid in keeping the populace pacified and unwilling to engage in a radical
sort of social change that would threaten the continuation of those indulgences.
Nevertheless, although it may appear that repression is minimized in the face of
this reduction of what one is permitted to indulge and the accessibility of those indulges,
the avenues of indulgence and the deferral of instant gratification is still conditioned by
the major corporations as they continue to create the desires for what must be profitably
sold in conjunction with technical rationality’s conditioning of what we ought to value.
“The reality principle materializes in a system of institutions. And the individual,
growing up within such a system, learns the requirements of the reality principle as those
of law and order, and transmits them to the next generation.”1013 As Ocay explains:
Central to Freud’s theory of instincts, as Marcuse reconstructs it, is the
idea that there is an inherent antagonism between the satisfaction of
human instincts and individual freedom on the one hand and the
development of civilization on the other. For Freud, this antagonism is an
antagonism between individual and cultural demands, or sexuality and
civilization. And in order for civilization to thrive the demands of the
human instincts must be constantly held in check by some socially useful
norms.1014
However, as Marcuse noted throughout his career, what are considered “socially useful
norms” are dictated by capital, commodity and the invested interests that profit and
endure precisely because they are the ones who dictate what is “normal” and what is
“useful.” As such, the antagonism is further complicated: it is not merely between
individual freedom and civilization but, precisely because “civilization” is the demands
1013
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of technical rationality in all its oppressive indoctrination and commodity fetishism,
individual freedom becomes pitted against the peculiarly alienating and pacifying modes
of the advanced industrial society.
Further, Marcuse noted that individuals “grow up” in such a milieu and this is a
profound point that must not be glossed over. As Peirce noted, and the studies of the
Frankfurt School later corroborated, effective indoctrination into a system of institutions
and their values is best served by aiming such indoctrination at the young who are raised
into a universe of desires and needs such that they know of no alternative, are denied the
effective “negative” or “critical” thinking to learn other than they have, and then pass
along those values to the next generation and the system perpetuates itself to the benefit
of the invested interests. Prior to this indoctination of the young, however, the instincts
are free, not yet sublimated, not yet repressed, and it is the recollection, inherent in all
men and women, that Marcuse saw as a potential site of emancipation in adulthood. “In
the remembrance of infantile desires Marcuse finds one of the greatest resources for adult
liberation.”1015 The infantile desires, prior to their integration into technical rationality,
are a potential cite for emancipation if the indoctrinating effects of forced sublimation
and repression can be dissolved. As Marcuse noted, this infantile experience “continues
to haunt the mind; it preserves the memory of past stages of individual development at
which integral gratification is obtained.”1016 Thus, memory plays an integral role in the
potential emancipation of the instincts and the transcendence of the seemingly allpervasive nature of technical rationality, “first against deeply internalized domination
(false needs) and then against class society as a whole. Memory comes to perform the
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function of a transcendent culture.”1017 In coming to perform the function of a
“transcendent culture,” a transcendence above or beyond the established norm, this
conditions a type of “negative thinking” which, with this Freudian reading, is inherent
within individuals prior to a more developed, more conditioned form of negative thinking
gained later in life through non-indoctrinating forms of higher education. From a
Peircean perspective, it becomes even more fascinating: the “wider social feeling” of the
individuals capable of transcending the established discourse of authority is, in part, a
recollection of a point in time not prior to one’s own existence (previous administrations
and social structures) but to the nascent forms of one’s own existence. As Marcuse said:
The psychoanalytic liberation of memory explodes the rationality of the
repressed individual. As cognition gives way to re-cognition, the
forbidden images and impulses of childhood begin to tell the truth that
reason denies … the rediscovery of the past yields critical standards which
are tabooed by the present. Moreover, the restoration of memory is
accompanied by the restoration of the cognitive content of phantasy.
Psychoanalytic theory removes these mental faculties from the
noncommittal sphere of day dreaming and fiction and recaptures their
strict truths. The weight of these discoveries must eventually shatter the
framework in which they were made and confined. The liberation of the
past does not end in its reconciliation with the present. Against the selfimposed restraint of the discoverer, the orientation of the past tends toward
an orientation on the future. The recherché du temps perdu becomes the
vehicle of future liberation.1018
Just as Peirce noted, the “past yields critical standards which are tabooed by the present,”
as Marcuse says here, standards asynchronous with the established norms of the status
quo and thus a site of tension and fruitful comparison to bring about the negative thinking
requisite for radical social change. Marcuse, via Freud, noted that such emancipatory
potential of conjuring the past may be found within the lived past of the individuals
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themselves from a previous age of development prior to the onset of indoctrination,
sublimation and repression.
However, Marcuse was not advocating a return to a prior state of civilization, as
we saw with his critique of pre-Industrial Puritanism. Memory is not a vehicle to return
to a prior state of the past but, rather, is a vehicle that bears upon “future liberation” as he
said here. As Agger notes, “Marcuse here links memory to the liberating function of
phantasy … phantasy grounded in the memory of infantile gratifications can show us the
way beyond the present reality principle that subordinates gratification to a strict regimen
of surplus labour and surplus consumption.”1019 The role of “phantasy,” the imagination,
is tied to the function of memory in terms of its liberating potential: a kind of negative
thinking that permits the individual to imagine what is other. “Phantasy does not,
however, dwell within the infantile but is a resource for mature planning of a different
civilizational order. Marcuse here prefigures his views on the emancipatory function of
art,” which will be the central focus of our next chapter.1020 In terms of Marcuse’s
Freudian analysis, of central issue here, he notes:
Freud’s metapsychology here restores imagination to its rights. As a
fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its
own, which corresponds to an experience of its own—namely, the
surmounting of the antagonistic human reality. Imagination envisions the
reconciliation of the individual with the whole, of desire with realization,
of happiness with reason.1021
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civilized. This resonates with Peirce since, as I demonstrated, beliefs do construct reality,
to no small degree, whether they are the beliefs proliferated by authority or the beliefs
forged of authentic inquiry. Thus, “if absence from repression is the archetype of
freedom,” freedom not to indulge in the instant gratification of the id but to be freed from
the chaos and destruction that an unbound Eros would conjure, “then civilization is the
struggle against this freedom,” a civilization conditioned, for Marcuse, by technical
rationality which is synonymous with one-dimensionality.1022 In sum, civilization is the
efficiency and progressiveness of the advanced industrial society and, as such, despite the
nominal sense of “freedom” is allows its citizens to engage in, its ultimate goal is to
overcome the absolute freedom found in a non-repressive milieu.
However, “the fact that the reality principle has to be re-established continually in
the development of man indicates that its triumph over the pleasure principle is never
complete and never secure.”1023 As Agger notes, “the psychoanalytic model of
personality explains why false consciousness and false needs persist and at the same time
why their hold on interiority can never be total, thus holding open the prospect of
eventual liberation.”1024 Further:
This structure of personality is such as to guarantee that there is never
complete cooptation of the person by the social system for residues of
libido always remain. And this for Marcuse is the emancipatory resource
for which he had been searching in the 1930s … at last, Marcuse found in
the objective character of human subjectivity, our instinctual core, a
barricade against total mobilization. But he also found a new wellspring of
deep domination. The plasticity of our biological structures allows us to be
more deeply manipulated. The layer of instinct thus constitutes an inner
barrier against the eradication of bourgeois interiority, a type of inner
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second dimension that replaces bourgeois culture with dynamic potential
of resistance and transcendence.1025
Throughout Marcuse’s Counterrevolution and Revolt, he noted the various ways,
historically, the Establishment had countered the revolutionary tendencies of its populace
by adapting to changing socio-historic circumstances, finding new ways to indoctrinate
and pacify its populace into acquiescence. As Peirce noted, not even the authority had the
ability to militate against all changes in beliefs but, most importantly, at least the ones
that do not undermine its hold on power. The invested interests are adaptable to changing
circumstances, altering the values, beliefs and avenues in which individuals defer their
pleasure so long as all roads continue to lead to the perpetuation of their hold on power.
As we noted in our previous chapters, the adaptability of the individual, as an organism
struggling to survive in its social environment, is the turn to conformity, heteronomy,
efficiency and homogeneity, for those are the terms dictated by the invested interests for
the individual’s flourishing within the confines of technical rationality. As Marcuse said,
“the struggle against freedom reproduces itself in the psyche of man, as the selfrepression of the repressed individual, and his self-repression in turn sustains his masters
and their institutions.”1026 Thus, this conformity to the socio-historically conditioned
reality principles is conditioned by, as Freud himself notes, “the eternal primordial
struggle for existence.”1027 This becomes “the most effective rationalization for
repression,” namely, that repression is demanded by civilization for the survival of the
individual organisms within that socio-historical environment.1028 Marcuse’s critical
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theory, exemplified in One-Dimensional Man, added the further point that “civilization”
had become synonymous with the values and structure of technical rationality which, in
turn, perpetuates and is perpetuated by invested interests who dictate the avenues of
deferred gratification, create the Reality Principle conducive to their own ends, and
interject the values, desires and beliefs that reify their agendas.
Although, as Marcuse suggested, “the ultimate relationship between Eros and
Thanatos remains obscure,” it can be outlined in general terms: “at the earliest stage of its
development, Freud’s theory is built around the antagonism between sex (libidinous) and
ego (self-preservation) instincts; at the latest stage, it is centered on the conflict between
the life instincts (Eros) and the death instinct.”1029 Marcuse said, however, that Freud was
driven by his theory “to emphasize time and again the common nature of the instincts
prior to their differentiation.”1030 Something perhaps more fundamental than either Eros
or Thanatos is a “regressive or ‘conservative’ tendency in all instinctual life.”1031 This
conservative tendency, Freud suspected, may be universal in all organic life, namely, “a
compulsion inherent in all organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living
entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces.”1032
This tendency has a profound bearing on the notion of “equilibrium” which is “ultimately
regression behind life itself.”1033 As external stimuli disturb the organism from out of its
equilibrium, a state of comfort without tension or turmoil, the organism is naturally
compelled to seek out, based on this fundamental drive, “an earlier state of things” prior
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to the problematic situation, namely, back to equilibrium itself. We may note an eerie
resonance with Peirce who noted that the human organism is naturally compelled to
instigate inquiry the moment a problematic situation occurs, stimulated by the excitation
of the external world, in order to find a state of equilibrium once more. For Peirce,
however, this process was always progressive: for every doubt and problem experienced,
inquiry drives the organism to greater heights of knowledge and stronger forms of
equilibrium having incorporated the problem and its solution forged of inquiry into its
conceptual matrix. Alternatively, the organism could hide from such excitations (the
method of tenacity) and thus retain its equilibrium that, as Peirce noted, invariably failed
to shield the organism from doubt in the long run.
As Ocay notes:
Eros, whose elemental goal is the preservation of life, and Thanatos,
whose primary goal is the destruction of life, are the two mechanisms
immanent within the human psyche that man uses in the process of
releasing tension. Eros does it through the immediate satisfaction of
sexual desires, while Thanatos does it through destruction or death.1034

According to Freud, these two drives, primal and universal, must be subjugated to the
demands of society for civilization to exist at all. In no small part, this is due to the reality
of Ananke, or “scarcity.” As Marcuse notes:
Behind the reality principle lies the fundamental fact of Ananke or scarcity
(Lebensnot), which means that the struggle for existence takes place in a
world too poor for the satisfaction of human needs without constant
restraint, renunciation, delay. In other words, whatever satisfaction is
possible necessitates work, more or less painful arrangements and
undertakings for the procurement of the means for satisfying needs.1035
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Thus, in a world governed by scarcity, where there is not enough material and food to
provide for a populace without demanding labor “for the procurement of the means for
satisfying” those needs, it is all the more important that civilization, for it to exist at all,
find ways to divert the instinctual drives of the individual into avenues that are useful for
the provision of such goods. As Marks reminds us, scarcity motivates repression, for
“there is not enough of the world’s goods to go around; pleasure does not produce food or
shelter; work is unavoidable.”1036 In a world governed by scarcity, such restraint and
sublimation are necessary for survival.1037
And yet, such a state of scarcity bears little resemblance to the milieu of the
advanced one-dimensional society. As Marcuse noted throughout One-Dimensional Man,
and throughout the new preface to Eros and Civilization, the vested interests “deliver the
goods.”1038 Individuals are, in fact, satisfied by the goods and services proliferated by the
administration—all, except the outlying minorities that Marcuse considered in greater
detail throughout Counterrevolution and Revolt.1039 Thus, in the age of scarcity, once a
justifiable reason for repression and sublimation of our instinctual drives, the deferral of
immediate satisfaction for the perpetuation and survival of the community as a whole,1040
has come to an end within the advanced technological milieu, why does repression
1036

Marks, The Meaning of Marcuse, Op. Cit., 44.
“Chief among the environmental variables that condition the prevailing repressive organization of the
instincts is the brute fact of material need, Ananke, the condition of scarcity that has dominated the world
history of civilized society has dictated that a considerable part of the instinctual (libidinal) endowment of
the population be diverted from enjoyment into productive labor” (Barry Katz, Herbert Marcuse and the
Art of Liberation [London: Verso, 1982], 150).
1038
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Op. Cit., xii.
1039
These minorities who are not, in fact, satisfied by the goods and services offered by the administration
are a cite of radical social change, for Marcuse, since the apparatus of commodity festishism and technical
rationality fails to provide the euphoria requisite for their overall complacency. Considering the fact that
Eros and Civilization and One-Dimensional Man were written at the height of the Civil Arts movement,
there is no doubt much of this discussion is at the foreground of Marcuse’s thought at the time.
1040
“This work is of necessity in opposition to erotic instincts, and so a repression of libido, because a
direct libidinal fulfillment comes in the way of efficient work” (Ocay, “Eroticizing Marx, Revolutionizing
Freud: Marcuse’s Psychoanalytic Turn,” Op. Cit., 14).
1037

333

continue to increase rather than decrease? As Marks notes, “of direct concern are the
effects of repression. Modern civilization is marked by a paradox. Having conquered
nature to the degree that most human wants could be satisfied, it has less and less need
for repression.”1041 Nevertheless, it is here, “at the height of civilization,” that Marcuse
noted “the most effective subjugation and destruction of man by man takes place … when
the material and intellectual attainments of mankind seem to allow the creation of a truly
free world.”1042 For as Marks explains, the contrary tendency unfolds: “the more
unnecessary the need for repression, the more vigorously it is imposed.”1043
It is here where Marcuse’s Marxism comes to the fore and compels him to make
two critical amendments to Freud’s fundamental thesis: “the performance principle” and
“surplus repression.” For the “central point in Marcuse’s general position was that Freud
had revealed the inherent conflicts of the instincts—with one another and with the
constraints of the external world—but by failing adequately to distinguish between the
biological and the historical, he had defused an explosive theory.” 1044 In short, Freud
failed to critically assess the changing socio-historical milieu in which the instincts are
pitted against civilization, not in general, but in specific iterations, especially the milieu
of the advanced industrial society. In a way, this is similar to Marcuse’s amendments to
Marx, himself, who likewise failed to provide a critical social psychology of the working
class within advanced capitalism, thereby failing to anticipate the euphoric indulges that
staves off the radical social change Marx envisioned. It was not enough to address the
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biological aspects of instinct, for Marcuse, but the socio-historic, as well. As Hyman
insists:
Fundamental consideration must be focused on the material and historical
context of social reality, the relationship of social theories to both the
subjective and objective expressions of this reality, and the possible
contributions of psychoanalysis to the practical project of a critical social
elimination of the antagonism between generalized social will and
individual desire established in the social practice of developing a
liberatory society.1045
Thus, through the elucidation of what Marcuse called “the performance principle” and
“surplus repression,” critical amendments to Freud’s theory which account for the sociohistorical and not merely the biological, “Marcuse attempts to reactivate such explosive
theory by unraveling the socio-historical aspect of the instincts.”1046
Marcuse defined “surplus repression” as “the restrictions necessitated by social
domination” which is “distinguished from (basic) repression: the ‘modifications’ of the
instincts necessary for the perpetuation of the human race in civilization.”1047 Surplus
repression, distinguished from repression as such, is the peculiar manifestation of
repression in the most advanced forms of civilization: it is the unique occurrence of more
repression when, with the reduction of scarcity to obscurity, there ought to be less.1048
Moreover, “Marcuse’s terminology clearly revealed that surplus repression was meant to
be identified with Marx’s surplus value—that is, the quantitative measure of human
exploitation under capitalism.”1049

Hyman, “Eros and Freedom: The Critical Psychology of Herbert Marcuse,” Op. Cit., 144-45.
Ocay, “Eroticizing Marx, Revolutionizing Freud: Marcuse’s Psychoanalytic Turn,” Op. Cit., 18.
1047
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Op. Cit., 35.
1048
“Marcuse introduces the notion of surplus repression, which he differentiates from the more basic
Freudian notion of repression, by delineating surplus repression as the biologically unnecessary restriction
imposed by social (i.e. class) domination” (Hyman, “Eros and Freedom: The Critical Psychology of
Herbert Marcuse,” Op. Cit., 151).
1049
Robinson, The Freudian Left, Op. Cit., 203.
1045
1046

335

Marcuse’s complementary concept of the “performance principle” he defined as
“the prevailing historical form of the reality principle.”1050 Amending Freud’s traditional
concept that the pleasure principle gives way to the reality principle for civilization to
endure, and all the repression of instincts, sublimation of desires and deferred
gratification that entails. Again, as with surplus repression, the performance principle is
the peculiar occurrence exclusively found in the most advanced forms of society: it is
how the reality principle is manifest in the modern, capitalistic milieu of the onedimensional society.1051 As Elliot notes, “what Freud did not see, Marcuse argues, is that
capitalism creates a crippling (though impermanent) burden of repression. From this
angle, individuals are in fact adapting to the destructive forces of capitalist domination,
forces that masquerade as the ‘reality principle’.”1052
It is clear enough how the two are mutually complementary.1053 Within the unique
composition of the advanced technological epoch, repression endures over and above
what is requisite in earlier forms of civilization in a cultural milieu (the reality principle)
unique to that socio-historical setting. As I argue elsewhere, “in advanced industrial
societies the relatively complex movement from pleasure principle to reality principle is
insufficient to account for what takes place on the instinctual level of its citizens.”1054 The
fundamental Freudian formula no longer makes sense: if scarcity is the foundation for
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repression, the alleviation of scarcity should entail the nullification of the need for
repression, and the fundamental Freudian thesis that repression is necessary for
civilization is called into question. As Macintyre notes:
The form of the distribution of work have always been imposed upon me,
and the forms of repression necessary to maintain them represent an
overplus beyond what is necessary for civilization. Furthermore, as
technical and material progress removes the obstacles which scarcity
placed in the path of civilized development, repression is more and more
surplus to the task of maintain civilization.1055
Thus, Freud’s traditional conception of the reality principle is insufficient to account for
the peculiar occurrence of repression in an age without scarcity.
To claim that it is the reality principle which demands repression Marcuse
retorts that we confused the demands of the reality principle with the
demands which some particular form of social domination seeks to impose
in the name of reality. That we should perform our social tasks in an
allotted order and hierarchy is not a prescription of reality as such; the
principle embodied in this prescription is what Marcuse calls the
performance principle.1056
Reality “as such,” as embodied in the reality principle in terms of a necessary amount of
repression for civilization’s survival, is invalidated when the reasons for that repression
are negated or diminished, at least, substantially. The fact that repression not only
endures but multiplies demanded a new principle: a performance principle that describes
the reality of social domination in an era where the prior terms of repression no longer
hold.
For Marcuse, following from Freud, human history can be divided into two basic
epochs, the pre-industrial and post-industrial world:
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Up through the modern age, a certain amount of repression and social
domination was necessary to confront Ananke, this scarcity, and provide
the technological substructures required for abundance. But in the second
phase, the age of the advanced in industrial society, the repression of the
pleasure principle has become needlessly repressive, excessively so, a
‘surplus repression.’1057
As Marks notes, “Marcuse observes that the reality principle operates differently in
different situations; it does not have the same functions for the aborigine as for the man in
modern industrial society.”1058 This is the critical amendment to Freud’s failure to
account for the socio-historic as well as the biological implications of instinctual
sublimation.
The term “performance” is apt in light of Marcuse’s critique of technical
rationality. As we noted previously, especially in his critique of capitalism’s unfortunate
influence on higher education, “efficiency” has supplanted “values” and the
transmogrified goal of a life well lived is to “perform” exceptionally well as a cog in the
machine of industry. The performance principle is the reality of what is considered a life
of flourishing within the advanced industrial society; it is what we need to do to our
instinctual drives not to allow civilization to endure but, moreover, what we need to do in
order to ensure this civilization endures, and that requires our performance as part of the
machine of industry and our submission to the mandates of technical rationality. Indeed,
just like technology itself, the performance principle has become “an end in itself …
divorced from rational purpose.”1059 It becomes, as Marks explains, “habitual. It becomes
surplus repression, a ritualization of behavior no longer required for safety and
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survival.”1060 The invested interests have no desire to dissolve the holdover needs for
repression from a previous epoch when it is they that now control the avenues of tension
release as well as benefit from a repressed populace that lack the drive for instinctual
release that may bring about a break from the Establishment’s dominion. As Wolff notes:
Some repression serves only to protect the favored position of the rulers,
by restraining the subjects from rising up and overthrowing their masters
… at a time when our technology should permit us considerably to relax
the bonds of necessary repression, through the shortening and lightening
of the workday, through the relaxation of work discipline, and so forth,
surplus repression grows greater and greater so that the total burden of
repression suffered by modern industrial man is not appreciably lighter
than that suffered by his technically less advanced predecessors. The
purpose … of surplus repression is, Marcuse claims, to maintain the ever
more manifestly unjustifiable dominance of the ruling sectors of our
society.1061
As Marcuse said, “under the performance principle, body and mind are made into
instruments of alienated labor; they can function as such instruments only if they
renounce the freedom of the libidinal subject-object which the human organism primarily
is and desires.”1062
Further, not only does the domination of authority in advanced society create this
surplus repression in the face of diminished scarcity, Marcuse noted, the types of pleasure
sublimated are, themselves, transmuted to the terms dictated by the power structures; the
fundamental theme of “false needs” in One-Dimensional Man.
The psychoanalytic interpretation reveals that the reality principle enforces
a change not only in the form and timing of pleasure but in its very
substance. The adjustment of pleasure to the reality principle implies the
subjugation and diversion of the destructive force of instinctual
gratification, of its incompatibility with the established societal norms and
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relations, and, by that token, implies the transubstantiation of pleasure
itself.1063

Within the industrial society, the reality principle, now transmogrified into the
performance principle, alters not only the amount of repression but the avenues of tension
release: what we take pleasure in is, as we saw throughout One-Dimensional Man,
conditioned by the invested interests to their benefit.
The crucial significance of Marcuse’s distinction between basic repression
and surplus repression was that it opened up, at the theoretical level at
least, a way out of Freud’s unhappy equation of civilization with
repression. In theory, modern society might be relieved of its repressive
character without at the same time falling back into barbarism and
chaos.1064

Although Marcuse conceded time and again that advanced civilization is still civilization
and, as such, a certain basic repression is necessary now as it was in the pre-industrial
epoch, nevertheless, the surplus repression under the performance principle is engineered
by those in power to remain in power to the detriment and limitation of autonomous
human expression in an era where scarcity has been significantly diminished.
One major problem in Marcuse’s amendment to Freud’s fundamental theses
seems to emerge: if the end of scarcity is the foundation for surplus repression (if scarcity
endured, Marcuse would admit to the necessity of a certain basic form of repression),
why is Marcuse so certain that scarcity has, in fact, been diminished to profoundly that
the only repression left is surplus? Time and again he notes throughout One-Dimensional
Man that the Establishment delivers the goods, creating the euphoric indulges that keep a
populace complacent, negating the need for repression in an age where civilization is no
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longer hanging in the balance of necessary labor to work for food and shelter. The “vital
needs,” as he called them, have been fulfilled. Thus, a utopian conclusion should be
attainable: “to the degree to which the struggle for existence becomes co-operation for
the free development and fulfillment of individual needs, repressive reason gives way to a
new rationality of gratification in which reason and happiness converge.”1065 Happiness is
no longer perfunctory or, worse, detrimental to civilization’s continuation. Repressive
reason or, as he might otherwise say, “technical rationality,” can now give way to an
emancipated realm of pleasure without surplus repression, what he will call an
“aesthetic” rationality which we will discuss in the following chapter. Further, without
having to pit oneself against the Other, a non-repressive, non-alienated form of solidarity
and social individualism of cooperation can replace the heteronymous, pseudo-solidarity
of homogeneity. But, as Marks notes, “this alternative is not realized. It is a possibility,
not an actuality. In fact, the reverse is the case.”1066
It is evident that the overriding theme that unites Eros and Civilization with OneDimensional Man is that the creation of false needs and the perpetuation of repression are
conducive to the capitalistic goals of those in control of a community of commodity
fetishism. As such, it is no surprise that this utopia has not unfolded, despite the
foundation for its rise in light of the end of scarcity, as the authority guards against this
potential for radical social change through the various means we’ve elucidated at length.
As Marcuse said, surplus repression is habituated and thus rarely (if ever) experienced as
“surplus,” especially in the absence of the negative thinking that might illuminate it as
such. Of course, as we have seen, part of the Establishment’s hold on power is precisely
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this obfuscation of the “surplus” nature of its repression, as it obfuscates all means of
alienation and indoctrination or else run the risk of creating those Peircean individuals of
“wider social feeling” that could engage in the negative thinking requisite for radical
social change.
However, it is unclear, given this ability to engage in negative thinking and make
such a realization, precisely how much of the populace of advanced society would be
able to authentically make such a claim. Marcuse was quick to illuminate the positive
aspects of technological progress, primarily the ability of technology to end scarcity and
disease. But for what percentage of the populace is this ability actually realized? The fact
that technology has the potential, not in the future but now, to reduce scarcity to the point
of obscurity, a fundamental concession of Marcuse for his Freudian amendments, is not
the same as claiming that potential has been realized for the majority of people. In a
nation wherein 35.4% of the wealth in America is in the hands of 1% of the people, and
16% of Americans live below the poverty line, who, exactly, was Marcuse talking
about?1067 Scarcity can be diminished into obscurity. Scarcity has been diminished into
obscurity for some tiny sliver of the American populace. But for the majority of
Americans, scarcity is not only alive and well but remains the central factor of the
trajectory of their entire lives. “With the globalization of production activities … we have
seen the social distribution of income and wealth become increasingly polarized.” 1068 As
Hyman notes:
The distinct modes of scarcity that prevailed at different points in the
history of civilization have neither been distributed collectively nor
organized to respond to individual needs. The distribution of scarcity has
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been imposed both on individuals and society, first violently and then
more rationally through the manipulation of power. Despite the utility of
this form of rationality for the progress of civilization, scarcity remains the
rationality of domination.1069
This reality does not necessarily undermine Marcuse’s position. Repression
remains “surplus” repression in America not because the citizens experience the end of
scarcity but because they don’t need to experience scarcity at all. Nevertheless they do
and toil and labor still dictate the trajectory of their lives as they fight tooth and nail to
eke out the fulfillment of even their basic, “vital” needs. This reality would seem, at first,
to be antagonistic to the capitalistic goals of the invested interests. True, one efficient
way to increase profit margins is to reduce overhead in the form of minimizing pay for
laborers but, nevertheless, for businesses to flourish, the working class must be able to
afford the goods and luxuries they peddle (false needs), over and above the fulfillment of
the vital needs they need to survive. As Marcuse noted in One-Dimensional Man, the
invested interests must create the desire for the goods that must be profitably sold, not to
a tiny elite, but to the majority of people. So, too, must they ensure that the overwhelming
majority has the capability of affording the goods they are made to desire. The euphoria
at the heart of the acquiescence central to Marcuse’s thesis in One-Dimensional Man is
created not because desires go unfulfilled. Individuals are given their desires, or in the
language of Eros and Civilization, the avenues for the release of their instinctual tensions,
in order for those desires to be fulfilled by the invested interests to their benefit and our
alienation and indoctrination. If people can’t afford their goods and services, what’s the
point of instilling those desires in the first place? Moreover, without the ability to fulfill
those desires by purchasing those goods and services, there would be no acquiescence,
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only hostility, and the sort of tension requisite for the radical social change that the onedimensional society attempts to stave off at all cost. The hostility and the tension
experienced precisely because an overwhelming number of Americans do not experience
an end of scarcity was, for Marcuse, a fertile ground for the radical social change he
seeks. Marcuse was immensely sympathetic to this dilemma and made a close study of
the marginalized, the impoverished, the racial, ethnic and gender minorities that do not
thrive in such a society, that do experience scarcity, and that experience the realization
that they do not need to experience scarcity (and, too, that others not like themselves are
freed from it when they are not in a purportedly egalitarian and democratic society), may
well be sowing the seeds for the radical change he felt would invariably come about in
the long run. In short, there are those individuals of a Peircean “wider sort of social
feeling” capable of engaging in Marcusean negative thinking that do not experience
scarcity, that view repression as surplus repression, that see the performance principle for
what it is (indoctrinating, alienating), and rebel against this status quo. But there are other
agents at work, as well, for Marcuse, those that experience enduring scarcity in a society
that could, if it so chose, reduce it to obscurity and see themselves clearly and decidedly
as the alienated and impoverished so that the wealthy can remain wealthy, so that those in
power may remain in power. The veil of obfuscation perpetuated by the Establishment
has less effect on the hyper-marginalized, those who are given desires that cannot be
satisfied, and Marcuse saw in this tension a site of radical progressive revolt. Indeed,
Marcuse began Counterrevolution and Revolt with what amounts to a sort of checklist of
all of the counterrevolutionary techniques utilized by the authority to stave off radical
social change that Peirce enumerated in his critique of the method of authority,
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specifically aimed at those who are not satisfied by the goods and services offered by the
administration: “in the United States, students are still in the forefront of radical protest:
the killings at Jackson State and Kent State testify to their historical role. Black militants
pay with their lives: Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Fred Hampton, George
Jackson.”1070
As Marcuse said, “technical progress and the vast output of ‘luxuries’ create and
re-create … the images of a world of ease, enjoyment, fulfillment, and comfort which no
longer appears as the exclusive privilege of an elite but rather within the reaches of the
masses.”1071 Certainly Marcuse was right in saying that the Establishment creates the
“image” of the attainability of these luxuries for the mass of people, for without the hope
and desire to live like “the elite” the impetus to purchase the goods and services offered
would be negated; a type of Horatio Alger “rags to riches” bootstrapping mythos. But the
reality remains that most cannot live up to this image and are subsequently left with
unfulfilled desires and goods and services they simply cannot afford. Marcuse refered to
these individuals as “small radical minorities.”1072 In truth, they are anything but, unless
we are talking about a type of “political” or “power” minority à la King; in terms of sheer
numbers there is nothing “minority” about them, and certainly they are not “small,” but
encompass a vast swathe of the population. A site of potential radical social change, “the
ghetto population of the United States constitutes such a force.”1073
Confined to small areas of living and dying, it can be more easily
organized and directed. Moreover, located in the core cities of the country,
the ghettos form natural geographical centers from which the struggle can
be mounted against targets of vital economic and political importance …
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their location makes for spreading and “contagious” upheavals. Cruel and
indifferent privation is now met with increasing resistance, but its largely
unpolitical character facilities suppression and diversion.1074

Not because of negative thinking, nor necessarily even because of ideological concerns,
but the pure, brute facticity of unnecessary scarcity (perhaps surplus scarcity is an apt
term for this phenomenon) and the inability to engage with the mores of commodity
fetishism, creates an entire cross-section of the populace primed to engage in the Great
Refusal. It’s only drawback is precisely its “unpolitical” character, its non-ideological
character, granting the tension and irritation requisite for radical social change without a
concise structure by which to express that irritation and rise against the forces that ensure
the “cruel and indifferent” (and unnecessary) privation they experience.1075
The long-range power of the black rebellion is further threatened by the
deep division within this class (the rise of a Negro bourgeoisie), and by its
marginal (in terms of the capitalist system) social function. The majority
of the black population does not occupy a decisive position in the process
of production, and the white organizations of labor have not exactly gone
out of their way to change this situation. In the cynical terms of the
system, a large part of this population is “expendable,” that is to say, it
makes no essential contribution to the productivity of the system.
Consequently, the powers that be may not hesitate to apply extreme
measures of suppression if the movement becomes dangerous. The fact is
that, at present in the United States, the black population appears as the
“most natural” force of rebellion.1076

To these outliers, the counterrevolution of the Establishment manifests its most
brutal and violent form. It is not necessarily their ideological differences that separate
them from the ideal consumer society but their economic inability to participate in the
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commodity fetishism that alienates them from the system as a whole. As such, the
utilization of the “imago” returns in full force: institutes of higher education instill
“liberal” values and must be redesigned to ensure students graduate with degrees that
help them become efficient cogs in the machine, capable of affording the goods and
services offered by the administration; racial minorities are “lazy” and choose not to get
the jobs requisite for full participation in commodity capitalism. For those who cannot
assimilate, they are labeled as “deviant” or “criminal” by the administration, and violent
acts of suppression are …
primarily directed against powerless but conspicuous minorities who
appear as disturbing aliens to the established system, who look different,
speak and behave differently, and who are doing things … which those
who accept the social order cannot afford to do. Such targets are black and
brown people, hippies, radical intellectuals.1077
Along with art (the subject of the next chapter), the “folk tradition” of minorities offered,
for Marcuse, the most fertile ground for radical social change:
The latter is largely the language of the oppressed, and as such it has a
natural affinity to protest and refusal. In black language, methodically
fostered by black people today, it strengthens solidarity, the consciousness
of their identity, and of their repressed or distorted cultural tradition. And
because of this function, it militates against generalization.1078

Inherent in minority culture is the self-awareness of their own oppression, manifesting in
a language that is incommensurate with the discourse of the administration, just as the
language of Marxism and negative thinking is incommensurate with the goals and ideals
of commodity capitalism. In The Art of Liberation, Marcuse further emphasized this
break from the standard discourse of the Establishment in minority groups:
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It is a familiar phenomenon that subcultural groups develop their own
language, taking the harmless words of everyday communication out of
their context and using them for designating objects or activities tabooed
by the Establishment … but a far more subversive universe of discourse
announces itself in the language of black militants. Here is a systematic
linguistic rebellion, which smashes the ideological context in which the
words are employed and defined, and places them into the opposite
context—negation of the established one. Thus, the blacks “take over”
some of the most sublime and sublimated concepts of Western
civilization, desublimate them, and redefine them.1079
Marcuse invoked an interesting reversal of his normal categories of “sublimation” and
“desublimation.” From the perspective of positive thinking, the categories and discourse
of the Establishment are the sublimated for the mass of citizens and thus, from this
transcendental norm, the co-opting of the language of the Establishment is, itself, a type
of desublimation, the redefining of the fundamental terms of the hegemony.
This language manifests in music, as well. Traditionally African-American modes
of music, “blues and jazz,” for example, “are not merely new modes of perception
reorienting and intensifying the old ones; they rather dissolve the very structure of
perception in order to make room” for a new sensibility, one that is “not yet ‘given.’”1080
Black music as the cry and song of the slaves and the ghettos. In this
music, the very life and death of black men and women are lived again:
the music is the body; the aesthetic form is the “gesture” of pain, sorrow,
indictment. With the takeover by the whites, a significant change occurs:
white “rock” is what its black paradigm is not, namely, performance. It is
as if the crying and shouting, the jumping and playing, now take place in
an artificial, organized space.1081
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Indeed, even traditionally “black” music has become co-opted in a vibrant display of
artificial desublimation by the Establishment, a powerful example of the subtle forms of
indoctrination and assimilation utilized by the invested interests.
Consider, for example, Tupac Shakur’s iconic track “Changes,” recorded in 1992.
In an intriguing example of sublimation (or, perhaps, counter-desublimation), Tupac
utilizes the instrumentation of Bruce Hornsby’s (a white singer-songwriter) 1986 hit song
“The Way it is,” and applies it directly to the themes of racial oppression in America:
It’s time for us as a people to start makin’ some changes.
Let’s change the way we eat, let’s change the way we live
and let’s change the way we treat each other.
You see the old way wasn’t working so it’s on us to do
what we gotta do, to survive.1082
It is a song of protest against that which is (either ironic, given the name of the song it’s
sampling, or a genius deployment of Marcusean critical theory), a type of negative
thinking peaking back behind the veil of obfuscation and alienation. The title itself is a
call for progressive social change, change against the current milieu (thus, the title of the
song is transmuted from “The Way it is” to “Changes”) of commodity fetishism and,
specifically, it is a song decrying the violence and intolerance aimed at the outliers who
do not assimilate into the status quo. Being poor, being black, is enough to consider
suicide in the face of a society stacked perpetually against success, against the ability to
even achieve the indoctrinating goals of the Establishment. The pain of hunger, so great
that it leads to criminality just to feed oneself, is not a sign that scarcity has been
eliminated but, rather, the awareness that scarcity could be eliminated, if only the color of
an individual’s skin were the same color as those who control the flow of capital. The
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police, enforcing the rules and regulations of the Establishment, are heralded for killing
off these minorities: “one less hungry mouth on the welfare.” A culture of violence is
championed so that the outliers kill themselves and those like “Huey,” those individuals
with wider social feeling that feel it’s time to “fight back,” are gunned down “in the
dark.” It is a call to an authentic form of solidarity, to see one another as “brothers” rather
than the Sartrean seriality of “distant strangers” aligned at the bus stop. It is a call to
change “the way we eat,” “the way we life,” “the way we treat each other” away from the
Establishment’s mandates and towards an idealized future. And instead of a “war on
poverty,” the idealized form of technology’s deployment to end scarcity for Marcuse, the
militant efforts of the Establishment seek, instead, to eradicate the radically
disenfranchised. The attack is not against poverty and scarcity but against those who are
poor and those who are starving.
Compare this to the average “Top 10” hit of the 21st century from some of the
most famous black musicians. Bruno Mars, for example, rose to prominence with his
mind-numbingly inane jingle “I Want to Be a Billionaire” which is nothing but a wistful
daydream listing all of the goods and services he wishes to one day buy and consume.
And of course, there are the countless throngs of musicians who champion violence not
against the Establishment but against one another: a culture of drugs and violence and
womanizing precisely that which Tupac warned against as an imago of the black as
inherently violent and criminal, an image perpetuated by the vested interests to wipe out a
minority (by their own hands, to turn them against one another).
Marcuse was also keenly aware of gender discrimination and championed
movements in women’s liberation as a site of potential radical social change. Feminism,
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itself, poses a threat to an “American life” structured by the performance principle in
advanced capitalism.1083 In Steuernagel’s analysis of Marcuse, she brings him into
conversation with Susan Faludi and her book Backlash. Faludi notes that the
Establishment militates against the disenfranchised women in America who have,
historically, been kept incapable of integrating into the status quo, by militating against
feminism on the two fronts of mass marketing and mass media: “two institutions that
have since proved more effective devices for constraining women’s aspirations than
coercive laws and punishments.”1084 As Steuernagel says, “the system uses the tools of
mass media and mass marketing to seduce women into believing that feminism is the
enemy,” in a key trope of the “imago” that we have discussed previously.1085 Women,
like racial minorities, poor whites and all those who were unable to assimilate into the
status quo were those who Marcuse turned to “who were not or should not be satisfied
with the existing state of affairs.”1086 As Steuernagel notes, and as I argued above,
beyond the students who have gained the ability to engage in negative thinking on
ideological terms and choose not to participate in the mores of commodity fetishism, “the
second component of the Great Refusal included those whose marginalization by the
Establishment prevented their integration,” namely, those who cannot participate in the
modes of capitalism and thus the indoctrinating mechanisms of desire manipulation for
goods and services they cannot afford, greatly nullifying the pacifying effects.1087 “These
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individuals have revolutionary potential as a result of their race and sex and not as a
result of their revolutionary political consciousness.”1088
In the case of women, once again, if indoctrination depends upon integration, and
if integration depends upon the availability of the goods and services that indoctrinate, to
close those avenues of participation minimizes the indoctrinating effects and engenders a
consciousness of tension and frustration requisite for radical social change. “Although
women are more oppressed by men … again, as in the case of blacks in the United States,
women’s revolutionary potential is linked primarily to their marginalization in the
production process and the reduced levels of integration.”1089 As Marcuse said, “this
isolation (separation) from the alienated work world of capitalism enabled the woman to
remain less brutalized by the Performance Principle, to remain closer to her sensibility:
more human than men.”1090
Much has been made of Marcuse’s brief foray into identity politics including
critiques of what appears to be an essentializing, on his part, of female “nature” as
inherently “non-aggressive” and the degree to which a male-dominated society has
determined the self-identification of women in capitalist societies.1091 To fully address
this critique is beyond the scope of this current project but, nevertheless, Marcuse’s
fundamental point remains pertinent to our discussion here: precisely because a maledominated society has taken it upon itself to alienate women from the workforce and
denied them fair and equal access to capital, their exposure to the indoctrinating
tendencies of technical rationality has been diminished compared to their male
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counterparts and, as such, are in a better position to desire radical social change. As
Hyman notes, “according to Marcuse, progressive alienation itself increases the potential
for freedom; the more objectified and therefore distanced necessary labor becomes for the
individual, the less it involves him or her in the realm of necessity.”1092
In sum, Marcuse’s insights into Freudian psychoanalysis offered a closer look into
the indoctrinating tendencies explored later in One-Dimensional Man, specifically, the
desire modification as it transpires on the most fundamental, instinctual level. His
amendments to Freud’s theory, “surplus repression” and “the performance principle,”
inject a much needed and clearly absent socio-historical component to Freud’s theory,
demonstrating how desire manipulation manifests in, specifically, the advanced industrial
society. In exploring Marcuse’s conception of “surplus repression,” modeled after Marx’s
notion of “surplus value,” I noted a subtle distinction that must be made, a distinction
between a surplus repression forged of the realization that scarcity has ended and the
experience of surplus repression forged of the realization that scarcity could be ended,
and has been ended, for some, but not all, of the populace. Such a distinction, I maintain,
Marcuse was already well aware of, as demonstrated in the aforementioned analysis,
though perhaps not drawn forth as explicitly as it could have been. This, what I call
“surplus scarcity,” manifests in those individuals who are hyper-marginalized, not the
working class which is the focus of most of his work, but the obscenely poor which, I
maintain, constitutes a larger swathe of the country that Marcuse admits. Beyond those in
abject poverty, the political minorities likewise constitute a cite of hyper-marginalization
who experience surplus scarcity as goods and services that they desire, that would
otherwise be fulfilled by the Establishment, are denied them for reasons of politics and
1092
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prejudice. Those who experience surplus scarcity become a site of potential radical social
change, not because they engage in negative thinking per se, but because they have been
given the desires for goods and services they cannot afford or aren’t allowed to have,
creating the requisite tension and frustration that grounds the desire for seeking a wholly
other way of life. As Marcse said:
The obvious contradiction between the between the liberating possibilities
of the technological transformation of the world, the light and free life on
the one hand and the intensification of the struggle for existence on the
other, generates among the underlying population that diffused
aggressiveness which, unless steered to hate and fight the alleged national
enemy, hits upon any suitable target … this is the aggressiveness of those
with the mutilated experience.1093
What Peirce called “The Gospel of Greed” creates its own nemesis. Technology
can eliminate scarcity and poverty for all but, under the sway of capital, it hasn’t done so
for a great portion of the populace. This experience of surplus scarcity leads creates the
potential ground for radical change. The solution would seem to lie in a drastic
revaluation of technology’s deployment by those in power: the alleviation of poverty and
scarcity even though that might undermine capitalistic growth. Only when emancipated
from capital can technology return to its instrumental value and, with it, can the surplus
repression experienced in modern society be diminished. As Marks notes:
The central theme in Marcuse’s social philosophy … is that utopian
possibilities are inherent in the technical and technological forces of
advanced capitalism and advanced socialism. These possibilities consist in
the rational use on a global scale of the available technology to a single
end: to terminate poverty and scarcity.1094
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What Marks is referring to here is not the technical rationality that Marcuse’s critiques,
but a rationality liberated from the alienating aspects of technology, hearkening back to
Marcuse’s discussion of Bildung and values, beliefs and desire satisfaction conducive to
authentic human flourishing and autonomy. Rationality must be liberated from its
technological underpinnings specifically, here, for the potential of scarcity’s end to
become a reality for all people, as Marks says, “on a global scale” where technology is
returned to its instrumental (rather than indoctrinating) value. For “every type of
bureaucracy … is an exploitive apparatus; and to be dependent on such a system is to
prolong servitude.”1095 As Marcuse said, “former luxuries become basic needs”1096 which
may well be true but, I would add, those former-luxuries-now-basic-needs are soon
complemented by new luxuries beyond the old ones, and the former luxuries, now basic
needs, are still not necessarily affordable for the majority of the populace, “basic needs”
as they may have become. Indeed, this adds another level to the tension by the radically
disenfranchised: they are increasingly alienated from an increasing standard of living and
more and more do the goods and services they made to desire slip out of their reach.
It is not enough for technology to arrive at the point of being able to eliminate
scarcity, as Marcuse suggested it more or less already has, but that the values of the
human beings in control of that technology’s deployment must be radically altered.
“What is required at this stage of social history is a qualitative change in the ‘nature’ of
man,” a change that can only come about “through the progressive development of an
attitude of refusal—the ‘great refusal,’ the rejection of domination by the
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Establishment—any Establishment, even one nominally dedicated to social welfare.”1097
As Marcuse said in An Essay on Liberation:
For the world of human freedom cannot be built by the established
societies, no matter how much they may streamline and rationalize their
dominion. Their class structure, and the perfected controls required to
sustain it, generate needs, satisfactions, and values which reproduce the
servitude of the human existence. This “voluntary” servitude … which
justifies the benevolent masters, can be broken only through a political
practice which reaches the roots of the containment and contentment in the
infrastructure of man, a political practice of methodical disengagement
from an refusal of the Establishment, aiming at a radical transvaluation of
values. Such a practice involves a break with the familiar, the routine ways
of seeing, hearing, feeling, understanding things so that the organism may
become receptive to the potential forms of a nonaggressive,
nonexploitative world.1098

Until negative thinking is pervasive enough to lead to a Great Refusal on the scale and
scope of radical social change through the radical revaluation of values, the deployment
of technology to the end of eliminating scarcity and poverty (its ideal form of use, for
Marcuse) will remain potential rather than actual in a system dominating by capital. Until
such an emancipated form of rationality and technology comes about, “surplus”
repression must be seen not as the “end of scarcity” per se but, rather, as the unfulfilled
potential of the end of scarcity for the great majority of those living within advanced
technological capitalistic societies.
Ultimately, as Farr affirms, “Freud’s theory of the instincts provides Marcuse
with a new anthropological foundation for Revolution.”1099 Kellner explains Marcuse’s
drive to incorporate Freudian theory into his Marxism and the ultimate, utopian
possibilities inherent in such a project:
1097

Marks, The Meaning of Marcuse, Op. Cit., 106.
Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, Op. Cit., 6.
1099
Arnold Farr, Critical Theory and Democratic Vision: Herbert Marcuse and Recent Liberation
Philosophies (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2009), 56.
1098

356

Since history had not provided a guarantee of revolution, Marcuse turned
to nature to provide a foundation for revolutionary possibility. In his
reading of Freud, human nature contained rebellious and creative energies
which will not tolerate excessive oppression and, if liberated, could
generate revolutionary struggle. In a sense, Marcuse is returning to the
revolutionary perspectives of his first period, where a contradiction
between human nature and capitalist society elicited “radical action.”1100

From Freud, Marcuse saw a fundamental foundation for radical social change in the very
nature of humanity itself. As Wolff notes:
The repressed content of the unconscious in all of us exists as a permanent
psychic pool or source of opposition to the established order of society.
We all construct powerful defenses against this repressed content within
ourselves, using such familiar mechanisms as denial, projection, and
transference. When a rebellious member of society violates some taboo …
he provokes a response that is exaggerated all out of proportion.1101
Intriguingly, Marcuse provided another alternative to Peirce’s potential dissolution of the
method of authority. Though Peirce admitted a certain biologically necessity of inquiry
forged of a preternatural repulsion towards doubt, this sensation of doubt can be staved
off nearly perpetually by the invested interest unless an individual with wider social
feeling can discover a productive comparison to the current milieu by looking abroad to
other systems or past manifestations of his or her own. Marcuse added a third dimension
for the possibility of radical social change: within each individual citizen, tension already
exists and is perpetually struggling for release against the mores of a repressive society.
The instinctual drives, as Marcuse noted, are never dissolved by the Reality
Principle but exist in a suppressed, sublimated form that threaten to emerge if
emancipated from the surplus repression of the Performance Principle in advanced

1100

Douglas Kellner, Herbert Marcuse and the Crisis of Marxism (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1984), 162.
1101
Wolff, “Marcuse’s Theory of Toleration,” Op. Cit., 475.

357

societies; it is an inherent drive for something other than the confining parameters of the
modern age. Eros is, itself, the potential for imaginative negative thinking precisely
because it is confounded (experiences the requisite Peircean tension for inquiry and
change) by the Performance Principle. As Farr notes:
In what way is eros a form of prophetic imagination? As we have seen, the
function of the imagination is to present the individual with an image of a
possibly new and qualitatively different, a liberated, reality principle. The
prophetic is a call for transformation, an overturning of the present order, a
rupture in the continuum of domination. In Marcuse’s critical theory eros
functions as the prophetic call for liberation.1102
The presence of Eros creates “a constant dialectical tension between one’s internal
biological system and external cultural conditions.”1103 The repressed instincts, never
dissolved entirely, continue to “manifest themselves as fantasy. Fantasy or the
imagination functions as the principle of negation whereby the present, repressive reality
principle is constantly challenged by the possibility of a better, liberated experience.”1104
As Habermas confirms, for Marcuse:
As soon as the progress of civilization, which is based on the repressive
modification of the instincts, increases, the existence of a surplus product
not leading to individual gratification provokes a reaction from both Eros
and Thanatos. Once instinctual repression loses its function for necessary
self-preservation, the two conservative powers behind the scenes of
civilization form a coalition and demand the recalling of energies from
alienated labor.1105

As such, we may move to the final chapter in our analysis of Marcuse. The
different strains of his thought complement one another and move us towards a Utopian
1102
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alternative: Marcuse’s adaptation of Weber’s technical rationality forms the foundation of
indoctrination in industrial societies which create surplus repression to perpetuate their
own agendas through processes of indoctrination and the dissolution of the requisite
negative thinking. In order to move away from the stultifying milieu of the present, the
conditions for such emancipation have already been laid subtly throughout our
investigation: rationality must be emancipated from technology’s hold and technology
must be returned to its instrumental function as that which has as its sole aim the
elevation of scarcity and poverty. Freed from these repressive confines, fantasy,
imagination and Eros dictate a new sensibility, as he calls it, not one of technical
rationality but a distinct “aesthetic” dimension antithetical to the mandates of
technocracy, commodity fetishism, and advanced capitalist culture. This “new direction
of progress would depend completely on the opportunity to activate repressed or arrested
organic, biological needs: to make the human body an instrument of pleasure rather than
labor … the emergence of new, qualitatively different needs and faculties seemed to be
the perquisite, the content of liberation.”1106
This “new sensibility” is not the dissolution of reason in favor of a release of
unrestrained Eros. Rather, Marcuse was championing a fusion of reason and pleasure
rather than the strict dualism that repression appears to demand for civilization’s
flourishing, an erotic or aesthetic rationality in sharp contrast to the prevailing technical
rationality of the modern age. “It is in and through the joining of instinct and reason that
we can fashion a new rationality which shatters the constricting dualisms, the domination
of the present. Our biological bases are the vehicles of liberation; they open from the
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realm of necessity (instinct) onto the plateau of freedom (reason).”1107 The instincts,
sublimated and repressed in the current milieu, must be emancipated not in conflict with
reason, but utilized by it, fused with it, to construct a new rationality, forged of new
values, all of which in direct conflict with the technical rationality of the modern age, not
a conflict with reason, itself. The instincts “must be channeled by a rationality that
partakes both of the realms of necessity and freedom,” effectively recreating “labour as
gratifying as well as socially useful activity,” not gratification at the expense of social
utility.1108 As we recall, for Marcuse, basic repression remained a necessity for
civilization in any form and, as such, he is not advocating a kind of hedonism that would
cripple civilization. It is not a world without toil, but a world where toil is infused with
pleasure. As we saw, Marcuse linked this new sensibility with the imagination and it
plays a central part in his utopian vision which will be the subject of our next chapter:
Imagination envisions the reconciliation … of happiness with reason.
While this harmony has been removed into utopia by the established
reality principle, phantasy insists that it must and can become real, that
behind the illusion lies knowledge. The truths of imagination are first
realized when phantasy itself takes form, when it creates a universe of
perception and comprehension—a subjective and at the same time
objective universe. This occurs in art. The analysis of the cognitive
function of phantasy is thus led to aesthetics as the “science of beauty”:
behind the aesthetic form lies the repressed harmony of sensuousness and
reason—the eternal protest against the organization of life by the logic of
domination, the critique of the performance principle.1109

Thus, all of the themes we have so far engaged become clearly interwoven into a decisive
systematic critique of one-dimensional society. The “logic of domination,” tied
inextricably with “technical rationality,” militates against the emancipation of instincts,
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relegating a non-repressive civilization to the realm of phantasy. But phantasy, as
Marcuse noted in Freud, is never wholly obliterated by the reality principle but persists
despite its indoctrinating manifestation in the performance principle. It is a vehicle not for
a return to a chimerical “golden age” but a tool to envision wholly alternative modes of
existence to the current milieu, a type of “negative” thinking requisite for radical social
change. And despite the authority’s ability to infiltrate into every aspect of waking life,
creating as it does false needs and a false consciousness resulting in a type of “euphoria
in unhappiness,” this instinctual realm, encrusted with indoctrination as it has become,
remains a cite of potential emancipation through phantasy and, as we’ll see in our next
chapter and as Marcuse foreshadows here, through art: Eros and phantasy do not supplant
rationality, but are synthesized with it, offering a “new sensibility,” a new “aesthetic
rationality,” that merges toil with pleasure in a civilization freed from surplus repression.
This is a utopia that can exist, for Marcuse, and it is to this potential utopian vision that
we now turn.
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Chapter 10

Utopia and the Aesthetic Dimension

Governed by his first rule of reason, Peirce sought to illuminate and dissolve the
blockades to inquiry. Similarly, Marcuse, via his deployment of negative thinking, sought
to illuminate and dissolve the indoctrinating mores and values of the one-dimensional
society. Both confronted a profound instrumentalism of human cognitive capacities and
the types of blockades of inquiry Peirce articulated likewise existed as the alienating and
indoctrinating mores of one-dimensional society for Marcuse. Indeed, I maintain that a
Marcusean critical theory of the advanced industrial society confronts the blockades of
inquiry established by a Peircean authority. Both philosophers desired a radical form of
autonomy. Though Peirce never articulated a utopian vision, nascent in his method of
inquiry was a socio-political coordination comprised of an ideal, unlimited community of
inquirers operating in a milieu wherein inquiry could flourish as wide and varied as the
human imagination itself. Marcuse, however, explicitly laid bare the general framework
of a post-one-dimensional society, a utopia, in a word, freed from the alienation and
indoctrination of the advanced technocracy.
As we noted, for Marcuse, technology had long since lost its instrumental value as
a neutral entity at the command of the individuals that employ it. It had taken up a
“productivity” and momentum all its own, commanding the individuals to align with its
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mandates in a phenomenon beyond the direct, immediate control of any individual praxes
that contribute to it. As such, in Marcuse’s utopian vision, it would follow that the
instrumental deployment of technology must be liberated from its productive role in
domination. It was not a return to some pre-industrial age that Marcuse sought, as we’ve
said, one riddled with the superstitions and mystification of a Puritanical age with its own
oppressive forms of domination and social control. Technology must remain in a future
utopian society as it is the primary means of limiting scarcity and poverty provided it is
instrumentally utilized to those ends and only those ends, emancipated from its
indoctrinating tendencies under capitalism.
The socio-historic evolution of technology from its instrumental nature to one of
indoctrinating productivity coincides with the rise of modern capitalism and commodity
fetishism, deployed to create and satisfy the “false needs” conducive to the perpetuation
of corporate powers. Via negative thinking, it would follow that, in order to emancipate
technology from its productive moorings, a radical revaluation of human needs would
have to occur: a movement from the desire for these surplus goods and services towards
the fulfillment of the “vital” needs of nourishment, clothing, shelter, at a reasonable level
of sustenance and comfort. Further, the indoctrinating nature of technology is intimately
bound up with the immediate association of “technology” and “rationality,” as Weber
called it, “technical rationality,” wherein the progressive and efficient come to be seen as
the rational and pitted against the irrationality of the previous, pre-industrial age. As such,
technology must be divorced entirely from rationality, employed by rationality, and a new
“sensibility,” a new form of rationality, must emerge in its stead. In short, technology
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would return to its instrumental form just as human rationality would rise past its
instrumentalism to take part in autonomous value creation and assessment once more.
Since Marcuse’s critique of technology formed the bedrock of his critique of onedimensional society, like a domino effect, the reformulation of society as depicted in
One-Dimensional Man unfolds from this proceeding critique. With the dissolution of
commodity fetishism and the deployment of technology to produce these superfluous
goods and services, the “false needs” so central to the Establishment’s domination of
individuality are dissolved and, with them, the need for surplus toil and labor requisite for
the accumulation of capital necessary for the procurement of these goods and services
that are no longer desired. Since the creation of, and subsequent delivery of, the false
needs create the euphoric unhappiness in society, individuals are once again freed from
both surplus labor time and desire for these goods, dissolving the false consciousness and
heteronomy of mass mentality. Authenticity reemerges as individuals are freed to selfnarrate, self-legislate, in a universe of discourse and pursuits that are once again of their
own making.
The very term “one-dimensional” referred to an “increasingly homogenous
society and culture that suppressed higher dimensions of critique and alternatives” and, as
such, a new dimension must transcend the uni-dimensionality of the established universe
of discourse, needs, and rationality.1110 Thus “another dimension of reality” must be
added, an “aesthetic dimension” which will undermine the vicissitudes of indoctrination
in the advanced industrial society, one which has featured to varying degrees throughout
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all of Marcuse’s work but takes on new significance and connotation in light of his work
in the 50’s and 60’s until his final publication, The Aesthetic Dimension, in 1977.1111
In Eros and Civilization, Marcuse’s primary amendments to Freudian psychology,
namely “surplus repression” and “the performance principle,” must, too, be addressed.
The manifestation of the reality principle in the modern milieu, what Marcuse called “the
performance principle,” was, effectively, synonymous with one-dimensional society as he
would later articulate it in One-Dimensional Man. Forged of the commodity fetishism of
advanced capitalism, the “surplus” repression would be reduced, once more, to “basic”
repression requisite for the perpetuation of civilization in its least repressive form. Eros
would be freed towards greater heights of self-expression as the reasons for surplus
repression (the creation and desire for superfluous goods and services, unnecessary
amounts of scarcity, and a power structure bent on the perpetuation of earlier, and now
obsolete, requirements of repression in light of this scarcity) would be dissolved. Here,
too, we see the ingression of an aesthetic dimension that transcends the performance
principle through the imagination’s deployment of fantasy, in coordination with memory
and art, to not only de-obfuscate the indoctrinating structures of repression and alienation
but, too, conjure entirely new realities in sharp contrast to those maintained in the modern
milieu.
Thus, Marcuse’s utopia would seem to suggest the following, based on the
negation of the current milieu alone: technology would be restored to its instrumental
value and deployed exclusively for the reduction of scarcity and poverty; 1112 the false
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needs of commodity fetishism would be dissolved in favor of the “vital” needs only; and
libidinal instincts would be freed from surplus repression. The result would,
consequently, seem to entail the following: the dissolution of heteronomy and restoration
of autonomy; the fusion of labor and pleasure in a less repressive society; and the
reemergence of authentic individuality with the dissolution of mass mentality.
How this utopia emerges can likewise be ascertained, at least in part, by relying
solely on negative thinking in the manner we have just engaged. At base, the most
fundamental changes requisite for a utopian society are three-fold: first, a radical
revaluation of needs away from the goods and services of commodity fetishism thereby
restoring technology to its instrumental value while freeing it towards a new productive
capacity generative of beauty, art, and pleasure. Second, it would entail the emancipation
of instincts from out of the dominion of repression through fantasy and art. Third, it
would require the championing of negative thinking through education, requisite for a
Great Refusal and the radical social change necessary to bring about a better world.
As we turn to Marcuse’s explicit utopian vision, we will see the inexorable
manifestation of the these alternatives to the current milieu stemming from imagination’s
role (“fantasy”) manifest in art, emancipating the instincts and aiding negative thinking to
conjure a societal structure unburdened by technical rationality. The free-play of
imagination, as I demonstrated, was likewise central to Peirce’s own endeavors in the
mode of abductive inquiry.
As we’ve explored, Weber’s conception of “technical rationality” is so ubiquitous
in the industrial society as to not only infiltrate every aspect of life, from the direction of
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higher education to the ways in which we take our leisure, but does so relatively
unnoticed, receding into the background gestalt of lived experience as rationality
becomes technology and that identification is no longer questioned. Of course, it is
conducive to the perpetuation of the Establishment to not draw attention to the
contingency of that relationship as technical rationality is beneficial to commodity
fetishism and the basic mores of capital. As Ingram notes, “the Frankfurt School’s
reliance on Weber’s theory of rationalization led them to embrace a starkly pessimistic
vision of modern society.”1113 Weber’s technical rationality bears upon Marcuse’s
Freudian analysis as well, framed naturalistically as an organism’s need to adapt and
survive in its environment.
In the absence of absolute values, the only end worth pursuing is selfpreservation. Adaptability, or technological domination for the sake of
domination, becomes synonymous with reason. In the final analysis,
technological rationality not only conceives reality as a unified,
mathematical system. It actively constitutes it as such.1114

Adaptability becomes equated with what is rational. Throughout Peirce, as we recall,
adaptability was central to his theory of belief formation. Inquiry, itself, was the mode of
adaptation, the impetus to move from a state of disequilibrium (doubt) to a state of
equilibrium (belief) once more. But within the method of authority, the surest way to
adapt, to survive, is to acquiesce to the proliferated beliefs of the hegemony. Read as
such, this complicates the nature of the individuals with wider social feeling that
challenge the authority and the accepted norms of the indoctrinating society. On the one
hand, these individuals are irrational precisely because they threaten their own existence,
their own “self-preservation,” by challenging the fundamental tenets of the authority.
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They are made to be viewed by their fellows as irrational by the authority, one more
mechanism of social control, being labeled as deviant, defiant, criminal. On the other
hand, these individuals strive for a higher form of adaptability, using the method of
inquiry to acquire more stable beliefs than those that the authority permit, beliefs that
better lead to Truth and Reality, not as the authority would dictate them, but as they really
are, for Peirce. But this higher form of adaptability can only be viewed properly from the
perspective of the long run. In the long run, the authority itself is the problem that must
be overcome in order to achieve an ever-greater state of belief. In the short run, however,
it may be viewed as irrationality, as madness; to challenge a system in such a way that
one’s own self-preservation is on the line.
A similar issue is at stake here. If technology is the means of assimilation, then
the individual within such a milieu, operating within the performance principle, adapts by
aligning him or herself with the mores of capital and commodity fetishism. One of the
most fundamental principles in Freud’s theory is the (apparently) necessary correlation
between instinctual repression and civilization. If individuals are to preserve themselves
they must adapt to the mandates of civilization, thereby necessitating the sublimation of
their drives and repression of their instincts. The well-adapted individual becomes the
efficient worker and consumer in a technocratic society. “The standardization of
production, dictated by technically efficient methods of mass production, requires a mass
market composed of persons possessing uniform (standard) needs.”1115 If you swap
“needs” with “beliefs” you have the very essence of Peirce’s method of authority.
Advertising and mass marketing instill the needs for the commodities that must be
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profitably sold in a universe of goods and services that one-dimensionalize, standardize
the needs of all, a “homogeneous identity of mass consumers.”1116
If rationality is technical rationality, if adaptation and self-preservation is
repression and sublimation to this new performance principle, then what one ought to do
is confirmed as rational by the invested interests in the advanced industrial society: a
totalizing, self-perpetuating system of control and indoctrination. Marcuse never fully
succumbed to this intense degree of pessimism, however, based in no small part on his
insistence on dialectical thinking and his emancipatory reading of Freud. To the former,
Marcuse witnessed the endurance of negative or dialectical thinking in pockets of society
within the advanced industrial society; in students and in the wildly disenfranchised
minorities who do not enjoy the euphoric pleasures of commodity capitalism enough to
succumb to total acquiescence. To the latter, the pleasure principle is never wholly
negated by the performance principle, but endures as sublimated with the potential for
eventual emancipation from surplus repression, manifest through fantasy, memory, and
art. For Marcuse, although reason has become aligned with technology and adaptation to
the mores of the performance principle, this is a contingent, and not necessary, fact of the
present reality and, as such, he held out hope for an emancipated form of rationality
divorced from the technical aspects of commodity capitalism. He never wholly
abandoned his “commitment to emancipatory reason entirely” for “critical, dialectical
reason—that technological society suppresses—continues to live on … in the aesthetic
unconscious (imagination).”1117
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It would follow, then, that emancipation from the indoctrinating form of technical
rationality is possible through, specifically, the cultivation of imagination as it manifests
in art and all forms of negative thinking. This may be engaged throughout forms of
higher education,1118 as we saw in our analysis of Marcuse’s radical pedagogy, at least
where efficiency and technical rationality haven’t completed subverted institutions of
higher learning from their ideal ends. Perhaps more useful still, as Peirce noted as well, is
the cultivation of such talents at a far earlier stage in human development. As I discussed,
“fantasy” or “imagination,” an aspect of negative thinking, is manifest in children whose
instinctual suppression has not yet been fully indoctrinated and sublimated into the
present performance principle. Marcuse’s Freudian analysis of this phenomenon parallels
the results of the Frankfurt School’s 1950 study, The Authoritarian Personality that we
discussed briefly. The results of this study, spearheaded by Horkheimer, concluded that:
The roots of authoritarianism lie in early childhood development. Children
raised by parents who enforce rigid discipline and submission to authority
are likely to feel helpless and inferior, while projecting their repressed
hostility onto out-groups … the solution to the problem lies in
reeducation.1119

As Peirce noted, a key aspect to indoctrination within the method of authority is instilling
the beliefs conducive to the authority’s hold on power to the young and those properly
assimilated will turn their repressed hostility not on the indoctrinating hegemony but on
freedom…the equation of freedom and happiness tabooed by the conscious is upheld by the unconscious”
(Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Op. Cit., 18). The relationship between phantasy (imagination) and the
unconscious he framed in this way: “Phantasy plays a most decisive function in the total mental structure: it
links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the highest products of consciousness (art); the dream with
the reality; it preserves the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and
individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom” (Ibid., 140-41).
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any and all who deviate from the norms and mores of that establishment, effectively selfregulating the perpetuation of the system of control. The same is seen here. The child’s
mind is not emancipated from indoctrination, it is prior to indoctrination, and as Marcuse
noted in Freud, such unrepressed instincts are sublimated but never totally dissolved as
individuals are brought up into the mandates of the performance principle.
This would seem to run contrary to the notion that rationality is adaptability.
Effectively, the recommendation would be to raise children who do not conform to the
established system of indoctrination and thus raise serious challenges to their selfpreservation under the mandates of the performance principle. As such, this form of
education would seem inherently irrational. This raises a primary concern throughout
Marcuse’s vast corpus, namely, the dialectical relationship between the individual and the
social: society’s mandates must change in order for this form of education to be rational
and conducive to self-preservation and for the human organism to adapt to an
environment that is not hostile to critical thinking, imagination, and unrepressed desires.
What we call “rational” (technical rationality) must, itself, be transformed into a new
rationality, a new sensibility. But if this form of education takes place only on the level of
childhood development, and not systemically throughout all echelons of advanced
industrial society, every child conditioned against indoctrination will be acculturated into
that system of control and either acquiesce to it or else be ostracized from it. Although
this form of early, radical pedagogy may be part of the solution, ultimately, the solution
must be broader and more fundamental: a radical transformation of rationality itself. As
Marcuse said, “reason presupposes freedom, the power to act in accordance with
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knowledge of the truth, the power to shape reality in line with its potentialities.”1120 It is
here, Bronner notes, “that the basis for Marcuse’s utopian conception emerges.”1121 If
rationality presupposes freedom, but technical rationality in the performance principle is
a site of indoctrination and profound unfreedom, “technical rationality” is not
“rationality” as Marcuse defines it but is, itself, inherently irrational precisely because it
negates the freedom requite for rationality in the first place. Only the most profound and
radical type of negative thinking can unweave this unfortunate association of technology
and rationality, a dialectical thinking that must “risk defining freedom in such a way that
people become conscious of and recognize it as something that is nowhere already in
existence.”1122 As Bronner notes, “once freedom is defined in this way, even if it remains
subjectively unrecognized, the potential for utopia will objectively be maintained,” 1123 at
least, as Marcuse says, as the “determinate socio-historical negation of what exists.”1124
This highlights the interrelation between “freedom” and “negative thinking,”
specifically, the latter’s ability to bring about the former. Negative thinking operates in
the realm of potentiality, for Marcuse, that which is not as opposed to that which is (the
stultifying milieu of one-dimensional society, the performance principle, and everything
Marcuse critiqued throughout his work).1125 Negative thinking also conjures a subtle
comparison to Peirce’s conception of “the long run,” his fallibilism, his method of
inquiry, and his first rule of reason. Precisely because inquiry is open-ended and the
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conclusions ever-revisable, there is an omnipresent sense of potentiality throughout
Peirce’s methodology, an insistence that to submit to chimerical claims of apodicticity,
blockading further inquiry, admits that conclusions about Truth or Reality are, at last,
fully actualized. There is no such totalizing actualization in Peirce for all of the reasons
we have enumerated previously. “Freedom” here, like Peirce’s “Truth,” is that which
negative thinking keeps alive as a potentiality-yet-to-be-actualized, thereby staving off
complete submission to the chimerical claims of apodicticity and necessity perpetuated
by, and conducive to, the Establishment’s systemic control.
Further, from the basic associations above, it is plain that technology has long
since been divorced from its instrumental value as the means of diminishing scarcity and
poverty. Had it been deployed to those ends and only those ends, that is, not succumbing
to the productivity and indoctrinating uses in modern capital, the scarcity necessitating
surplus repression would be dissolved and, with it, the entire structure of the performance
principle, emancipating the underlying pleasure principle as far as the basic repression for
civilization allows. Precisely because technology perpetuates scarcity and profits from it,
it is clear that “technology” is no longer “technics” in its previous, pre-industrialized
form. It is not being used for what Marcuse believed it ought to be used for, its ideal and
most fundamental deployment, having been co-opted by commodity fetishism and
modern capitalism. Thus, technology must be restored to its instrumental value as a
means to end scarcity and thereby dissolve the performance principle and all of the false
needs, false consciousness, indoctrination and heteronomy that stems from it. We need a
new rationality, in short, and return technology to its proper form, as something under the
control of humanity rather than its master.
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The “pacification of existence” is the liberation of “nature from its own violence
and cruelty.”1126 This was the heart of Marcuse’s critique of technology’s productive
deployment in the one-dimensional society to the indoctrinating ends of consumer
culture, destroying nature rather than finding a way to live in accord with it.1127 It is the
difference between the “cultivation of the soil” and the “destruction of the soil,”
“extraction of natural resources” and “wasteful exploitation.”1128 As Habermas notes in
his study of this emancipatory aspect of technology in Marcuse:
Instead of treating nature as the object of possible control, we can
encounter her as an opposing partner in a possible interaction. We can
seek out a fraternal rather than an exploited nature. At the level of an as
1126
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yet incomplete intersubjectivity we can impute subjectivity to animals and
plants, even to minerals, and try to communicate with nature instead of
merely possessing her under conditions of severed communication.1129

Technology returned to its ideal form would entail a complete transmutation of
humanity’s interaction with nature and this transfiguration of the basic uses of technology
was central to Marcuse’s Utopian vision. However, in order to move technology’s
deployment in this direction, we must first address the “false needs” and desires we have
for the productivity of technology in modern capitalism, specifically, the phenomenon of
commodity fetishism. For as long as we desire these surplus goods, so far above and
beyond our “vital needs,” technology will continue to operate as it does within the
performance principle and the invested interests will continue to profit while the
trajectory of civilization remains fundamentally riddled with surplus repression. This, in
turn, entails a radical transformation of humanity’s fundamental values away from the
desires instilled in us by the vested interests and how those desires are fulfilled, how
those tensions are released, in ways diametrically opposed to the ways in which
technology is currently deployed to meet these needs.
The fusion of art and technology was perhaps expressed best in One-Dimensional
Man wherein Marcuse discussed what he called an “aesthetic reduction.”1130 There,
Marcuse explicitly called for a “radical reconstruction of technology and the
environment,” a “merger of art and technology” wherein “reason would converge with
art, recapturing the affinity between art and technique stressed by the Greeks. A new
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technology would help a more aestheticized reality and could be part of an art of life.”1131
In complementary fashion, technical rationality would be split by the aesthetic
dimension: technology would no longer be associated with rationality and a new
rationality, one more aligned with aesthetics, would replace it and would utilize
technology to create a more aesthetic world devoid of environmental devastation and
individual alienation. As Marcuse said:
The rationality of art, its ability to ‘project’ existence, to define yet
unrealized possibilities could then be envisaged as validated by and
functioning in the scientific-technological transformation of the world.
Rather than being the handmaiden of the established apparatus,
beautifying its business and its misery, art would become a technology for
destroying this business and this misery.1132
As such, as Kellner notes, “aesthetic values would be merged with practice in the
transforming activity of rebuilding the environment, houses, and cities,” 1133 producing, in
Marcuse’s words, “society as a work of art.”1134
Marcuse’s amendments of Freudian psychoanalysis, as we’ve seen, suggest the
direction Marcuse took for a more emancipated psyche manifest in his Utopian vision. As
Ingram summarizes, Freud’s fundamental thesis “forgets that repression is relative to
scarcity, and that surplus repression is a function of artificially induced scarcity.”1135
Further:
Given current levels of technological development, there is no reason to
think that, with a more equitable distribution of wealth and a more modest
standard of living, the need to work (and, therewith, the current level of
surplus repression) might be reduced. Second, work need not be
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unpleasurable and alienated. Art and other forms of creative endeavor
testify to the fact that productive activity can be inherently satisfying. 1136

A movement in this direction would require a transcendence of the performance principle
in conjunction with a radical revaluation of needs away from the productive momentum
of goods and services within commodity capitalism. Technology deployed to reduce
scarcity in concert with the dissolution of surplus (“false”) needs would significantly
reduce the labor time requisite for human flourishing,1137 maintaining the minimum,
“basic” repression necessary for civilization’s continuation. Further, toil itself would no
longer be wholly divorced from pleasure that, according to Freud’s pre-Marcusean
reconfiguration, was necessarily antagonistic to pleasure that must be sublimated and
repressed so that we can work and survive in concert with one another. Marcuse, on the
contrary, saw no necessary disjunction between pleasure and toil in a world rid of surplus
repression.
As I noted earlier, “Freud seems a most improbable basis on which to build a
utopian social theory,”1138 especially in light of the fact that Freud, himself, maintained
that neither scarcity nor the repression forged of scarcity would ever be transcended. For
instance, Freud, in discussing the possibility of a future Utopia, notes in The Future of an
Illusion: “it is questionable if such a state of affairs can be realized. It seems rather that
every civilization must be built upon coercion and renunciation of instinct.”1139 In
discussing the possibility that the Soviet Union would end repression by ending scarcity
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and ushering in a radical egalitarianism, his response was a blunt: “that in my opinion is
an illusion.”1140 Nevertheless, as we’ve seen, Marcuse excavated a radical kernel within
Freud and found, within Freud’s own theory, despite Freud’s pessimism to the contrary,
the seed of a Utopian future:
Freud’s metapsychology here restores imagination to its rights. As a
fundamental, independent mental process, phantasy has a truth value of its
own - namely, the surmounting of the antagonistic human reality.
Imagination envisions the reconciliation of the individual with the whole,
of desire with realization, of happiness with reason.1141
As early as Marcuse’s 1937 essay, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” Geoghegan
notes that Marcuse was already pointing to “the potentially progressive role of fantasy in
Marxism.”1142 As Marcuse said, “the abyss between rational and present reality cannot
be bridged by conceptual thought. In order to retain what is not yet present as a goal in
the present, phantasy is required.”1143 By the “rational,” here, I contend that Marcuse
does not mean “technical rationality” or what passes for rationality in a pervasively
irrational age. Rather, Marcuse is pitting an authentic, emancipated rationality against
precisely that “present reality” which he will eventually come to equate with the
“performance principle,” “one-dimensionality,” and the irrationality of the technological
age, in general. The “conceptual thought” of the present reality, as we saw in his critique
of positivism, lacks the tools requisite to engage that which is “not yet present” and, thus,
Marcuse turned to “imagination” as a mode of precisely the sort of “negative thinking”
that positivism inherently lacks; the only form of thinking with the potential to lead to
radical social change precisely by its ability to de-obfuscate the indoctrinating structures
1140
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of this “present reality” and postulate a radically “Other.” Indebting himself to both
Aristotle and Kant on this point, Marcuse highlighted “the power of the imagination to
intuit that which is not there; to create novelty out of the given; to be free in the midst of
unfreedom.”1144 “Imagination,” “phantasy,” and “negative thinking,” in this sense,
became complementary terms for Marcuse. As he said, “in a situation where such a future
is a real possibility, phantasy is an important instrument in the task of continually holding
the goal up to view.”1145
The “truth value” of fantasy has a wholly operational connotation here, namely,
fantasy operates as means of de-obfuscating the indoctrinating structures of the present
milieu, assessing their contingency rather than their purported necessity, by exposing the
“antagonistic human reality” of the performance principle. The performance principle
pits individual against individual (just as Peirce said the Gospel of Greed saw neighbor
trampling on neighbor) in a mad scramble for goods and services conducive to the
thriving of capital and the myth of static scarcity when, in fact, scarcity continues to be
(potentially) limited by technological advance. It insists on the repression of desires in
order to achieve those ends and supplants a radically free form of reason with the
Weberian “technical rationality” of the modern age. Fantasy, as Marcuse suggests here,
reconciles these antagonisms or, in other words, transcends the fundamental tenets of the
performance principle itself. As such, fantasy now acts “in the service of the id and its
‘pleasure principle,’” championing “in various forms all that is most authentic in
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humanity against the restrictions of the ‘performance principle,’ by returning “that which
is repressed in the present.”1146
According to Marcuse, such a society would liberate the polymorphous
potential inherent in sexuality, but in a sublimated form. Persons would
not regress in their sexual behavior, although there would be much greater
tolerance of sexual diversity. Rather, they would become more sensitive,
loving, creative, and spontaneous. Their receptivity toward themselves and
others would also be reflected in their caring attitude toward nature, as
well as in the pleasurable aesthetics of their domestic and work
environments.1147

Pleasure would be released from its surplus repression and sublimated, as it was before,
but in a manner commensurate with the forms of labor1148 required in a much simpler
standard of living1149 emancipated from the universe of surplus goods and services
conducive only to the capitalistic interests of the Establishment. Inherent in this
emancipation of eros is a revaluation of needs away from commodity fetishism and
towards creativity and sensitivity for oneself, others and nature, in general. However, this
“communal reconciliation with others would not mark a dissolution of selfhood in a
nirvanic, totalitarian oneness. Instead, a nonrepressive individuality would emerge that
would preserve the accomplishments of technological and formal rationality within the
framework of an ‘aestheticized’ instinctual rationality,” a kind of “sensuous reason”1150
would replace the oppressive forms of “technical reason.” However, as we noted before,
Marcuse was not advocating the dissolution of technology for it is through technology
that scarcity and poverty are minimized and, ideally, outright dissolved, a further
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“reduction of labor time to a minimum.”1151 The only aspect of primitive society that
Marcuse would see us “return to” is that of a lower standard of living demanding less
repression. Beyond this, however, Marcuse’s Utopian vision was forward-looking for
“primitive societies are, in some sense, more repressive than their advanced counterparts”
in the sense that “the susceptibility of persons living in such societies, to early and often
painful deaths, inherently lends their reality a repressive cast which is not lessened by the
aesthetic, communal conditions of their existence,”1152 thereby necessitating the perpetual
advance of science and technology to address those earlier problems but emancipated
from their indoctrinating function in the current milieu.
As a complement to Marcuse’s account of “fantasy,” “memory is the means to
recapture earlier experiences of freedom and happiness…by showing that happiness once
obtained” and, in so doing, “also raises the possibility of, and the desire for, future
satisfaction.”1153 Just as “fantasy” maintained its own operational “truth value” for
Marcuse, so, too, did memory:
Its truth value lies in the specific function of memory to preserve promises
and potentialities which are betrayed and even outlawed by the mature,
civilized individual, but which had once been fulfilled in his [sic] dim past
and which are never entirely forgotten [. _ .] Against the self-imposed
restraint of the discoverer, the orientation of the past tends towards an
orientation on the future. The recherche du temps perdu becomes the
vehicle of future liberation.1154
As a complement to the truth-value of fantasy, memory operates by preserving “promises
and the potentialities” that are negated in the modern, “civilized” age but had “once been
fulfilled” in a bygone past. It is a past both social and individual: Marcuse linked “the
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origin of the repressed individual” (which he called ontogenesis 1155) with “the origin of
the repressive civilization” (which he called phylogenesis1156) and it is the role of fantasy
to preserve “the archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the
collective and individual memory, the tabooed images of freedom.” 1157 On the individual
level, it is an appeal to the freedom of youth, prior to the full integration of the individual
into the performance principle.

On the social level, just as Peirce noted that the

individuals of “wider social feeling” were able to look at past manifestations of
government to create the doubt and requisite tension for inquiry and change in
comparison to the current authority, it is an appeal to previous incarnations of
administration, prior to the indoctrinating effects of technical rationality. It is no wonder,
then, that Marcuse was alive to the rampant “counterrevolution” of the Establishment that
militates against memory’s role in this way: on the individual level, we see the allpervasive insistence on the repression of childlike desire satisfaction in favor of
efficiency and productivity in the status quo and, on the social level, we see
manifestations of rampant censorship and historical revisionism in an attempt to
retroactively bring the past into an artificial alignment with the present administration.
For example, if “memory” is a vehicle for emancipation, then “amnesia” is a vehicle for
indoctrination. As Marcuse said, “the ability to forget is the mental faculty which sustains
“The replacement of the pleasure principle by the reality principle is the great traumatic event in the
development of man” in two primary stages, “ontogenetically” and “phylogenetically,” ibid., 15. The
formation of the reality principle, supplanting the pleasure principle, in the individual is “ontogenesis”
which occurs “during the period of early childhood, and submission to the reality principle is enforced by
the parents and other educators” and, subsequently, “submission is continually reproduced,” ibid.
Interesting to note is how this resonates with the Frankfurt School’s study of the “Authoritarian
Personality” that I discussed previously.
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submissiveness and renunciation.”1158 Marcuse invoked Adorno’s warning against “the
spectre of man without memory” achieved precisely through the sorts of historical
revisionism both Marcuse and Peirce discuss or, as Geoghegan puts it, “as bourgeois
society seeks to neutralize history.”1159 In short, “by forgetting one both loses the imagery
of liberation and forgives that which should not be forgiven,” 1160 perpetuating one’s
complete immersion in the indoctrinating effects of one-dimensional society. As Marcuse
said:
Phantasy [...] retains the structure and the tendencies of the psyche prior to
its organization by the reality, prior to its becoming an ‘individual’ set off
against other individuals. And by the same token, like the id to which it
remains committed, imagination preserves the ‘memory’ of the
subhistorical past when the life of the individual was the life of the genus,
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the future in a robust and healthy way,” John Fritz, “Pete, Peggy, Don, and the Dialectic of Remembering
and Forgetting,” in Mad Men and Philosophy, edited by Rod Carveth and James B. South (New York:
Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), 54. Conversely, Nietzsche “connects the idea of forgetting with happiness,
strength, and vitality,” ibid., 57. As Nietzsche notes: “it is always the same thing that makes happiness
happiness: the ability to forget,” Nietzsche, “On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for Life,” Op. Cit.,
62. The crux of the matter as it applies to Marcuse’s observations here is, as Nietzsche noted, “to be
incapable of taking one’s enemies, one’s accidents, even one’s misdeeds seriously for very long – that is
the sign of strong, full natures in whom there is an excess of the power to form, to mold, to recuperate, and
to forget…such a man shakes off with a single shrug many vermin that eat deep into others,” Friedrich
Nietzsche, On the Geneology of Morals, translated and edited by Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage
Books, 1987), first essay, 10, 39. Marcuse responded to this Nietzschean position directly, in fact, though
not so much by way of refutation as it was by way of lamentation that Niezsche’s analysis of forgetting,
though contingent, was nevertheless the prevalent manifestation: “Nietzsche saw in the training of memory
the beginning of civilized morality – especially the memory of obligations, contracts, dues. This context
reveals the one-sidedness of memory-training in civilization: the faculty was chiefly directed toward
remembering duties rather than pleasures; memory was linked with bad conscience, guilt, and sin.
Unhappiness and the threat of punishment, not happiness and the promise of freedom, linger in memory,”
Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, Op. Cit., 232. Ultimately, Marcuse warned, “if the past is just left behind
and forgotten, there will be no end to destrictive transgression,” ibid., 117.
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the image of the immediate unity between the universal and the particular
under the rule of the pleasure principle.1161
In this way, the past (conjured by fantasy manifest in memory) is a “vehicle of future
liberation.” An individual looks to the past, both that individual’s own and the past of
society in general, brings it into contrast with the present, and uses that tension to both
reveal the obfuscated structures and faux necessity of the performance principle and
postulate an idealized future to work towards.
Indeed, there was a sense in which Marcuse was advocating a certain type of
“regression.” For Freud, regression had no beneficial qualities and led, often enough, to a
variety of debilitating mental illnesses. Conversely, for Marcuse, regression before and
beyond the effects of the performance principle had an emancipatory connotation.
Goeghagen, in his close analysis of the diverging emphases on “regression” in Freud and
Marcuse, conjures a powerful analogy: Freud aligned himself with Paul who said: “When
I was a child, I spake as a child, I understood as a child, I thought as a child: but when I
became a man, I put away childish things” for “the expression ‘savages or children’
flowed easily from Freud’s pen.”1162 Marcuse, conversely, aligned himself with these
iconic passages from the Gospel of Matthew: “except ye be converted and become as
little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.” Ultimately, for Marcuse, “a
truly civilized society will have to regain those features which time and maturity have
eradicated,”1163 in a word, “regression,” by emancipated from the negative connotations
in Freud’s own theory:
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The emergence of a non-repressive reality principle involving instinctual
liberation would regress behind the attained level of civilized rationality.
This regression would be physical as well as social: it would reactivate
early stages of the libido which were surpassed in the development of the
reality ego, and it would dissolve the institutions of society in which the
reality ego exists. In terms of these institutions, instinctual liberation is
relapse into barbarism.1164
This was a tension in Marcuse, as Ingram notes, “in the final analysis, Marcuse
seems torn between the allure of a simpler, less-developed (but also less wasteful and less
destructive) society, and a more technologically advanced one.”1165 Marcuse’s critique of
technology was at the heart of this dilemma. On the one hand, as we’ve seen, the lower
standard of living in less-developed societies diminishes repression, heteronomy, and the
destruction of natural resources. On the other hand, such primitive stages of civilization
were also far more at the mercy of natural forces that lead to death and suffering on a
sometimes-massive scale. The only viable solution, I argue, would be the emancipation
of technology from its capitalistic moorings but without the reduction of its advancement
and efficacy, returning it to its instrumental function under human control and aimed
specifically at the goals of eliminating scarcity, poverty, disease and suffering, thereby
emancipating humans from surplus labor time and surplus repression while preserving
the integrity of their lives freed from disease and unnecessary suffering. In conjunction
with this return to a type of benevolent instrumental value, technology, too, as I’ve said,
could be applied in its productive capacity provided technical rationality has been
dissolved and supplanted with a new rationality dictating the trajectory of technology
towards pleasure, beauty, and emancipation rather than efficiency, indoctrination, and
alienation.
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Marcuse, as we’ve seen, transplanted his Utopian hopes from a working class
made impotent by the onslaught of commodity culture towards a rising revolutionary
sentiment in university students. It is here that this dialectical tension between values and
society comes to the fore. As we’ve seen, commodity capitalism alters the trajectory of
higher education for two fundamental reasons: (1) efficiency is rationality and integration
into the machine of capital becomes the goal directing the types of degrees students are
told to receive, and (2), the humanities and the liberal arts are bastions of the type of
critical or negative thinking that threaten to undermine the Establishment’s hold on
power. “The prevailing mode of enculturation in the United States” is “education to
alienation and to single-dimensionality.”1166 Marcuse argued that the values cultivated in
higher education should be antithetical to enculturation into a milieu of alienation and
indoctrination but, as with childhood education, this creates an individual whose survival
is threatened if the milieu in question is hostile to negative thinking. Students need to
spearhead the transmutation of this milieu of values away from commodity fetishism, but
the milieu of commodity fetishism must change in order to allow the humanities, the
liberal arts, and the immersion in negative thinking to flourish. As a result, as we saw,
Marcuse noted the realm of negative thinking in higher education continued to dissipate
and the possibility for radical social change along with it as the realm of education, like
the working class, succumbed to desublimation.
Indeed, there was a corollary between Marcuse’s critique of education in the onedimensional society and his observations on the role of memory in emancipation. There is
memory in capitalism, but like all things its emancipatory power has been desublimated
and streamlined into a reification of the status quo. Negative thinking gives way to rote
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memorization, a recollection of facts and data that reify the mandates of the
Establishment. “So far as memory is cultivated, it is in the repressive form of memorizing
the requirements of the capitalist order.”1167 Further, beyond the data and instructions
that memory is aimed towards (“the one-sidedness of memory-training in
civilization”1168) is likewise a repressive factor in conjuring not the freedoms of the past,
but the sins that individuals are taught to adopt and associate with themselves in order to
keep them submissive, docile, and guilt, where “the faculty was chiefly directed toward
remembering duties rather than pleasures; memory was linked with bad conscience, guilt
and sin. Unhappiness and the threat of punishment, not happiness and the promise of
freedom, linger in memory.”1169
Integral to his conception of radical higher education is the students’ immersion in
the arts, formulating “a particular approach to aesthetic education and a unique version of
philosophical humanism that he then presents as critical theory against the debilitating
paradoxes that he sees at the core of our single-dimensional culture,”1170 including
“alienation in the mist of affluence, repression through gratification, and the
overstimulation and paralysis of mind.”1171 Art is, by its very nature, part and parcel with
negative thinking and, as such, must play a critical role in higher education.
Marcuse’s interest in aesthetics had been present since his very first publication,
his dissertation, Der deutsche Künstlerroman (The German Artist Novel), which he
completed in 1922. From that first text on, as Kellner notes, “culture and art played an
important role in shaping forces of domination, as well as generating possibilities of
1167
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liberation”1172 maintaining Marcuse’s familiar dialectical analysis. Further, throughout
his long career, “at key junctures…art, the aesthetic dimension, and the relation between
culture and politics became a central focus of his writings.” 1173 To what degree art
featured in Marcuse’s critical theory waxed and waned throughout his career but never
wholly vanished from his work. Further, as Kellner mentions here, the “relation between
culture and politics” and “art” changes (or, as I will argue, “evolves”) throughout his
career, specifically on the issue of what role art is meant to play in the revolutionary
movement: should art be as distanced from politics and culture as possible so as to retain
its position as a “higher perspective” which inspires radical political action and staves off
the desublimating effects of consumer culture or, conversely, should art be intimately
involved in radical political action directly, though it runs the risk of being easily coopted by precisely the same structures it attempts to transcend.
Working under Philip Witkop, a professor of literature with a focus on German
poetry, Marcuse completed his dissertation in 1922. Although Marcuse never cited Hegel
by name, the great German theorist’s fingerprints are ubiquitously dispersed throughout
the entirety of Marcuse’s text,1174 specifically in the structure of the argument itself. Like
Hegel, Marcuse “delineated a progression and development of literary forms emerging
out of interaction and sometimes conflict with each other,”1175 demonstrating Marcuse’s
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first manifestation of the dialectical method1176 that he would continue to champion
throughout his long career.
In this early text, Marcuse analyzed the tension between the “artistic calling and
the demands of everyday life,”1177 namely, “the novel articulates individual longing and
striving for a higher, more authentic mode of existence.”1178 To frame it in Peircean
language, the individual of “wider social feeling,” the artist here, finds him or herself at
odds with the demands of the current milieu which has become antagonistic to the artist’s
pursuits and the artist, thus, experiences a profound sense of alienation. 1179 This sense of
alienation, depicted in the German artist novel, creates the primary tension that Marcuse
would, himself, wrestle with throughout the entirety of his career: the artist deals with his
or her alienation by either striving to transform society (political activity) into the type of
society wherein the artist would no longer feel alienated or, conversely, recedes into the
safety and security of a beautiful, imagined but ultimately ostracized, world.
We see shades1180 of the relationship between art and negative thinking that would
manifest more explicitly later in Marcuse’s career: the artist’s sense of alienation
concurrently conjures both a picture of society as it is wherein the artist cannot find a
home and, too, postulates a world conjured by fantasy and imagination of a society which
is not yet and the question for the artist then becomes whether or not such a aesthetic
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society can be achieved and whether or not the artist ought to engage in political activity
in an attempt to make it so (or, simply, recede from society). As Marcuse said:
When the artist, who had demanded that the private self had a right to a
life of its own, then steps out into the surrounding world, he endures the
curse of a culture in which Idea and reality, art and life, subject and object,
stand in start opposition to one another. He finds no fulfillment in the
surrounding world’s forms of life with all their limitations; his authentic
self (Wesen) and his desires find no resonance there; in solitude he stands
against reality. Here is where the artist novel sets itself to work. Here the
artist seeks somehow to come to grips with his painful twoness, which pits
his essential being as an artist (sein Künstlertum) against the surrounding
world, which is not allowing him to find satisfaction in its forms of life.
Somehow a solution, a new unity, must be found, because this
contradiction is so painful that in the long run it is unbearable without
destroying the artist and humanity…the artist must overcome this twoness:
he must be able to configure a type of life that can bind together what has
been torn asunder, that pulls together the contradictions between spirit and
sensuality, art and life, artists’ values and those of the surrounding
world…this is the fundamental problem and theme of the artist novel: it
generally presents us with the attempt of an artist to reconcile this
dichotomy in some manner.1181

Marcuse even presented this dilemma in a naturalistic language reminiscent of Peirce:
“from the very beginning here it is a question of assuaging some irritation from the
surrounding world, bridging a gap, reconciling opposites, attempting to regain balance
and equilibrium.”1182
This tension corresponds with an intriguing distinction that Marcuse highlighted
between two types of artist novel, the “realistic-objective”1183 and the “romantic.”1184 In
the former, “the artist acknowledges that the world’s contemporary surroundings are the
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basis of his artistry, yet he seeks to transform, transfigure, and renew them.”1185 In the
latter, “the romantic artist…finds it impossible to see even any potential satisfaction
within the frame of the world’s given conditions: he thus flees into an otherworldly
idealist dreamland, and constructs there his poeticized world of fulfillment.”1186 The
former represents Marcuse’s position that art has a direct impact on political activity
which he will maintain in texts like An Essay on Liberation and Eros and Civiliation
whereas the latter represents Marcuse’s position that art has a more indirect impact on
political activity, operating as more of an ideal for emulation and inspiration, that will
manifest to some degree, in The Aesthetic Dimension.
Throughout most of his career,1187 Marcuse kept his analysis of aesthetics
intimately intertwined with his socio-political critique, whether art played a direct or an
indirect role, in transforming society. It should then come as no surprise that Marcuse
peppered this early text with a subtle critique of romanticism,1188 the more subjective
literary form that lead not to the transformation of objective reality but, instead, to the
inward flight of the artist away from a hostile world.
Marcuse, in this early text, tended to side with the representations of the
objective-realist camp over and against the quietism of the romantics as he did for the
majority of his career. His analysis of Goethe, for example, culminated in Marcuse’s
championing of the heroic figures in Goethe’s work that progress “further toward
overcoming artistic subjectivism and alienation”1189 through the protagonists’ integration
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into society, the “shaping” of one’s “personality according to an ideal of humanity.”1190
As Kellner notes, Marcuse used Goethe “to criticize romanticism and tendencies” that
“championed art over life, the artist over common humanity. Throughout the study,
Marcuse criticized romantic idealist fantasies, ineffectual strivings, and the various
failures of romantic artists” especially “the romantic tendency to withdraw from everyday
reality and to create ideal fantasy worlds, as well as the romantic belief that the artist is
the highest form of human reality.”1191 As Bronner notes:
This illusion projects a transcendent utopia. But, believing that happiness
can exist internally and independent of the actual external conditions
which prevail, artworks of this type can abrogate their critical function in
sociopolitical terms and perhaps even help perpetuate the given state of
affairs.1192

In this early text, Marcuse was far more sympathetic to the role of art as more
direct and immediate upon radical social change, going so far as to that that “art itself
became a weapon” in “service to the revolutionary tendencies”1193 of the Young Germany
movement. Against quietism and the flight inward of the romantic movement, Marcuse
was quite clear that the doctrine “art for art’s sake,” which he attributed to the artistic
response to the rise of modern capitalism that increasingly co-opted the artistic endevour
and alienated the artistic temperament, lead to nothing but “suffering, misery, and
frequent collapse” by championing “art over life.”1194 This powerful critique of the
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“aesthete” was concretized when he noted, “something always remains unfulfilled” in
these individuals, namely, “their humanity.”1195 As he said:
Those who seek only aesthetic charms…who are forced to become
constantly conscious spectators of their own life can never step out of their
egocentricity…for them, every human activity and togetherness is
prohibited…life only has meaning and value when it is seen through the
medium of art, is transformed into art.1196

Consciousness divorced from external conditions, especially within the advanced
industrial society, creates, as we discussed previously, the “happy consciousness” of
euphoria in ignorance, making individuals “complacent to the point where they will lose
the desire for emancipatory change and so come to terms with the existing order and its
evils”1197 by taking comfort in a wholly divorced, “inner realm” of their own, personal,
illusion of freedom. Further, for the mass of mankind within such societies, the
dissociated inner realm of freedom and phantasy isn’t even maintained, even in this
impotent form, but incorporated into the status quo through all the processes of desire
manipulation articulated in One-Dimensional Man. As Marcuse said, this “happy
consciousness” is flung “back upon itself” an the individual with it “learn to bear, and in
a certain sense, to love his isolation.”1198 Thus, even the individual with a wider sort of
social feeling, the creative, the imaginative individual, may take so much solace in his or
her own isolated inner realm of freedom and phantasy, that in describing him or herself
as the outlier, the rebel, the deviant, seeks solace in that identification alone, in contrast
to an established order, and makes no move to bring about any form of radical social
change.
1195

Marcuse, The German Artist Novel, Op. Cit., 14.
Ibid.
1197
Bronner, Of Critical Theory and its Theorists, Op. Cit., 113.
1198
Marcuse, Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Op. Cit., 122.
1196

393

Thus, as Kellner rightly concludes, though Marcuse from the start linked art with
radical social change, in no way was his early position anything but “critical of aesthetic
escapism.”1199 Intriguingly, it was not a rejection of bourgeois values that Marcuse
championed in that early text, but a “reconciliation of the artistic life with bourgeois
society”1200 which he saw in the work of Thomas Mann. “Accommodation with the
bourgeois world was possible, Mann suggests, through pursuing writing as a bourgeois
profession, exemplifying the values of conscientiousness, professionalism, and creativity
(S1, pp. 322ff).”1201 This integration of the artist and bourgeois society was not a
submission to the mores and indoctrinated beliefs of the status quo but, rather, the
integration of the radically artistic mind into the milieu directly, for “if the writer can
become an educator and ethical force within bourgeois society, he has overcome his
alienation…is once more an integrated member of society,”1202 and can, from within,
change the structures of the system without succumbing to them. As Marcuse said, “the
artistic existence and bourgeois society are no longer two life-forms, two essentially
opposed unities, but the artist is integrated into the bourgeois world, art and life are
united, with the result that the problematic of the artist novel is no longer acute.”1203 But
Marcuse, perhaps foreshadowing his Freudian-Marxist phase, cautioned the reader to
behold Mann’s protagonist Gustav von Ashenbach who, in Death in Venice, fails to
completely integrate himself into the cultural mores of a society that demands the
repression of precisely those libidinal tendencies the artist would otherwise unleash.
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Lastly, Marcuse highlighted the necessity of a “community” (Gemeinschaft)
within which the artist may thrive. It is, in many ways, only the postulation of such an
ideal community, shades of Peirce’s own. For Marcuse, however, it was not the ideal
community of inquirers, per se, but an ideal community where the antagonisms wrought
by capital and commodity are dissolved: a community wherein the artist is no longer
alienated precisely because there are no inhibitions mandated by the Establishment to
curb the artist’s expression and immersion in beauty and pleasure. As Marcuse said:
But the living and artistic working out of this experience – the epical life
and shaping of art – demands always and everywhere a presupposition: the
presence of an organic and meaningful (sinnhaltig) form-of-life, unified
and carrying its own values – a ‘community’ (Gemeinschaft) in the most
extreme and deepest sense. It is the solid and fruitful ground out of which
great epics rose, in which the resigned (entsagend) artist can perform a
proper and fulfilling adjustment (Einordnung). S1, pp. 329 – 330.1204

We see shades here of many of the themes Marcuse would articulate throughout his later
career. There is the postulation of a community other than the modern state of capital,
one which carries “its own values” that are in stark contrast to the values of commodity
and modernity. A community wherein art and life are not in opposition, but mutually
coordinated and fulfilled, where labor is expressed in art, and art expressed in labor,
effectively dissolving the alienation the protagonists throughout all of the novels Marcuse
discussed here experience to some degree. “For the German artist novel, the community
is not something given, but given up and something to strive for (etwas Aufgegebenes).
S1, p. 333).” Marcuse invoked both a nod to ages past where he maintained the artist was
less alienated from a community that was more accepting of the artistic life (ancient
Greece) and, too, the hypothetical community yet to come, something to “strive for,” the
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goal yet to be achieved operating, in a sense akin to Peirce, as a heuristic device against
which we can fruitfully compare the present milieu in order to de-obfuscate the negative
tendencies therein and move ourselves towards the ideal community yet to be. This is a
theme present in all of Marcuse’s work and it is fascinating to see it manifest here at so
early a stage in his intellectual development. In sum, in this early text, Marcuse was alive
to art’s role in radical social change, articulating the tension between the artist’s two
choices: (a) to integrate him or herself into society or (b) to recede from society into a
beautiful illusory world of his or her own. Precisely because of his constant critique of
the latter (the form of the German artist novel he qualified as the “romantic”) and a
tendency to side with the attempts of the “objective-realist” protagonists, at least in this
early work, Marcuse saw the possibility that the artist had an obligation to integrate him
or herself into the current milieu and change it from within, offering a more direct and
immediate application of art to radical social change that will be quite different than the
position he will hold at the end of his career.
After beginning work with the Frankfurt School in 1934, Marcuse shifted the
focus of his research to the ways in which the Establishment may utilize art in order to
further indoctrination and alienation rather than, as was the focus of his dissertation, the
ways in which the artist struggled with an otherwise stifling milieu. As Kellner notes,
“one aspect of a critical theory of art is to delineate how it serves to advance oppression
and domination. But for Marcuse, a critical theory also depicts the positive emancipatory
and utopian features of cultural phenomena that can advance the cause of human
liberation, helping to create a free and happier life.”1205 We’ve seen this manifest
throughout Marcuse’s long career, stemming from his unique utilization of “negative
1205
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thinking” which functions, as we’ve explored, both to illuminate the otherwise
obfuscated tendencies of indoctrination and alienation by postulating that which is not, a
negation of the current milieu which necessarily entails speculations about a possible
utopian society. As Kellner rightly summarizes, “a critical theory of art is thus a
dialectical one, criticizing negative features and articulating positive ones. It analyzes art
within specific social formations and develops utopian notions of art and liberation that
show art can have emancipatory potential and effects within specific social
conjunctures.”1206
The most significant text of the 30’s that dealt with this two-fold notion of art as
both indoctrinating and emancipatory was his paper “The Affirmative Character of
Culture” in 1937. There, Marcuse anticipated many of the themes that would manifest
later in One-Dimensional Man, including a proto-form of “artificial desublimation” and
the “reification” of the mores of an oppressive milieu. As Kellner notes:
The concept ‘affirmative culture’ for Marcuse refers to the culture of the
bourgeois epoch. Affirmative culture projected its spiritual realm as a
higher, more sublime, and valuable realm than the everyday world and
claimed its values were crucial to the individual’s well-being…affirming a
superior realm of Truth, Goodness, and Beauty, where one could find the
most stable and lasting happiness.1207

To all this Marcuse would heartily agree: philosophy, art, the humanities in general, are
realms of education and culture he would always champion, noting these as sites of
negative/dialectical thinking. However, Marcuse was likewise alive to the manifestation
of bourgeois culture in the 30’s which had taken on its own peculiar ideology “whereby
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the values of culture became allegedly accessible to each individual,”1208 in his words,
offering a “realm of apparent unity and apparent freedom in which the antagonistic
relations of existence were supposed to be stabilized and pacified,”1209 in a sense,
offering the sort of “community” without antagonism that was the central focus of his
dissertation.
Along with the otherwise positive aspects of bourgeois society (philosophy, art,
Truth, Beauty, and the rest), “affirmative culture…helps stabilize and preserve bourgeois
society” along with “its system of production,”1210 indoctrination, and alienation. This
affirmative culture affirms the superiority of the bourgeois milieu, both the aspects
Marcuse would champion along with all those he readily rejected as part and parcel of an
entire milieu. It served “an escapist function by allowing the individual to transcend the
toil…of the everyday world and attain a higher spiritual realm that provides a refuge from
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Dimension: A Conversation between Herbert Marcuse and Larry Hartwick,” in Collected Papers of
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can produce authentic literature. The question is: under what historical conditions?,” ibid. Hartwick pushes
Marcuse further on this point: “but there was a certain manipulation of conceptions of beauty in Nazi
Germany, which may have been simply a devaluation of the aesthetic handed to it, of the tradition of art
before it. But it did try to take the idea of an aesthetic form and call that art and in the process deny the Eros
principle which underlies your own definition of the aesthetic,” to which Marcuse replied, “tt is a realism
that conceals, that hides what reality actually is. And that, of course, is opposed to the very essence of art.
Art should reveal and not conceal,” ibid.
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the suffering and uncertainty of everyday life,”1211 culminating in the type of
“romanticism” and “quietism” that Marcuse critiqued in The German Artist Novel. This
idealization, highly contrived in a society that did in fact maintain social strife, alienating
labor, and immense suffering from the working class and the impoverished, effectively
created a “veil that covers” these “social antagonisms and contradictions”1212 and to
obfuscate the antagonisms and contradictions is to dissolve precisely the sort of
dialectical thinking that Marcuse would champion throughout his career. Thus, Marcuse
concluded that bourgeois society’s “affirmative culture contains both repressive and
compensatory functions.”1213 On the one hand, as Marcuse explored at length in Eros and
Civilization, bourgeois society demands the sublimation of sensuality which would be
“subversive” to the “demands of the capitalist economy for a disciplined, hard-working
labor force,” while offering a “tranquilizing balm” in the form of its idealization of love
which “provides escape into a higher spiritual world.”1214 In essence, it demanded
profound unfreedom in the outer realm and placated the individual by offering escapism
into a profoundly free inner realm of beauty and pleasure, not wholly unlike the
“euphoria” experienced within the culture of commodity fetishism Marcuse would later
express in One-Dimensional Man. Effectively, by locating freedom in an inner realm of
escapism into beauty and art, much like Marcuse’s critique of the romantic artist novel,
the focus shifts from the objectivity of lived reality into a pure subjectivity wherein
individuals come to see themselves in isolation from their fellows and any sense of
community and solidarity (the goal of the artist in Marcuse’s dissertation and the goal of
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his utopian critical theory in general) is dissolved. As Kellner notes, “bourgeois culture
isolates individuals in their cultivated subjectivity, and it submits them to the domination
of the repressive powers that rule the existing society.”1215 Akin to a kind of Peircean
society under the aegis of authority, or, perhaps, a type of Sartrean “seriality,” there is no
authentic “group-in-fusion” here, no authentic community of free inquirers, but a false
sense of community wherein the individuals are indoctrinated into submitting to the
mores of the repressive powers, focusing not on their solidarity with their fellows, but
their own subjectivity, the only realm of freedom left to them. It “induces the individual
to escape from the problems of social existence in the space of subjectivity,” like Peirce’s
ostrich, this escape does not dissolve the problems of social existence, it simply creates a
quietism wherein those problems will go unnoticed and unaddressed, in effect, reifying
them and perpetuating them to the benefit of these “repressive powers.”
However, in effectively maintaining the positive aspects of bourgeois culture,
namely, “humanity, goodness, joy, truth, and solidarity”1216 in this inner, higher realm of
culture, the bourgeois culture, itself, made the tension requisite for the possibility of
radical social change by preserving these qualities and perpetuating the longings for
them. As Marcuse said, “only in art has bourgeois society tolerated its own ideals and
taken them seriously as a general demand. What counts as utopia, phantasy, and rebellion
in the world of fact is allowed in art.”1217 Here, Marcuse began to move away from the
objective-realist demand that the artist ought to strive for a direct change to the social
environment through radical practice to art operating now as an ideal, separate from the
realm of radical practice, as inspiration for radical social change rather than a direct
1215
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instrument of it. “Pushed to the margins of society,”1218 the “artistry of the beautiful body,
its effortless agility and relaxation, which can be displayed today only in the circus,
vaudeville, and burlesque”1219 create joy, when seen, in individuals who can anticipate
what it would like to attain such pleasures in their everyday experience, “liberated from
the ideal.”1220 These individuals of “wider social feeling,” we might say, see in art, on the
margins of society and not in their everyday activities, an ideal to which to strive, a
fusion of pleasure and toil the likes of which Marcuse will champion later in his career in
discussing the “new sensibility” wherein the aesthetic realm, this marginalia, is integrated
into labor after Weberian technical rationality is dissolved.
However, as Marcuse noted here, it was not long before this industrialized
manifestation of bourgeois culture in advanced capitalism began to notice the potentially
subversive elements of this marginalized, idealized realm, and began to militate against
it.1221 As capitalism’s strength increased, and commodity fetishism proliferated, so, too,
did it increase the demand for “total mobilization”1222 of the individual within the work
force, including the time spent in this inner and marginalized realm of art and beauty. The
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 25.
Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” Op. Cit., 101.
1220
Ibid. It is not wholly clear what Marcuse means by “ideal” here in reference to a need to be liberated
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Marcuse said: “The cultural ideal assimi- lated men’s longing for a happier life: for humanity, goodness,
joy, truth, and solidarity. Only, in this ideal, they are all furnished with the affirmative accent of belonging
to a higher, purer, nonprosaic world. They are either internalized as the duty of the individual soul (to
achieve what is constantly betrayed in the external existence of the whole) or represented as objects of art
(whereby their reality is relegated to a realm essentially different from that of everyday life),” Ibid., 100. If
the ideal, noble in itself, is only and ever kept as an ideal, then “reality is relegated” to this “ideal,” a realm
“essentially different from that of everyday life.” To liberate ourselves from an ideal may be read not as
ridding ourselves of the content of the ideal (here an admixture of an aesthetic ideal permeating and
constructing a socio-political ideal where the two are no longer antagonistic) but the acquiescence that it
must remain only an ideal. That is to say, to liberate ourselves from an ideal may be read as a call to make
manifest in lived reality the content of that ideal.
1221
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use of the term “total mobilization” anticipated his critique of one-dimensional society,
specifically, the ubiquitous and omnipresent nature of technical rationality and
capitalism’s ability to infiltrate into every aspect of the individual’s life. Slowly, Marcuse
noted, the adversary to emancipation and pleasure was no longer bourgeois society, per
se, which maintained ideals of truth, beauty, and art, but the system of “capitalist
labor…and the totalitarian state” that “demanded an abolition of the individualistic,
humanistic elements in bourgeois culture that were potentially oppositional.”1223
Capitalism began to militate even against the inner realm of freedom preserved by
bourgeois high culture, demanding “renunciation and subjection to the status quo, made
bearable” not through escape from the everyday world of toil and labor, but “by the real
appearance of gratification”1224 in the goods and services the system of commodity
fetishism and capital provided, directly anticipating his critique in One-Dimensional
Man.
The bourgeoisie, Marcuse claimed, came to manifest a “deep contempt for the
mind,1225” as Kellner notes, a profound distrust of “intellectual activity,”1226 which
anticipated Marcuse’s radical pedagogy wherein he noted the transformation of higher
education from the early bourgeois pedagogy of values, the betterment of mankind, and
the search for truth and beauty, into degrees and technical training that produced efficient
cogs in the machine of industry.
Thus, “affirmative culture” comes to affirm “the dominant cultural values of the
bourgeoisie and ends up being affirmative toward the existing social order, quelling
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rebellious impulses and tranquilizing critical consciousness,”1227 that is, deadening the
desire and capacity for dialectical thinking that is manifest so prominently in the arts.
Although great bourgeois art still maintained, by the nature of art itself, a “progressive
function”1228 that held out the potential for inspiring radical social change, it “entered
increasingly into the service of the suppression of the discontented masses.”1229
Nevertheless, with the perpetuation of art at all within advanced capitalism, the ideal
against which one may fruitfully compare the current milieu remained a live possibility
and, as such, Marcuse argued, perpetuates the drive towards radical social change and the
integration of the ideal world of art into the everyday world of toil and labor. As he said,
“the real gratification of individuals can only be realized against idealist culture, and only
against this culture is it propagated as a general demand: the demand for the real
transformation of the material conditions of existence, for a new life, for a new form of
labor and enjoyment.”1230 Although art, for Marcuse, lost a little of its direct application
to radical social practice, it remained the inspiration for those who do not take the
romantic path of quietism and seclusion but, instead, the objective-realistic path towards
transforming society such that alienation is dissolved through the creation of a milieu
which no longer creates antagonisms between labor and pleasure, toil and art, individual
and society.
As Kellner notes, “during the long periods in which Marcuse toiled in government
bureaucracies, there was little evidence of what would later emerge as his aesthetic theory
and vision for the potential role of the aesthetic dimension in the process of social

1227

Ibid., 26.
Ibid.
1229
Marcuse, “The Affirmative Character of Culture,” Op. Cit., 189.
1230
Ibid., 90.
1228

403

transformation.”1231 However, thanks to the work of Kellner and others, a 1945 article
entitled “Some Remarks on Aragon: Art and Politics in the Totalitarian Era,” never
published in Marcuse’s lifetime and discovered in his archives, demonstrated an enduring
interest in art’s role in social transformation. This study of Louis Aragon and French
resistance literature articulated Marcuse’s views at the time of the role of authentic art in
radical social transformation and confirmed Marcuse’s appreciation for surrealism1232
which always held a great fascination for him.
In keeping with his analysis of art’s role in “Affirmative Culture,” here, as
Kellner notes, “art and love are among the most radical oppositional forces sine they
produce an alternative reality completely at odds with an oppressive reality; this
difference can help reveal the horror of the totalitarian life and the need to make a break
with it.”1233 As Marcuse said:
[Art] must be shaped in such a manner that it reveals the negative system
in its totality and, at the same time, the absolute necessity of liberation.
The work of must, at its breaking point, expose the ultimate nakedness of
man’s (and nature’s) existece, stripped of all the paraphernalia of
monopolistic mass culture, completely and utterly alone, in the abyss of
destruction, despair and freedom. The most revolutionary work of art will
be, at the same time, the most esoteric, the most anti-collectivist one, for
the goal of the revolution is the free individual.1234

Truly revolutionary art must be in such sharp contrast to the profoundly unfree milieu of
capitalism that it is beyond capitalism’s ability to desublimate, co-opt, and integrate it
into their reifying mores. It must portray “the horrors of existing reality” and project
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 28.
“In Marcuse’s view, certain forms of surrealist art…are dedicated to the destruction of the world in its
totality and in a totalitarian world the negation of the whole repressive system is the goal of truly radical
art,” Ibid., 29.
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“images of a better life”1235 so utterly and completely that it can in no way be reduced to
the terms of the system that it critiques.
Critiquing forms of avant-garde art and extreme formalism, Marcuse noted the
failed attempts of these schools of artistic expression to become truly radical forms of art,
both being easily “absorbed as aesthetic fashion.”1236 The challenge becomes, as Kelnner
notes, “for emancipatory art…to combine the aesthetic and the political, to produce
aesthetic forms that also engage sociopolitical reality and can have progressive political
effects.”1237 Here, Marcuse hinted at his analysis of the objective-realist strains in the
German artist novels where art has a direct and immediate transformative power rather
than remaining on the marginalia of culture and operating as a hereustic or inspirational
device for an entirely separate realm of political action. This is what Marcuse meant by
“authentic art,” art that acts as “a negation of existing oppressive reality” by “the
postulating of another world” and preserving “visions of emancipation” in keeping with
the “radical project”1238 of critical theory. Art, in this sense, cannot help but have a
political dimension, whether or not that was the artist’s intention and whether or not that
political dimension is explicitly manifest in the work of art itself. Further, art takes on a
more direct and immediate role, continuning his general critique of romanticism as he
notes here that romanticism, as we’ve explored, amounts to little more than “cheap
escapism.”1239 Truly progressive art, which he saw manifest in the poetry of Aragon, Paul
Élard, and others in the idiom of French resistance writers, speaks “the language of
estrangement,” depicting “the sacrificed utopia which is to emerge as the historical
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 29.
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reality”1240 once more. “As the language of estrangement, the paraphernalia of love and
sensuality,” repressed as a necessary condition of commodity capitalism as he notes
throughout Eros and Civilization, “thus are part of the political form of these poems.”1241
In so doing, these forms of authentic, radical art refuse “an oppressive social reality” by
promoting “estrangement from this world,” become incapable of co-option, and create
the “images of a better world” which instigate the desire for radical change.
The first explicit expression of an “aesthetic dimension” came in Eros and
Civilization where Marcuse concretized many of the disparate trains of thought running
throughout his earlier ruminations on art and art’s place in revolutionary change. Already
we’ve seen hints at its formulation in Marcuse’s depiction of the “realm” or “dimension”
of art as something, to varying degrees, separate from the political dimension and,
ultimately, uni-dimensional aspects of modern society. It is a dimension, sometimes
depicted as arising out of, and sometimes depicted as a complete break from, the
bourgeois-qua-capitalist political state, taking on the form of a productive comparison
that not only reveals the indoctrinating tendencies of the current milieu but, too, provides
fruitful comparison with it through an articulation of an entirely other realm of
possibility, conjuring images of a radically other societal structure of freedom and the
integration of art and labor negating all forms of alienation and repression. As Kellner
summarizes:
Eros and Civilization carried through a revolution in aesthetic theory,
combining psychoanalysis with radical philosophy and social theory in
elaborating perspectives on how the aesthetic dimension could help
promote individual liberation and the creation of nonrepressive society
and culture. Taking aesthetic theory out of the realm of pure philosophy,
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Marcuse moved aesthetics into the center of critical social theory and
revolutionary theory and practice.1242
As we’ve explored, Marcuse’s central focus on this seminal text was to demonstrate the
demand for surplus repression within the performance principle of the modern age. Art,
imagination, fantasy, and memory,1243 offered the most idealistic potential for the onset
of radical social change. An individual was capable of recollecting a youth free from
repression,1244 a more libidinous and pleasurable existence prior to the repressive and
stultifying milieu of the present age. Further, an individual, according to Marcuse, could
postulate an earlier historical epoch1245 prior to the industrialization and mechanization
that lead to the commodity fetishism and stultification of the modern age. Both, in a
Peircean sense, create the tension requisite for doubt about the necessity and efficacy of
technical rationality and the general composition of the modern age and, for Marcuse,
stimulates negative thinking by demonstrating alternatives to what is and creating the
tension requisite for the postulation and, ideally, movement towards, radical alternatives
of a community without alienation, where labor and pleasure are fused, where technology
no longer indoctrinates, and where authenticity can reemerge as a viable human reality.
Fantasy operated as a sort of alienation from alienation, a necessarily distinct and
divergent reality from the alienating tendencies of the status quo. Fantasy, as he said, is

Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 31.
“Marcuse subtly reformulated the therapeutic role of memory stress in psychoanalysis. Drawing on the
distinction between Gedachtnis (a standard term for ‘memory’) and Erinngerung (or remembrance)
Marcuse interprets Erinnerung as bringing together repressed elements of the past, utopian longings, and
struggles for a better world…although Marcuse preserves the psychoanalytic linkage between forgetting
and repression, he stresses the liberating potentialities of remembrance and the recollection of pleasurable
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“kept free from reality-testing and remained subordinated to the pleasure principle
alone,”1246 in opposition to the performance principle, operating against its indoctrinating
and repressive tendencies at every turn. For, as we recall, the pleasure principle may be
repressed in the modern milieu, but never wholly eradicated. Art and fantasy, imagination
and memory, are the instigators and agitators that rouse the pleasure principle from its
slumber and raise an awareness in the individual of just how repressed those drives have
become in the performance principle. As Marcuse said, “this is the act of phantasymaking (das Phantasieren), which begins already with the games of children, and later,
continued as daydreaming, abandons its dependence on real objects.”1247 As Kellner
notes:
Marcuse suggests that phantasy –in daydreaming, dreams at night, play,
and its embodiments in art – can project images of integral gratification,
pleasure, and reconciliation, often denied in everyday life. Hence, along
with memory, Marcuse argues that phantasy can imagine another world
and generate images of a better life by speaking the language of the
pleasure principle and its demands for gratification.1248
1246
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negative thinking, the free-play of ideas being unleashed to conjure possibilities wholly distinct from the
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independent of real objects, indefinitively. Such a mentality might lead to quietism or the kind of
romanticism that Marcuse chastised in his critique of the German artist-novel, a flight from reality
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occurs in art,” Ibid., 143 – 144.
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Art’s relationship to fantasy and memory is that it “encodes memory and phantasy
mediated by the faculty of imagination,”1249 operating as a dynamic form of negative
thinking, “the negation of unfreedom.”1250 The key passage linking art and phantasy can
be found in Eros and Civilization where Marcuse noted: “phantasy plays a most decisive
function in the total mental structure: it links the deepest layers of the unconscious with
the highest products of consciousness (art), the dream with the reality; it preserves the
archetypes of the genus, the perpetual but repressed ideas of the collective and individual
memory, the tabooed images of freedom.”1251 Art is the product of phantasy: imagination
made manifest. Though phantasy is a subjective, cognitive experience, it can be
translated into sound and image in the objective world for others to experience as a site of
inspiration and critical engagement.
The relationship between “phantasy” and “imagination,” however, is far less clear
in Marcuse’s work. Top scholars frequently equivocate between the two in their analyses
of Marcuse’s aesthetics.1252 Further, Marcuse was not always consistent in referring to
“imagination” as a “faculty,” nor precisely what he meant by “faculty” in the first place.
Indeed, even “phantasy” was sometimes referred to as a “faculty” without any
explanation as to what, precisely, that term meant for him in this context. In Negations,
for example, Marcuse noted: “the essential connection of phantasy with philosophy is
evident from the function attributed to it by philosophers, especially Aristotle and Kant,
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under the title ‘imagination.’”1253 Here the two terms appear synonymous though, as
we’ve seen already, Marcuse also insists that imagination is a “mediating faculty” which
is not synonymous with phantasy.
Marcuse’s invocation of the term “mediating faculty” leads one to believe that he
viewed “imagination” through a Kantian lens, noting imagination’s “unique capacity to
‘intuit’ an object though the latter be not present and to create something new out of
given material of cognition, imagination denotes a considerable deree of independence
from the given, of freedom amid a world of unfreedom.”1254 But Marcuse’s conception of
imagination was not a pure Kantian reading, as he noted in his lectures at the Van Leer
Jerusalem Foundation in 1971, he traced the development of “imagination” through
Kant’s first critique, his second critique, his third critique (Marcuse’s favorite work by
Kant), then on through Hegel, Schiller, and finally, Marx,1255 appropriating aspects of
each into his own conception of the term. Add to that the fact that the term “phantasy”
(which he took from Freud) dovetails into, and out of, his analysis of “imagination,” and
the result, I argue, is a fusion of the development of the German theorists conception of
“imagination” with a Freudian conception of “phantasy,” something Marcuse used to his
advantage in discussing the creative potential of the imagination in a milieu which
seemed closed off to the possibility of anything radically new or distinct from the world
of commodity fetishism.
Part of Marcuse’s project was to rescue the faculties of “sensibility” and
“imagination” from their pre-Kantian manifestations as faculties viewed as ideally
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subservient to “reason” or “understanding,” the traditional Platonic-qua-Aristotelian line
picked up again by medieval philosophers like St. Augustine, for example, who insisted
that the “well-ordered” soul was one in which the senses (the gateway to cupidity) are
subjugated by reason (that seeks non-corporal values and ends like God, Truth, and
wisdom).1256
Rae articulates the synthesizing aspect of imagination succinctly, noting that it
creates “the synthetic unity of the senses gleaned from reality with the rational possibility
inherent in the intellect. The realm of aesthetics overcomes the binary opposition between
sensation and intellect, actuality and possibility, by establishing a synthetic harmonious
and organic unity between the opposing terms.”1257 Further, “by combining the actuality
of the sense with the rationality of the intellect, Marcuse argues that aesthetics can
overcome the manipulation and indoctrination constitutive of the logic of modernity. The
synthetic combination of the senses and the intellect has, therefore, the potential to lead to
a new reality, one that is free from the repression of the logic of modernity.”1258 Thus, for
Marcuse, “the imagination is the mediating aspect between the sensuousness object and
the pure subjectivity of the individual…the imagination allows the individual to
experiment with the world, realize his subjectivity and play with the objects of his

“Now, in the philosophical tradition and practically from its beginning, the human senses, sensibility,
together with that other strange faculty of the human mind, the imagination, were condemned to a rather
inferior role, subordinated to reading and understanding. The truth o the senses and of the imagination – if
any truth at all was granted to them – was a highly dependent one, if not altogether negative. Now, this
conception of the hierarchical structure of the human mind that begins with Plato, and goes throughout the
history of philosophy, seems to take a decisive turn beginning with German idealism in the philosophy of
Kant, Schiller, and Hegel. And the whole conception explodes in the theory of Marx, especially the young
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world…without the contrainst of a pre-defined end,”1259 i.e., instrumentalism as
Horkheimer defined it.1260
It remains unclear, however, if “imagination,” thus conceived, is identical with
“phantasy,” as Marcuse presented the term. Frequently he equated the two, noting
phantasy’s “constitutive role” in creativity and art, phantasy defined as “artistic
imagination.”1261 Marcuse did us no favors, either, by often calling “phantasy” a
“faculty,” like imagination (or, perhaps, he was referring to the same faculty under two
names), as he did here, for example: “phantasy does not relate to the other cognitive
faculties as illusion to truth…without phantasy, all philosophical knowledge remains in
the grip of the present or the past and severed from the future.”1262 Reitz even refers to
them in the plural, that is, the “human faculties of ‘imagination’ and ‘phantasy.’”1263
Leaving aside the unlikely possibility that Marcuse was referring to two, distinct
faculties, let us look, briefly, at how he defined “phantasy” along Freudian lines in Eros
and Civilization and note the similarities between this definition and his articulation of
“imagination” I discussed above:
Freud singles out phantasy as one mental activity that retains a high degree
of freedom from the reality principle even in the sphere of the developed
consciousness…phantasy plays a most decisive function in the total
mental structure: it links the deepest layers of the unconscious with the
highest products of consciousness (art), the dream with the reality…the
recognition of phantasy (imagination) as a thought process with its own
laws and truth values was not new to psychology and philosophy.1264
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Just as imagination is capable of synthesizing data gleaned through sensibility to
construct images not bound to the immediate, positivistic present experience, phantasy is
free “from the reality principle even in the sphere of the developed consciousness.” The
products of phantasy, “art,” are a synthesis of dream and reality, consciousness and
unconsciousness, operating in a realm with truth values all its own. Indeed, so similar are
the two terms (“imagination” stemming from a Kantian emphasis with what appears to be
a dash of Schiller’s “free play” concept and “phantasy” from a Freudian perspective) 1265
that Marcuse explicitly equates them here in putting “imagination” in parathenses after
“phantasy.” In sum, as Schoolman notes, “art is the ‘form’ of imagination. The
imagination or the realm of fantasy is the unconscious expression of the imagination’s
psychological contents. Art is the sublimated expression of fantasy, and, at the same time,
it mediates between the unconscious and the social universe.”1266 Art is the product of
imagination made manifest, tangible or audible, existing out in the social universe. Thus,
“art gives rise to the ability to reconcile imagination and reality.” 1267 For Marcuse, our
“sensibility” is intimately bound up with our “imagination” and both are the fore of
determining actual, existing social reality. Sensibility is our immediate gateway to the
present, our experience of what is, the content of which determines, in no small part, the
content of the imagination and, thus, the form that content takes, that is, “art.” Marcuse
was concerned that technical rationality, the performance principle, the logic of
modernity, or whatever one wishes to call it, entering in through sensibility had an
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adverse effect on the imagination, namely, “where the images of the imagination were
identified with the rational design of the social and political world to which it had
historically been opposed by virtue of its erotic content.”1268 Thus:
As art is translated into one-dimensional language, the drives of the
repressed instincts are translated into one-dimensional behavior. The
normative truths associated with unconscious Eros are forfeited. This
decline of art has serious implications for critical theory, for the success
with which positivism (as reification) asserts its authority over all
language, which now includes the language, that is, form, of art, testifies
to the far more significant triumph of one-dimensional behavior over the
dimension of Eros, Marcuse’s ‘second dimension.’1269

But as much as one-dimensionality can infiltrate the imagination (thereby conditioning
“art,” its product), it cannot (Marcuse optimistically opines) infiltrate it so completely as
to close off the possibility of genuine creativity and novelty. Marcuse’s hope, then, was
that by reinvigorating art and championing the imagination, the products of that creative
free play of ideas (art) could come to subsequently condition the social reality in which
those products are located. Thus, though one-dimensionality threatens to flow from the
external social world, through sensibility, into the imagination thus one-dimensionalizing
art, itself, which is then produced, placed into that external social world, thereby
perpetuating the indoctrinating process of reification and one-dimensionality, Marcuse
held hope that an opposite current could likewise be harnessed: from the creative free
play of the imagination comes art, made manifest in the external social world, taken in
through sensibility by others and into their own imaginations, conditioning further
novelty and creativity that breaks from the indoctrinating mores of one-

1268
1269

Schoolman, “Marcuse’s Aesthetics and the Displacement of Critical Theory,” Op. Cit., 66.
Ibid., 66 – 67.

414

dimensionality.1270 Further, Marcuse held out hope that sensibility itself would change,
explaining his perennial call for a “new sensibility,” one inspired by art (the products of
imagination, the sensuous, the taboo, Eros, and all that is repressed in one-dimensional
society) such that we begin to experience the world anew, through fresh, liberated eyes.
In sum, art (the product of imagination/phantasy) fulfills a very similar function as
negative thinking, in general.
This type of art-as-negative-thinking was represented, for Marcuse, most
profoundly in the work of the surrealists that, as we’ve seen, had always captured
Marcuse’s interest. He noted, for example:
The surrealists recognized the revolutionary implications of Freud’s
discoveries…but when they asked, ‘Cannot the dream also be applied to
the solution of the fundamental problems of life?’ they went beyond
psychoanalysis in demanding that the dream be made into reality without
compromising its content. Art allied itself with the revolution.
1270

By this reading, it would appear to follow that both creating works of art and, simply, enjoying them,
would provide a stimulus to negative thinking: either one’s own imagination is engaged in the creation of
art or else one’s imagination is being stimulated by the sensible experience of someone else’s art. The
latter, however, is more tenuous; as it presumes that one’s sensibility has not been so warped by onedimensional thinking that his or her imagination can be so stimulated. Rae notices this tension, as well,
saying, “at times Marcuse conflates the distinction between individual liberation arising from the creation
of the aesthetic, which he privileges, and individual liberation arising from the enjoyment of the aesthetic.
By privileging the liberating role of aesthetic creation Marcuse argues that the emancipatory value of a
genuine aesthetic lies in its capacity to liberate the individual from constraining socio-economic forces by
facilitating an alteration in the individual’s subjective consciousness. Not only does this risk fetishising the
role of production in a way that threatens to mirror the fetishisation of production of the logic of modernity,
but it may also result in each individual simply finding liberation in his own world of subject aesthetic
production. The danger of privileging aesthetic creation is that the emancipation that accompies it only
describes a subjective liberation; it does not describe the way that this subjective transformation can and
will transcend the limitations of the individual artist to transform the entire logic of society,” Rae,
“Marcuse, Aesthetics, and the Logic of Modernity,” Op. Cit., 396. This would be the type of passivity and
quietism Marcuse railed against in his dissertation, where “reliance on aesthetic creation to overcome the
logic of modernity risks each individual simply retreating into a world of subjective escapism,” Ibid. Thus,
it would seem Marcuse can’t hold the position that aesthetic creation ought to be privileged above aesthetic
enjoyment, for even if aesthetic creation inspired another individual (through that second individual’s
aesthetic enjoyment) to create art him/herself who then creating some work of art that inspired a third
individual (through that third individual’s aesthetic enjoyment) to create art, ad infinitum, if the emphasis
remains only on aesthetic creation, and not aesthetic enjoyment, then aesthetic enjoyment is reduced to the
means of the end of inspiring one to create for him or herself and art becomes some manner of benevolent
contagion; a virus, of sorts, spreading throughout a society of relativiely solipsistic and isolated individuals
who are encouraged to kick the proverbial latter (someone else’s art) away once they’ve been sufficiently
inspired to create art themselves.
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Uncompromising adherence to the strict truth value of imagination
comprehends reality more fully.1271

Here, in keeping with his adherence to the objective-realist novels of his earliest work,
Marcuse insisted that the most authentic forms of art have as their goal, whether
explicitly or implicitly, social transformation. As Kellner notes, “art in its highest
potentialities is a protest against the existing order, a refusal to conform to its repression
and domination, a projection of alternatives and, in the case of the surrealists and
aesthetic modernist groups, a demand that they be realized.”1272 Though the emphasis
here is on visual arts, Marcuse multi-fold analysis of art as negative thinking ranged the
gamut from painting, sculpture, performance arts, to music.1273
Although Soviet Marxism and American democracy are ideologically divergent,
as we saw in One-Dimensional Man, they maintain similar problems in terms of
individual autonomy by their technological structure. This similarity is apparent in the
role of art as both (as we’ve seen before) capable of emancipation as well as further
indoctrination. In Soviet Marxism, for example, Marcuse noted that realism “can be – and
has been – a highly critical and progressive form of art; confronting reality ‘as it is’ with
its ideological and idealized representations, realism upholds the truth against
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concealment of falsification.”1274 However, realism as it manifests in the Soviet Union,
“conforms to the pattern of a repressive state.”1275 In “idealizing the existing society,”1276
it adds to the reification of the mores of that society without the ability to militate against
it.
The same phenomenon manifests in America, wherein “culture and art have
progressively lost their radical potential and are becoming more conservative as they are
integrated into the structure of the existing society,”1277 what we discussed previously as
a form of artificial desublimation. “Mass culture absorbs and transforms high culture,
robbing it of its subversive potential, so that art is at most an adornment, or mild
diversion.”1278 As Bronner notes:
When Marcuse applies these concepts to the condition of an artwork in
advanced industrial society, a cyclical process is seen as going into effect.
Where repression is brought to bear upon the individual through
institutionalized controls, he will attempt to vent his libidinal energy
through a sublimated practice that will result in a work of art. But, the very
society which the artwork attempts to oppose will transform that oeuvre
and ‘absorb’ the erotic, libidinous content which provides the aesthetic
object with its emancipatory ‘truth.’ As a consequence, repression will
literally increase through society’s subversion of sublimated activity.1279
This “one-dimensionalizing” of culture and everyday life negates the otherness of art and,
with it, negates its emancipatory and radical potential. As he noted, the best itirations of
bourgeois art “express a conscious, methodical alienation from the entire sphere of
business and industry, and from its calculable and profitable order.”1280
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As Bronner notes, “institutionally, this becomes manifest in the culture industry
which can turn any work into a fad or a ‘spectacle,’”1281 of which theorists like Guy
Debord and Shierry Weber made extensive analyses. Indeed, as Weber notes:
The perversion of the aesthetic: whereas the aesthetic is a totality formed
by sublimation of the instincts, the spectacle releases instinctual energies
but does not bind them into forms. On the other hand, the spectacle as
aesthetic and as consumption prevents the individual from experiencing
action and process; he is an actor only as an object and a subject only as a
spectator; he consumes rather than makes.1282
Despite art’s emancipatory potential to envision, through phantasy and imagination,
alternative structures to the prescribed norms, these endeavors are co-opted by the
administration, packaged and sold as yet one more avenue of revenue. As Bronner notes:
A similar result can take place through commercial simplification of a
work to the point where its critical and emancipatory qualities are
liquidated. Thus, classics will be reduced to Monarch notes and Don
Quixote will become Man of La Mancha. In such instances, the existing
‘reality principle’ will be strengthened by the libido which it has absorbed
or diffused. This is what Marcuse terms ‘repressive desublimation,’ or the
channeling of sublimated activity into socially acceptable – and ultimately
repressive – forms.1283

Precisely because artificial desublimation is utilized by the Establishment to stave off
radical social change through reducing anything wholly alien to their own system of
indoctrinating discourse to that prescribed universe of discourse, it follows that if art,
phantasy and imagination are tools of negative thinking, clearly the Establishment would
have art first and foremost in the crosshairs of desublimation. As Marcuse said:
[Art becomes] part of the technical equipment of the household and of the
daily work world. In this process, [artistic works] undergo a decisive
1281
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transformation; they are losing the qualitative difference, namely the
essential dissociation from the established reality principle which was the
ground of their liberating function. Now the images and ideas, by virtue of
which art, literature, and philosophy once indicted and transcended the
given reality are integrated into the society, and the power of the reality
principle is greatly extend.1284
“Television provides excerpts from Beethoven and Stravinsky while a voice tries to sell a
product.”1285 The cultured individual, who must, obviously, love Beethoven, must also,
obviously, love high end products and must, of course, drive a Lexus. Conversely,
traditionally counter-culture musicians in the idiom of The Sex Pistols or Rage Against
the Machine are used to sell counter-culture products, offering the illusion that freedom
of self-expression is possible within the advanced industrial society by appearing to
champion “counter”-cultural goods and services where, in truth, the goods and services
are sold to reify the commodity fetishism of indoctrination to the very “Machine” the
youth think they are “raging” against. As Ellul notes, “artistic expression” becomes
“subordinated to a censorship of money or the state.”1286
Previously “disruptive characters…the artist, the prostitute, the adulteress, the
great criminal and outcast, the rebel-poet, the devil, the fool, and other subversive
characters”1287 no longer “represent another form of life”1288 but have become “freaks or
types of the same life, serving as an affirmation rather than negation of the established
order.”1289 As we explored briefly above, the reliance upon “outlier” characters, those
that fail to assimilate into the status quo, lose their radical efficacy precisely because they
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obfuscate the underlying truth that these figures are only “outliers” at all based upon the
universe of discourse of the system itself and, in this way, in fact contribute to the
system’s reification more than they do its dissolution. The self-identification of a reader,
for example, with one of these figures results not in the desire for radical social change
(as with the objective-realist) but with the quietism and recession from the culture more
in line with the problematic forms of romanticism Marcuse critiqued.
In the period of One-Dimensional Man, even some representations of the “avantgarde and the beatniks” “suffer the fate of being absorbed by what they refute,” sharing
the “function of entertaining without endangering the good conscience of men of good
will.”1290 Thus, only the most extreme forms of art are capable of avoiding this form of
co-option, only “truly avant-garde work of literature communicates the break with
communication,”1291 such as “Rimbaud, dada, surrealism, and other avant-gardists” that
“reject the structure of everyday discourse, presenting compelling words, images,
harmonies, and works in a context of refusal and negation.”1292 Thus, following from his
pessimistic critique of desublimation and ease wherein the Establishment is able to co-opt
what may have previously been profoundly revolutionary forms of art, Marcuse
demanded a more direct and intimate connection between art and political practice: the
art, itself, must have a component of negation of the status quo and participate in
Whitehead’s “Great Refusal.”
At the bohemian margins of society…avant-garde movements arose in the
beginnings of the twentieth century which sought to oppose this
development [of radical desublimation]. A ‘negative’ culture of allencompassing protest sharpened the critical faculty, emphasized the
subject, and reasserted the utopian dream. In this sense, Andre Breton
1290
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could call for the ‘Great Refusal’ which, in Marcuse’s terms, demands an
attempt to increase the distance between social reality and the aesthetic
sphere from the standpoint of revolt. Thus, Marcuse’s support of
experimental, modernist works which consciously attempt to estrange
themselves from the given order.1293

Authentic art, then, must either directly confront and critique the established
norms so powerfully that they resist any effort of co-option by the Establishment, or else
operate in a universe of discourse so extreme and alien to the Establishment that it could
never be reduced to the Establishment’s language. As he said:
If the established society manages all normal communication, validating
or invalidating it in accordance with social requirements, then the values
alien to these requirements may perhaps have no other medium of
communication than the abnormal one of fiction. The aesthetic dimension
still retains a freedom of expression which enables the writers and artists
to call men and things by their name – to name the otherwise
unnameable.1294

To the former, Marcuse was keen on the types of art that are, themselves, political in such
an extreme fashion that they cannot be co-opted by the Establishment, citing Bob Dylan
as an example. In a 1967 essay, “Art in the One-Dimensional Society,”1295 Marcuse said,
“when I saw and participated in their demonstration against the war in Vietnam, when I
heard them singing the songs of Bob Dylan, I somehow felt, and it is very hard to define,
that this is really the only revolutionary language left today.”1296
With this renewed insistence on a revolutionary component to art itself, Marcuse
distanced himself from the position that art ought to operate in a distinct social sphere as
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a heuristic and inspirational device only. Here, Marcuse insisted on a far more direct and
radical manifestation of art as an instrument of direct political action. As Kellner notes:
In the light of the ways that a one-dimensional cultural and political
establishment absorb art and political protest, a revolutionary art and
movement must seek genuine emancipatory alternatives and see how art
can produce a different reality. In this context, art would no longer be a
separate sphere cut off from social life, but would become a productive
force helping to produce a new society.1297

In this direct and productive mode, just as technology has become productive of new
forms of social control and indoctrination, “art could shape social reality” and “thus lose
its illusory status as a realm independent of reality.”1298
As we noted above in our discussion of Marcuse’s “aesthetic reduction,” the
creation of this new social order relies upon not the dissolution of technology but its cooption by this new, radical, aesthetic sensibility. As he said:
The image of art as technique in building or guiding the building of the
society calls for the interplay of science, technique and imagination to
construct and sustain a new system of life. Technique as art, as
construction of the beautiful, not a beautiful objects or places but as the
Form of a totality of life – society and nature.1299

Freed from the antagonisms of technological societies, harkening back to the desires he
articulated in the protagonists of the German art novel, a community without alienation
would be forged as art guides technology and imagination creates entirely new forms of
social arrangements.
This radical approach to art’s direct application to political action would continue
throughout the 60’s and early 70’s in texts such as An Essay on Liberation and
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Counterrevolution and Revolt. As Kellner rightly notes, a “new tone emerges” in these
texts, a tone that “is assertive, aggressive, and highly enthusiastic about the radical
potentials of art” as an agent “of liberation and radical social transformation.”1300 In An
Essay on Liberation, for example, Marcuse again called for a “new sensibility” born of a
rebellion that “envisages a new culture which fulfills the humanistic promises betrayed
by the old culture,”1301 one that maintains a radical transformation of rationality to one
that would be “bodily, erotic, and political.”1302 In this Utopian society, Marcuse
envisioned an “integration of aesthetics and rationality…the merger of art and technology
in the construction of a new social reality, society as a work of art.” 1303 This new
sensibility would be antithetical to the destructive tendencies of the one-dimensional
society and champion, instead, having fused reason with aesthetics, the erotic, livebringing impulses heretofore repressed under the performance principle. Freed from the
indoctrinating and anesthetizing goods and services of commodity capitalism under the
rule of technical rationality, the “false” needs of the one-dimensional society give way to
new needs, both vital and aesthetic, that would “constitute the instinctual basis for
freedom which the long history of class society has blocked.”1304 As he said:
Freedom would become the environment of an organism which is no
longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances required for
well-being under domination, no longer capable of tolerating the
aggressiveness, brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life. The
rebellion would then have taken root in the very nature, the ‘biology’ of
the individual; and on these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the
objectives and the strategy of the political struggle, in which alone the
concrete goals of liberation can be determined.1305
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The adaptive human organism under the aegis of commodity capitalism effectively
integrated him or herself into the milieu through acquiescence to the terms of technical
rationality, buying the goods and services offered by the Establishment and educating
him or herself towards productivity and efficiency. This new sensibility, with its new
needs, would integrate the aesthetic dimension into everyday life, dissolving the
antagonism between the individual and the natural environment and dissolving the
destructive aggressiveness and brutality of competitiveness under capitalism. We see
again the desired goal of the “community” beyond antagonism and alienation, where the
artistic life is life, and society is the aesthetic dimension. As Kellner notes, “the aestheticerotic needs” now liberated from their repression “would manifest themselves in the drive
to create a beautiful and pleasing environment that would eliminate the horrors of
capitalist industrialization, terminating in a new society that would eliminate surplus
repression.”1306
Just as the aesthetic dimension is inherently antithetical to the performance
principle, as we’ve seen, the aesthetic needs, too, have an inherent “subversive and
political quality.”1307 As he said, “the aesthetic needs have their own social content: they
are the claims of the human organism, mind and body, for a dimension of fulfillment
which can be created only in the struggle against the institutions which, by their very
functioning, deny and violate these claims.”1308 The faculty of imagination, so stifled in
the one-dimensional milieu, would be liberated in “the collective practice of creating an
environment: level by level, step by step – in the material and intellectual production, an
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environment in which the nonaggressive, erotic, receptive faculties of man, in harmony
with the consciousness of freedom strive for the pacification of man and nature.” 1309 This
represents the “affirmation of the right to build a society in which the abolition of poverty
and toil,” the ideal utilization of technology which went awry in commodity capitalism,
“terminates in a universe where the sensuous, the playful, the calm, and the beautiful
become forms of existence and thereby the Form of society itself.”1310 Technology,
liberated from its productive capacities under technical rationality, would work with the
imagination, a tool of a new aestheticized rationality, indeed, the imagination would be
“sustained by the achievement of science” and “could turn its productive power to the
radical reconstruction of experience…society as a work of art.”1311
Marcuse’s Utopia can only be realized through a cultural as well as political
revolution, and the cultural revolution is based on the emancipation of imagination’s
capacity to engage in fantasy, inspired by art, creating art, and transforming a society
previously antagonistic to art’s extreme freedoms into an aesthetic society. In An Essay
on Liberation, one of his militant and optimistic texts, Marcuse championed “rock and
protest music, soul music and blues, slang and obscenity, and guerrilla street theater, as
well as surrealism, Russian formalism and other movements of the avant-garde,”1312
anything and everything that had direct and immediate application to a cultural revolution
as political practice incapable of being co-opted by the Establishment they seek to
undermine. Breaking from his earlier position that bourgeois culture ought to be
embraced and merely liberated from its indoctrinating tendencies under commodity

1309

Ibid., 31.
Ibid.,, 25.
1311
Ibid., 45.
1312
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 50.
1310

425

capitalism, in An Essay on Liberation Marcuse “champions all the most radical breaks
with bourgeois culture and affirms these aesthetic movements” in a “radical break with
the existing society.”1313 However, in his next book, Counterrevolution and Revolt
(1972), Marcuse returned to that earlier position to some degree, arguing, instead, for a
“need to preserve certain aspects of bourgeois culture and aesthetic form precisely for the
goals of the revolution”1314 to come. Although he advocated “a total transformation of the
entire traditional culture”1315 as before, he insisted that the new sensibility cannot be
“invented” ex nihilo but, rather, “will necessarily depend on the subverting use of
traditional material.”1316 Although, as we explored above, Marcuse continued to
champion subversive cultural languages and forms of art that challenge the Establishment
(folk traditions, avant-garde, etc.) that speak “the language of the oppressed” or have “a
natural affinity to protest and refusal,”1317 he is no longer an advocate of the “systematic
use of obscenity” 1318that he previously championed in An Essay on Liberation. This is no
inconcistency on Marcuse’s part, but an observation, borne of his insistance that critical
theory is always socially and historically situated in the here and now, that obscene
language “no longer defines the radical”1319 after it had been so thoroughly co-opted by
the Establishment as to not only become so ubiquitous as to lose its radical edge, but
actually reifying for the commodities that now cater to obscenity, sexual debasement, and
shock value. Further, Marcuse leveled a scathing critique against forms of art that take
themselves to be so radical that they become a type of “anti-art” which he viewed as
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antithetical to the purpose of cultural revolution. Since “aesthetic qualities are essentially
nonviolent, nondomineering” and enable the individual “to see things in their own right,
to experience the joy enclosed in them,”1320 anti-art movements undermine the very
purpose they set out to achieve by negating the radical utility of art in political practice.
Within his critique of anti-art movements, Marcuse revealed another subtle shift
in his position on the relationship between art and political practice. As we’ve seen,
Marcuse oscillated between viewing art as a direct instrument of political practice and
social transformation and an indirect method of an aesthetic dimension connected to, but
ultimately separate from, everyday life that operates as a heuristic or inspirational role to
provoke political action in a strictly political realm. Whereas in An Essay on Liberation,
Marcuse seemed to champion the former, in Counterrevolution and Revolt, he moved
back to the latter in saying, for example, the “relation between art and revolution is a
unity of opposites, an antagonistic unity” and that art is, and ought, to remain “nonoperational.”1321 As Kellner notes, “art serves the revolution in its own dimension and not
by being mere propaganda or instrument.”1322
The tension between art and revolution is stressed, as is its necessary
distance between the aesthetic dimension and revolutionary practice.
Marcuse now defends the form of art as the vehicle of the aesthetic
liberation and argues that the forms of the great classical and modernist
bourgeois art reveal the potential of genuine art to transcend and critique
existing reality.1323
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Marcuse saw examples of this form of authentic art in the poems of Ginsberg and
Ferlinghetti, as well as a continued appreciation for the songs of Dylan.1324 Working
within the form of art without succumbing to ant-art tendencies, they represent a critique
of bourgeois culture while still operating with its mediums, radical yet stopping short of
becoming an anti-art that would undermine the revolutionary efforts they set out to
achieve in the first place.
Consider, for example, Ginsberg’s iconic poem “Howl”:
I saw the best minds of my generation destroyed by madness, starving
hysterical naked, dragging themselves through the negro streets at dawn
looking for an angry fix, angelheaded hipsters burning for the ancient
heavenly connection to the starry dynamo in the machinery of
night…expelled from the academies for crazy and publishing obscene
odes on the windows of the skull…who burned cigarette holes in their
arms protesting the narcotic tobacco haze of Capitalism.1325
In asking “what sphinx of cement and aluminum bashed open their skulls and ate up their
brains and imagination?”1326 Ginserg hints at the stultification of Marcuse’s realm of
“phantasy” requisite for radical artistic expression by the “cement and aluminum” of a
technological age. The villain of the piece is “Moloch,”1327 perhaps doubling for
Marcuse’s “Establishment,” the “heavy judger of men,” “the incomprehensible prison,”
“the crossbone soulless jailhouse and Congress of sorrows.” Moloch, “whose mind is
pure machinery,” “whose blood is running money.” Ginserg highlighted the plight,
sorrow and misery of the radically marginalized, the homosexual, those labeled “deviant”
and “criminal” within the terms of the Establishment. The very language and imagery of
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the poem was antithetical to the vestigial Puritanical notions of the Establishment when it
was published, resulting in the notorious court case that followed.
In a fascinating exchange between Kellner and Marcuse in 1978, Kellner reveals
that Marcuse didn’t change his mind on the revolutionary role of art so much as evolved
with the changing times and efficacy of the movements themselves:
He claimed that 1960s folk and protest music, the songs of Bob Dylan,
radical theater and other forms of movement art successfully combined
aesthetic form with political messages, and by contributing to a large-scale
radicalizing process were playing an important part in a political
movement. In the 1970s, Marcuse claims, the dissident cultures were
losing, for the most part, both their aesthetic and political quality,
sacrificing both concern with the formal qualities that he ascribes to
authentic art and political content and effects. Hence, in this situation,
Marcuse perceived the need to go back and defend the aesthetic values and
works of the classical bourgeois heritage which, he believed, contained
important emancipatory and political potential that was being neglected by
the concern with the cultural fads of the moment.1328
Marcuse’s position in Counterrevolution and Revolt was further reified in his exploration
of surrealism throughout the 70’s. He was, as we’ve seen, always deeply intrigued by the
surrealist movement, especially the work of Breton, Aragon, Magritte, and Dali.1329 In
surrealism, he saw the effort to freely express “fantasies in painting” which called for
“the radical transformation of art and life.”1330 The fantastic and imaginative aspects of
surrealism continued to push Marcuse away from the position that art ought to have a
direct and instrumental value in political activity and ought, instead, remain a distinct,
separate aesthetic dimension from which political action may be inspired indirectly. In a
letter to a Chicago surrealist group, Marcuse went so far as to claim there was an
“irreconcilable contradiction between art and politics, due to the transcendence of art
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 54.
Ibid., 55.
1330
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beyond all political goals.”1331 Surrealism, for Marcuse, attempted to “sustain and
recapture the transcendent, sur-realistic qualities of art, to sustain and recapture the
alienating force of art as force in and for the political struggle.”1332 In this way, art has an
operational value in radical political change, but a far less direct and immediate one than
Marcuse championed previously. As Kellner notes, “surrealism suggests that we live in
another metaphysical, spiritual world,”1333 one that, in Marcuse’s words, “interferes with
the established one without invalidating or abolishing it.”1334 As Marcuse said:
In this situation, the direct polarization of art, i.e., its proletarization or
popularization, can be attained only at the price of sacrificing the radically
noncomformist qualities of art, and sacrificing the commitment to the
internal, autonomous (though historical) truth of art which calls for its
own, autonomous forms of representation and communication.1335
Here, again, Marcuse “stresses…the inevitable contradiction between art and revolution,
the fact that art cannot be instrumentalized to serve pragmatic purposes, that art cannot
serve the existing reality, that is constitutes another reality, an aesthetic dimension that
can promote the interests of liberation.”1336
This “aesthetic dimension,” already referenced explicitly in Eros and Civilization,
is the title and focus of his last book published in 1978. As Marcuse’s thought continued
to gravitate away from the notion of art as direct and instrumental in political action,
some scholars like Lukes have argued that Marcuse ended his aesthetic investigations
with a “flight into inwardness,” a radical aestheticism bordering on the type of
romanticism that he’d critiqued throughout his long career. Others, like Kellner, argue
Herbert Marcuse, “Letters to the Chicago Surrealists,” in The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse,
vol. 4, Art and Liberation, ed. Douglas Kellner (Routledge: New York, 2007), 181.
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against this position, saying instead that Marcuse continued to view art as an integral role
for radical social change as he had been doing since the beginning. As I will explore
briefly, there is validity in both positions and I will attempt to adjudicate between them.
Precisely because the heart of the text is a critique of traditional Marxist aesthetics
(the notion that “revolutionary art should be proletarian art” and “that all bourgeois art is
decedent and ideological”1337), Marcuse remained consistent with his later position that
art ought to be, to some degree, divorced from direct and immediate political practice,
arguing that Marxist aesthetics were reductive in that they “reduced art to political
instrumentalization.”1338 Continuing to champion the benevolent aspects of high
bourgeois culture and art, Marcuse said:
In contrast to orthodox Marxist aesthetics I see the political potential of art
in art itself, in the aesthetic form as such. Furthermore, I argue that by
virtue of its aesthetic form, art is largely autonomous vis-à-vis the given
social relations. In its autonomy art both protests these relations, and at the
same time transcends them. Thereby art subverts the dominant
consciousness, the ordinary experience.1339
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Indeed, in sharp contrast to the romanticism he always railed against, Marcuse noted that:
With the affirmation of the inwardness of subjectivity, the individual steps
out of the network of exchange relationships and exchange values,
withdraws from the reality of bourgeois society, and enters another
dimension of existence. Indeed, this escape from reality led to an
experience which could (and did) become a powerful force in invalidating
the actually prevailing bourgeois values, namely by skirting the locus of
the individual’s realization from the domain of the performance principle
and the profit motive to that of the inner resources of the human bring:
passion, imagination, conscience. Moreover, withdrawal and retreat were
not the last position. Subjectivity strove to break out of its inwardness into
the material and intellectual culture. And today, in the totalitarian period,
it has become a political value as a counterforce against aggressive and
exploitative socialization.1340

Akin to his views on negative thinking, art does, indeed, have an inward turn to
subjectivism at least insofar as the individual recedes out of the stultifying confines of the
performance principle, a necessary first step in emancipation. But Marcuse was quick to
add, too, that this is not the end of the story, but the beginning: like the objective-realists
he discussed in his very first book, the drive is not to remain in seclusion but to bring to
bear this new sensibility into everyday life in order to transform culture and society and
bring about a society without antagonism and alienation. As Kellner notes, “Marcuse is
clearly not advocating withdrawal or inwardness, but is claiming that genuine art
provides an experience that helps liberate the individual from thrall to the existing society
to cultivate a critical subjectivity capable of motivation to transformative action to

distinguishes Art from any other product of human activity” which provides “the ‘holiday,’ the elevation,
the breat in the terrible routine of life – to present ‘higher,’ ‘deeper,’ perhaps ‘truer’ and better, satisfying
needs not satisfied in daily work and fun, and therefore pleasurable,” Ibid.
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produce a better world.”1341 Subjectivity “moves from withdrawal into an inner world of
its own to spring forth to action in the external world.”1342
Art, operating in its own aesthetic dimension, first draws the individual out of the
stultifying milieu of the performance principle (effectively, the individual withdraws into
him or herself) to be inspired, therein, to then “spring forth to action” and political
practice to help transform the external world. Further, Marxist aesthetics, for Marcuse,
did not take seriously enough precisely the sort of social psychology of the working class
that Marcuse elucidated throughout his career. As such, the more art moves towards
popularization, the more likely it is to reach the proletariat in a form already
desublimated, co-opted, and utilized for increased alienation rather than emancipation.
To the same extent that art seeks to ‘reach the masses,’ the work’s content
will be turned against itself by the culture industry even when that work
attempts to express a ‘revolutionary’ message. As a ‘radical’ work
becomes a popular commodity, the liberal and tolerant image of the status
quo becomes ever more secure. Only through the estrangement from the
given order will art remain able to preserve itself as the negation of that
order.1343

However, Marcuse demonstrated pessimism as never before in this final text as to
the degree to which this Utopian coordination of art and technology, the aeshetic and the
everyday, can ever truly be achieved. Falling away from his thesis in Eros and
Civilization wherein Marcuse envisioned a harmonious community wherein unrepressed
instincts and society were coordinated into an aesthetic-rational whole, in this last book,
he suggested, instead:
Art declares its caveat to the thesis according to which the time has come
to change the world. While art bears witness to the necessity of liberation,
Kellner, “Marcuse, Art, and Liberation,” Op. Cit., 63.
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it also testifies to its limits. What has been done cannot be undone; what
has passed cannot be recaptured. History is guilt but not redemption. Eros
and Thanatos are loves as well as adversaries. Destructive energy may be
brought into the service of life to an ever higher degree – Eros itself lives
under the sign of finitude, of pain. The ‘eternity of joy’ constitutes itself
through the death of individuals. For them, this eternity is an abstract
universal…the world was not made for the sake of the human being and it
has not become more human.1344
Precisely because “Eros is always subject to limitations an the ingression of destructive
energies,” a community of “pure and lasting joy” is, ultimately, “impossible.”1345 Rather
than the optimistic underpinnings in Eros and Civilization and other earlier texts, the
ideal community mentioned as early as The German Artist Novel now operates far more
as a heuristic device: a hypothetically postulated possibility that will never fully
actualized but ought to remain a beacon towards which we ought to strive to achieve.
“The aesthetic dimension can offer consolation in the face of the impossibility of
attaining lasting happiness, but it cannot realize absolute freedom and happiness.”1346
Nevertheless, art’s emancipatory potential to bring about this ideal community “ought to
remain ideal.”1347 In a summary of one of his last public appearances, Kellner notes that
in a lecture at Irvine in 1979, Marcuse maintained, “art can enter, as a regulative idea, the
political struggle to change the world.”1348 Thus, at the end, Marcuse adopted a view of
art and its capacity to bring about an ideal community in a manner akin to Peirce’s use of
Truth as both as goal to be achieved by the ideal community of inquirers and an
indication of that community’s mobilization (if Truth has been achieved, that is, it
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follows that a most ideal sort of community must have likewise been achieved in order
for Truth to be discovered).
In sum, for Marcuse, the entirety of his critique of modern capitalism, whether
framed as Freudian-Marxism, a critique of Weberian technical rationality, or his own
unique contributions in One-Dimensional Man and subsequent texts, the faculty of
imagination was stifled into obscurity within these totalitarian societies. But the
imagination, in service to the id and the pleasure principle, is not dissolved in its
repression, but endures, and seek release through art (as either inspiration or through
direct political action), culminating in a dissolution of technical rationality, the
performance principle, and all forms of alienation and repression. Technology and
aesthetics end their antagonism, as do rationality and art, the everyday life and the
aesthetic dimension, and all forms of dichotomies that prevent the realization of
authentic, individual freedom. Art …
… would then be creativity, a creation in the material as well as
intellectual sense, a juncture of technique and the arts in the total
reconstruction of the environment, a juncture of town and country,
industry and nature, after all have been freed from the horrors of
commercial exploitation and beautification, so that Art can no longer serve
as a stimulus of business. Evidently, the very possibility of creating such
an environment depends on the total transformation of the existing society:
a new mode and new goals of production, a new type of human being as a
producer, the end of role-playing, of the established division of labor, of
work and pleasure.1349

Herbert Marcuse, “Art as a Form of Reality,” in The Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 4, Art
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Art draws upon “fantasy” as Marcuse defined it, unleashing “its imaginative structures”
to “make liberation a temporary reality and a possible goal.” 1350

By utilizing the

imagination, fantasy offers the hypothetical postulation of a radically Other form of
reality, providing that “possible goal” while, in practice, the act of engaging in artistic
endeavors allows at least a “temporary” reprieve from the stultifying effects of technical
rationality within the performance principle by engaging in an activity wholly alien to the
regimented form of productivity and efficiency in consumer capitalism. “Art has the
power to create alternatives to the present”1351 for great art has, historically, “held up…as
a task the image of a better order,”1352 and, as such, operates as form of negative thinking.
As Bronner notes, “art contradicts the existing order with its ‘inner truth’ as it manifests
the freedom to shape reality in terms of the imagination. This is the basis for the
transcendent character of art.”1353 The “inner truth,” as we noted in our previous analysis
of Marcuse’s Freudian Marxism, is the unfettered libidinal expression of childhood prior
to the indoctrinating acculturation into the milieu of technical rationality. As such, art is
“one of the most potent forms of imagination” and “is also a form of memory, recalling a
beauty that once was and which might once more be.”1354
Thus, “Marcuse stressed the educational value of the arts because of the
qualitative difference he finds between the multidimensional kind of knowledge thought
to be produced by the aesthetic imagination and the uni-dimensional kind of knowledge
attributed to what he describes as the controlled and repressive rationalities of
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achievement, performance, and domination,”1355 in short, the enculturated values of
technical rationality. Just as an aesthetic rationality must supplant the technical rationality
of the current age, aesthetic education must supplant the indoctrinating call to efficiency
and performance within the advanced technological society. The revaluation of values in
education and society are mutually complementary, as Marcuse “views aesthetic
education as essential for the actualization of a utopian form of society, where art is also
to become a material force for the revitalization of all aspects of social life.”1356
Fundamentally, no matter the stage of his career, Marcuse wanted to re-imagine
art as something beyond the confines of a specific genre, instrumentality or traditional
definition of an art “work.” Rather, it was an artistic life1357 and an artistic world that
Marcuse envisioned wherein “art” became synonymous with the “sensuousness, pleasure,
and gratification”1358 of the pleasure principle released from its sublimated confines of
the performance principle. This inner realm, repressed but never wholly negated,
maintains values diametrically opposed to the stultifying confines of the technical milieu
and, as such, provides the foundation for a revolutionary consciousness. Art, and the
education in the arts, cultivates this unique brand of negative thinking by not only turning
the student’s attention towards works of art that envision wholly different worlds and
possibilities than those proliferated by the Establishment but, too, cultivates the
expression and re-emergence of the sensuousness and pleasure buried within the
repressed pleasure principle itself. Indeed, as Reitz notes, “the thematic interconnections
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among Marcuse’s theories of art, alienation, and the humanities constitute the decisive
structural and philosophical unity of his work.”1359 Higher education, under the sway of
commodity capitalism, deadens this emancipatory impulse and leads, instead, to further
alienation through integration into the status quo and it is against this phenomenon that
Marcuse’s aesthetic education manifests:
Alienation, in [Marcuse’s] estimation, is thought to be the result of
training people to forget their authentic human nature – its essential
internal turmoil and social potential – by educationally eradicating the
realm where this knowledge is considered to be best preserved, that is, the
humanities.1360

Technical rationality, enmeshed with commodity fetishism to the benefit of the
Establishment, militates against the desublimation (in an emancipatory sense) of the
sensuousness of the pleasure principle, resulting in the surplus repression of Eros and
Civilization. This aspect of “authentic human nature” is suppressed through education,
both formal and informal. Informally, technical rationality demands efficiency and
productivity, antithetical to the gratification of pleasure except on the limited terms of the
euphoric indulgences of commodity capitalism. Formally, it manifests in the realm of
higher education through a diminishing role of the humanities, especially aesthetic
education, and the increasing role of degree programs geared towards creating efficient
cogs in the machine of capitalism.1361 The “turmoil” and “tension” of human nature,
necessary for dialectical growth (for Peirce as well as Marcuse), is supplanted with the
“happy consciousness” of euphoria within the advanced one-dimensional society.
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“Alienation is seen as the result of mis-education or half-education that leads people to
accept sensual anesthetization and social amnesis as normal” and “making a living
becomes more important than making a life.”1362
As such, Marcuse came to view aesthetic education and art as “countermovements
to alienation” entailing a new “aesthetic rationality”1363 thought to “transcend the
prevailing logic of performance and achievement”1364 indicative of technical rationality.
Prior to The Aesthetic Dimension, Marcuse argued that art has a direct and immediate
role in teaching “radical action and human fulfillment”1365 rather than merely playing a
symbolic, indirect role of inspiration and the further cultivation of negative thinking. Art,
like negative thinking, preserves the dialectical tension between the ideal (what is not)
and the real (what is), in contrast to the prevailing philosophical trend of positivism
which engages the latter while relegating the former to mere metaphysical speculation
best discarded. As such, Marcuse’s is inexorably driven, by the terms of his unique brand
of critical theory, to a Utopian position, offering the ideal in light of the negation of the
real.
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Chapter 11

Critical Theory and its Discontents

Throughout my investigation of Marcuse, I have drawn brief comparisons to the
work of Peirce, noting here and there where their respective theories both seem to align
and where they seem to diverge. Both are considered central figures in their respective
schools, yet both bring their own, unique visions to bear upon those discussions,
sometimes placing themselves in a state of relative tension with their compatriots in
pragmatism and critical theory, respectively. Although it is important (to borrow the
phrase from Marcuse) not to “one-dimensionalize” the traditions too extravagantly,
subsuming the idiosyncrasies and unique perspectives of the various members of each
school into a completely artificial, singular philosophy, nevertheless a general overview
of pragmatism’s relationship to critical theory is important for my purposes here. To
bring Peirce into conversation with Marcuse and suggest that what unifies their respective
projects far outweighs what divides them, I will first address two key critiques from
Marcuse’s fellow critical theorists and investigate to what degree Peircean pragmatism is
compatible with Marcusean critical theory.
From the outset, critical theory has not looked upon pragmatism with a
particularly favorable eye. For the first general critical theorists, Horkheimer chief among
them, their introduction to pragmatism came through the perspective of William James
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who was far more widely read than Peirce.1366 Although Harvard had produced Peirce’s
Collected Papers by that time, it was still James, not Peirce, who popularized the term
“pragmatism” and introduced it to the world. Further, James famously coined the phrase
“cash value” in reference to pragmatism’s point and purpose and, as we saw earlier,
deviated wildly enough from Peirce’s original position that the latter felt he had to
rename his philosophy “pragmaticism.” Of course, the phrase “cash value” would not sit
well with a group of social theorists critical of the indoctrinating tendencies of modern
capitalism and they came to view pragmatism as yet one more indication that even the
realm of philosophy had succumbed to capitalism’s insidious thrall.
But that unfortunate phrase by James was only the tip of the proverbial iceberg.
The more substantive critiques revolved around pragmatism’s apparent reduction of
theory to practical action, where all that is “meaningful” (or, in some iterations, all that is
“true”) is so only to the degree that it “cashes out” in practical experiences for the
individual him or herself. Instead of a philosophy which created and/or analyzed values
(ends in themselves), pragmatism came to be seen as purely instrumental, concerned
exclusively with the ways in which an individual can productively and efficiently make
his or her way in a (profoundly indoctrinating) milieu. In this sense, pragmatism became
just another offshoot of positivism wherein philosophy is reduced to little more than
reifying and apologetic of the domineering Establishment. This interpretation gave
pragmatism an air of selfishness and greed, absolved, as it appeared to be, of any
dynamic exploration of intersubjectivity and solidarity. Further, with pragmatism’s
Even Joseph Brent, the most famous chronicler of Peirce’s life, was surprised by his first encounter
with Peirce’s work in 1957 and the reference to Peirce as the founder of pragmatism, noting, “the idea that
it was Peirce rather than William James who originated pragmatism denied what was then the accepted
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alliance with a “method of science,” the Weberian concern was all-pervasive:
pragmatism’s instrumental orientation resulted in an exploitation of nature to achieve
personal satisfaction, science was a means of technical control and domination of the
environment, and all that “mattered” was a process of inquiry that was as cold and
impersonal as it was calculating and myopic. This was the general trajectory of
Horkheimer’s robust and scathing critique of pragmatism as he articulated it in his
chapter “Means and Ends” in Eclipse of Reason.
As I highlighted, Peirce was adamant that the trajectory of inquiry not be distorted
by socio-political concerns. Nevertheless, as Anderson, Talisse, and others rightly note,
Peirce was certainly alive to the socio-political problems that emerge historically to
hamper inquiry’s unfolding and, by constructing an ideal community of inquiries,
implicitly aligned himself with a social theory at least in so far as he articulated an ideal
social structure for inquiry to unfold. How can it be said that Peirce was offering anything
even remotely resembling a critical theory if he maintained that philosophy ought never
be subjugated to socio-political concerns? Ingram, for example, defines the project of
critical theory as follows:
Unlike most contemporary theories of society, whose primary aim is to
provide the best description and explanation of social phenomenon,
critical theories are chiefly concerned with evaluating the freedom, justice,
and happiness of societies. In their concern with values they show
themselves more akin to moral philosophy than to predictive science.1367
Logic (central to Peirce’s method of inquiry) was a normative science, resting upon
ethics, and ethics, in turn, resting upon aesthetics. The abductive component of inquiry
utilized a free-play of imagination to hypothesize goals, values and ends to which, only
1367
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secondarily, the inductive and deductive modes of logic would then either verify or
invalidate. “Practics,” or “antethics,” as he called it, “is the theory of the conformity of
action to an ideal.”1368 “Ethics,” on the contrary, “involves more than the theory of such
conformity; namely, it involves the theory of the ideal itself, the nature of the summum
bonum.”1369 Both are requisite for the flourishing of inquiry. The “error” of writers on
ethics often manifests as a conflation of “an ideal of conduct with a motive to action. The
truth is that these two objects belong to different categories. Every action has a motive;
but an ideal only belongs to a line [of] conduct which is deliberate.”1370 Whereas
“practics” aids an individual in correlating his or her actions to pre-established ends
(instrumentalism), “ethics” is the creation and analysis of the ideal ends, themselves. Just
as “action” is not the be-all, end-all of Peircean pragmatism, nor is “practics”
(instrumentalism) the be-all, end-all of Peircean pragmatism, either. The brute reduction
1368
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their conceivable practical bearings, the former is the more fundamental” where “by ‘practical’ I mean apt
to affect conduct; and by conduct, voluntary action that is self-controlled, i.e. controlled by adequate
deliberation,” Ibid., CP 8.322.
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of thought to action, of ethics to practics, is a gross misreading of Peirce that, I maintain,
informed many an ill-begotten critique of the father of pragmatism from the start.
Further, although Peirce was ever reluctant to associate philosophy with sociopolitical concerns, as Anderson notes, Peirce was nevertheless concerned with “the
structure and health of the polis.”1371 Especially in “Fixation of Belief,” “in asking how a
community should govern the processes and contexts of fixing its beliefs, we ask not only
about a specific kind of political action, but also about how we might envision the
constituency of a healthy community.”1372 As I’ve demonstrated throughout this project,
Peirce was concerned with offering a “description and explanation of social
phenomenon,” at least insofar as social phenomenon may influence the trajectory of
inquiry (and the ways in which it can contribute to its flourishing). Of primary concern
throughout Peirce’s career (forged in part, no doubt, by the intransigence and meddling of
a bureaucratic apparatus that continuously stifled his innovations in science and logic),
was “the freedom, justice, and happiness of societies,” the freedom to inquire without
obstacle or externally prescribed values that narrow the otherwise near-infinitely wide
channels of the human imagination. Certainly these issues were manifest in his critique of
the “method of authority” and his concern that ulterior motives, the greed of capitalism
chief among them, infiltrated an otherwise ideal version of the scientific method that
would bring about an unlimited, democratic, egalitarian community free to follow inquiry
wherever it may lead.

Douglas Anderson, “A Political Dimension of Fixing Belief,” in The Rule of Reason: The Philosophy of
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Of primary concern to Horkheimer was the belief that philosophy had
degenerated from its analysis of social values to nothing more than this “predictive
science.” This emphasis on bare factual analysis lost its critical edge. In essence, the
concern was that late 19th and 20th century philosophy fell under the spell of capital
(productivity and efficiency chief among its goals) and succumbed to the technical
rationality of the age. With Weber lingering in the background, “science” and
“technology” more often than not took on a reifying tone: they were instruments of
capital and domination and thus any philosophy, pragmatism chief among them, that took
up a scientific method, must, in turn, be nothing more than a philosophy of apologetic
acquiescence to the status quo. As Adorno and Horkheimer said, for example, “kings, no
less directly than businessmen, control technology; it is as democratic as the economic
system with which it is bound up. Technology is the essence of this knowledge. It does
not work by concepts and images, by the fortunate insight, but refers to method, the
exploitation of others’ work, and capital.”1373 This reduces rationality to its pure
“instrumental”1374 form such that “what men want to learn from nature is how to use it in
order wholly to dominate it and other men. That is the only aim.” 1375 But Peirce was alive
to this critique, so much so that he claimed, “the worst feature of the present state of
things is that the great majority of the members of many scientific societies, and a large
part of others, are men whose chief interest in science is as a means of gaining money,
and who have a contempt, or half-contempt, for pure science.”1376 Further, critical
theorists were concerned that an acquiescence to this standard of efficiency and
Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Critical Theory: The
Essential Readings, ed. David Ingram (New York: Paragon House, 1998), 49.
1374
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productivity lead to a kind of mass mentality, a one-dimensionalizing, in Marcuse’s
terms. As Adorno and Horkheimer said, men become “mere species beings, exactly like
one another through isolation in the forcibly united collectivity. The oarsmen, who cannot
speak to one another, are each of them yoked in the same rhythm as the modern worker in
the factory, movie theater, and collective.”1377 These conditions “made the suppressed
men dumb and separated them from truth.”1378
This was a concern for Peirce, as well. Indeed, Peirce’s critique of the method of
authority was a critique of instrumentalism, as Horkheimer defined it, in its most vibrant
and vitriolic form. Peirce noted that the authority wields “the various forms of organized
force in the state” and “will never be convinced that dangerous reasoning ought not to be
suppressed in some way.”1379 Further, “if liberty of speech is to be untrammeled from the
grosser forms of constraint, then uniformity of opinion will be secured by a moral
terrorism to which the respectability of society will give its thorough approval.” 1380 Just
as Adorno and Horkheimer were concerned that the mass of mankind had been made
“dumb and separated from truth,” Peirce said, “when society is broken into bands, now
warring, now allied, now for a time subordinated one to another, man loses his
conceptions of truth and of reason.”1381 For Adorno and Horkheimer, and for Peirce as
well, it was “truth” that has been denied the individual living under such an authority, and
it is this “truth for…which he fights.”1382 The only litmus test for “truth” in a state of
authority is “what the state thinks,”1383 making its claims to knowledge reifying and
Adorno and Horkheimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” Op. Cit., 55.
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apologetic. For, as we recall, the method of authority does not seek to fix belief in the
individual “merely, but in the community.”1384 As Peirce said:
Wherever there is an aristocracy, or a guild, or any association of a class
of men whose interests depend, or are supposed to depend, on certain
propositions, there will be inevitably found some traces of this natural
product of social feeling. Cruelties always accompany this system; and
when it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of the most
horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man.1385
Like the “oarsmen” in Adorno and Horkheimer, the individuals under such authority
become nothing more than “intellectual slaves”1386 to the authority. Where, in Adorno
and Horkheimer’s terms, collectivity is “forcibly united,” the authority perpetuates itself
so long as, in Peirce words, “men are in such a state of culture that one opinion does not
influence another – that is, so long as they cannot put two and two together.”1387
But, for Peirce, out of this society a class of individuals will be “raised above that
condition,” individuals that “possess a wider sort of social feeling” who are capable of
seeing that “men in other counties and in other ages have held to very different doctrines
from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe.”1388 I argue that these
Peircean individuals who are capable of ascertaining the “accident of their having been
taught as they have…that has caused them to believe as they do and not far differently”
1384
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are engaging in precisely the sort of “negative thinking” that the critical theorists
champion. I argue, in short, that these individuals of “wider social feeling” are critical
theorists. Like the members of the Frankfurt School, these Peircean individuals have to
develop not only a direct critique of the historical situatedness of the current milieu, but
must also cultivate an historical awareness of the establishments of the past, the beliefs of
“other nations and other centuries; thus giving rise to doubts in their minds.”1389
Ultimately, for Peirce and the critical theorists both, “the willful adherence” to these
indoctrinating beliefs, and “the arbitrary forcing” of these beliefs upon others, “must,
therefore, both be given up.”1390
Peirce juxtaposed this faux community with an ideal community of inquirers who
are free to inquire as they will, in coordinated, communal dialogue. Undoubtedly, this is
what attracted Habermas to Peirce from the start. Although Habermas had his own
critique of pragmatism, his theory of “communicative rationality consists…in formal
procedures of free, reciprocal conversation,” implying “an ideally democratic and
egalitarian community.”1391 Although Habermas held a more complimentary view of
pragmatism, at least, a Peircean form of pragmatism, Horkheimer read into pragmatism
(Peirce included) all of the worst ills of the modern era: reduction of theory to practical
activity, philosophy’s assimilation into technical rationality, and a dissolution of values
and objective deployments of reason in favor of pure, cold, calculating, subjective forms
of instrumental rationality.
Broadly construed, instrumental rationality is the deployment of human reason
solely to ascertain the means to achieve some specific, prescribed end. Though in a
1389
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practical sense, instrumental reason is clearly critical to our successful navigation of the
inroads of life, it has nevertheless been criticized as reducing human cognitive capacities
to the bare utility of achieving practical ends while sacrificing those capacities that ought
otherwise be aimed at loftier goals such as the attainment of Truth, Beauty, and
Goodness, that is, the increase of human understanding in general and the elevation of the
human condition. The agent of instrumental rationality constructs the means to achieve
prescribed ends whereas the agent of non-instrumental rationality constructs the ends,
themselves, namely, “values.” The agent of instrumental rationality deploys his or her
rational capacities as a “tool” or “instrument,” a means of achieving whatever the goals
may be, whereas the agent of non-instrumental rationality uses reason to divine which
goals ought to be pursued. Pragmatism, with its scientific method of inquiry and
experimental method of refining and formulating beliefs, has been accused of not only
instrumentalizing rationality for the cold, calculating process of inquiry as a “predictive
science,” but, too, has instrumentalized nature as nothing more than an “obstacle” or a
“means” of achieving its practical pursuits.
Part and parcel with the fairly ubiquitous adaptation of Weberian “technical
rationality,” critical theorists have decried instrumental rationality as a fundamental facet
in the indoctrination and alienation of the industrial milieu. In Marcuse, for example, the
one-dimensional society, the performance principle, surplus scarcity, commodity
fetishism, capitalism, and technical rationality conspired together to set the goals for the
individuals within the industrial society. Marcuse’s critique was often framed in the
language of organism/environment transaction, just as it is with Peirce, 1392 though for

Peirce’s radical pedagogy was potentially influenced by his father, Benjamin, and his first wife,
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Marcuse the concern was that the one-dimensional society dictated the terms of
adaptation for the organism, terms that dictated goals of efficiency and productivity
conducive to the perpetuation of the alienating and indoctrinating power of commodity
capitalism. We see this in Marcuse’s critique of the changing trajectory of higher
education. The passage is powerful and bears repeating:
Once upon a time, it was the proclaimed principle of great bourgeois
philosophy that the youth ‘ought to be educated not for the present but for
a better future condition of the human race, that is, for the idea of
humanity.’ Now the council for Higher Education is called upon to study
the ‘detailed needs’ of the established society so that the colleges know
‘what kinds of graduates to produce.’1393
In a passage of shocking resonance with Marcuse’s critique of contemporary
higher education in a system of capital, and likely stemming from Peirce’s misbegotten
experiences in gravimetrics in the early part of his career,1394 Peirce said:
They want results, tangible to them. The teacher is dismissed as a failure,
or, if he is allowed another chance, he will take good care to reverse the
method of his teaching and give them results -- especially, as that is the
lazy way. These are some of the causes of there being so few strong
reasoners in the world …

We see non-instrumental rationality pitted against instrumental rationality quite explicitly
by the terms as we have generally defined them: education has shifted under commodity
capitalism from setting goals (elevating the condition of the human race) to adapting
goals (efficiency and productivity in the machine of industry) as institutes of higher
education in the science,” Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 31. His wife, “Zina,” was a
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education become little more than degree factories and the means of achieving goals
prescribed for the students by society.
Marcuse was clearly antagonistic to instrumental rationality, especially framed in
the Weberian context, and called for (depending on the period in which he was writing)
either a return to the values of bourgeois culture that championed Truth, Beauty, and
Goodness over practical concerns or else a complete break from capitalism’s co-option of
these goals within the stifling milieu of one-dimensional society.1395 This explains, in no
small part, his advocacy of the humanities as sites of negative thinking and radical forms
of protest in both the political and aesthetic realms. If instrumental reason constructs the
means to achieve prescribed goals, and if the prescribed goals are efficiency and
productivity conducive to the individual organism’s adaptation into a milieu of
commodity capitalism, then negative thinking, art, and political protest transcend these
goals and effectively construct new goals, with a new rationality, aiming towards a more
emancipated world. Once these new goals have been established, reason would be
deployed to ascertain the means to achieve these ends. This would not longer be the
exclusively instrumental reason Marcuse (and the other critical theorists) lamented, but an
instrumental deployment of reason to ascertain the means to achieve the ends freely
postulated by a mind no longer at the mercy of technical rationality and the logic of
modernity. There is always a motive to act, as Peirce would say, but the ideal deployment
of this kind of “instrumentalism” would follow from the autonomous deliberation of the
ends themselves (the “objective” form of reason Horkheimer championed) rather than

That’s not to say that Marcuse “abandoned” the goals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness, only that, in
some portions of his career, he demanded a complete break from the ways in which these terms were
defined in the bourgeois area and new conceptions forged of an emancipated rationality through negative
thinking (in general) and aesthetics (in particular).
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passively accepting those ends and then deploying reason exclusively for the instrumental
sorting out of the means to achieve them. But a question remains: what if these new goals
are not, in fact, achievable? Do we simply grind out the means, altering them again and
again, all to no avail? Does it become a kind of Sysiphian task in which we have a motive
to act but those actions lead nowhere?
One of the more explicit differences between Peirce’s pragmatism and Marcuse’s
critical theory, one that I will explore further in the concluding chapter of this project,
was Peirce’s insistence that the precise content of future beliefs cannot be claimed with
apodictic certainty a priori. “Truth,” at the end of the long run, is a specific goal with
some specific content (for Peirce, Truth will be that belief that will, hypothetically, be
forever beyond the possibility of revision and never subject to doubt). As Peirce said:
“for experimental inquiry sets out with a hypothesis; upon which it bases predictions as to
the issue of experiments, and it is left to the future experiment to bring forth the
conclusion from the womb of the future.”1396 Peirce often referenced the ultimate true
belief we are “destined”1397 to one day reach, should the method of inquiry be engaged
and push far enough. This hypothesis likely stemmed from Peirce’s cosmology that
stipulated that the universe, in general, was moving from absolute indeterminacy1398 to
absolute lawlike determinacy.1399 The more determinate the future (indeed, absolute
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determinacy) the more static the content of Truth ought to be. Hence Peirce’s (rather
poetic) conception that future experiments ought to bring forth the conclusions from the
womb of the future. Nevertheless, from the perspective of the present, to assume, a
priori, the exact content of what those true beliefs will, in the future, infallibly be is
nothing more than a blockage of inquiry. Any such speculation as to the content of these
true beliefs (speculation which is welcome so long as it is represents the beginning of
further inquiry and not the end) must, necessarily, be presented in terms of “probability.”
For Peirce, we may conjecture about the content of these ultimate beliefs so long as we,
as good falliblists, remain in the only, and ever, highly probable, and never apodictally
certain, a priori. Although this may not “solve” the problem of “how can we seek that
which we don’t know?” it can, at least, explain it: for Peirce, there is a concrete,
determinate answer to every question which the method of inquiry, over the long run, if
duly persisted in, is “destined” to uncover.
Add to this the fact that Peirce wrote little to nothing on socio-political
philosophy (for reasons I’ve discussed), what we have are nothing but the most general
hypotheses about the structure of any future polis. If we are, as Peirce believed, truly
destined to reach the Truth, and if the only method that can reach the Truth is the method
of inquiry, and the only socio-political coordination that can sustain the method of
inquiry is a non-authoritarian democratic coordination of some kind, it would follow that
Peirce does, nascently, anticipate a future socio-political coordination that is some kind of
non-authoritarian democratic system. But the precise content of that socio-political
coordination must remain only in the realm of possibility, probability, and hypothesis: to
assume, from the start of inquiry, what the answers must be is to succumb to the type of
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anti-scientific blockade of inquiry that Peirce resisted all his life. People, that is, the
inquirers themselves, must discover the specifics of that future for themselves through the
long run process of inquiry.
Marcuse, however, deployed his conception of negative thinking to negate the
stultifying aspects of the modern milieu and to postulate the radically other (if technical
rationality is the problem, we need an aesthetic rationality; if the performance principle is
the problem, we need to find ways to alleviate the repression of the pleasure principle;
and so forth). The goals, though still relatively nebulous, were concrete enough to
demand the question: how can we get there? Marcuse’s critical theory was extraordinarily
precise in its ability to critique what is and immensely imaginative in postulating what
ought and what might otherwise be, but constructing the bridge that reaches from here to
there remains relatively obscure in terms of some concrete plan. Rae notes, for example,
notes this “ambiguity that runs throughout Marcuse’s thought between the incorporating
capacity of the logic of modernity and the means of affecting radical social change.”1400
Specifically, Rae says:
It is not easy to see how Marcuse is able to reconcile his claim that
individual emancipation can be achieved through authentic art, which is
grounded in a specific economic revolution, with his claim that individual
and social liberation can only be grounded in an authentic aesthetic. By
making individual liberation dependent on an authentic aesthetic that is
grounded in an economic revolution that he maintains is forestalled by the
logic of the socio-economic formation that he aims to negate, it is difficult
not to come to the conclusion that the central theses of Marcuse’s
philosophy are, at best, based on blind faith in the individual’s capacity to
liberate himself, or, at worst, simply irreconcilable.1401
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Both Peirce and Marcuse create philosophical methods to critique the modern milieu but
only Peirce refrains from postulating concrete “must bes” into the future, allowing future
beliefs the status of probability and hypothesis only, and allowing free inquiry to bring
them about without needing to postulate determinate content a priori. Nor was Peirce
relying on “blind faith” but, rather, an intriguing coordination of evidence gleaned from
the logic of inquiry (whether it be phenomenological experience or the cosmological
make-up of the cosmos, everything appears to moving from absolute chaos to absolute
order, an hypothesis that some modern scientists are now actually corroborating1402) and
the progression of science in general (knowledge, be maintained, was moving forward,
though not always steadily nor in a perfectly straight line, nevertheless, consensus was
increasing on matters long-debated through communal inquiry rather than decreasing).
True, all of this may be folly on Peirce’s part (though, I maintain, he presents quite a
convincing argument for both as I’ve touched upon throughout this investigation), but if
it is folly, it is at least a reason to stipulate a destined end of inquiry, that Truth exists and
is hypothetically attainable in the long run, and not mere “blind faith” as if it were no
more than a stab in the dark. Thus, though perhaps we can asribe no absolute confidence
that the goals either philosopher poses are, in fact, achievable, by providing a method of
belief formation that is the most likely candidate for eradicating doubt in the long run,
combined with Peirce’s ruminations on cosmology, logic, and inquiry, and by allowing
the content of future beliefs from the perspective of the present to remain relatively
indeterminate (though, as Peirce believed, the content of future beliefs are determinate,
we simply haven’t discovered that content yet), we have reason to hope (and not just
1402

As I mentioned in a previous footnote, scientists from the University of the Basque Country in Bilbao
and Spain’s University of Salamanca have published papers on their findings that the universe is literally
concretizing as time, itself, is slowing down towards absolute zero.

455

“mere” hope) that the deployment of instrumentalism after these goals have been
postulated isn’t grinding its gears in utter futility. It is harder, I maintain, to make the
same argument for Marcuse.
Now, it’s true that pragmatism has often been associated with instrumental
reasoning at its most cold and calculating, in no small part due to James’s unfortunate
deployment of the catchy phrase “cash value” in terms of assessing the efficacy of our
beliefs. If the value of our beliefs is nothing more than how efficiently they “cash out” in
practical activity, this clearly becomes an example of instrumental reasoning. Through a
Marcusean lens, it is easy to see how such a definition of the value of belief is conducive
not to emancipation but further indoctrination into a system where the beliefs and goals
of individual adaptation are dictated by an alienating and indoctrinating milieu. What
“cashes out” can only “cash out” in a milieu of prescribed goals that are anything but
Truth, Beauty, Goodness, and the elevation of the human condition. As Cotkin notes,
“Marxist critics would come to fixate upon the metaphor as indicative of James’s
supposed celebration of the crass values of the marketplace or as proof positive that
Jamesian pragmatism was the philosophical expression of American capitalism.”1403 As
James

himself

admitted,

critics

see

it

as

a

“characteristically

American

movement…excellently fitted for the man on the street, who naturally hates theory and
wants cash returns immediately.”1404
James attempted to explain the use of this phrase in his essay “The Pragmatist
Account of Truth and Its Misunderstandings.” He started his defense by noting that “the
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commonest mistake” of critics of pragmatism is the assumption that the tradition is little
more than a “reediting of positivism.”1405 Lumping “scepticism, positivism, and
agnosticism” together, James argued that all, to varying degrees and in different ways,
“either suggest or declare that real truth, absolute truth, is inaccessible to us, and that we
must fain put up with relative or phenomenal truth as its next best substitute.”1406
Positivism, specifically, is “cheerful” about that assessment, calling “real truth sour
grapes” and considers “phenomenal truth quite sufficient for all our ‘practical’
purposes.”1407 James responded that, “in point of fact nothing could be farther from all
this than what pragmatism has to say of truth.”1408 Pragmatism’s answer, James
maintained, “is intended to cover the most complete truth that can be conceived of,
‘absolute’ truth, if you like, as well as truth of the most relative and imperfect
description.”1409
To some degree, this accurately portrayed Peirce’s intentions. Specifically, James
was quite right in highlighting “truth” both in its “ideal”/“absolute” sense as well as (and
this is key) “truth” in its “relative and imperfect description.” To the former, Peirce did,
indeed, postulate an ideal goal of inquiry as Truth in the absolute sense. To the latter,
Peirce, in keeping with this thoroughgoing fallibilism and adherence to the first rule of
reason, maintained that all of our beliefs are, no matter how apparently secure, always
provisional and never complete. In this way, Peirce differentiates between “Truth” in the
long run, and “true beliefs” manifest in the here and now.1410 Peirce consequently only
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ever put a relative value on “true beliefs” as a stepping-stone to the greater goal of
absolute Truth in the long run. This is an important distinction to make, as it shifts the
focus of inquiry from the practical efficacy of “true beliefs” that help navigate us through
the world unproblematically, to the loftier goal of absolute Truth viewed from the
perspective of the long run. So, too, does it shift subjective goals (I wish to navigate
myself successfully through the world) to objective goals (only together can we,
communally, attain the postulated goal of Truth that is more than any finite number of
individuals have to say about it). Further, as Brent notes, Peirce championed “the
reintroduction of the value judgments of the scientist as a normal element of the scientific
method,”1411 not the mere cold calculation pragmatism is charged with.
I maintain that if Peirce ever went mad and actually used a “slipshod”1412 term
like “cash value” to apply to his conception of “truth,” it would not apply to “absolute”
Truth in the long run. As Peirce said, after all, and quite explicitly: “truth is not
something to be pushed like a business.”1413 Truth, in this ideal sense, is the means to no
greater end than itself. “True beliefs,” in the qualified sense that we’ve discussed,
certainly have a “cash value” component insofar as they help navigate the individual
through life successfully. However, even here, the navigation through life is only part of
the value of “true beliefs,” more importantly, they are an indication that Truth has, to a
relative degree, been attained. I argue, for Peirce, we don’t achieve “true beliefs” as a
means of attaining Truth, nor even, really, as a means of navigating our world
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successfully. The value of “true beliefs” lies in their participation along the long run
towards Truth through inquiry. If they happen to be the means of successful navigation
through life, successful life-navigation is only a side effect. Peirce was quite explicit on
this point:
Truth is truth, whether it is opposed to the interests of society to admit it or
not -- and that the notion that we must deny what it is not conducive to the
stability of British society to affirm is the mainspring of the mendacity and
hypocrisy which Englishmen so commonly regard as virtues. I must
confess that I belong to that class of scallawags who purpose, with God's
help, to look the truth in the face, whether doing so be conducive to the
interests of society or not.1414
“Truth is truth,” an end in itself, that is not as a means to anything else, not even the
interests of society.1415 There is no “cash value” to it whatsoever. This is likewise
corroborated in Peirce’s scathing critique of scientists who value money over the ultimate
goal of Truth.1416
I argue, further, that neither was Peirce a positivist, not in the general sense James
articulated here, nor the specific sense that Marcuse railed against in his own critique. If
James was fair in saying that positivism calls “real truth sour grapes” and considers
“phenomenal truth quite sufficient for all our ‘practical’ purposes,” 1417 it should be
equally clear that Peirce did neither the one nor the other. Quite the opposite of calling
real truth (what I take James to mean as absolute Truth) “sour grapes,” Peirce insisted
1414
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That Peirce places the pursuit of Truth above “the interests of society” is ambiguous here. On the one
hand, this could distance him further from the goals of the critical theorists who certainly had “the interest
of society” as one of their chief goals. However, precisely because Peirce ties this in with his critique of
capitalistically-minded scientists, it may also be read as a condemnation of “the interests” of modern
society, with its emphasis on capital and, as Peirce often calls it, “The Gospel of Greed.” However, again, it
is ambiguous.
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upon its potential attainment, not only that we ought to operate with it as a goal yet to be
achieved, but also that we really are approximating it through inquiry over time. In
contrast to positivism, Marcuse advocated “negative” thinking, the ability to conceive of
alternative possibilities to what is, that is to say, to think what is not. The method of
inquiry, for Peirce, relied upon precisely this component of potentiality for its success.
Combining abduction and induction with deduction, Peirce’s method was ever forward
thinking, ever ready to engage problems as they emerge from whatever source,
embracing the opportunity to develop and improve existing beliefs. Indeed, Peirce’s
fallibilism, itself, attests to the necessity of an anti-positivistic attitude: Peirce didn’t
advocate lowering the epistemic bar of requirements for certainty but, rather, insisted on
postponing certainty indefinitely while concurrently admitting to Truth’s increasing
approximation. Admission of the incompleteness of our current beliefs is not the end of
inquiry necessitating a demand to lower our epistemic expectations but the beginning of
inquiry and impetus for further cognitive development. As James said, “this question of
what truth would be like if did exist, belongs obviously to a purely speculative field of
inquiry…it abstracts from facts altogether.”1418 For Peirce, “facts speak only in the
fallible voices of the guesses, conjectures, and hypotheses that imply them, deductively,
and which are then verified,” or falsified, “inductively.”1419 Thus, if positivism is the
reduction of speculative theory to bare facts, as Marcuse argued it was, Peircean
pragmatism is clearly not a form of positivism.1420
James, “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstandings,” Op. Cit., 2.
Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 11.
1420
As we’ll see in Habermas’s critique, however, the divergence of theory and empirical facts presents
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progress is real, and that Truth is attainable, without succumbing to vicious circularity (the theory of
scientific progress and Truth dictates which beliefs are “true,” but which beliefs are “true” is what
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The second major criticism that James addressed was the apparent pragmatic
reduction of all theory to action, lending itself to the accusation that it is nothing more
than instrumental rationality in its most practical manifestation. If our beliefs happen to
“work well,” as James argued, the critic immediately leaps to the conclusion that this
means, “in their immediate workings in the physical environment, their enabling us to
make money, or gain some similar ‘practical’ advantage.”1421 Without question, a person
may well make money or gain some similar practical advantage if an individual maintains
a robust set of “true beliefs” in a Peircean sense.1422 But that these are contingent (and not
necessary) side effects of inquiry’s quest for Truth in the long run cannot (and must not)
be ignored.1423 “Not crediting us with this rudimentary insight, our critics treat our view
as offering itself exclusively to engineers, doctors, financiers, and men of action
generally, who need some sort of rough and ready Weltanschauung, but have no time or
wit to study genuine philosophy.”1424 For Peirce, beliefs manifest as habit that, in turn,
manifest as a predisposition towards regular patterns of practical activity. That is true.
However, this is a far cry from the claim that pragmatism places as its goal “practical
activity” to which belief formation is merely the means to that end. Peirce was quite
explicit in rejecting the reduction of thought to action: “if pragmaticism really made
Doing to be the Be-all and the End-all of life, that would be its death. For to say that we
live for the mere sake of action, as action, regardless of the thought it carries out, would
be to say that there is no such thing as rational purport.”1425 The manifestation of belief in
James, “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstandings,” Op. Cit., 3.
“It is quite true that, when the refined theoretic question that pragmatism begins with is once answer,
secondary corollaries of a practical sort follow,” Ibid.
1423
“Ideas do work thus, of course, immediately or remotely; but they work indefinitely inside of the
mental world also,” Ibid.
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practical activity is a symptom of this process, not its termination and certainly not its
goal. Critics who argue otherwise, James said, “ignore our primary step and its motive,
and make the relation to action, which is our secondary achievement, primary.” 1426 As
Peirce said, “every man of action is, must be, and ought to be, cunning, worldly, and
dishonest, or what seems so to a man of pure science. When such men dispute, the
dispute has some other object than the ascertainment of scientific truth.”1427 Further, and
quite explicitly, “pure science has nothing at all to do with action.”1428 Although “in vital
matters, it is quite otherwise” where “we must act in such matters,”1429 this is the realm of
instinct, not reason: “pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say
concerning practical matters, and nothing even applicable at all to vital crises. Theory is
applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of vital importance must be left to
sentiment, that is, to instinct.”1430
As I’ve demonstrated, Peirce and James were not at all on the same wavelength
when it came to many of the most central aspects of Peirce’s initial doctrine. In a letter to
James, Peirce said quite bluntly, “you and Schiller carry pragmatism too far for me”1431
and again in a different letter, “your mind and mine are as little adapted to understanding
one another as two minds could be.”1432 I heartily agree with scholars like Perry who
note: “perhaps it would be correct, and just to all parties, to say that the modern
James, “The Pragmatist Account of Truth and its Misunderstandings,” Op. Cit., 4.
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 4.34.
1428
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concerns” is a double-edged sword for our current exploration. On the one hand, philosophy-science would
eschew the “practical concerns” of the modern age: capital, commodity, and so forth. On the other hand,
“emancipation,” the dissolution of “alienation,” are certainly “vital concerns” which, according to Peirce,
would likewise not be the concern of philosophy as he conceives it.
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movement known as pragmatism is largely the result of James’ misunderstanding of
Peirce.”1433 Indeed, if “there are as many pragmatisms as there are pragmatists,”1434 any
critique that seeks to reduce a philosophical tradition that runs from Peirce, James, and
Dewey through Adams, Royce, and Mead, to Papini, Rorty, and Davidson (naming but a
few who have, over the years, either self-identified as a pragmatist or who have been
identified as a pragmatist), to one man (James), to one phrase of one man (“cash-value”),
welcomes more confusion than it offers substantive critique.
In “Means and Ends,” Horkheimer outlined not only the defining characteristics
of instrumental reason, which he likewise called “subjective reason,” but pitted it against
objective reason and demonstrated how modernity had given rise to an increased
emphasis on the former to the detriment of the latter. With the fall of objective
rationality, instrumental reason feeds into the indoctrinating milieu of capitalism in a
critique that complements Marcuse’s own.
Horkheimer began his critique by noting that the average man on the street, when
asked “what reason is” will answer with a dismissive shrug, that “the concept of reason is
self-explanatory,” and that, if it is anything more than entirely an “superfluous” question,
this man will answer that “reasonable things are things that are obviously useful, and that
every reasonable man is supposed to be able to decide what is useful to him.”1435 Thus,
instrumental rationality is both (a) directed exclusively to utility and practical affairs and
Perry, Ibid., 409. Further, “James amended Peirce’s position (that ideas mean general rules for conduct)
to his own stand that meanings can be reduced to a particular consequence,” Patrick Kiaran Dooley.
Pragmatism as Humanism: the Philosophy of William James (New Jersey: Littlefield, Adams & Co.,
1975), 119. Also, “Peirce was concerned with the practicality of consequences to bear out intellectual
concepts, but…James was more concerned with particularity of consequences…James was concerned
chiefly with the effect of thoughts on the individual and his particular acts; Peirce was concerned chiefly
with the clarification of ideas,” James Feibleman, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Charles S. Peirce:
Interpreted as a System (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1970), 303 – 304.
1434
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(b) subjective in so far as every, individual man is “supposed to be able to decide what is
useful” to him, subjectively.
If individuals seek solely to avoid disappointment, to find what is “useful,” and
have no loftier goals than these, it is not to reason at all that Peirce suggested they appeal,
but rather to “instinct.” “Instinct,” by Peirce’s admission, guides the organism through
life far more infallibly1436 than reason ever could. As he noted:
It is only a remarkable man or a man in a remarkable situation, who, in
default of any applicable rule of thumb, is forced to reason out his plans
from first principles. In at least nine such cases out of every ten, he
blunders seriously, even if he manages to escape complete disaster. We
shall therefore be well within bounds in pronouncing Reason to be more
than a thousand times as fallible as Instinct.1437
For Peirce, reason’s deployment in matters of “vital concern,” nine times out of ten
actually hinders the individual’s successful navigation through life rather than aids it.
Peirce went to great lengths to discuss and catalogue various instincts which he divided
into two, general categories, “individual” and “social,” both “adaptive” to changing
environmental circumstances, and both “adapted to the preservation of the
stock…through preserving the individual in whom the instinct acts, and those which are
social, and therefore, so far as they are adaptive, are adaptive primarily to the advantage
of some other individual or individuals than the agent.”1438 This, too, factors into his
method of inquiry and further illuminates instinct’s relationship with reason. As he said,
for example, in his critique of the a priori method, that it was based upon “the expression

“Science is foredestined to reach the truth of every problem with as unerring an infallibility as the
instincts of animals do their work,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 7.77.
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of instinct which must be the ultimate cause of belief.”1439 Important to note here is that
Peirce is critiquing the a priori method in this way. In the a priori method, the
“expression of instinct” becomes the cause of belief, in sharp contrast to the method of
inquiry, and if the former guides individuals through life more practically, it becomes
increasingly clear how distant Peirce’s pragmatism was to the charge of instrumentalism.
Indeed, Peirce was even suspicious of science’s marriage to practical concerns,
further corroborating the claim that his method was neither advocating scienticism nor an
abnormal veneration of scientists, for even in science can practioners run afoul of a
certain instrumental rationality:
Even if a science be useful -- like engineering or surgery -- yet if it is useful
only in an insignificant degree as those sciences are, it still has a divine
spark in which its petty practicality must be forgotten and forgiven. But as
soon as a proposition becomes vitally important -- then in the first place, it
is sunk to the condition of a mere utensil; and in the second place, it ceases
altogether to be scientific, because concerning matters of vital importance
reasoning is at once an impertinence toward its subject matter and a treason
against itself.1440
Peirce explicitly wanted to avoid science becoming a “mere utensil,” “instrumental,” in
this sense, to the end of dealing with “vital concerns.” It is “instinct,” not “reason,” that,
for Peirce, ought to guide the practical concerns of humans.
Further, based on his complementary notions of fallibilism and the long run of
inquiry, precisely because inquiry does not terminate with me, with you, or with any
finite number of inquirers currently alive, our faith in the attainment of Truth must be
transferred from faith in just ourselves (subjectively) to an infinite community of
inquirers stretching indefinitely into the future. As he said:
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Death makes the number of our risks, of our inferences, finite, and so
makes their mean result uncertain. The very idea of probability and of
reasoning rests on the assumption that this number is indefinitely great…it
seems to me that we are driven to this, that logicality inexorably requires
that our interests shall not be limited. They must not stop at our own fate,
but must embrace the whole community. This community, again, must not
be limited, but must extend to all races of beings with whom we can come
into immediate or mediate intellectual relation. It must reach, however
vaguely, beyond this geological epoch, beyond all bounds. He who would
not sacrifice his own soul to save the whole world, is, as it seems to me,
illogical in all his inferences, collectively. Logic is rooted in the social
principle.1441
If, as Horkheimer said, instrumental (subjective) reason “concerns itself at all with ends,
it takes for granted that they too are reasonable in the subjective sense, i.e. that they serve
the subject’s interest in relation to self-preservation – be that of the single individual, or
of the community on whose maintenance that of the individual depends,”1442 Peirce’s
pragmatism was neither subjective nor concerned with self-preservation: an issue of
“instinct,” not “reason.”
Further, Horkheimer was concerned that, “the idea that an aim can be reasonable
for its own sake – on the basis of virtues that insight reveals it to have in itself – without
reference to some kind of subjective gain or advantage, is utterly alien to subjective
reason.”1443 Let us consider the following definition of what Peirce called “the true man
of science,” that is, the ideal sort of philosopher:
There are two qualifications which every true man of science possesses,
and which, if a man possesses them, he is sure to develop into a scientific
man in the course of time, if he ought not fairly to be called such already.
First, the dominant passion of his whole soul must be to find out the truth
in some department, regardless of what the color of that truth may be.

1441

Ibid., CP 2.654.
Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, Op. Cit., 3.
1443
Ibid.
1442

466

Secondly, he must have a natural gift for reasoning, for severely critical
thought.1444

The goal of this ideal man of science is clearly not personal gain, personal advantage, nor
the mere avoidance of subjective problems and disasters. Here, the goal is not personal
gain but “truth,” “regardless of the color of that truth,” that is, regardless of how that truth
may manifest, in what realm of inquiry it may manifest, and regardless, too, of what
personal benefits can be gained through its approximation via inquiry. 1445 The emphasis
on “severely critical thought” likewise indicates anything but submission to the
indoctrinating mores of the current milieu but, quite the contrary (in keeping with his first
rule of reason), the ideal man of science will be all-too-ready to critique the beliefs
proliferated by the authority and seek a Truth above and beyond (perhaps, “behind”)
those beliefs.
In contrast to subjective/instrumental reason, Horkheimer forwarded what he
called “objective reason”:
The supreme endeavor of this kind of thinking was to reconcile the
objective order of the ‘reasonable,’ as philosophy conceived it, with
human existence, including self-interest and self-preservation. Plato, for
instance, undertakes in his Republic to prove that he who lives in the light
of objective reason also lives a successful and happy life.1446

Peirce made this point explicitly:
The love of truth is still far from mighty; and a gift for reasoning is still as
rare a talent as a gift for music. Most men are incapable of strong control
over their minds. Their thoughts are such as instinct, habit, association
suggest, mainly. Their criticism of their thoughts is confined to
1444
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reconsideration and to asking themselves whether their ideas seem
reasonable. I do not call this reasoning: I call it instinctive reflexion. For
most purposes it is the best way to think; for instinct blunders far less than
reason. Reasoners are in danger of falling into sophistry and pedantry. Our
instinctive ways of thinking have become adapted to ordinary practical
life, just as the rest of our physiology has become adapted to our
environment. Wisdom lies in nicely discriminating the occasions for
reasoning and the occasions for going by instinct. Some of my most
valued friends have been almost incapable of reasoning; and yet they have
been men of singularly sound judgment, penetrating and sagacious. So
much more important is it, on the whole, to feel right than to reason
deeply. But in science instinct can play but a secondary rôle. The reason of
this is that our instincts are adapted to the continuance of the race and thus
to individual life. But science has an indefinite future before it; and what it
aims at is to gain the greatest possible advance in knowledge in five
centuries or ten.1447
Peirce explicitly linked organism-environment adaptation, as Horkheimer said, “selfpreservation,” not to reason but to instinct, as we’ve discussed.1448 Reason operates in the
domain of science when the goal is seeking Truth into an “indefinite future” from the
perspective of the long run.
In contrast to instrumental, subjective reason that has increasingly infiltrated
“Western thinking in the course of the last centuries,”1449 “for a long time, a diametrically
opposite view of reason was prevalent.”1450 As Horkheimer said:
This view asserted the existence of reason as a force not only in the
individual mind but also in the objective world – in relations among
human beings and between social classes, in social institutions, and in
nature and its manifestations. Great philosophical systems, such as those
of Plato and Aristotle, scholasticism, and German idealism were founded
on an objective theory reason.1451
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Horkheimer serendipitously cited, as examples of this superior deployment of reason, the
great majority of traditions that created the mulligan stew of Peirce’s own philosophy.
That reason exists not only in the human mind but in nature, as well, featured in Peirce’s
later work. For example, Peirce noted that “it seems incontestable, therefore, that the
mind of man is strongly adapted to the comprehension of the world; at least, so far as this
goes, that certain conceptions, highly important for such a comprehension, naturally arise
in his mind; and, without such a tendency, the mind could never have had any
development at all.”1452 Further:
The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain
busy week, in the year 4004 B.C., but is going on today and never will be
done, is this very development of Reason. I do not see how one can have a
more satisfying ideal of the admirable than the development of Reason so
understood. The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior
reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we can
comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be to
execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand
toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is
‘up to us’ to do so.1453
The universe, like reason, is ever unfolding. “What is this Reason? In the first place, it is
something that never can have been completely embodied.”1454 Key, too, in this passage
is Peirce’s admission that “the one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior
reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness,” a goal not yet achieved, but a
goal in itself. And what is the ideal deployment of reason, the ideal conduct of life? It is
not for subjective self-betterment, nor personal gain, nor the personal avoidance of
disaster as a instrumental model might have it, but, instead, we participate in reason’s
unfolding “by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as
1452
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the slang is, it is ‘up to us’ to do so.” By helping the world become more reasonable,
reason’s ideal purpose is the approximation of Truth.1455
Peirce continued to flesh out this conception of what is admirable in itself by
juxtaposing it to the pursuit of subjective pleasures and desires of instrumental reason:
Now what would the doctrine that that which is admirable in itself is a
quality of feeling come to if taken in all its purity and carried to its furthest
extreme -- which should be the extreme of admirableness? It would
amount to saying that the one ultimately admirable object is the
unrestrained gratification of a desire, regardless of what the nature of that
desire may be. Now that is too shocking. It would be the doctrine that all
the higher modes of consciousness with which we are acquainted in
ourselves, such as love and reason, are good only so far as they subserve
the lowest of all modes of consciousness. It would be the doctrine that this
vast universe of Nature which we contemplate with such awe is good only
to produce a certain quality of feeling. Certainly, I must be excused for not
admitting that doctrine unless it be proved with the utmost evidence.1456

For Peirce, reason and instinct can, and do, conflict on occasion. As Peirce said: “In the ordinary
conduct of everyday affairs, men really do act from instinct; and their opinions are founded on instinct in
the broad sense in which I here take that term. A small dose of reasoning is necessary to connect the
instinct with the occasion: but the gist and character of their conduct is due to the instinct. It is only a
remarkable man or a man in a remarkable situation, who, in default of any applicable rule of thumb, is
forced to reason out his plans from first principles. In at least nine such cases out of every ten, he blunders
seriously, even if he manages to escape complete disaster. We shall therefore be well within bounds in
pronouncing Reason to be more than a thousand times as fallible as Instinct,” Ibid., CP 2.176. Nevertheless,
in a curious twist, Peirce noted that the prescription to follow “instinct” rather than “Reason” in matters of
vital concern is, itself, a mandate of Reason. As he noted: “Invariably follow the dictates of Instinct in
preference to those of Reason when such conduct will answer your purpose: that is the prescription of
Reason herself. Do not harbor any expectation that the study of logic can improve your judgment in matters
of business, family, or other departments of ordinary life. Clear as it seems to me that certain dicta of my
conscience are unreasonable, and though I know it may very well be wrong, yet I trust to its authority
emphatically rather than to any rationalistic morality. This is the only rational course,” Ibid. In short,
Reason prescribes that we default to instinct in matters of vital concern. But this sort of life, though
adequate, and certainly unavoidable even for the most rational among us, is not the ultimate sort or life that
Peirce prescribed. Drawing upon something that sounded akin to a type of Aristotelian “eudaimonia” (that
rarified form of “happiness” perhaps best translated as “flourishing”), he said: “but fortunately (I say it
advisedly) man is not so happy as to be provided with a full stock of instincts to meet all occasions, and so
is forced upon the adventurous business of reasoning, where the many meet shipwreck and the few find, not
old-fashioned happiness, but its splendid substitute, success. When one's purpose lies in the line of novelty,
invention, generalization, theory--in a word, improvement of the situation--by the side of which happiness
appears a shabby old dud--instinct and the rule of thumb manifestly cease to be applicable. The best plan,
then, on the whole, is to base our conduct as much as possible on Instinct, but when we do reason to reason
with severely scientific logic,” Ibid., CP 2.178.
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The only reason Peirce saw for this position “is that gratification, pleasure, is the only
conceivable result that is satisfied with itself; and therefore, since we are seeking for that
which is fine and admirable without any reason beyond itself, pleasure, bliss, is the only
object which can satisfy the conditions.”1457 However, “in these days…when these ideas
of progress and growth have themselves grown up so as to occupy our minds as they now
do, how can we be expected to allow the assumption to pass that the admirable in itself is
any stationary result? The explanation of the circumstance that the only result that is
satisfied with itself is a quality of feeling is that reason always looks forward to an
endless future and expects endlessly to improve its results.”1458 Evolutionary models of
inquiry, thought and nature lend themselves to antiquating the notion that an end in itself
can be such a “stationary” conception. In response, Peirce maintained that the goals of
reason, ever future-oriented, and ever-unfolding, are more likely candidates for what is
most admirable, not mere pleasure. This position is further corroborated when he said:
What does right reasoning consist in? It consists in such reasoning as shall
be conducive to our ultimate aim. What, then, is our ultimate aim? … if we
had, for example, no other aim than the pleasure of the moment, we should
fall back into the same absence of any logic that the fallacious argument
would lead to. We should have no ideal of reasoning, and consequently no
norm.1459
Again, Peirce decried the notion that “pleasure of the moment,” an integral part of
instrumental, subjective rationality as Horkheimer defined it, could possibly be the
ultimate aim of inquiry. We do have an ideal of reasoning, namely, “Truth” in the long
run, that becomes the approximation of the ideal goal of reasoning itself.

1457

Ibid.
Ibid.
1459
Ibid., CP 1.611.
1458

471

Just as Peirce noted that instinct, the realm of self-preservation, of pleasures and
of the avoidance of pain, played a “secondary” role in science, so, too, did Horkheimer
note that objective reason “never precluded subjective reason, but regarded the latter as
only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality from which criteria for all
things and beings were derived.”1460 Indeed, for Horkheimer, it was precisely the
“objective structure, and not just man and his purposes, was to be the measuring rod for
individual thoughts and action.”1461 Peirce’s method, too, was objective, as I
demonstrated, both in terms of the Secondness of the encountered world as well as the
communally forged beliefs that comprise reality, beyond what you, I, or any finite
number of inquirers might say. Peirce provided an example wherein “all the followers of
science are animated by a cheerful hope that the processes of investigation, if only
pushed far enough, will give one certain solution to each question to which they apply it.”
Initially utilizing different methods,1462 “they may at first obtain different results, but, as
each perfects his method and his processes, the results are found to move steadily
together toward a destined centre. So with all scientific research.” Further:
Different minds may set out with the most antagonistic views, but the
progress of investigation carries them by a force outside of themselves to
one and the same conclusion. This activity of thought by which we are
carried, not where we wish, but to a fore-ordained goal, is like the
operation of destiny. No modification of the point of view taken, no
selection of other facts for study, no natural bent of mind even, can enable
a man to escape the predestinate opinion. This great hope is embodied in
the conception of truth and reality. The opinion which is fated to be
ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth,
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and the object represented in this opinion is the real. That is the way I
would explain reality.1463

Horkheimer echoed this language in his definition of objective reason in sharp contrast to
that of instrumentalism in saying “the emphasis [is] on ends rather than on
means…objective reason did not focus on the co-ordination of behavior and aim, but on
concepts – however mythological they sound to us today – on the idea of the greatest
good, on the problem of human destiny and on the way of realization of ultimate
goals.”1464 Peirce offered us all this and more: the greatest good is the attainment of
Truth, an end in itself, and the “problem of human destiny” is bound up in this quest
which terminates, ideally, in the attainment of said Truth, the ultimate, destined
agreement.
Horkheimer associated the instrumental attitude with science itself, noting that the
functions of instrumental rationality “contribute to the co-ordination of means and ends,
which is, after all, the social concern of science.”1465 Although Peirce readily admitted
that there are sciences “many of whose results are almost immediately applicable to
human life,” nevertheless, “the true scientific investigator completely loses sight of the
utility of what he is about.”1466 Further:
In philosophy, touching as it does upon matters which are, and ought to
be, sacred to us, the investigator who does not stand aloof from all intent
to make practical applications will not only obstruct the advance of the
pure science, but, what is infinitely worse, he will endanger his own moral
integrity and that of his readers.1467
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Science seeks Truth, not utility, though no doubt vast utility may come from scientific
endeavors.1468 Indeed, Peirce made not “the slightest promise” that he had “any
philosophical wares to offer you which will make you…more successful men.”1469
Further, there is nothing “subjective” about reason, as Horkheimer noted, in instrumental
reason, “the subject alone can genuinely have reason.”1470 As Peirce cautioned, as well,
“in the conduct of life, we have to distinguish everyday affairs and great crises. In the
great decisions, I do not believe it is safe to trust to individual reason. In everyday
business, reasoning is tolerably successful; but I am inclined to think that it is done as
well without the aid of theory as with it.”1471 In the “vital crises,” the everyday affairs to
which instrumental reason is directed, the construction of means to achieve prescribed
ends, “reason, for all the frills it customarily wears…comes down upon its marrow-bones
to beg the succour of instinct.”1472 Further, “if I allow the supremacy of sentiment in
human affairs, I do so at the dictation of reason itself; and equally at the dictation of
sentiment, in theoretical matters I refuse to allow sentiment any weight whatever.”1473
For Horkheimer, the problem problem was that:
If the subjectivist view holds true, thinking cannot be of any help in
determining the desirability of any goal in itself. The acceptability of
ideals, the criteria for our actions and beliefs, the leading principles of
ethics and politics, all our ultimate decisions are made to depend upon
factors other than reason.1474

Between “Truth” and “utility” there appears to arise the sort of dualism that Peirce (and the other
pragmatists, as well) attempted to eschew. A charitable reading, one still faithful to the essence of Peirce’s
thoughts here, might be to bring the discussion back to instrumentalism: so long as “utility” is not the end
or goal of inquiry (this is the rightful place of “Truth”), but merely the byproduct of inquiry, no profound
tension between “Truth” and “utility” need arise.
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All thought becomes little more than “matters of choice and predilection” and it has
become “meaningless to speak of truth.”1475 The latter, it goes without saying, clearly
does not apply to Peirce and the former rings of Peirce’s critique of the a priori method
of belief formation, where “the action of natural preference” is left “unimpeded”, resting
on no “observed facts,” but “adopted” only because “their fundamental propositions
seemed ‘agreeable to reason.’”1476
Just as Horkheimer lamented that the rising tide of instrumentalism would come
to dominate the age, Peirce, too, voiced a similar concern:
The nineteenth century is now fast sinking into the grave, and we all begin
to review its doings and to think what character it is destined to bear as
compared with other centuries in the minds of future historians. It will be
called, I guess, the Economical Century; for political economy has more
direct relations with all the branches of its activity than has any other
science. Well, political economy has its formula of redemption, too. It is
this: Intelligence in the service of greed ensures the justest prices, the
fairest contracts, the most enlightened conduct of all the dealings between
men, and leads to the summum bonum, food in plenty and perfect comfort.
Food for whom? Why, for the greedy master of intelligence….until there
has resulted a philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is
the great agent in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of
the universe.1477

Peirce leveled a stunning critique of the growing commodification of philosophy and its
submission to capitalistic instrumentalism. Indeed, Peirce’s critique was not altogether
dissimilar from the critique leveled at pragmatism by its critics.
Further, as I’ve indicated throughout, Peirce faced this rising ride of
instrumentalism personally and professionally at every turn, handicapping his otherwise
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revolutionary scientific discoveries. As he noted on one occasion, for example, in a letter
to Mendenhall:
I feel impelled to say that one or two things you said to me…appear to me
quite wrong. You mentioned as almost culpable that every head of a
bureau wants to set up an investigating laboratory of the brance of science
which concerns him. The idea is, I suppose, that he mustn’t try to do his
work scientifically, because that might cost money…that view seems to
me in the first place to overlook the facts of human nature. If you pay a
man a very low salary to begin with, and then forbid him to have any
warmth or zeal in the conduct of his office, carefully remove all
intellectual interest it might have and leave him nothing but the pure
money to work for, and finally construct a series of fiscal regulations the
main purpose of which seems to be to take up as much time with accounts
as possible, - if you do all that you will have the heads of bureaus even
worse than they are now. In the second place, it rather shocks me to hear
you who know what a slough of materialism this country has sunk in,
where nothing is considered as sacred except the holy, holy, holy dollar, giving in to complaints against heads of bureaus that they are spending a
little money in trying to advance science…1478

Nevertheless, Horkheimer insisted that pragmatism was the prime culprit of this
new form of instrumental rationality, specifically in “its surrender to heteronymous
contents”1479 in juxtaposition with the “autonomy”1480 of objective reason, precisely the
sort of instrumentalism that Peirce decried in this letter and battled against every step of
his professional career. Pragmatism, which Horkheimer viewed as a co-conspirator along
with positivism in this regard, was guilty of allowing reason to be “completely harnessed
to the social process,”1481 stripped of all objective content. That Peirce would adamantly
reject that reason should be completely harnessed to the social process was patently clear
through his critique of the method of authority, not to mention Peirce’s insistence that
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philosophy ought not be subjugated to practical, “vital” concerns that would result in the
altering or influencing of inquiry’s trajectory. Inquiry must, he insisted, “be determined
by nothing human, but by some external permanency -- by something upon which our
thinking has no effect.”1482 This “external permanency would not be external, in our
sense, if it was restricted in its influence to one individual. It must be something which
affects, or might affect, every man.”1483 To subjugate reason’s role in inquiry to anything
but Truth would be to effectively block the ongoing path of inquiry, the worst of all
intellectual sins for Peirce. By rejecting the position that the goals of inquiry be created
by anything “human” (instrumentalism), this clearly includes rejecting also any social
processes forged of human desires, specifically, the beliefs foisted upon inquirers within
a method of authority. If philosophy was put in thrall to socio-political concerns, those
concerns would dictate inquiry’s trajectory, and then we could, indeed, claim that reason
had become instrumental, namely, a means of validating the pre-existing goals and claims
of a given society. This was precisely the heart of Peirce’s critique of the method of
authority and Peirce’s “suspicion” of allowing reason to be harnessed by socio-political
concerns was that the trajectory of inquiry would be dictated by pre-ordained ends
conducive to the perpetuation of the authority’s power, the very essence of instrumental
deployment of reason:
To declare that the sole reason for scientific research is the good of society
is to encourage those pseudo-scientists to claim, and the general public to
admit, that they, who deal with the applications of knowledge, are the true
men of science, and that the theoreticians are little better than idlers.1484
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If we read this through the lens of “technical rationality,” the “good of society” is
represented by the indoctrinating mores that lead to integration into a milieu of
efficiency, productivity, and commodity capitalism. These are “good,” at least, from the
perspective of the invested interests. “Truth is truth,” after all, “whether it is opposed to
the interests of society to admit it or not.” 1485
As Anderson notes, “the political situation, as Peirce saw it, is that the
subservience of philosophy-science to social needs is yet another, more subtle, form of
authority.”1486 As Gallie notes, “if once science is directed to fixing belief in subservience
to the interim needs of practice, it thereby ceases to be genuine science.”1487 As Peirce
himself said, “we are told that we must not believe a certain purely theoretical
proposition because it is ‘anti-social’ to do so, and because to do so ‘is opposed to the
interests of society.’”1488 But this is precisely the sort of commitment to negative thinking
that the Frankfurt School championed: if the interests of society are totalitarian, Peirce
was advocating the true individual of science ignore those purported “interests of
society” and stay the course towards Truth. As Peirce said:
I stand for, have always stood for the very freest of free-thinking. If there
is anyone who goes beyond me in reprobation of all attempts and any
attempt to stifle or discourage free-thought or its proper expression all I
can say is that I have never yet met such a person.1489

Thus, I argue, in no way did Peirce advocate the harnessing of reason by social
processes.
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Horkheimer continued his critique of pragmatism in saying that reason’s
“operational value, its role in the domination of men and nature, has been made the sole
criterion.”1490 In terms of the latter, Peirce framed the method of inquiry as the
transactions between an organism and its environment. For example, he said, “doubt,
usually, perhaps always, takes its rise from surprise, which supposes previous belief; and
surprises come with novel environment.”1491 But there is no implication in the
transactional model of inquiry that “domination” or “subjugation” of nature has any place
in Peirce’s model.
Consider, for example, the juxtaposition between the methods of inquiry and
tenacity. Tenacity entailed the purposive self-isolating of the individual to prevent the
exposure to alternative beliefs that did not corroborate the individual’s own. Burning the
newspaper that advocates alternative perspectives has the same result as not reading it.
Taking a hammer to the television that expresses alternate opinions has the same result as
turning it off. In sum, destroying the immediate or proximate source of the problem is not
the same as engaging the problem itself. As Peirce said, “here is the operation of the
environment, which goes to break up habits destined to be broken up and so to render the
mind lively.”1492 The state of belief is type of equilibrium with the environment, not the
domination of it. And the ideal reaction to disequilibrium, a state of doubt, is not the
destruction of the object of tension, but its understanding, integration, and assimilation
into a new, stronger belief. As De Waal says, “inquiry…is a mechanism by which certain
organisms adapt themselves to concrete changes in their environment so as to regain their
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homeostatic equilibrium.”1493 Adaptation does not entail destruction. Quite the opposite,
in fact, since the destruction of the environment would, in the long run, necessarily result
in the destruction of the organism itself.1494 Indeed, Peirce even took a quick, sly stab at
capitalism as framed in this way, noting, “here, then, would be a continual increase of
wealth, which is a sort of ‘adaptation to one's environment,’ produced by a survival of the
fittest, that is, by the elimination from the game of every player who has lost his last
dollar.”1495 Although undeniably science has been used to destroy the environment, this is
not the form of science’s deployment that Peirce advocated.
In terms of using reason instrumentally to dominate man, I find no substantive
indication of this in Peirce. Between his critique of authority, his critique of capitalism1496
as the “Gospel of Greed,” his insistence on a democratic form of inquiry, I feel such a
charge is easily refuted. Although it could be argued that the creation of an ideal
De Waal, On Pragmatism, Op. Cit.,2. As De Waal frames it here (and he’s not wrong to do so), this
begins to sound more like the goal of inquiry is something akin to “utility” rather than “Truth.” However,
for Peirce, “Truth” was beyond any doubt (apodictic, in this sense) such that no problems could, or would,
ever arise to disturb it, forcing reevaluation in the future. Inquiry necessarily takes place through
transactions between organisms and their environments (environments which include other organisms).
Thus, if the problems that “Truth” would no longer encounter would have otherwise been the product of
these transactions, it follows that “Truth” is a type of ultimate equilibrium between an organism and its
environment where no disruption (disequilibrium) would ever re-emerge. In short, I contend that there is
the type of equilibrium of utility that does not necessarily entail the approximation of Truth (perhaps driven
by “instinct” on matters of vital concern) but, also, there is the type of equilibrium in this more rarified
sense which is the approximation of Truth and does entail the former conception, as well: Truth would
satisfy both the rational as well as the instinctual quest for equilibrium whereas the instinctual quest for
equilibrium does not necessarily need to entail the rational.
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community of inquirers is merely an individual’s means to achieving the end of Truth for
him or herself, this strikes me a very odd reading, indeed, and one that is hard to justify in
light of Peirce’s entire body of work.
Horkheimer continued his critique by charging pragmatism with encouraging
“concepts” to become nothing more than “‘streamlined,’ rationalized, labor-saving
devices. It is if thinking itself had been reduced to the level of industrial processes,
subjected to a close schedule – in short, made part and parcel of production.”1497 Peirce’s
deployment of reason for inquiry and his quest for Truth had, by my estimation, nothing
whatsoever to do with “production” in the sense of commodity and capital, as indicated
by his critique of scientists motivated solely by money. 1498 Further, I argue that there is
no “close schedule” (one that Horkheimer rightly associates with the ongoing means of
production and commodity consumption) that Peirce adhered to, indeed, far from it. As
Gallie notes, “the ends and standards of scientific inquiry cannot be equated with those of
practice – whether conceived in terms of immediate economic utility, personal wellbeing, or social cohesion”1499 for “inquiry can only fulfill its proper function, the
settlement of belief, if it abjures all thought of an immediate or temporarily useful
settlement.”1500 As Thompson notes, “the final aim of each inquirer is never the
verification of this or that hypothesis but rather the truth which is pursued by the
unlimited community”1501 in the long run. If the goal of Peirce’s method of inquiry were
somehow commodified by capitalism, the invested interests would fail to meet their
1497
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deadlines, I dare suspect, and, considering the ideal (i.e., perpetual) nature of the goal,
itself, these invested interests would find themselves out of business long before they
could package and ship the product of Peirce’s philosophy.
According to Horkheimer, pragmatism maintained that:
No aim as such is better than another. Modern thought has tried to make a
philosophy out of this view, as represented in pragmatism. The core of this
philosophy is the opinion that an idea, a concept, or a theory is nothing but
a scheme or plan of action, and therefore truth is nothing but the
successfulness of the idea.1502
The first part of Horkheimer’s critique here is a charge that pragmatism did not create
values, and thus “no aim…is better than another.” However, Peirce made an exhaustive
study of what he called “normative science” as one of the “three grand divisions”1503 of
philosophy, that which “investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of
Phenomena to Ends, that is…to Truth, Right, and Beauty.”1504 Peirce then subdivided
“normative science” into “esthetics, ethics, and logic”1505 wherein “esthetics considers
those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those things whose
ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something,”1506 all of
which was central to his pragmatism.
Further, as I’ve demonstrated above, both in terms of James’ refutation that the
purpose of philosophy terminates in action and Peirce’s explicit claim that “pure science
has nothing at all to do with action,”1507 it is, I argue, patently clear that Horkheimer’s
condemnation of pragmatism as a philosophy that reduces all theory to “nothing but a
Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, Op. Cit., 28 – 29.
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scheme” has nothing at all to do with Peirce. It is true, of course, as Mullin notes, for
Peirce, “we call a belief true if the action that it produces leads us to what we expect in
reality.”1508 That a belief’s veracity is actively tested to determine if the guiding
principles of that belief do indeed lead to the conclusions the inquirer expects, is no more,
nor less, than a fundamental aspect of the scientific method itself, one which Peirce never
privileged at the expense of the belief, the doubt, the inquiry, the resolution, Truth that
lies in wait, Reality that may be found, or any other part of the cyclical process of belief
formation. Beliefs shape actions, actions that engage with the environment through
testing and inquiry, and produce new beliefs. Beliefs establish “in our nature…a rule of
action, or, say for short, a habit. As it appeases the irritation of doubt, which is the motive
for thinking, thought relaxes, and comes to rest for a moment when belief is reached.”1509
And on the cycle goes. The habit (that denotes a rule for action not the action itself, it is
important to add) is established by the belief and allows thought to relax, temporarily,
until a new problem disrupts the initial belief and demands a reformulation. As I’ve
argued before, there is no reason to privilege action over belief in Peirce, especially in
light of the ideal, ultimate goal of inquiry that was meant to secure the veracity of “true
beliefs” (not actions).
However, Horkheimer may well have been right to raise, at least, a worried
eyebrow if he’s aiming this part of the critique at James, rather than Peirce. As Philström
notes:
In Peirce’s view, this doctrine, assuming that ‘the end of man is action,’
pushes the pragmatic method ‘to such extremes as much tend to give us
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pause’ (CP 5.3, 1902). James’ pragmatism is ‘extreme,’ implying that
‘Doing is the ultimate purpose of life’ (CP 8.115, c. 1900).1510
I’ve noted this before, but it bears repetition here in light of Horkheimer’s direct
criticism. In a letter to James, Peirce wrote:
That everything is to be tested by its practical results was the great text of
my early papers; so, as far as I get your general aim…I am quite with you
in the main. In my later papers, I have seen more thoroughly than I used
to do that it is not mere action as brute exercise of strength that is the
purpose of all, but say generalization, such action as tends towards
regularization, and the actualization of the thought which without actions
remains unthought.1511
Though to some degree James may have been guilty of Horkheimer’s charge, Peirce
maintained, “the end of thought is action only in so far as the end of action is another
thought.”1512 The elevation of “action” as the sole reason for inquiry obfuscates the
general trajectory of his method of inquiry.
For Horkheimer:
If it were not for the founder of the school, Charles S. Peirce, who has told
us that he ‘learned philosophy out of Kant,’ one might be tempted to deny
any philosophical pedigree to a doctrine that holds not that our
expectations are fulfilled and our actions successful because our ideas are
true, but rather that our ideas are true because our expectations are
fulfilled and our actions successful. Indeed, it would be doing Kant an
injustice to make him responsible for this development. He made scientific
insight dependent upon transcendental, not upon empirical functions. He
did not liquidate truth by identifying it with the practical actions of
verification, nor by teaching that meaning and effect are identical.1513
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Horkheimer claimed, for Peirce, that ideas are considered “true” only to the extent that
our actions are successful rather than, as I argue was Peirce’s intent, that our actions are
successful precisely because our beliefs are true. Horkheimer effectively reversed
Peirce’s justification for the creation of “true beliefs.” Although it’s true, for Peirce, that
we may claim that we have a “true belief” if our expectations are fulfilled and our actions
successful, this is not what makes it true. A belief’s veracity is “determined by nothing
human, but by some external permanency -- by something upon which our thinking has
no effect.”1514 Further, there was an implicit sense of ultimate termination in
Horkheimer’s claim that, for pragmatists, “our ideas are true because our experiences are
fulfilled and our actions successful” as if this were the end of the story whereas, for
Peirce, it’s just a moment of inquiry’s unfolding. This misreading of Peirce is further
corroborated in Horkheimer’s accusation that pragmatism liquidated “truth by identifying
it with the practical actions of verification,” in keeping with the methods of positivism, in
general. For Peirce, Truth can never be liquidated nor, really, can it ever be exhausted.
Further, as Horkheimer said, “pragmatism reflects a society that has no time to
remember and meditate.”1515 Aside from the fact that Peirce discussed “memory” at
length throughout his vast corpus, granting it a significant role, a reality, and a
“power”1516 that contributed to the present as well as the future, Peirce’s critique, for
example, of the method of authority was riddled with examples culled from history’s past
to demonstrate the real terror and real efficacy of this method of belief formation.
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.384. This “external permanency” would be that objective factor in inquiry,
namely, that externality of Secondness that I discussed previously that, though experienced
phenomenologically, resists our beliefs if they are less than “true” in the provisional sense. That is, for
Peirce, we cannot simply believe whatever we wish, as if resolutely believing that fire will not burn us, for
it will, a fact of the matter that cannot be circumvented no matter how much we may wish it.
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Horkheimer’s critique also implicitly accused pragmatism of sacrificing reflection for
expediency, that society “has no time” for such matters and requires instant gratification.
But of course, considering Peirce’s “long run,” whatever “instant” gratification we may
receive from the deployment of the method of inquiry is provisional at best.
Horkheimer continued his critique, emphasizing the “subjectivism of the school”
that highlights “the role that ‘our’ practices, actions, and interests play in its theory of
knowledge, not in its acceptance of a phenomenalistic doctrine. If true judgments on
objects, and therewith the concept of the object itself, rest solely on ‘effects’ upon the
subject’s action, it is hard to understand what meaning could still be attributed to the
concept ‘object.’”1517 Aside from the fact that Horkheimer failed to appreciate the central
role phenomenology (phaneroscopy) played in Peirce’s pragmatism (or didn’t read it), if
he was claiming that human practices, actions, and interests constitute all that there is
about an object, this view contradicts Peirce’s insistence on an objective component of
inquiry. As Peirce said, objects “are what they are, and persist at every opportunity in
revealing themselves regardless of what you or I, or any man or any generation of men,
may think that they are.”1518 The fundamental hypothesis of Peirce’s scientific method of
inquiry was this:
There are Real things, whose characters are entirely independent of our
opinions about them; those Reals affect our senses according to regular
laws, and, though our sensations are as different as are our relations to the
object, yet, by taking advantage of the laws of perception, we can
ascertain by reasoning how things really and truly are.1519
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Horkheimer eventually cited Peirce directly, a citation that culminated in Peirce’s
contention that not only ought philosophy adopt the scientific method but, too, that
pragmatism operates by the “logical rule – ‘By their fruits ye shall know them.’”1520 It is
curious to note that Horkheimer harvested this quote from a section in which Peirce was
explicitly distancing himself from the rest of the tradition for many of the reasons we
have hitherto explored.1521 Setting aside, for a moment, the issue of divergences between
James, Dewey, and Peirce, let us look at the citation itself: “By their fruits ye shall know
them.” By Horkheimer’s own admission, he sought a theory that, in his words, would be
“that our expectations are fulfilled and our actions successful because our ideas are true.”
This is quite right. “By their fruits ye shall know them.” By the fulfillment of our
expectations, by the success of our actions, by the correlations achieved between beliefs
as guiding principles with the results we expect we have good evidence to suggest that,
albeit provisionally, our ideas (prior to the actions that tested them) are true. The “fruits”
are the successes of inquiry. The “them” is the Truth. Which, by my estimation, is
precisely the formulation Horkheimer was seeking, himself. As Brent notes, for Peirce,
meaning was not exhausted in a mere empirical act of observation of traits or effects but
rather “meaning is the result of what physicists call a thought experiment; it is the
consequences of the testing of a hypothesis by way of its conceivable results. Meaning is
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virtual, not actual.”1522 Meaning was never exhausted, for Peirce, nor could it be fully
encapsulated by a simple dictum or singular experiment. It was an ongoing process of
determination, ever only approximate, always relatively indistinct, and ever futureoriented: meaning is the result of the testing of hypotheses and, as we’ve seen, tests that
reach far beyond the cold confines of the sterile laboratory but into all walks of human
inquiry including the realm of the socio-political and “though experiments,” hypotheses,
are precisely what an authoritarian power structure would seek to diminish (or influence)
for fear of the results undermining the beliefs they have proliferated. As Peirce said, “the
best that can be done is to supply a hypothesis, not devoid of all likelihood, in the general
line of growth of scientific ideas, and capable of being verified or refuted by future
observers.”1523
In direct contrast to a reduction of thought to mere “cash value,” Peirce, in his
critique of Ernest Mach, a renowned instrumentalist, noted:
It is Prof. Ernst Mach who has done the most to show the importance in
logic of the consideration of Economy although I had written a paper on
the subject as early as 1878. But Mach goes altogether too far. For he
allows thought no other value than that of economizing experiences. This
cannot for an instant be admitted.1524
Further, Peirce’s philosophy not only entailed the achieved objective of inquiry
(Truth and Reality), but the ideal forum for that objective’s achievement. The unlimited
community itself became an ideal implicit in Peirce’s method of inquiry: if he believed
that Truth and Reality could, ideally, be known, and if Truth and Reality can only be
known by an unlimited community of inquirers, it follows that Peirce also maintained the
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possibility of, and desire for, a most robust form of solidarity and community. As Megill
notes in his comparison of Marxism and Pragmatism, Peirce accepted a “radical” form of
reason, one that “involves the assertion that there is a reality independent of human
consciousness” which “requires asserting that man lives in community.”1525 As Peirce
said:
The question whether the genus homo has any existence except as
individuals, is the question whether there is anything of any more dignity,
worth, and importance than individual happiness, individual aspirations,
and individual life. Whether men really have anything in common, so that
the community is to be considered as an end in itself is the most
fundamental practical question in regard to every public institution, the
constitution of which we have it in our power to influence.1526
Individual, subjective “happiness” and “aspirations” are nothing compared to the
happiness and aspirations of the community. Far from submitting to the subjectivist
charge, the community is far more important than the individual.
With Peirce’s ideal community in mind, in conjunction with his assertion that the
individual is but a “cell” in a greater social organism and only through inquiry and
solidarity does the individual dissolve the antagonisms that displaced him or her in the
first place, let us consider this passage from the early Marx:
Human emancipation will only be complete when the real, individual man
has absorbed into himself the abstract citizen; when as an individual man,
in his everyday life, in his work, and in his relationships, he has become a
species being and when he has recognized and organized his own powers
as social powers so that he no longer separates the social power from
himself as political power.1527
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If we juxtapose Marx’s desire to see the individual man who has “recognized and
organized his own powers as social powers” with Peirce’s claim that “no man can be
logical whose supreme desire is [limited to] the well-being of himself,”1528 we begin to
see the profound resonance and Peirce’s extreme distance from any accusation of
subjectivism. Interesting to note, too, that Horkheimer was critical of this conception of
man becoming a “species being” when he said that, in the modern milieu, men have
become “mere species beings, exactly like one another through isolation in the forcibly
united collectivity. The oarsmen, who cannot speak to one another, are each of them
yoked in the same rhythm as the modern worker in the factory, movie theater, and
collective.”1529 The distinction between Marx’s positive reading of species being, and
Horkheimer’s negative reading, may be equated to the “community” under the rule of
authority and the “community” under the method of inquiry in Peirce. As we’ve
explored, there is solidarity and “community” under the method of authority, but it is
forged of force, coercion, indoctrination, violence and fear. An ideal community would
be entirely uncoerced, radically democratic, and brought together by a common goal of
their own making (again, parallels may also be drawn between Sartre’s distinction of
“seriality” and a “group-in-fusion,” respectively).
“Pragmatism,” Horkheimer claimed, is “trying to turn experimental physics into a
prototype of all science.”1530 But Peirce did not privilege the bare facts of physics over
the theories, themselves. As he said, “in all the explanatory sciences theories far more
simple than the real facts are of the utmost service in enabling us to analyse the
phenomena, and it may truly be said that physics could not possibly deal even with its
1528
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relatively simple facts without such analytic procedure.”1531 Further, Peirce was explicit
in noting “the dependence of physics upon philosophy,”1532 not the other way around.
Further still, in his analysis of physics, there is this often overlooked passage:
The old-fashioned political economist adored, as alone capable of
redeeming the human race, the glorious principle of individual greed,
although, as this principle requires for its action hypocrisy and fraud, he
generally threw in some dash of inconsistent concessions to virtue, as a sop
to the vulgar Cerberus. But it is easy to see that the only kind of science this
principle would favor would be such as is immediately remunerative with a
great preference for such as can be kept secret, like the modern sciences of
dyeing and perfumery. Kepler's discovery rendered Newton possible, and
Newton rendered modern physics possible, with the steam engine,
electricity, and all the other sources of the stupendous fortunes of our age.
But Kepler's discovery would not have been possible without the doctrine of
conics. Now contemporaries of Kepler -- such penetrating minds as
Descartes and Pascal -- were abandoning the study of geometry (in which
they included what we now call the differential calculus, so far as that had at
that time any existence) because they said it was so UTTERLY USELESS.
There was the future of the human race almost trembling in the balance; for
had not the geometry of conic sections already been worked out in large
measure, and had their opinion that only sciences apparently useful ought to
be pursued, [prevailed] the nineteenth century would have had none of those
characters which distinguish it from the ancien régime.1533
Peirce was rescuing the “otherwise useless” from obscurity precisely by advocating
inquiry for inquiry’s sake not reducible to the “utility” determined in a culture of capital
and greed. Peirce was not contributing to a culture of expediency, capital, and
commodity, as Horkheimer maintained, but railing against any milieu deeming some
avenue of inquiry “useless” if it failed to address “immediate” concerns.
At the end of his critique, Horkheimer concluded that Peirce, and his fellow
pragmatists, were quite “unable to deal with the cultural debacle of our days.”1534 As he
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said, “the fathers of pragmatism made the satisfaction of the subject the criterion of
truth.”1535 Such a conception would result in a thoroughgoing “rugged” or “atomic”
individualism, inherent in capitalistic competitiveness, selfishness, personal greed, and
the dissolution of authentic solidarity. Quite the contrary, Peirce was adamantly opposed
to such a conception of atomic individualism. As Mullin observes:
Political democracy and the system of capitalism and private ownership
developed on the assumption that the individual first subsists, and then
enters into arrangements with other individuals for their mutual benefit.
The preeminence that each of us bestows on our separate selves bolsters
the belief in the reality of separate individuals. Each of us seems to be
self-contained and self-centered, and our cooperation and communication
take place among ready-made selves.1536
Peirce, as we’ve seen, was the hyperbolic inverse of this conception: a theory of an
unlimited postulated community and an original “social individualism” more primal than
our subjective individuation. As Peirce said, “a person is not absolutely an
individual…the man’s circle of society (however widely or narrowly this phrase may be
understood), is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some respects of higher rank than
the person of an individual organism.”1537 In sharp contrast to this, as we’ve seen, lies
“the conviction of the nineteenth century,” the milieu of capital and commodity and
competition under the “illusion” of atomic individualism, extreme subjectivism, the idea
that “progress takes place by virtue of every individual’s striving for himself with all his
might and trampling his neighbour under foot whenever he gets a chance to do so. This
may accurately be called the Gospel of Greed.”1538 In articulating a method of inquiry
that demands hyperbolic freedom, in noting that method can flourish only in a
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hyperbolically inclusive socio-political democracy, and in sticking to his first rule of
reason that seeks to dissolve any blockade of inquiry, Peirce’s quest for freedom to
inquire became a quest to deal with, as Horkheimer felt pragmatism could not, “the
cultural debacle of our days.”1539 How many of the horrors of capitalism and commodity
fetishism, as Horkheimer and Marcuse articulated them, would tumble down if Peirce’s
first rule of reason was applied across the board? Every obstacle of inquiry, most
especially instrumentalism itself, would be razed to the ground to allow not only inquiry
to flourish but, in allowing inquiry to flourish, so, too, create a milieu in which inquiry
could flourish, that is, a hyperbolically inclusive, radically free community.1540
Horkheimer claimed that Peirce’s philosophy “reflects with an almost disarming
candor the spirit of the prevailing business culture.”1541 Unless Horkheimer meant that
“the spirit of the prevailing business culture” was a profoundly negative critique of the
prevailing business culture, I cannot see how Horkheimer is anything other than
completely mistaken in this accusation. As Brent notes, Peirce died just prior to the First
World War, the “end of an age whose dominant values he despised.”1542 As Anderson
rightly notes, Peirce’s critique of the “Gospel of Greed” clearly demonstrates that Peirce
“was not an advocate of what seem to many to be the worst demons of American
capitalism.”1543 This is ubiquitous and clearly apparent throughout Peirce’s vast corpus,
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this critique of instrumentalism and this critique of the “greedy master of
intelligence.”1544
Peirce’s critique of the deployment of intelligence under the aegis of capital and
commodity resonates with Marcuse’s position on technology, in general. For Marcuse,
technology was the means of combating both poverty and scarcity but had been
manipulated by invested interests in the advanced industrial society to further alienate
and disenfranchise all but the upper echelon of the modern milieu, resulting in an
indoctrinating performance principle, surplus repression and, as I have added, surplus
scarcity (namely, that there is more scarcity than there needs to be precisely because, as
Peirce argued, the food and comfort afforded by capital serves only the “greedy master”
that deploys this intelligence, indicative of the type of “performance principle” Marcuse
critiqued in Eros and Civilization). Further, as Peirce said:
What I say, then, is that the great attention paid to economical questions
during our century has induced an exaggeration of the beneficial effects of
greed and of the unfortunate results of sentiment, until there has resulted a
philosophy which comes unwittingly to this, that greed is the great agent
in the elevation of the human race and in the evolution of the universe.1545
In a brief analysis of “political economy,” Peirce found ubiquitously dispersed “trappings
which serve to hide from author and reader alike the ugly nakedness of the greedgod.”1546 He went so far as to say that “society could not exist upon a basis of intelligent
greed alone.”1547 In a short anecdote about “the social atmosphere” he found in
Baltimore, it “affected” him somewhat in his “prejudice against monsters of iniquity and
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against men of greed.”1548 I fail to see, throughout these passages and innumerable others
still, a “disarming candor” that reifies “the spirit of the prevailing business culture.”
What Horkheimer desired was a philosophy wherein ideas enjoy “freedom” and
“an objectivity that did not submit to ‘our’ interests.”1549 That Peirce sought Truth
“regardless of what the color of that truth may be,”1550 that Peirce demanded “severely
critical thought”1551 rather than submission to any authoritarian power, that Peirce sought
freedom to inquire without externally prescribed values that altered and narrowed the
trajectory of inquiry, leads me to the conclusion that Horkheimer justifiably, but
ultimately mistakenly, read James retroactively back into Peirce without appreciating the
massive divergences between the two thinkers. To what degree Horkheimer’s critique
was valid as it applied to James (or Dewey) is beyond the scope of this current project,
but suffice it to say, I hope I have demonstrated that when Horkheimer leveled his ire
against pragmatism, Peirce, at least, ought not to have been in the crosshairs. Nor am I
suggesting that Horkheimer’s call for an objective form reason, one that does not reduce
theory to practicality, one that does not simply reify a totalitarian state and kneel at the
alter at capital, is in any way mistaken. I agree with Horkheimer entirely. My point,
merely, was to show that Peirce, in all the most substantive ways, would agree with him,
too.
As Megill notes, far from having no clue as to how to transcend the current
stultifying milieu, though Peirce was far from making this explicit, “the scientific
method, the method of the future, provides a way in which a state of permanent

1548

Ibid., CP 7.265.
Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, Op. Cit., 31.
1550
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 7.605.
1551
Ibid.
1549

495

revolution, or open inquiry, can be established.”1552 This was the beauty of Peirce’s
theory that Horkheimer failed to see. In maintaining that Truth is established in the here
and now, Horkheimer made no reference to the “long run” at all in his critique. Peirce’s
method was, as Megill notes, a method of the future, an indefinite future terminating in
the most hopefully optimistic union of Truth and an unlimited community. Precisely by
being future-oriented, it places reason in a constant state of revolt against any
indoctrinating system that would dictate its trajectory towards coming to understand an
objective world. Fallibilism itself mitigates against technical rationality and the
indoctrinating methods of capitalism that would pawn off beliefs conducive to its
perpetuation as “necessary” rather than “contingent.” For the fallibilist, no claim,
especially not from a source of authority, is beyond analysis, critique, and revision. As
Peirce resolutely said:
The doctrine of fallibilism will also be denied by those who fear its
consequence for science, for religion, and for morality. But I will take
leave to say to these highly conservative gentlemen that however
competent they may be to direct the affairs of a church or other
corporations, they had better not try to manage science in that way.
Conservativism…is altogether out of place in science – which has on the
contrary always been forwarded by radicals and radicalism…not the
radicalism that is cocksure, however, but the radicalism that tries
experiments.1553

Fallibilism, the method of inquiry, is radical, not conservative, as Horkheimer claimed,
conservative of the values of the current milieu. It looks to the past with a revolutionary
eye: “[Peirce] well knew, from personal experience as a man of science and religion as
well as from his knowledge of the past, what a tremendous and culture-wracking
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revolution in basic beliefs the invention of modern science required.”1554 It looks to the
future and, in so doing, transcends the stultifying confines of the current milieu though
not at the expense of the present, a present that demands experiment, curiosity, wonder,
and engagement to challenge the beliefs pawned off by whatever authority is in
control.1555
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Chapter 12

Habermas’ New Critical Approach to Pragmatism

As the decades wore on, new scholarly work on Peirce and a proliferation of
previously unpublished manuscripts ushered in a new generation of scholars interested in
peeking back in time before James’s interpretation of pragmatism to view Peirce afresh.
One such scholar was German born Karl-Otto Apel, professor at the University of
Frankfurt, semeiotician, critical theorist, and friend of Jürgen Habermas, the foremost
contemporary representative of the Frankfurt School. Apel’s Charles S. Peirce: From
Pragmatism to Pragmatism (1981) was crucial in ushering in a new age of Peirce
scholarship by excavating the Kantian themes that run throughout Peirce’s vast corpus. It
was through Apel, and this Kantian reading, that Habermas came to ultimately
incorporate many of Peirce’s insights (consensus, community, inquiry, and semeiotics)
into his own mature thought.1556
Although still critical of what he saw as nascent instrumentalism and a form of
positivism1557 in Peirce’s work, Habermas’ respect and appreciation for Peirce’s
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incalculable scholarly endeavors resonated on every page of his critique.1558 Unlike
Horkheimer, who had been “aware of pragmatism, but had been dismissive in his
assessment,”1559 Habermas both saw and appreciated Peirce’s connection to Kant whom
he said contributed to the “concept of synthesis through social labor”1560 (in a
complementary manner to Marx’s own project1561) no doubt inspired by Apel.1562 As
Bookman notes, it was from Peirce, and his fellow pragmatists, that Habermas developed
his own theory of the “consensus-making power of reason – an intersubjective outcome
that emerges from problems detected in concrete situations.”1563
As with Horkheimer’s, I must limit myself to only a cursory evaluation of
Habermas’ critique of Peirce and focus on two of the more salient facets of his
then we see in it primarily the outline and program of a ‘logic of science’ for the future. It goes without
saying the the logic of science that has been developed in the meantime by analytic philosophy, with the aid
of mathematical logic, has come much farther than Peirce in technicalities. But it seems just as certain to
me that the basic, two dimensional (syntactic-semantic) approach which modern work in the logic of
science took over from logical Positivism’s anti-metaphysical program is fundamentally inferior to Peirce’s
three-dimensional semiotic approach. The two-dimensional approach forces philosophers of science to
reduce the metaphysical problems of the so-called pragmatic dimension, that is, problems regarding the
subject who interprets and engages in science, by making them problems of an empirical science…if we
take to its logical conclusions the idea, which Peirce had already implicitly founded in his logical Socialism
[the ideal of a practicing community of inquirers], that the world cannot be known or explained merely by
its previsouly fixed, lawful structure, but must rather continue to be developed as a historical, social world
of institutions and habits for which we must assume responsibility, then it becomes evident that man
confronts mankind with other tasks besides that of objectifying and explaining the world through science or
of converting science into efficient behavior…human beings must remain for mankind the subject engaged
in science and nonetheless be capable of being made the topic of rational knowledge and praxis,” Karl-Otto
Apel, Charles S. Peirce: from Pragmatism to Pragmaticism (Amherst: the University of Massachusetts
Press, 1981), 192 – 193.
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argument:1564 (a) Peirce’s metaphysical commitments and their bearing on “consensus,”
and (b) the limits of Peirce’s intersubjectivity. To the former, Habermas (like nearly
every other Peirce scholar) found Peirce’s metaphysical commitments ambiguous since
Peirce seemed to demand both a “reality” that constrained inquiry (leading to a quasicorrespondence theory of truth where the sum-total of our beliefs matches a mindindependent reality) as well as a “reality” that was constituted by inquiry (leading to a
quasi-consensus theory of truth where the sum-total of our beliefs is reality so constituted
phenomenologically). The problem with the former was that the method of inquiry,
bound to semeiotic and phenomenological categories, can only “hope” or vaguely strive
to reach out to connect in some occult fashion with a mind-independent world. The
problem with the latter was that without some verifiable connection to an objective
reality, “consensus” becomes little more than a type of “perspectivism” without any
assurance that Truth (in the long run) even exists let alone is being approximated. This
fed into Habermas’ second major critique of Peirce: the concept of “consensus” itself.
Without some recourse to an objective grounding of inquiry, it is unclear how consensus
is even achieved. Further, for Peirce, knowledge increased through a coordination of
abduction and induction. However, Habermas claimed that we do not, in fact,
communicate through syllogisms, and thus Peirce seemed to have no dynamic
explanation for how our intersubjective communication took place beyond the mere
“monologic” exchange of syllogisms which, when taken up for subjective verification by
each member of the community, ultimately lead to an atomic individualism akin to
Cartesian solipsism, that is, a philosophy of consciousness. The genesis of these dynamic
Habermas’ critique also continued Horkheimer’s concern that pragmatism was ultimately bare
instrumentalism but, having exhaustively engaged Horkheimer’s concerns, I will refrain from further
comment here.
1564
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critiques, I will argue, lies in Habermas’ conflation of Peirce’s phenomenological
categories and a brief overview of Peirce’s so-called “phaneroscopy” will both clarify the
objective backing for the community’s consensus as well as illuminate the social
individualism that conditions the kind of radical communicative interaction that
Habermas ultimately champions.
Habermas saw in Peirce the foundations of an extraordinarily dynamic theory of
Truth that emphasized communal consensus in a necessarily social and dialogical method
of belief formation. However, Habermas claimed that the ambiguities inherent in Peirce’s
metaphysics derailed Peirce’s efforts to construct his theory without raising seemingly
insurmountable problems. After attempting to disambiguate Peirce’s apparent
metaphysical conception of “reality” from his phenomenological conception of “reality,”
Habermas dug into the latter, his preferred interpretation of Peirce as maintaining that
“reality” is constituted through intersubjective inquiry. However, having dissolved
Peirce’s conception of “reality” (in his early work) as metaphysically independent of
cognition, Habermas was at pains to see how Peirce could have any sort of objective
gauge by which to form consensus or demonstrate the progress of inquiry. Without some
criterion by which to achieve consensus, Peirce’s method threatened to succumb to a
banal sort of “perspectivism” which neither explained consensus nor aided in dissolving
antagonistic beliefs. Habermas offered such a criterion without succumbing to the egocentric trap of postulating a mind-independent realm: a transcendence from within that
created objectivity through dialogical means, a middle-ground between the false
ontologizing of a mind-independent, inaccessible world and pure subjectivism where no
belief can be demonstrated to be more “true” than any other. However, I will argue that a
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closer look at both Peirce’s phenomenology as well as his quasi-Kantian conception of
“purposefulness,” “practics,” and abduction, might establish a more favorable reading of
Peirce for Habermas.
In engaging Peirce’s method of inquiry, “questions arise about truth and reality”
at which point, along with nearly every other Peirce scholar, Habermas found that
“Peirce’s account is ambiguous.”1565
On the one hand Peirce defines ‘truth’ as the ideal permanent consensus of
scientists at the limit of the application of their method of testing and selfcorrection, and defines ‘reality’ as the totality of possible true statements.
On the other hand Peirce wants to retain some notion that this set of true
statements ‘corresponds’ to an external reality which somehow guarantees
the success of science by self-correction.1566

If reality is based only on consensus (the totality of possible true statements), this fails to
provide a robust criterion for what makes statements “true” to begin with and how
consensus is ultimately forged if there is no external permanence acting as a gauge
against which to measure the veracity of propositions. On this model, reality is
constituted through inquiry. On the other hand, if reality constrains inquiry’s trajectory,
guaranteeing consensus and the success of science by self-correction by supplying that
external gauge against which to measure the veracity of beliefs and pull them together
into consensus over the long run, on this model reality is discovered through inquiry.
However, Habermas noted that Peirce was quite insistent that we are bound within an
unlimited network of signs and language as well as the three phenomenological
categories of experience and thus, on this reading, Peirce can either only vaguely grasp
“beyond” his own cognitive faculties to a kind of Kantian world-in-itself to which the
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ultimate opinion would have to somehow “correspond,” or else admit that reality is
forged of beliefs without any external guage or objective permanence with which to
determine the veracity of our beliefs. For Peirce, it would seem, we either have consensus
without correspondence or else we have correspondence that is doomed to fail under the
proviso that we can never get out of our semeiotic-cum-linguistic-cum-phenomenological
realm of experience (or, for Habermas, the unfortunate problem that Peirce seemed to
want both at once without showing how this could happen).
Ultimately, Habermas rejected “Peirce’s contemplative notion of reality uniquely
constraining the truth-seeking process of science”1567 given Peirce’s adamant rejection of
spectator theories of knowledge, and sided with the other reading of Peirce that eschews
correspondence in favor of consensus as generative of “Truth.”1568 Without a constraint
on inquiry, however, it remains to be seen what justifies the veracity of propositions
made by the community of inquirers.
Like Horkheimer, Habermas rejected any theory of knowledge acquisition that
was wholly subjective and sought, instead, an objective ground to gauge truth claims.
However, an objectivism too divorced from discursive practices opens the unbridgeable
chasm between language and mind-independent reality. Such an “objectivism deludes the
sciences with the image of a self-subsistent world of facts structured in a lawlike manner;
it thus conceals the a priori constitution of these facts.”1569 In an interesting reversal of
critique, whereas Horkheimer accused Peirce of cold, selfish subjectivism in reducing all
thought to practical benefits for the individual him or herself, Habermas comes at Peirce
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from the opposite side of the critical spectrum,1570 claiming Peirce couldn’t “escape from
objectivism” and thus could not “comprehend…the foundation of the knowledgeconstitutive interests toward which”1571 his thought was directed. What Habermas sought
was a new “self-reflection of the sciences,”1572 a “methodology that transcends its own
boundaries,” and, given the “the self-correcting nature”1573 of Peirce’s method of inquiry,
saw “the beginnings of this sort”1574 of theory in the work of Peirce.1575 Once we shed
ourselves of what Habermas called the “misleading ontologizing” of nature,1576 “we can
understand a given scientific system of reference as the result of interaction between the
knowing subject and reality.”1577 Habermas readily admitted that the “first to tread the
dimension of a self-reflecting philosophy of science was Charles Sanders Peirce”1578 but

“Objectivism, which makes a dogma of the prescientific interpretation of knowledge as a copy of
reality, limits access to reality to the dimension established by the scientific system of reference through the
methodical objectivication of reality. It prohibits discerning the a priori element of this system of reference
and calling into question in any way its monopoly of knowledge,” Ibid., 89.
1571
Ibid., 69.
1572
Ibid.
1573
John E. Smith, The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 24 – 25.
1574
Ibid.
1575
Along with the work of Wilhelm Dilthey, an analysis of whom is unfortunately beyond the scope of
this current project.
1576
Now, it is true that Peirce saw nature structured in a lawlike manner, maintaining, that “intelligibility”
is “reason objectified” (Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.366) and that “our physical science, whatever extravagant
historicists may say, seems to have sprung up uncaused except by man's intelligence and nature's
intelligibility” (Ibid, CP 2.13), such that nature acts according an “intelligible law” (Ibid., CP 1.366). All of
this gives credence to Habermas’ concerns. The objectivism that Habermas alludes to would indicate a
commitment to a type of metaphysical realism, the “self-subsistence” of an external world, specifically,
external to our experience of it, from which Peirce, he says, could not escape. What complicates matters
here is that, although Peirce did claim that the universe was structured in a lawlike manner, it was neither
wholly clear whether or not this word was “self-subsistent” (mind-independent) or whether it concealed the
constitution of its lawlike mechanisms. Peirce developed three “metaphysical” categories of being as
complements (though not identical) to the phenomenological categories: possibility, actuality, and destiny
or “law” (Ibid., CP 1.483). Although it can be argued that the two sets of categories result in a sort of
parallelism (one set governs mind-independent “being”, the other governs phenomenological experience),
because, like Habermas, I do not read Peirce as an adherent to correspondence theories of truth, I believe a
transactional view of the categories is more faithful to Peirce’s overall project wherein individual inquirers
are just as much a part of the “world” as the world is manifest in individual cognition, and thus the triadic
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with correspondence to a wholly external reality dissolved, it remains to be seen what
gauge for objectivity (of the non-problematic variety) remains to ground his method of
inquiry.
The problem with Peirce’s theory, for Habermas, was two-fold: on the one hand,
reality seemed to exist prior to inquiry and constrained its trajectory while
simultaneously existing as constituted by inquiry. The former granted an objective
criterion to evaluate the veracity of propositions but succumbed to the misleading
ontologizing of a mind-independent realm. The latter eschewed correspondence for
consensus but lost its objective gauge. What’s worse is that Peirce seemed to hold both at
once. On the other hand, if Peirce insisted that we are limited in our cognition of reality
through the sphere of signs, language, and phenomenology, how can we know that our
beliefs about reality are true if our beliefs make reality to begin with?
Habermas illuminated this apparent disparity1579 and ultimately rejected a
correspondence reading, noting that Peirce “can no longer regress to the objectivist
attitude in which knowledge appears as a description of reality that can be detached from
the knowing subject” precisely because Peirce’s method “comprehends the process of
inquiry as a world-constituting life activity (Lebenspraxis).”1580 As I argued earlier, this
strikes me as a perfectly legitimate reading of Peirce who simply cannot, as I maintained

“…[I]t may be said that this view is directly opposed to the abstract definition which we have given of
reality, inasmuch as it makes the characters of the real depend on what is ultimately thought about them.
But the answer to this is that, on the one hand, reality is independent, not necessarily of thought in general,
but only of what you or I or any finite number of men may think about it; and that, on the other hand,
though the object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is, yet what that opinion is does not
depend on what you or I or any man thinks…the opinion which would finally result from investigation does
not depend on how anybody may actually think. But the reality of that which is real does depend on the real
fact that investigation is destined to lead, if continued long enough, to a belief in it,” see Ibid., 95 – 96, and
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.408.
1580
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Op. Cit., 95.
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earlier, hold any sort of correspondence theory of truth precisely because, as Habermas
notes here, “reality” is the ongoing process of a “world-constituting life activity.”
Ultimately, as Habermas claimed, for Peirce “reality means nothing but the sum
of those states of fact about which we can obtain final opinions.”1581 For Peirce, it was the
“mechanism of the process of inquiry as a self-regulating, cumulative learning
process”1582 that constituted the objects of possible experience, a position that is
ubiquitously dispersed throughout Peirce’s corpus.1583 This follows from a strictly
phenomenological reading of Peirce’s idealism wherein Thirdness is “Reality” so
constituted by experience.1584
This led Peirce to the conclusion, Habermas rightly pointed out, “that there can be
no knowledge that is not mediated by prior knowledge” and thus “the cognitive process is
discursive at every stage.”1585 All thought,1586 for Peirce, was thought mediated by
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“Everything, therefore, which will be thought to exist in the final opinion is real,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP
8.12; “The object of the final opinion depends on what that opinion is,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.408; “The
objective final opinion is independent of the thoughts of any particular men, but is not independent of
thought in general,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 7.336; “Reality is only the object of the final opinion to which
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by virtue of an act of thought knowing it, but that thought is not an arbitrary or accidental one dependent on
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signs. Plainly, no other thought can be evidenced by external facts. But we have seen that only by external
facts can thought be known at all. The only thought, then, which can possibly be cognized is thought in
signs. But thought which cannot be cognized does not exist. All thought, therefore, must necessarily be in
signs,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.215.
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signs.1587 The key here, as Cooke notes, is that “the mind is not given thoughts; rather,
the mind takes an object and it always takes the object in some respect. The thought-sign
is an interpretation of the object.”1588 This resonates with both Peirce’s rejection of
private, isolated thoughts as well as any spectator theory of knowledge, for every thought
necessarily suggests other thoughts, “which become the signs of something to the later
thought. It is never the case that a previous thought-sign does not determine the next
one.”1589 Thus, ultimately, “we can never get outside the realm of signs.”1590
If all cognition is semiotic in nature, cognition manifests exclusively in a social
realm of language that necessarily, for Peirce, had a public character. Peirce thus had a
“social view of knowledge.”1591
Signs are not given by introspection but through language and use. Even
those thoughts which seem private and introspective are in fact signs. And,
as signs, thoughts depend in large part upon the community for their
derivation of meaning and correct use. Peirce’s sign theory is part of his
overall argument to replace the individual with the community as the
proper subject of knowledge.1592
Cooke’s assertion that the proper subject of knowledge is the community, rather than the
individual, is a controversial claim, indeed, since it would seem that only individual’s

“There can be no purely isolated thoughts. They are all in interaction with other thoughts through
inferences. The only way thoughts are intelligible is if they are brought together under general laws of the
mind. A singular thought is by itself unintelligible, but it is made intelligible by the mind relating it to other
thoughts…single thoughts are not really single at all, but are all interrelated with other thoughts. In fact, all
meaning and intelligibility lie in the relations of thoughts, rather than in any one singular thought which is
present to the mind at one instant. The real meaning of a thought lies in its similarity and comparisons with
other thoughts,” Elizabeth Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry (New York: Continuum, 2006), 14
– 15.
1588
Ibid., 17.
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Ibid.
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“A sign, in order to be a sign, must be interpretable, and signs can be interpreted only by other signs, so
if we try to get at the meaning of any sign, we shall find only some other sign. Hence, if we think by means
of signs at all – which we evidently do- we can never get outside the realm of signs,” Peter Skagestad, The
Road to Inquiry: Charles Peirce’s Pragmatic Realism (Columbia University Press: New York, 1981), 24.
1591
Cooke, Peirce’s Pragmatic Theory of Inquiry, Op. Cit., 18.
1592
Ibid.
1587

507

could possible be the bearers of knowledge claims. However, we must not forget Peirce’s
extreme form of social individualism wherein “a person is not absolutely an
individual….all thought whatsoever is a sign, and is mostly of the nature of language”
and that “man’s circle of society … is a sort of loosely compacted person, in some
respects of higher rank than the person of an individual organism.”1593 Precisely because
of Peirce’s realism, and wholesale rejection of nominalism, universal concepts like
“society” are quite real and not wholly reducible to the sum-total of its constituent parts.
As Habermas said, “because all knowledge is discursive, it is true that in thought
we cannot jump out of the dimension of mediation. No matter how far we retrace our
inferences to their premises, we remain caught in the compass of our interpretations.”1594
As Cooke notes, for Peirce, “we know the object from within a communal context which
comes with its own interpretations of the objects.”1595 For Peirce, “all knowledge must be
generated in the context of a challenge to prior beliefs. Knowledge, and crucially contact
with the world, is therefore always already mediated by prior beliefs”1596 which have,
under ideal circumstances, been communally formulated utilizing the method of inquiry.
However, according to Cooke, though “we cannot meaningfully conceive of
anything like uninterpreted facts,” at the same time, “the facts cannot be exhaustively
reduced to our interpretations.”1597 That is to say, for Peirce, we cannot simply be
creating reality ex nihilo based on nothing but our interpretations which could easily
degenerate, without an objective gauge, into a perspectivism or metaphysical relativism
which would dissolve the possibility of dialogue or consensus. On the one hand, as
1593
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Habermas noted, “every empirical basis on which we can conceivably rely is mediated by
implicit inferential interpretations. These inferences, no matter how rudimentary, are tied
to representational signs. Consequently, even perceptions already occur in the dimension
of semiotic representation.”1598 Peirce was quite explicit on this, noting, for example,
“what are really abductions have been mistaken for perceptions.”1599 Further, “even so
called deceptions of the senses, where evidently it is the inferences that are at fault, we
take for immediate perceptions.”1600 On the other hand, “the empirical basis cannot be
totally mediated by thought. Besides the logical laws it obeys, the process of reasoning
linked to signs depends on information inputs. It does not proceed immanently, but
incorporates impulses deriving from experience.”1601 As such, as Habermas notes, Peirce
pulled up short of an idealist’s abandonment of the “distinction between thought and a
contingently experienced reality.”1602
Habermas rightly highlighted the stimulus for cognitive development in the
engagement with problematic situations that arise out of Secondness, or the “resistance”
of “independent original stimuli.”1603 However, an “independent” source of the original
stimuli for cognitive development problematizes Peirce’s pragmatism by setting up a
quasi-Kantian “thing-in-itself,”1604 something Peirce adamantly rejected throughout his
career.
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However (and this is key), Habermas called this resistance “reality.” As I
discussed earlier, Peirce explicitly associated “reality” with Thirdness and the
“resistance” of the encountered external world with Secondness. Although this seems
counter-intuitive to traditional conceptions of “reality,” nevertheless, it would seem that
Habermas conflated one phenomenological category with another. It was Peirce’s
conception of Secondness1605 that was the experience of “struggle.”1606 “Reality” was
Thirdness, the constitution of a lawlike structure that pulls together the various disparate
aspects of our phenomenological experience. Nevertheless, “reality” as it is often
construed as that which is outside phenomenological experience does seem to be that
which provides the resistance experience in Secondness,1607 by whatever name. Of
course, there is a difference between “independent” and “unknowable.” As we’ll see,
Peirce makes just such a distinction through a radical departure from traditional
conceptions of “self” and the function of “mind.”1608

“The phaneron does contain genuine secundans. Standing on the outside of a door that is slightly ajar,
you put your hand upon the knob to open and enter it. You experience an unseen, silent resistance. You put
your shoulder against the door and, gathering your forces, put forth a tremendous effort. Effort supposes
resistance. Where there is no effort there is no resistance, where there is no resistance there is no effort
either in this world or any of the worlds of possibility. It follows that an effort is not a feeling nor anything
priman or protoidal. There are feelings connected with it: they are the sum of consciousness during the
effort. But it is conceivable that a man should have it in his power directly to summon up all those feelings,
or any feelings. He could not, in any world, be endowed with the power of summoning up an effort to
which there did not happen to be a resistance all ready to exist. For it is an absurdity to suppose that a man
could directly will to oppose that very will,” Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 1.320.
1606
Ibid., CP 1.322.
1607
“[Man] defends himself from the angles of hard fact by clothing himself with a garment of contentment
and of habituation. Were it not for this garment, he would every now and then find his internal world rudely
disturbed and his fiats set at naught by brutal inroads of ideas from without. I call such forcible
modification of our ways of thinking the influence of the world of fact or experience. But he patches up his
garment by guessing what those inroads are likely to be and carefully excluding from his internal world
every idea which is likely to be so disturbed. Instead of waiting for experience to come at untoward times,
he provokes it when it can do no harm and changes the government of his internal world accordingly,”
Ibid., CP 1.321.
1608
For the pragmatists, “‘mind’ is not something subjective or simply ‘between the ears.’ Instead, ‘mind’
signifies ‘minding’ in the sense of directing available resources to the attentive management of problems,
akin to ‘minding the store,’” Frank Ryan, Seeing Together: Mind, Matter, and the Experimental Outlook of
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Peirce adamantly rejected any immediate intuiting as the source of knowledge in
either a Cartesian or Lockean sense. Nevertheless, as Habermas noted, “what is
incorporated in the interpretations of our inferential thought is something immediate,
although it cannot be represented by it as unmediated and ultimately given” even though
“all of our statements about ‘the real’ are in some measure grounded” 1609 in this external
reality. Peirce held both, according to Habermas, “the concept that reality…derives from
[a] methodological concept of truth” that “prohibits any thought of something evidently
ultimate and unmediated”1610 and yet, at the same time, that “the Unanalyzable, the
Inexplicable, the Unintellectual runs in a continuous stream through our lives.” 1611 On the
one hand, according to Peirce’s phenomenological idealism, “reality” is constituted in
“Thirdness.” On the other hand, “reality” seems to be that which we encounter
phenomenologically as “resistance” in “Secondness” that is an integral component to
belief formation and the determination of what, reality, ultimately is. It is this precise
ambiguity towards which Habermas draws our attention.
Peirce insisted, as we’ve seen, that though there is “something noumenal” in
experience, this “something” is also “intelligible, conceivable, utterly unlike a thing-initself.”1612 Further:
This theory of reality is instantly fatal to the idea of a thing in itself, -- a
thing existing independent of all relation to the mind's conception of it.
Yet it would by no means forbid, but rather encourage us, to regard the
appearances of sense as only signs of the realities. Only, the realities
which they represent would not be the unknowable cause of sensation, but

John Dewey and Arthur F. Bentley (Great Barrington, Massachusetts: American Institute for Economic
Research, 2011), 30.
1609
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Op. Cit., 98.
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Ibid., 99.
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noumena, or intelligible conceptions which are the last products of the
mental action which is set in motion by sensation. 1613
“Immediacy” is predominantly located in the category of Firstness. There is something
immediate and unintelligible in Peirce’s phenomenological circuit of inquiry in the sense
of it being prior to the distinction of “it from other” (Secondness) and prior to linguistic
and conceptual systematizing (Thirdness). As Hoopes notes, “Firstness,” these “feelings,”
are “immediate” but “a meaningless immediacy until feelings are interpreted as
representations or signs.”1614 They are “immediate” only in the sense that they are prior to
attentive inquiry and linguistic-cum-semiotic interpretation. They are explicitly
“knowable” but, at the stage of “Firstness,” simply not-yet-known, that is, not yet
interpreted.
Consider the following example from Peirce, one highlighted by Habermas, as
well:
This ideal first is the particular thing-in-itself. It does not exist as such.
That is, there is no thing which is in-itself in the sense of not being relative
to the mind, though things which are relative to the mind doubtless are,
apart from that relation. The cognitions which thus reach us by this infinite
series of inductions and hypotheses (which though infinite a parte ante
logice, is yet as one continuous process not without a beginning in time)
are of two kinds, the true and the untrue, or cognitions whose objects are
real and those whose objects are unreal. 1615
For Peirce, the “real is revealed in a similar fashion as individuation, something that we
must first have had when we discovered that there was an unreal, an illusion; that is,
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when we first corrected ourselves.”1616 Yet the real is not revealed only through negation
(what it is not) but is also through “that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning
would finally result in, and which is therefore independent of the vagaries of me and
you.”1617 This “conception of reality” (and it is a “conception”) is thus essentially
involved with a notion “of a COMMUNITY, without definite limits, and capable of a
definite increase in knowledge.”1618 The “real” is in part revealed through negation (the
recalcitrance experience in Secondness) but ultimately constituted in Thirdness while all
the time lingering in the immediacy of Firstness that has yet to be disrupted by the onset
of tension. In the long run, our beliefs will be refined through a community of inquirers
as our “Thirdness” (which is a necessarily social dimension of Peirce’s phenomenology,
as we’ve seen) is strengthened.1619 Precisely because that which is thought (Thirdness)
contains the brute experience of existence (Secondness) and a full, unproblematic
immersion in the world (Firstness), it follows that, “consequently, that which is thought
in these cognitions is the real, as it really is. There is nothing, then, to prevent our
knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know
them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any
special case.”1620
As Habermas said, “Peirce denies a thing in itself in the sense of transcendental
philosophy, a reality that affects our senses while yet merely appearing under the
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transcendental conditions of possible objectivity and thus unknowable as such.”1621
Habermas was quite right, highlighting Peirce’s rejection of any sort “spectator” theory
of knowledge that maintains consciousness is affected by an external reality without
actively participating in its constitution. As Peirce said, it is a common belief that “the
real things in this world” are merely “blind unconscious objects working by mechanical
laws together with a consciousness as idle spectator.”1622 Peirce maintained, “this
spectator cannot have part or lot even in the intelligence and purpose of the business; for
intelligence does not consist in feeling intelligently but in acting so that one's deeds are
concentrated upon a result.”1623 As a consequence, this theory “makes the universe a
muddle. According to it consciousness is perfectly impotent and is not the original of the
material world; nor on the other hand can material forces ever have given birth to feeling,
for all they do is to accelerate the motions of particles.”1624 External matter operates
through means wholly external to the spectacular-subject. It leaves “no room for reaction
between mind and matter.”1625 The fundamental confusion, he maintained, stems from the
theory’s “incautious assumption that it is one thing to look red or green and another thing
to see red or green.”1626 The “muddle” of the spectator theory begins to dissolve once one
realizes “the spectator is no longer on one side of the footlights, and the world on the
other. He is, in so far as he sees, at one with the poet of the piece. To act intelligently and
1621
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to see intelligently become at bottom one.”1627 This was the only method, for Peirce, that
“promises to render the totality of things thinkable; and it is plain there is no other way of
explaining anything than to show how it traces its lineage to the womb of thought.” 1628
Thus, Peirce eschewed the spectator theory with its mind/world dualism and adapted the
only theory that he believed can render the world intelligible: “this is what is called
Idealism.”1629 Rather than proceeding from the unfounded assumption of an unbridgeable
divide between mind and world, Peirce insisted that both mind and world are parts of
what we mean by “reality” in total. Rather than external matter (unintelligible in itself)
affecting a passive consciousness, both matter and mind, world and consciousness,
engage in a transaction like the transactions that take place between inquirers in dialogue.
For Peirce, this form of idealism is the only way to render the world intelligible by
assuming that consciousness is (justifiably) part of the world. In this light, the method of
inquiry may be seen as the only productive means of clarifying our beliefs by reuniting us
not only with our community of inquirers through growing consensus but, too, reuniting
us with the world that we’re intimately engaged and could not divorce ourselves if we
wished. Such a reading is corroborated by Peirce’s holism manifest in both Firstness (the
fundamental unity of self and other in the greater social organism as well as the prereflective immersion in experience of Firstness [what Dewey would call the “having” of
an experience as opposed to “knowing”1630]) and an ultimate form of Thirdness (in the
sense of a ultimate opinion and complete picture of reality ideally awaiting us at the end
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of the long run, that is, once our idiosyncrasies have been overcome through the
deployment of Peirce prescribed method).
Thus, Habermas would agree with Peirce that this “ideal first, even if it cannot be
conceived as a thing in itself, is not just nothing.”1631 For Peirce, the ideal first is the
world within which an inquirer finds him or herself already thrown: in Firstness, the
world is experienced unproblematically, a “nonreflective background of experience
characterized not by discrete properties…but by a fit that ‘hangs together’ as a gestalt or
unity.”1632 In Secondess, some discrete aspect of the world is experienced as a problem
that divides itself from the unproblematic. Habermas asked, “are not actual experiences
the source of the information that enters the implicit inferences of perception and of
judgment and that is elaborated by thought processes into definitive beliefs?”1633 That is,
I maintain, precisely what Peirce was arguing.
Consider, for example, Peirce’s phenomenological account of hearing a train
passing by in terms of the specific frame of Habermas’s question: is experience the
source of the information that enters into our inferences that create our beliefs through
inquiry? As Peirce said, “we perceive objects brought before us; but that which we
especially experience -- the kind of thing to which the word "experience" is more
particularly applied -- is an event.”1634 Experience is a total “event,” moving from an
unproblematic immersion in the world (Firstness), disrupted by a tension (Secondness),
analyzed and cognitively coordinated into a systematic understanding (Thirdness).
“Experience” constitutes this entire “event” that admits of no degenerate parts but is
1631
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taken holistically.1635 The act of “perception,” itself, is not applied to the event as a
whole, but specifically directed at the phenomenological shift or change within the event
itself (Secondess).1636 In Peirce’s example, as a locomotive passes at high speed beside
him, he perceives the sound of its whistle but when it suddenly changes its pitch the
“event” of that change of pitch is experienced rather than perceived. 1637 The “shock”
(Secondness) sets the event in motion as an experience, for whereas “the long whistle of
the approaching locomotive…has set up in me a certain inertia…the sudden lowering of
the note meets with a certain resistance.”1638 However, the experience of shock
(Secondess) is only experienced as shock because of the experience of the
unproblematically expected (Firstness) that preceded it.1639 As he said, every Secondness
entails a Firstness. Thus, “the concept of experience is broader than that of perception,
and includes much that is not, strictly speaking, an object of perception,”1640 including the
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unproblematic experience that came prior to the resistance as well as the cognitive
understanding of what that disruption entailed that comes after. 1641
Peirce, eschewing the spectator theory of knowledge, analyzed the experience of
the locomotive as it actually occurs: “experience” entails the pre-reflective immersion of
self and environment (Firstness) prior to any divisions of “mind” and “world,” 1642 the
changing tone of the whistle that is perceived by the individual as attention-worthy
(Secondness), and the cognition of the change (“being of an intellectual kind,” that is,
Thirdness). As a complement to Peirce’s critique of Déscartes’ method that threw all our
beliefs into doubt,1643 our experience extends to all that we do not, in the moment,
perceive as the unproblematic background against which perception occurs (perception,
that is, of a specific aspect of “existence” (Secondness) that presents itself as problematic
or attention worthy against the background of an ongoing Firstness. The cognitive
reconciliation of Secondness (this “shock”) into Thirdness is what Peirce called “reality.”
We thus constitute “reality” in this process, portions of which (Firstness in terms of our
pre-reflective immersion in it and Secondness in terms of the tension from it that we
experience) stem from pre-reflective phenomenological experiences of the world as it
really is. Thus, our constitution of “reality” is neither a “correspondence” between our
beliefs about it and the way it is in-itself, nor is it wholly subjective and perspectival
since our engagement with the world (the moments of “having” rather than “knowing”)
comprise our constitution of it in Thirdness.

“It is the compulsion, the absolute constraint upon us to think otherwise than we have been thinking
that constitutes experience. Now constraint and compulsion cannot exist without resistance, and resistance
is effort opposing change,” Ibid.
1642
“It is perfectly simple and without parts,” Ibid., CP 1.531.
1643
Peirce, as a scientist, knew that for an experiment to work, there must be constants as well as variables,
the former allowing us to focus our inquiry on the latter.
1641
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As Habermas explained, “the affection of the senses, in which the facticity and
immediate quality of reality assert themselves, is thus a permanent occasion for
transforming old interpretations into new ones.”1644 Perception (the “affection of the
senses”) is a part, but not the whole, of experience. For Peirce, the experience of
“facticity” (Secondness) and the experience of “immediate quality” (Firstness) of reality
do, indeed, provide the occasion for transforming old interpretations into new ones
precisely because some disruption occurred that presented itself as problematic or
attention-worthy, namely, our beliefs and habits which “work” in so far as they allow us
to be immersed in a non-hostile world suddenly met with a tension (one or more of our
beliefs were demonstrated to be false) that instigates inquiry towards a new and stronger
equilibrium. 1645
Habermas provided a formulation of how Peirce ought to have responded to what
appeared to Habermas as a problematic account of idealism:
Peirce could counter that the constraint of reality dissolves to the extent
that we obey its motivating force, advance the process of inquiry, and
form true beliefs about reality. The constraint of reality would then be a
complementary concept to the idea of the process of inquiry. In contrast to
reality as the totality of all knowable matters of fact, this concept denotes
the disproportion factually existing at a given time between our beliefs and
reality. But Peirce did not argue in this fashion. Instead, he attempts a
justification in terms of the logic of language. Had Peirce argued in the
manner suggested, he would have realized the necessity of using the logic
of inquiry to compensate for his denial, on grounds of the logic of
language, of a ‘thing in itself.’1646

There is, for Peirce, as Habermas rightly said, a disproportion factually existing between
our beliefs and reality, depending on how “reality” is defined. From the standpoint of a
1644

Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Op. Cit., 101.
“The affecting power of things (to which we may not ascribe existence in themselves) is nothing other
than the constraint of reality, which motivates us to revise false statements and generate new ones,” Ibid.
1646
Ibid., 101 – 102.
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spectator theory of knowledge, this would present itself as a potentially unbridgeable
divide. However, for Peirce, this disproportion was “problematic” only in so far as it
provides the impetus for cognitive development. Reality, for Peirce, is the category of
“Thirdness” constituted through inquiry. In the long run, the “disproportion” between our
beliefs and reality (the sum-total of all true beliefs) would be dissolved. In the present,
however, the disproportion is merely the fallibility of our current, provisional beliefs as
they fail to (for the moment) reflect that ultimate state of beliefs at the end of the long
run. It is not a disproportion between the sum-total of our beliefs and some entirely
independent and unknowable reality-in-itself.
Habermas’ distinction between the “logic of language” and the “logic of inquiry”
seems to me a problematic distinction to make. A belief is not merely a “true statement.”
Beliefs are a nuanced form of habits, a predisposition to act in a certain way, not merely a
report about the issue. Language certainly plays its role, but it seems mistaken to claim
that either Truth or reality is the sum-total of all true statements. More accurately, I think,
Truth or reality is the sum-total of all true beliefs, of which statement-making is an aspect
of having a belief, but not exhaustive of what it means to have a belief. Reality wasn’t
simply what we can truthfully say about it, for Peirce, it was the culmination of thought
and action, theory and experimentation, an unproblematic immersion in the world.
Thus, when Habermas distinguished two functions in language (“the connotative
[representative] and the denotative”1647) and suggested, “Peirce calls real the connotations
of all predicates appearing in true propositions,”1648 strictly speaking, this is not the case.
Peirce said, quite explicitly, that the “real” is “what a word or other symbol or concept

1647
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Ibid., 102.
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denotes.”1649 Connotation, Peirce said, refers to whether or not an object is “external” as
opposed to “mental,”1650 that is, whether it’s attributable to a problematic situation
occurring through inquiry or merely a dream or fantasy. Habermas contended that, for
Peirce, “the individual objects to which a true predicate is ascribed in a particular case,
are denotations…the facticity of reality does not correspond to any linguistic content:
consequently we cannot make any direct statement about it. Nonetheless, it can be
grasped indirectly.”1651 In a sense, this is quite true for Peirce. If “facticity” is a kind of
“Secondness” wherein some aspect of existence presses in upon us, in a way that does not
correspond to any linguistic content but is, rather, a pre-linguistic aspect of experience as
“shock” or “recalcitrance.” It is made linguistic in Thirdness as we cognize and
categorize the experience to forge a new belief. Strictly speaking, however, the linguistic
content which is added to the shock of experience is, itself, not identical to the shock of
experience, nor the unproblematic Firstness prior to the shock, and thus there is
something, as Peirce said, “Inexplicable and Unintellectual” 1652 coursing through the
content of our experience. For Peirce, “no thought in itself, then, no feeling in itself,
contains any others, but is absolutely simple and unanalyzable.”1653 These thoughts are
“immediately present, a mere sensation without parts, in itself, without similarity to any
other.”

1654

Every thought, “in so far as it is a feeling of a peculiar sort, is simply an

ultimate, inexplicable fact.”1655 As soon as we’ve had time to reflect, that which is
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“present to me” in the moment has past and, further, “we can never bring back the quality
of the feeling as it was in and for itself, or know what it was like in itself, or even
discover the existence of this quality except by a corollary from our general theory of
ourselves.”1656 Firstness (and Secondness to no small degree), are more “havings” of
experience rather than “knowings” (a cognitive Thirdness). As he said, there is “nothing
which we can truly predicate of feelings is left inexplicable, but only something which
we cannot reflectively know.”1657 Firstness is a part of experience and entirely knowable
(in Thirdness) but not knowable in itself, as itself as a Firstness which is, by definition, a
pre-reflective component (a “having”) of experience. “In short, the Immediate (and
therefore in itself unsusceptible of mediation -- the Unanalyzable, the Inexplicable, the
Unintellectual) runs in a continuous stream through our lives; it is the sum total of
consciousness, whose mediation, which is the continuity of it, is brought about by a real
effective force behind consciousness.”1658
Through Peirce’s phenomenology, the “inexplicable” is not a Kantian thing-initself but the immediate component1659 of experience which is “inexplicable” precisely
because it occurs prior to explication. We can analyze it, but that analysis, explication,
and cognizing is a different moment of the experiential process (specifically, Thirdness).
Thirdness will have transformed it, categorized it, made sense of it, culminating in what
Peirce meant by “reality.” It’s not a sort of incursion of the noumenal that makes it
inexplicable, simply the immediacy of the “having” of experience prior to the “knowing.”
We experience the shock as it really is (shock) and refine it thereafter.
1656
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Further, as Habermas said:
The correlate of the denotative function of language is not completely the
same as what is called, in epistemological contexts, the affection of our
senses by things outside us. It is true that the denotative employment of a
sign attests to the facticity of facts, in other words the mere way in which
an existence that the subject immediately encounters forces itself upon
him. But it does not take account of the substantive qualities that are also
present in singular states of consciousness. The constraint of reality
expresses itself not only in the resistance of things in general, but in
specific resistance to specific interpretations.1660

Peirce seemed cognizant of the distinction Habermas was making here, between the
constraint of reality independent of specific interpretations of its effect on the inquirer
and how it plays out in specific situations, as his example of the train whistle portrayed.
A clap of thunder out of a clear sky is the shock of resistance for a specific individual in a
specific circumstance, the same noise on a rainy day monotonously continued would not
even be experienced as shock but could, in fact, recede into the background gestalt of our
immersive experience in Firstness. As Peirce said, “what I mean by the external might
vary with how persons of a given general description would think under supposable
circumstances.”1661
Habermas’s primary concern here was with the category of “Firstness” which has
an air of immediacy but which, as part of our mental apparatus, appears to simultaneously
be of the realm of representation (mediation). As he said:
The concept of quality is supposed to accomplish two incompatible
purposes: To account for the moment of immediacy in singular sensations
on the one hand and yet include an elementary representative function on
the other…either quality corresponds to the substratum of the sign and is
not iconic, or it retains its image character, in which case it must be
classified as a representative symbol and is no longer immediate.1662
Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Op. Cit., 102 – 103.
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.327.
1662
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It is true that an Icon, by itself, refers only to Firstness, the quality itself, devoid of
representational value. As Peirce said, “a Sign or Representemen, is a First.”1663 Although
“an Icon is a Representamen whose Representative Quality is a Firstness of it as a
First,”1664 nevertheless, a “Sign…stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second,
called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to
assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object.”1665 This necessary interactivity between the categories results in an inability to
isolate, statically, any one category from the other two in anything other than a
hypothetical and artificial abstraction for the sake of analysis of their respective
functions. “The triadic relation is genuine, that is its three members are bound together by
it in a way that does not consist in any complexus of dyadic relations.” 1666 For example,
despite a sign’s relationship with a First, or immediate quality, “a sign may be iconic, that
is, may represent its object.”1667 Habermas’s critique that “quality” must either be
representative or immediate may be based upon a belief that the categories were more
divisible and isolatable than Peirce maintained. Depending on how the First is
coordinated, it is either immediacy (hypothetically isolated and taken in itself) or
representative (in conjunction with a Second and Third), even though Habermas insisted,
“Peirce attempts to do both” while clearly not realizing “the incompatibility of these two
perspectives.”1668
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Nevertheless, Habermas was right to highlight the ambiguities of Peirce’s
conception of reality. I have attempted to offer a reading here wherein Peirce did not
maintain a correspondence theory of truth nor was he an adherent of metaphysical
realism (a mind-independent world), but scholars are heavily divided on this issue. The
significance is far more profound than metaphysical confusion, however: if what grounds
inquiry, determines and constrains its trajectory, and provides an objective gauge to
denote its progress and create consensus and the foundation for authentic dialogue is
located in the aspect of Peirce’s metaphysics that we’ve jettisoned (correspondence to a
mind-independent reality), Peirce was left with little to either justify science’s progress or
account for dialogue and consensus.
In Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas distinguished between “strategic
action” and “communicative action.” “The former would include purposive-rational
action while action aimed at reaching an understanding would be communicative.”1669
Communicative deployment of reason to achieve understanding, in this sense, is
inherently “non-instrumental.”1670 As Habermas said: “a communicatively achieved
agreement has a rational basis; it cannot be imposed by either party, whether
instrumentally through intervention in the situation directly or strategically through
influencing decisions of opponents.”1671 This resonates with Peirce’s first rule of reason,
specifically (in his critique of authority) the mandate that “the arbitrary forcing” of
beliefs upon others, “must…be given up” 1672 in favor of a more communal, egalitarian,
democratic, and free interplay of ideas between inquiring participants within the
1669
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community.1673 There is, however, a perlocutionary aspect of communication, for
Habermas, as there would seem to likewise be with Peirce. The dialogical component of
inquiry, even in the most ideal setting, requires a modicum of convincing or persuading
of the other party whose beliefs are antagonistic to one’s own. This perlocutionary aspect
of inquiry would have to, as Peirce said, be distinct from “forcibly” pushing one’s belief
onto another. Drawing upon a shared externality (a shared environment in which distinct
inquiring organisms are engaged in mutual transactions), the perlocutionary act would be
a directing of attention towards that shared externality and the processes of analysis, the
tangible results of experimentation, and/or the constitution of a guiding theory. If there is
a fact of the matter (say, for example, a heliocentric model of the galaxy), and two
individuals earnestly engaged in the method of inquiry with antagonistic beliefs on the
subject, the perlocutionary aspect of communication would be to place all available
information on the communal table of analysis and work through it together, the inquirer
who holds to the heliocentric model attempting to persuade the individual who does not
of the veracity of the belief in heliocentricity by appeal to that which is communally
verifiable for all parties without having to force his or her belief onto the other. Of
course, the individual that maintains a geocentric model would undoubtedly be engaged
in a similar perloctionary endevor, but precisely because of the fact of the matter and the
communally accessible results of both inquiries, consensus is achievable between these
intitially antagonistic positions. Without an objective gauge for inquiry, Peirce’s method
would succumb to pure instrumentalism in the vein of Horkheimer’s critique: if the
Although Peirce’s “practics,” his conception of purposiveness, and his deployment of induction,
construct a robust theory of “strategic action,” it is complemented by a theory of “communicative action”
that resonates with his “ethics,” conception of purposefulness, and deployment of abduction in the ways I
described above. Habermas will, however, explain the limits of Peirce’s communicative action at the end of
his critique to which I will return.
1673
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structures are dissolved that would allow individuals to come together to reach a mutual
understanding, all that’s left are the bare feedback-controlled reactions in the here and
now.
Like Horkheimer, the problem of instrumental reason remained at the fore of
Habermas’s critique.1674 As Swindal notes, Habermas criticized “positivist sciences for
defining knowledge, not on the basis of a self-reflexive determination of conditions of
critical knowledge, but by means of a closed relational system that generates its own
definitions and relations with an assumed isomorphism of statements and facts.”1675
Peirce’s method of inquiry did, certainly, include a “the self-correcting nature” of a
procedure that “is supposed to reside in the fact that any conclusion reached is still
subject to further review at the hands of those committed to following the method,”1676
entailing the possibility of a very insular system. However, if read in conjunction with
Peirce’s fallibilism, wherein “if inquirers are not fallibilists, then they will not be open to
questioning their beliefs, and thus they will not be open to new and worthwhile areas of
inquiry” such that “the possibility of novel scientific discoveries will be thwarted,”1677
Peirce’s method may be viewed not a “closed” system but, rather, as “inclusive, open,
and

egalitarian

as

possible”1678

and

always

“self-critical,”

maintaining

an

“experimentalist posture towards its own processes”1679 “Closing” the system, as the

As Rockmore notes, too, “like the early members of the Frankfurt School…Habermas stresses a view
which does not reduce rationality to instrumental reason.” Tom Rockmore, “The Epistemological Promise
of Pragmatism,” in Habermas and Pragmatism, ed. Mitchell Aboulafia, Myra Bookman and Catherine
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positivistic versions of science maintain, would violate Peirce’s highest commandment:
“do not block the way of inquiry.”1680 As Misak notes,
The pragmatist…supports a kind of radical democracy in inquiry. Belief
involves being prepared to try to justify one’s views to others and being
prepared to test one’s beliefs against the experience of others. Thus the
differences of inquirers – their different perspectives, sensibilities, and
experiences – must be taken seriously. If they are not, reaching the best or
the true belief is not on the cards.1681
Unlike Horkheimer, Habermas appreciated this critical distinction between Peirce’s
theory of science and the positivistic model. As Swindal notes, “Habermas argues
that…Peirce attempted to break the force of positivism by developing scientific
methodologies that could transcend their own empirical limits by means of critical selfreflection.”1682 Swindal rightly notes, too, that a central component of Peirce’s method of
belief formation about the nature of any given object of experience entailed a conception
of thinking that is “mediated by signs.”1683 Buchler notes, for Peirce “communication
takes place by means of signs, and Peirce’s theory, in its investigation of the nature and
conditions of sign-relations, endows with a new and vital significance that man is a social
animal.”1684 However, Habermas was critical of Peirce’s ruminations on the use of
language because it “conceptualized the interpretation of signs abstractly, detached from
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a model of linguistic communication between speaker and hearer.”1685 There is certainly
some validity to this claim that we will return to shortly.
What Habermas did appreciate was Peirce’s navigation between pure rational
reflection (“knowledge advances…through practical engagement in the world”1686) and a
“naïve empiricism” that founded knowledge claims on a supposed “immediate and
intuitive contact with the world,”1687 reflected in Peirce’s critique of the a priori method.
For example, as Shalin notes, “contrary to Cartesian philosophy,” for Peirce, “the solitary
knower cannot fathom the world in its complexity and growth, for he lacks the
perspectival view…needed to grasp things’ multiple relationships.”1688 This gives rise to
a necessary communicative interactivity between participants in the community of
inquirers1689 and delves deeply into Peirce’s dynamic semiotics that was concerned with
articulating the multiple relationships of signs between interpretents and objects of
experience. Further, precisely because of the extremity of Peirce’s social individualism
and first rule of reason, such communication must be uncoerced1690 either by a priority,
authority, or tenacity, and thus, conversely, must be open, egalitarian, inclusive, and
democratic.1691 As Dewey said, “freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom
of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the
ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as well as the scientific
Swindal, Reflection Revisited: Jürgen Habermas’ Discursive Theory of Truth, Op. Cit., 95.
Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, Op. Cit, 69.
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3 (Fall 1992): 215 – 259, 253 – 254.
1689
“Only through social intercourse as a member of a community of inquirers, can the knower survey an
object in several perspectives at once and thereby learn its true nature (or rather natures),” Ibid., 254.
1690
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method.”1692 Although many scholars, Shalin included, argue that Dewey’s sentiment
here “extends Peirce’s argument about communications and collective inquiry into the
socio-political domain, where it is reformulated as the program of freeing
communications

from

distortions

inhibiting

political

inquiry

and

community

building,”1693 I have argued throughout this project that Peirce’s system had these
concerns already in place, though clearly not as explicitly as did Dewey’s.1694 As Shalin
notes, “by freeing collective inquiry from domination,” precisely what the critique of
authority was meant to highlight, “and bringing in individuals previously excluded from
public discourse…we make society more rational, open, and humane.”1695
The collective project of signifying was not only central to Peirce’s philosophy as
a whole, but also a critical analysis of the methods by which this collective project
unfolds is central to critical theory’s aims at de-obfuscating the indoctrinating structures
(especially, here, of language) of the Establishment. Peirce’s critique of the method of
authority, in concert with his insistence on an unlimited community of inquirers,1696
granted the foundation for the tension requisite for bringing these contingent beliefs into
doubt which, in turn, motivated the process of radical social change. As Shalin notes,
“understanding the constitutive power of symbolization, its capacity to mystify and reify,
is a must if we want to break its stranglehold over our lives and reclaim control over our
1692
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own destiny,”1697 a concern central to the project of critical theory, a concern central to
Habermas’s work in particular, and explored thoroughly by Peirce. 1698 The method of
inquiry not only guards against external coercions (from authority) but internal, as well,
(from tenacity and a priority). As such, unlike any of the other methods of belief
formation, the method of inquiry, alone, deploys our faculty of reason as something that
“becomes not only self-conscious but also self-critical,”1699 notes Mead. “To facilitate the
emergence of such a society is the task of pragmatist philosophy” such that “pragmatism,
in this sense, is a critical undertaking”1700 founded, as Dewey says, on the premise that
“philosophy is criticism.”1701
Habermas continued the project of the Frankfurt School, criticizing the
indoctrinating tendencies and the exploitation of nature inherent in consumer culture and
capitalism. Just as in the method of authority, the manipulation of communication
dissolves the potential for radically free and democratic inquiry. Habermas thus saw the
potential for radical social change (at the macro-level of society) in a dynamic critique
and radical reformulation of the semiotic structures of language and communication (at
the micro-level1702). Emancipated from the indoctrinating and reifying tendencies of
communicative interactions, harnessing this “illocutionary force which derives from
society and empowers us in dealing with other people,”1703 we can reconstruct what he

1697

Ibid., 255.
Perhaps the best resource for the mystifying and reifying qualities of semiotics can be found in
Umberto Eco who was thoroughly Peircean.
1699
George H. Mead, Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), 255.
1700
Shalin, “Introduction: Habermas, Pragmatism, Interactionism,” Op. Cit., 255.
1701
John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover, 1929), 398. My emphasis.
1702
“He pins his hopes for emancipation on the fact that the ossified social order can be deciphered and
transcended on the micro-level, in routine symbolic interactions, where oppressive structures are
reproduced in the structures of interpersonal communications,” Shalin, “Introduction: Habermas,
Pragmatism, Interactionism,” Op. Cit., 255.
1703
Ibid., 256.
1698

531

called the ideal speech situation which entails “establishing a discursive consensus about
the most rational policies we can follow.”1704 For Habermas, there was an “emancipatory
potential built into communication structures themselves”1705 that must be released from
its indoctrinating and reifying confines in the modern milieu. Shalin summarizes the
conditions for this “ideal speech situation” as follows: “(a) every interested individual has
a practical chance to participate in discourse, (b) participants shun purely strategic
motives, (c) validity claims are discursively redeemed, (d) policies are adopted by
uncoerced consensus, and (e) rational decisions are subject to continuous revision.”1706
The resonance with Peirce, if not complete agreement, is immediately apparent.
For Habermas, “rationality is understood to be a disposition of speaking and
acting subjects that is expressed in modes of behavior for which there are good reasons
and grounds. This means that rational expressions admit of objective evaluation.”1707
Rationality, so construed, develops into a “consensus theory of truth” wherein:
Actions regulated by norms, expressive self-presentations, and also
evaluative expressions, supplement constative speech acts in constituting a
communicative practice which, against the background of the lifeworld, is
oriented to achieving, sustaining, and renewing consensus – and indeed a
consensus that rests on the intersubjective recognition of criticizable
validity claims.”1708
With Habermas’ emphasis on intersubjective communication resulting in consensus,
always against an already existing lifeworld,1709 once again the similarity, if not perfect
isomorphism, with Peirce’s thought is readily apparent.
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Nevertheless, although Peirce proved incalculably influential for the development
of Habermas’ own critical theory, Habermas still noted several deficiencies in Peirce’s
pragmatism. As Hesse notes, “Habermas’ primary thesis is that the positivist theory of
science is inadequate because it does not take account of what he calls communicative
knowledge, that is, of the linguistic conditions of interpersonal communication, and
because it is incapable of self-reflection, that is of applying itself to itself.”1710 Ultimately,
Habermas argued that Peirce, though he certainly took great strides away from
positivism, ultimately failed to provide an adequate account of the linguistic conditions of
interpersonal communication within his method of inquiry.
“In Peirce’s pragmatism, Habermas seeks to find a transcendental epistemology
that avoids the pitfalls of a first philosophy, which is to say a transcendentalism that
makes no substantial presuppositions as to what should count as knowledge.”1711 In this
way, Habermas appreciated the Kantian strain in Peirce far more than Horkheimer had
(again, no doubt due to Apel). The modification to Peirce’s method was at the level of
reflection upon “the justification of the statements scientists thereby produce” wherein, at
this stage, “we rise to the level of logic of science or epistemology…what Habermas calls
discourse.”1712 For Peirce, rather than focusing only upon “bare facts” or “raw data,” his
method demonstrated how “science progresses by proving old theories to be false, and
replacing them with better theories” and “precisely through his explicitly transcendental
framework, he is able to offer a more subtle account of both the constitution of the object
of scientific knowledge and of the inquiring subject.”1713
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Unlike his predecessors, Habermas was critical of too readily accepting Weber’s
pessimistic account of technical rationality. The concern, as Rasmussen notes, was that
“reason, imprisoned in the modern subject, could express itself only instrumentally,
resulting in the transition from a positive reading of the powers and capacities of reason
in the modern world (Hegel) to the negative one (Weber).”1714 Habermas attempted to
show that “this was a false diagnosis,” distinguishing between “subject-centered reason
and reason itself,”1715 the former instrumental and indoctrinating in all the ways Weber
perceived, but the latter was “communicative” and inherently emancipatory. 1716 If a
central task of critical theory was the “emancipation from instrumental reason,”1717 it was
to “communicative reason” that Habermas would turn. Not unlike Horkheimer’s critique
of subjective reason, Habermas’ critique noted the lack of any “intersubjective”1718
component to instrumental rationality. Thus, as Rasmussen notes, “the real enemy in the
theory of communicative action is not Weber...but post-Cartesian philosophy of
consciousness in general which was left with the concept of a completely isolated subject
whose relationship to the world can be only instrumentally conceived and not
intersubjectively established.”1719 Peirce, too, was critical of what he perceived to be
Cartesian solipsism, the lack of any intersubjectivity in belief formation, and established
his own form of communal, communicative, social individualism in sharp contrast to that
“atomic” position.
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“In a sense, the original idea for a discourse ethics comes from Charles Sanders
Peirce”1720 who championed the necessity of an egalitarian community of free inquirers
for the attainment of Truth in the long run. Rasmussen points out precisely the subtle
notion I’ve discussed above, namely, the complementary necessities of both arriving at
Truth in the long and a community capable of doing so: “Peirce’s idea was that the
possibility of scientific truth presupposed a scientific community.”1721 The normative
component to Peirce’s insight here was that, prior to postulating the need for such an
ideal community and the ideal of Truth, there was the conscious “decision to seek the
truth, which in principle requires a normative decision preceding the discovery of
scientific truth, the locus of which is to be found in the ideally postulated scientific
community.”1722 As Peirce said, “there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and
that is a hearty and active desire to learn what is true.”1723 This “passionate pursuit” 1724 is
the heart of Peirce’s first rule of reason. In this sense, “Peirce could be interpreted as one
who…could be seen to depart from a purely empirical investigation to raise the question
of the transcendental conditions for the possibility of such an investigation.”1725 As such,
“Peirce’s insight…was fundamental to the theory of communicative action itself.”1726
This is a fascinating critique that distances itself from Horkheimer’s precisely
because Habermas was sensitive to the value of “truth” as a collective project in the long
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run and that Peirce resisted describing the scientific method as cold, calculating
instrumentalism. For example, Habermas cited this lovely passage from Peirce on the
efficacy of the sciences:
… if I am asked to what the wonderful success of modern science is due, I
shall suggest that to gain the secret of that, it is necessary to consider
science as living, and therefore not as knowledge already acquired but as
the concrete life of the men who are working to find the truth.1727
When Peirce considered “the more immediate and more pertinent causes of the triumph
of modern science…and the singleness of heart with which… they cast their whole being
into the service of science,” was due to “their unreserved discussions with one another, to
each being fully informed about the work of his neighbour, and availing himself of that
neighbour’s results.”1728 We see, immediately, shades of Peirce’s distinction between the
Gospel of Christ and the Gospel of Greed, as I discussed, wherein the latter pits
neighbour against neighhour and the former seeks to merge their interests in common
purpose. Although Peirce was well-aware that even within science “there are a few selfseekers who succeed in gaining the power to make themselves more despired than they
naturally would be,”1729 the ideal community of inquirers are capable of “storming the
stronhold of truth”1730 by working together, in solidarity, a vibrant display of a Sartrean
group-in-fusion which topples the Bastille and a lovely nod to the short story Peirce
wrote when was a mere boy, already desirous of ascending the mountain of knowledge.
“This,” Peirce said, “is the veritable essence of science. It is in the memory of these

1727

See Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests, Op. Cit., 94. Also Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 7.50.
Ibid., CP 7.51.
1729
Ibid.
1730
Ibid.
1728

536

concrete living gests that we gain the speaking portraiture of true science in all her life
and beauty.1731
However, Habermas maintained that had “Peirce taken seriously the
communication of inquirers as a subject that transcendentally formed itself under
empirical conditions, then he would have been forced to a self-reflection which would
have exceeded its own limits as a fixed inquiry.”1732 Habermas was ultimately critical of
Peirce’s “failure to see only in the circle of instrumental action can initial conditions be
set so as to produce an observable reaction that exhibits a universal effect.”1733 In other
words, Habermas was concerned that without a viable objective basis to gauge scientific
progress Peirce had to fall back on merely the instrumental actions in the present to
establish the conditions for observable success and the mere hypothesis of further success
in the long run.
For Habermas, “we cannot break out of the sphere of language and
argumentation.”1734 As he said, “we can only establish the relation to reality, which is not
equivalent to ‘existence,’ by projecting a ‘transcendence from within.’”1735 Indeed, Peirce
made such a distinction in his phenomenology, noting that Secondness was the category
of “existence” (the recalcitrance we experience in inquiry) as opposed to Thirdness, the
category of “reality,” which is constituted phenomenologically. As Swindal explains:
For Habermas this view of inner transcendence both respects the
‘objectivity’ of the intersubjectivity of understanding that has become
reflexive and avoids the ontologization of reality…if the learning
processes of the human species are limited to mirror only what is already
1731
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contained in nature, they lose the convincing power of the better
argument, and he espouses instead a kind of ‘intersubjective realism’:
agreement always occurs between ego and alter about something in the
world. Both the topic of the agreement and the other with whom
agreement is reached give the intersubjective dialogue an objectivity.1736
Wanting to avoid the pitfalls of the timelessly problematic “ego-centric” predicament
bound up with a “correspondence theory of truth,” Habermas sought to avoid the
ontologization of reality and, with it, the gauge of having to “mirror” what is already
contained in nature. Instead, he advocated a dynamic “consensus theory of truth” wherein
both the topic (within the sphere of language) and the other (engaged through dialogue)
reach an agreement that is not subjectively constituted as a mere whim or any personal
fancy. As LaFont explains:
Habermas’s conception of objectivity can indeed be understood as an
attempt to explain the sense in which ‘the way the world is’ constraints
communicative practices from within. It also offers an explanation based
on the idea that what is shared by all discursive perspectives is that there is
a difference between what is objectively correct and what is merely taken
to be so, not what it is; what they share is formal and, thus, it is not a
cross-perspectival content.1737
Lafont maintains that, for Habermas, there were “conditions of possibility of discourse”
which entailed that communication “requires that the participants share a sense of
objectivity, for otherwise they would not see the need for deciding about the disputed
validity claims one way or another.”1738 For Habermas, communication presupposed the
postulation of an objective world-view, for “if participants in communication are to
evaluate whether things are the way they think or rather as someone else believes, they
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cannot at the same time dogmatically identify their own beliefs with the way the world
is.”1739 To do so would be to succumb to a kind of “tenacity” in a Peircean sense. This
reflexive form of communication “requires that the participants intuitively (and
counterfactually) distinguish between everyone’s (incompatible) beliefs and the assumed
world-order itself.”1740 As Habermas said:
Validity claims are in principle open to criticism because they are based
on formal world-concepts. They presuppose a world that is identical for all
possible observers, or a world intersubjectively shared by all the members
of a group and they do so in an abstract form freed of all specific
content.1741

The presupposition for Habermas was not a wholly mind-independent world of absolute
Truth and reality so much as a world constituted by the participants in communication, a
shared world that is available to all. It is a matter of “form,” however, rather than
“content.” Without succumbing to the Kantian problem of a world-in-itself as a
regulative ideal, Habermas’ world was intersubjectively constituted by the participants in
dialogue but still managed to find a criteria for validity that didn’t lead to pure relativism:
precisely because the world so constituted is presupposed to be immediate to, and
identical for, all possible observers” there is thus a criterion to weed out subjective
beliefs that diverge from that presupposed, common world. As Habermas said, “the
function of the formal world-concepts…is to prevent the stock of what is common from
dissolving in the stream of subjectivities…every action oriented to reaching
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understanding can be conceived as part of a cooperative process of interpretation aiming
at situation definitions that are intersubjectively recognized.”1742 As Lafont notes:
The presupposition of a single objective world is a built-in feature of the
assertional practice oriented towards the validity claim “truth” – a practice
constrained by the binary distinction true/false: if assertions are claims
about how things are in the world and the world is one and the same for all
of us, our beliefs about it can only be either true or false; and, for the very
same reason, if someone else’s beliefs are true, one should believe them
oneself.1743

Rather than postulating a mind-independent realm prior to discourse between parties and
then coming up with a way to “mirror” that realm through consensus, the objective of
inquiry arises from within discourse itself, which is Habermas’ position in contrast to
LaFont’s. However, it must be the presupposition not of a variety of “reals” (as Dewey
maintained) but a single objective world, agreed upon by all inquirers as a goal that arises
within the sphere of discourse itself. Consensus thus has both an objective basis that isn’t
susceptible to subjective whim or intractable antagonistic positions and, too, doesn’t
postulate a mind-independent realm that requires a correspondence theory of truth to
explain. This culminates in a theory of “unconstrained consensus.”1744 As Habermas
described it, from Peirce, “we term information scientific if and only if an uncompelled
and permanent consensus can be obtained with regard to its validity.”1745 This reading of
Peirce is closely aligned with those scholars who maintain Peirce was not a metaphysical
realist in the sense of postulating a wholly mind-independent realm that only a
correspondence theory could access. Instead, as a type of phenomenological idealist,
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“reality” is constituted through experience. For Habermas, however, precisely because
Peirce’s language kept hedging him closer and closer to a correspondence theory (and
many top scholars believe he did in fact maintain a correspondence theory), the
unnecessary ontologizing of nature muddied an otherwise dynamic, intersubjective,
communicative theory of truth.
As Habermas noted, the conclusion then, was that “reality can be considered not
only from the transcendental point of view of the genesis of true statements; conversely
the genesis of true statements can also be rendered comprehensible from the ontological
point of view of a reality of universals existing in themselves.”1746 According to Peirce’s
adherence to Scholastic realism (as opposed to nominalism), Habermas’ account is quite
correct.1747
The fact of scientific progress induces Peirce to define universal
propositions exclusively in relation to the anticipated end of the process of
inquiry as a whole and yet to assume at the same time that, in increasing
measure, we objectively arrive at true statements even before the
consummation of this process – despite subjective uncertainty about the
truth value of every single one of these statements. If this is so, however,
then we must be able per se to infer a universal matter of fact from a
given, finite number of singular cases, although for us the validity of the
procedure cannot be compelling but at best probable. Regarded from the
perspective of the logic of inquiry, synthetic inferences must be
possible.1748
Thus, as Habermas rightly said, “the universal exists not only as a concept of the
knowing subject but in itself, and in such a manner that the concrete cases ‘in’ which it
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exists ‘points’ to it.”1749 However, Habermas then noted, “in contrast, the perspective of
the logic of inquiry compels Peirce to adopt a concept of reality derived from the
methodological concept of truth”1750 which thus forced Peirce to “reconcile realism with
the principles of a transcendental philosophy.”1751
In this way, Habermas’s critique becomes plain:
What [Peirce] actually does, however, once having taken the logic of
inquiry as his point of departure, is detach from it a concept of reality
limited by the logic of language and remain satisfied with the observation
that reality is constituted under conditions of the grammatical form of
universal propositions. On this presupposition, the metaphysical version of
realism seems to be convertible into a metalinguistic one. But the limit of
linguistic transcendentalism reveals itself, as indicated, in the element of
immediate qualitative manifoldness, which, like that of facticity, first
guarantees being’s independence from our interpretations.1752
To say that Peirce considered reality to be “constituted under conditions of the
grammatical form of universal propositions” seems to oversimplify Peirce’s
phenomenology and conflate what it means to make a statement with what it means to
have a belief. As I’ve said, “beliefs” are more than simply what can be said of the world,
though what we can say of the world is clearly an important facet of having a belief. True
propositions were not forged by a disinterested spectator in a laboratory, for Peirce, they
were forged of a full, phenomenological immersion where the different moments of
experience can be parceled out for the sake of analysis but ultimately manifest in concert.
There are “havings” and “knowings,” moments of mediation and moments of immediacy,
all within a very dynamic transaction within a very wide conception of “experience.” In
Thirdness, where we constitute “reality,” that constitution has incorporated into it
1749
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moments of both Firstness and Thirdness, the moments of “having” an experience of the
world as it really is. “Reality,” so constituted, includes our experience of the world as it
exists independently of our inquiries but is not, at the same time, wholly reducible to that
independence. There is an externality that imposes itself upon inquiry (manifest most
prominently in Secondness) that is experienced phenomenologically as tension, as
resistance, for us. “Reality,” as Thirdness, takes the entire event of experience as a whole:
the inquirer’s immediate and unproblematic immersion in the world, the external world
experienced as tension or resistance, and the cognitive systematizing of those two
phenomena into a holistic idea of “reality.” The very real externally existing world
imposes itself quite against our will into our inquiries and plays a key role (but not an
exhaustive role) in our conception of reality. For Peirce, this conception of reality neither
corresponded with true statements nor did it exist as mere consensus wholly divorced
from an external permenancy.
For Habermas, however, according to his reading, Peirce was led away from
realism and away from Kant, landing him in a form of “idealism that is not unlike
Hegel’s.”1753 Of course, this flies in the face of what Peirce intended.1754 Habermas took
this as a kind of vicious circularity, namely:
With the concept of reality derived from the logic of inquiry, Peirce
already presupposes that the existence of anything independent of
synthetic inferences is inconceivable...if we assume that reality is not
1753
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constituted independently of the rules to which the process of inquiry is
subject, then we cannot refer to this reality to justify the validity of the
rules of the process of inquiry, that is the modes of inference.1755

Accordingly, Peirce adhered to the method of inquiry based on what appears to be no
more than faith1756 and the observational assumption that it’s been working pretty well so
far.1757 But, as Habermas said, “this does not answer the question, ‘What makes the facts
usually to be, as inductive and hypothetical conclusions from true premises represent
them to be?’”1758 The problem, for Habermas, seemed to be: if reality is constituted
through inquiry, it follows that we can’t use reality to gauge whether or not our
statements that comprise our constitution of reality are true. We thus lose any objective
standard to judge our beliefs as true or false.
However, Peirce’s categories include the “external”1759 world rather than set the
external world up from the start as something in-itself and unknowable. As Hoopes notes,
“pragmatism had its origins in a new conception of what thinking is – an objective
process of representation and interpretation in time and space rather than, as Déscartes
had thought, unmediated apprehension of the contents of the extended substance of
mind.”1760 Indeed, “in Peirce’s formulation even human thought is external in the sense
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that it is objective brain activity rather than the immaterial substance of mind described
by Déscartes.”1761 Although we are limited to our phenomenological experience, for
Peirce, that experience includes the totality of the objective world. If every facet of our
experiences were immediate and certain, there’d be little need for abduction or induction
at all.1762 Tensions continue to emerge against a background of established beliefs and
those tensions, refined communally through inquiry, constitute a more holistic and
complete picture of reality. But, for Peirce, there was no lingering world-in-itself behind
that phenomenological sphere precisely because the categories, themselves, include the
world-as-it-is, though never in-itself apart from us. We are always already caught up in it
(in Firstness), and this immediate correlation creates tensions (in Secondness) whenever
our beliefs about reality (Thirdness) prove to be misguided and thus must be reformulated
communally.
The problem for Habermas was that, on the one hand, “the logic of scientific
inquiry cannot be justified purely in terms of its logical coherence. At the very least, this
would suggest a paradoxical reversion to the a priori method, and the ultimate divorce of
science from reality.”1763 Coherence without correspondence results in a divorce from
science and reality, reducing the latter to merely the consensus agreed upon by the former
without an objective gauge to adjudicate their findings. “Yet, on the other hand, the logic
of inquiry cannot be justified by a simple appeal to the real. If all experience of reality is
mediated by prior beliefs (as Peirce argues), then the accuracy of a scientific hypothesis
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(let alone the abductive method that generated it) cannot be tested by an appeal to any
immediate knowledge of the real.”1764 Here, however, is the source of the confusion:
while it’s true that all experience of reality is mediated by prior beliefs, not all experience
is mediated (Firstness is immediate, and Secondness is an immediate experience of
“shock” though mediated nominally by shock-as-opposed-to-Firstness). The external
world, so construed in the language of mind/world dichotomies, is already packed into
the mediated experiences that constitute Reality. So although it’s true our experience of
reality is always mediated (thought-signs to other thought-signs, every Firstness is
comprised of a previous Thirdness), the categories of phenomenological experience
themselves already include that externality and do not operate as a barrier separating
mind (the limits of the categories) and world (that which is outside the categories that
they do not represent). As Edgar notes, according to Habermas’ critique of Peirce, “the
real at once exists prior to inquiry and yet is only recognized and constituted through
inquiry.”1765
Without seeing the externality latent within the phenomenological categories,
there appears to be no objective gauge to constrain inquiry and thus the results of inquiry
“remain contingent as a whole.”1766 To avoid this unfortunate consequence, Habermas
noted that Peirce went beyond his intended purpose of constructing a theory of meaning
“but rather the central question of a logic of inquiry that is guided by reflection on the
basic experience of positivism: how is scientific progress possible? Pragmatism answers
this question by legitimating the validity of synthetic modes of inference on the basis of
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the transcendental structure of instrumental action,”1767 thus re-raising Horkheimer’s twofold critique that pragmatism was little more than an extension of (a) positivism and (b)
instrumental rationality. The refinement of beliefs for Peirce, Habermas maintained,
revolved around “a system of reference of possible feedback-controlled action”1768
wherein beliefs are tested experimentally to ascertain their veracity in “objective life
context in which the process of inquiry fulfills specifiable functions: the settlement of
opinions, the elimination of uncertainties, and the acquisition of unproblematic beliefs –
in short, the fixation of belief.”1769 The instrumental context is that “the meaning of the
validity of statements is determined with reference to possible technical control of the
connection of empirical variables” as they manifest the “universal relations represented in
signs.”1770 Thus, “instrumental action” implies the conditions of validity for “inference”
itself.1771 Ultimately, we must “understand instrumental action as the control of the
external conditions of existence, which can be acquired and exercised only under the
conditions of a cumulative learning process.”1772 This is the heart of Habermas’ reading
of Peirce as a transcendental philosopher1773 in so far as the “transcendental grounding to
knowledge…lies in labour understood as a behavioural circuit of feedback-controlled
action” which “makes possible a certain form of knowledge of the world.”1774
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Habermas offered an alternative reading of what would have been more
reasonable given Peirce’s own project:
If Peirce had considered advocating this solution of the problem of
universals in terms of the logic of inquiry, he would have had to
differentiate in the concept of reality between, on the one hand, what is in
fact independent of cumulative learning processes and a human world
constituted by technical controllability and, on the other, what we catch
‘of’ this reality as soon as it enters our world and becomes the correlate of
true statements about reality. Marx had a conception of this difference,
and Heidegger, elaborating on the work of Husserl, has explicitly
formulated it: the difference between beings and Being. If the concept of
reality derived from the logic of inquiry were to be developed in a
pragmatistic direction, it would have to comprehend this difference.
Peirce, however, limits himself to a concept of reality that is exhausted in
being the correlate of all possible true statements.1775

By conflating what Habermas saw as two distinct strands (the logic of inquiry and the
logic of language), Peirce ultimately reduced the terms of “reality” to the latter,1776
thereby culminating in a conception of reality that was little more than the “correlate of
all possible true statements” which are, in turn, forged of experiment and technical
control over reality as it presents itself only as a problem that must be solved. The totality
of reason becomes, ultimately, instrumental precisely because there is no sense of reality
as anything beyond or behind the confines of this object-as-problem and no language to
describe it other than the language of technical control. Precisely because of this apparent
paradox wherein reality is both constituted by inquiry, and exists prior to inquiry,
Habermas seeks to disambiguate Peirce’s position by distinguishing “the issue of the
constitution of reality from that of the truth of scientific propositions about that
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reality.”1777 Thus, “on the one hand the real is relative to the current state of science or,
more precisely, to the current capacity to engage instrumentally with nature. On the other
hand, reality is ‘the totality of true propositions.’”1778 Precisely because knowledge of the
world increases through belief refinement, and beliefs are, themselves, “necessarily
linguistic,” it follows that “to assert that an experience is always mediated by prior beliefs
is also to assert that experience is always mediated by language. Reality is therefore
constituted in language,”1779 with “reality” meaning, here, the sum-total of all true
statements.
Even if it is possible to recognize that a given hypothesis is false, then it is
still not possible to guarantee that any substituted hypothesis is any closer
to being one of the totality of true propositions that will be achieved at the
end of scientific inquiry. This is due to the fact that if there is no access to
reality independent of language and belief, then there are no independent
criteria by which to assess the progress of science.1780

This problem led Habermas to criticize Peirce through the Nietzschean conception of
“perspectivism.” If Peirce failed to account for a singular, objective reality, then what is
to say that there isn’t a multiplicity of perspectives that amount to little more than “a
plurality of fictions relative to multiple standpoints”1781? Habermas wanted to side with
Peirce, specifically, “his commitment to the transcendental implications of the
‘hypothesis of reality.’ Such a disciplining ‘reality,’ articulated through labour, would
serve to ground our intuitive notion that science does progress rather than merely
change.”1782 Further, if “perspectivism” is all that’s left of Peirce’s doctrine, then the roll
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of pragmatism is reduced to its bare instrumental form: that is pragmatism’s
“perspective,” namely, “facilitating human survival.”1783 As Edgar summarizes, “at
worst, this is a biological claim: in effect, that what passes for knowledge is wholly
relative to the biological needs of the human species. At best, it is a sociological thesis:
what a community recognizes as knowledge is shaped by the particular survival needs of
that community.”1784 This devolves into a sort of “decisionism”1785 which resonates with
the concerns of the Frankfurt School: the needs of a community, what it needs to
“survive,” may be dictated by the needs of a power interest. Ultimately, such decisionism
would be indistinguishable from the “authority” Peirce abhored. Habermas attempted to
establish some form of transcendental framework for Peirce’s method that eschewed any
potential for it to devolve into decisionism.
We can only conjecture why Peirce accedes to a concealed positivism and
treats the pragmatist criterion of meaning in such an absolutistic manner
that it destroys the foundation of pragmatism itself. Had Peirce taken
seriously the communication of investigators as a transcendental subject
forming itself under empirical conditions, then pragmatism would have
been compelled to a self-reflection that overstepped its own boundaries. In
continuing his analysis, Peirce would have had to come upon the fact that
ground of intersubjectivity in which investigators are always already
situated when they attempt to bring about consensus about metatheoretical
problems is not the ground of purposive-rational action, which is in
principle solitary.1786
Habermas’ concern was that, given his reading of Peirce, pragmatism limits itself to
purposive-rational action and technical control of the environment that was, as he noted,
in principle solitary. Had Peirce taken seriously the communication of the investigators
within his community of inquirers, he’d have noted that human interests are not as
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“absolutistic” and single-minded as the parameters that Habermas believed pragmatism
has set upon itself. Habermas was quite right that Peirce noted that the ground of
intersubjectivity is one upon which all investigators are already situated, but Habermas
limited their motivational spectrum. By limiting the parameters of pragmatism to
instrumentalism, Habermas noted that since the goals are all, in principle, solitary
(survival, the dissolution of doubts, technical control of my environment, etc.) it dissolved
intersubjective dialogue entirely. Because “subjects acting instrumentally make use of
representational signs, and the technical rules that can be sedimented as habits must be
capable of formulation in statements about relations of events,” the logical determinations
that expand our knowledge (deduction, abduction, and induction) “establish relations
between statements that are in principle monologic. It is possible to think in syllogisms,
but not to conduct a dialogue in them. I can use syllogistic reasoning to yield arguments
for a discussion, but I cannot argue syllogistically with an other.” 1787 If Peirce limited the
parameters of knowledge acquisition to the deployment of the logical coordinations of
syllogisms, there can be no ground of intersubjectivity beyond the nominal sense of
comparing and contrasting syllogisms. Thus:
Insofar as the employment of symbols is constitutive for the behavioral
system of instrumental action, the use of language involved is monologic.
But the communication of investigators requires the use of language that is
not confined to the limits of technical control over objectified natural
processes. It arises from symbolic interaction between societal subjects
who reciprocally know and recognize each other as unmistakable
individuals. This communicative action is a system of reference that
cannot be reduced to the framework of instrumental action.”1788

1787
1788

Ibid., 137.
Ibid.

551

Inquiry itself, if it is to be authentically intersubjective and dialogic, must use more than
the syllogistic language of logic. As he said, individuals do not communicate in
syllogisms. Thus, in order to justify his emphasis on consensus and a community of
inquirers, Peirce would have had to establish a type of “communicative” rather than
merely “instrumental” framework to explain how his method of inquiry operates
intersubjectively at all. Ultimately, as Habermas concluded, despite Peirce’s abhorrence
to atomic individualism, Cartesian solipsism, and the method of tenacity, he provided no
solid ground upon which we can justify inquiry’s progress by means of consensus and
communication.1789
For Peirce, it was true that abduction and induction (which may be rendered
syllogistically) are the means by which knowledge increased. 1790 The problem that

“Inquiry understood as a relationship of deduction, induction and abduction remains monological,
which is to say, a process that could occur in the head of a lone inquirer,” Edgar, The Philosophy of
Habermas, Op. Cit., 73.
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Habermas presented is that Peirce seemed to suggest that Truth was both determined
intersubjectively yet, too, that knowledge grows syllogistically. We can, as Habermas
said, demonstrate our syllogistic reasoning to our fellows, but ultimately those shared
syllogisms must be verified individually, i.e., subjectively on the basis of validity claims.
In short, Peirce either failed to account for how intersubjectivity actually contributed to
consensus and knowledge growth, or else he ought to abandon his position that
intersubjectivity, beyond the nominal sense of sharing syllogisms (i.e., experimental data
and theories), contributes in any meaningful way to Peirce’s theory of inquiry.
For example, if I have a belief, I establish it in terms of a syllogism and place it on
the proverbial table of communal verification. Another inquirer “picks up” that belief off
the proverbial table, analyzes it, and either confirms it or denies it by presenting an
alternative belief for me to then pick up off the table and so forth. The two individuals
don’t ever communicate directly or immediately, “with each other” in a sense, as all
interpersonal communication is mediating by this proverbial table of communal
verification. If we view the problem through King’s definition of “monlogue” (as
opposed to “dialogue”), it’s clear that the former represents a kind of Peircean method of
tenacity wherein each party clings tenaciously to their respective beliefs and turns away
from the beliefs of the Other. Alternatively, it may be an example of the a priori method
wherein each party (like empiricists and rationalists) rest certain on fundamental
principles, themselves unquestioned and not forged of experience, and consequently can
never meet, dialogically, on common ground. What Peirce offered, instead, was a method
that was inherently communicative and dialogical and even though abductive, inductive,
and deductive deployments of logic in knowledge growth may be rendered syllogistically,
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they rarely are so rendered in common conversation, though nevertheless underlie our
discourse (if our discourse is to be sensible at all).
“On the contrary,” Habermas said, “every dialogue develops on an entirely
different basis, namely that of the reciprocal recognition of subjects who identify one
another under the category if selfhood (Ichheit) and at the same time maintain themselves
in their non-identity.”1791 As Habermas said, “the concept of the individual ego includes a
dialectical relation of the universal and the particular, which cannot be conceived in the
behavioral system of instrumental action.”1792 The system of instrumental action, for
Habermas, was borne out in technical control where “otherness” is seen as antagonistic,
oppositional, and, in a sense, pure negation. Viewing the individual ego in such a manner
denigrates the individual’s selfhood and non-identity to yet one more facet of technical
control, either through having to “overcome” the individual as “problem” or else to use
the collective sum of other individuals to create the communal beliefs that are, for
Habermas, ultimately verified by their reproducibility by each, singular individual.
Indeed, with his reading, it is hard to see how such communal beliefs could be forged to
begin with if they are forged of dialogue that can’t even get off the ground if the ego is
viewed through instrumental action.
In order to ground the method of inquiry, and save it from decisionism, Habermas
claimed that there must be an objective component to inquiry, one that is not reducible to
mediated sign relations.1793 As Edgar notes, “it is through experience, and not least
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experience that is literally incomprehensible – that cannot be meaningfully articulated –
that the ‘immediate quality of reality’ asserts itself. As such it is the source of challenges
to the publicly accepted interpretation of reality.”1794 As Edgar notes:
Human beings come to share an understanding of reality only in so far as
their engagement with reality is mediated by concrete intersubjective
relationships to each other. An understanding and justification of scientific
progress lies, therefore, in the explication not of an ahistorical logic, but
rather of the forms of open and critical debate that allow knowledge
claims to acquire genuine, universal acceptability.1795
However, Peirce’s social individualism is not merely the awareness of being out of step
and a drive to re-assimilate (this would be more in keeping with the method of authority),
but, rather, a semiotic individualism wherein the inquirer is intimately connected with
every other inquirer as well as the language used in inquiry and the objects discussed in
inquiry, so much so that “atomic” individualism can be nothing but a chimera. Our
“intersubjective relationships” with one another are how we come to know ourselves,
each other, and our world such that our experience of ourselves, each other, and our
world is, itself, mediated by our intersubjective relationships with others.
Peirce first establishes a general sign theory in which the value of any
given sign is its place in a general semiotic process. Communication
presupposes the existence of semiosis. As Peirce put it, to interpret his
general sign theory as a theory of communication between senders and
receivers was "a sop to Cerberus" that obscured his contention that a
general theory of signs constructed the very parameters of communication,
including the participant.1796
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Further, precisely because of his critique of the faux “consensus” and faux
“community” inherent in the method of authority, Peirce was alive to the possibility of
using the scientific method as a critical method.
Peirce recognizes that universal agreement can be – and frequently is –
brought about, not by open and rational consideration of evidence, but
through violence: ‘a general massacre of all who have not thought in a
certain way’ (Peirce 1960: 5.378). Reality and the collective subject that
constitutes it may thus be allowed to have complex and contingent
histories. However, within that flawed history there may be glimpsed in
the discursive practices of that community an ideal against which history
can be judged.1797
In a manner not overly dissimilar from Marcuse’s conception of “negative thinking,”
there is a hint, nascent in Peirce’s requirement of how Truth is achieved, of an ideal
community of inquirers that may be used as the hypothetical template against which to
measure deviations from that ideal, namely, the types of totalitarian formulations of
community that dissolve freedom of inquiry and democratic intersubjectivity. It is from
the “higher perspective,” as Marcuse might say, of this ideal community against which
the “flawed” history of a current milieu is illuminated and brought forth from the
obfuscating structures of its proliferated beliefs. In part, as Edgar suggests, this
realization of the tension between “what is” (the community as it exists) and “what is
not” (an ideal community) “may be glimpsed in the discursive practices of that
community” in the present. As I have argued before, the tension that arises from the
realization that one’s community is anything but “ideal” is created by those individuals
with a wider sort of social feeling which I have equated with critical theorists engaged in
negative thinking. Labour alone, especially framed against the problem of the method of
authority, cannot be the only transcendental conditions for the possibility of knowledge. It
1797

Edgar, The Philosophy of Habermas, Op. Cit., 74.

556

must be mutually framed along with a socio-political agenda designed, specifically, for a
superlative form of egalitarian democracy and freedom for inquiry to flourish at all. As
Edgar notes:
In sum, in the notion of the community of scientists, Peirce has begun to
recognize that labour alone cannot be the only transcendental condition of
(even natural scientific) knowledge. If it were, Nietzsche would be right.
Labour would entail nothing more than the empirical grounding of
scientific knowledge in the capacities of the human species. Labour must
be complemented by interaction as at least a first step in justifying
transcendentalism (KHI: 138).1798
As Rockmore notes, “Habermas regards Peirce as the first to see that knowledge
relies on uncompelled and permanent consensus in the form of an ultimate answer to
every scientific question.”1799 Though Peirce admonished any social constraints of
inquiry in the form of authority or capitalistic motivations, there is a kind of constraint
that operates to blockade inquiry from going in any which way it wants, namely, the
constraint of “Secondness,” the aspect of experience that determines “true” from “false”
beliefs by sending false ones spiraling off from the consequences we expect in those
particular guiding principles. “Existence,” in this sense, will block the way of inquiry, but
only in the nominal sense that it will stop us from tenaciously clinging to false beliefs in
the long run and, thus, has a productive role in inquiry itself. Further, as we’ve explored
exhaustively throughout this project, all “true beliefs” are always only provisional in light
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amendment to Rockmore’s point here: although the ideal end of inquiry, Truth, is both uncompelled and
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of the long run, thus “always open to change,” and approximated indefinitely.
“Consensus,” as I have argued, does not create reality, nor is it, alone, the full
demonstration of “Truth.” Consensus, as Rockmore rightly notes, is “compelled by
experience,” that is, is created through a coordination of intersubjective discourse that,
over time, better approximates the way the world actually is. Experience creates
consensus and consensus, then, is a good indication that, to the best of our current efforts,
provisionally, we have arrived at a fairly certain “true belief,” though, of course, never
(or, ideally, “not yet”) absolutely True. In this limited sense, we can, for Peirce,
distinguish between, as Habermas said, “true and false propositions,” though he quite
rightly says we cannot do so “definitively.” As Rockmore notes, for Peirce, “truth and
consensus are independent concepts,” though, of course, intimately related, nevertheless,
“one cannot infer from consensus, even unrestrained consensus, to truth.”1800 Consensus
operates as an indicator, rather than a guarantee, that Truth has, to a relative degree, been
attained. Truth, however, does not depend on consensus but on reality as a “limiting
concept,” in Rockmore’s terms, the resistance of reality bearing down upon our inquiries
and guiding us through inquiry in the long run. The ultimate difference between
Habermas and Peircean pragmatism, Rockmore summarizes, is this: “both hold that we
cannot directly know mind-independent reality. The former claims that we can, however,
know it indirectly through unconstrained consensus, hence attain truth as described in
theories of truth. The latter maintains that we have knowledge based on intersubjective
agreement, but not truth.”1801 The knowledge based on intersubjective agreement, the
Peircean consensus, warrants “true beliefs” but not Truth-in-itself, absolute and reflective
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of objective, mind-independent reality. Reality persists as a limiting condition, a guiding
principle, that determines true from false beliefs in this specific sense. I would amend
Rockmore’s distinction only slightly by adding “yet” at the end of his account of Peircean
pragmatism: “we have knowledge based on intersubjective agreement, but not truth” yet.
Indeed, in defense of Habermas, he admitted as much, noting, “the genuine achievement
of modern science does not consist primarily in producing true, that is correct and cogent
statements about what we call reality. Rather, it distinguishes itself from traditional
categories of knowledge by a method of arriving at an uncompelled and permanent
consensus of this sort about our views.”1802 Again, “uncompelled” in a social or
discursive, but “compelled,” at least, by the resistance of reality. Ultimately (and Peirce
was quite explicit here), the intersubjective agreement would culminate in Truth at the
end of the long run. Before we get to this ambiguously achievable goal, however, in the
interim, in the here and now, what we have is knowledge, not Truth, in an absolute sense.
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Conclusion

Towards a Critical Pragmatism

In attempting to reconcile American pragmatism with German critical theory, it
may seem an odd choice to turn to Peirce rather than Dewey.1803 On the one hand, Dewey
did not share Peirce’s qualms about applying the pragmatic methodology to issues of
contemporary socio-political import, having done so frequently and eloquently, and his
rocky relationship with capitalism is well documented. On the other hand, Peirce, to be
charitable, was not a paragon of virtue or tolerance, despite his explicit claims to the
contrary. As Hoopes notes in his intellectual history of Peirce, the father of pragmatism
and advocate of the radically egalitarian method of inquiry, was sympathetic to the antiabolitionist movement, complete with several overt examples of racial intolerance.1804
Perhaps the greatest success of any hypothesis is the moment it reveals the
shortcomings of its own progenitor. That Peirce, in some aspects of his life, failed to
adhere to his own method (succumbing, perhaps, to one or several of the
counterproductive methods of belief formation), in no way undermines the method itself.
Far from it, I argue, for such a revelation in turn may reveal the efficacy of the method in
a manner more honest and explicit than any example Peirce, himself, could conjure. It is
James Hoopes asked the same question and came to the same conclusion I will argue in this chapter: “I
sympathize greatly with the hope of these other liberal historians to find a usable past on which to rebuild
liberal ideals, but I do not believe that Dewey is the right foundation on which to build…there was another
pragmatic philosopher – Charles Sanders Peirce – who offered a sounder basis for the liberal dream that
Dewey did or does,” James Hoopes, Community Denied: The Wrong Turn of Pragmatic Liberalism (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1998), 2.
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important to be aware of this facet of Peirce’s life rather than ignore it, or else what are
we but more ostriches choosing to bury our heads in the proverbial sand? The very fact
that we may use Peirce’s own method to critique Peirce himself on this very issue stands
as testament to the enduring quality and efficacy of Peirce’s work: in essence, the method
transcends the man.
And it is the method that resonates so profoundly with the goals of the critical
theorists, especially those of Herbert Marcuse, whom we have focused on here. It is a
method that is hyperbolically inclusive and radically egalitarian, one that defies authority
and demands free and uninhibited dialogue and solidarity. It is a method that denies
capitalism the right to dictate the trajectory of inquiry and put a commoditized value on
philosophy’s quest for Truth. Though both James and Dewey utilized Peirce’s method of
inquiry, Peirce’s version was by far the most radical and the most useful for constructing
a socio-political philosophy precisely because, unlike James or Dewey, Peirce was a
realist and an objectivist and shared none of his successors flirtations with nominalism
and subjectivism. Indeed, “where Peirce’s pragmatism was strong and objective, theirs
was weak” and “was at least partially subjective.”1805 “Society” was not a mere word
bandied about. For Peirce, it was absolutely real,1806 an organism in its own right,1807 and
such a conception allowed Peirce, far more than any other pragmatist hence, 1808 to not
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only explain the relationship between individuals and their society succinctly, but to
ground that explanation in a precise metaphysics.1809 For “although Dewey knew that
communication was vital to society, he did not elaborate his metaphysics in sufficient
detail to offer a foundation for a well-developed theory of communication.”1810 It was
Peirce’s “detailed theory of communication [which] surpassed the philosophy of both
James and Dewey in its potential usefulness to political theory, a potential almost totally
unexploited,”1811 due in no small part to Peirce’s insistence on an objective, realistic
component to his philosophical system. Whereas nominalists “believed that the
individual was real in a way that society was not, a view that made it difficult to
recognize the reality of community or shared spirit,”1812 Peirce’s hyperbolic social
individualism was based on a conception of society as an organism in its own right, as
we’ve seen, every bit as real1813 as the individuals that comprise it.1814 “Peirce’s
philosophy, far more than James’s and Dewey’s, makes it possible to see that our relation
to society has some of the same kind of integration, some of the same kind of reality, as
do the relations within us that constitute our individual minds and selves.”1815 Indeed,
“society, according to Peirce, has some of the same reality as does the individual.” 1816 If
such a correlation holds, it follows that society is deserving of some semblance of the
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same moral consideration as do the individuals that comprise it, some of the “same
claims on our resources as do our individual selves.”1817
Further, despite Habermas’ concerns to the contrary, Peirce’s realism and
objectivism likewise provides the most robust and dynamic articulation of the possibility
of genuine dialogical engagement of any of the pragmatists. As Hoopes notes, Peirce’s
“metaphysics was communitarian, for it argued that logical relations were real
constituents of the universe an thus ensured not only the possibility of human
understanding of nature but also the possibility of communication among human beings.
Human thought could fathom the natural world because thought is natural.”1818
The resonance between Peirce and Marcuse, as I’ve illuminated, is particularly
illustrative of the potential reconciliation between American pragmatism and German
critical theory. Both Peirce and Marcuse maintained a Utopian vision, explicitly in
Marcuse and nascently in Peirce1819 as a necessary corollary to his prescribed scientific
method.1820 Further, as I have argued, the individuals with a “wider sort of social
feeling”1821 that arise out of the method of authority to critique and challenge the
legitimacy of those proliferated beliefs are engaged in precisely the sort of “negative
thinking” ubiquitously championed by Marcuse throughout his canon. Indeed, I argue
that the individuals Peirce admires in those key passages are, themselves, critical theorists
of a profoundly Marcusean idiom.
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However, one more problem emerges: the problem of “pluralism.” Pluralism,
according to Talisse, “is the thesis that at least some, and perhaps many, disagreements
over Big Questions are inevitable, irresolvable, non-contingent, and permanent. In other
words, the pluralist denies that when such disagreement endures it is necessarily because
some of us are misinformed, obstinate, irrational, or wicked.”1822 Talisse explores why
Dewey, despite his application of pragmatism to democratic concerns, ultimately came
up short in offering a robust pluralism that I unfortunately can’t engage here.1823 It would
seem, at first glance, that precisely because of the objectivism and realism in Peirce,
there’s an even more diminished likelihood that Peirce could forward a robust pluralism.
If the goal of inquiry is a unified, “ultimate opinion” shared by all inquirers, what
possibility is there for mutually compatible, but ultimate distinct, belief-systems and
ideologies living side by side in a single nation?1824
It is important to remember that Peirce prescribed no beliefs, ideologies, nor
truths in his manifestation of pragmatism. To prescribe a belief would be little more than
succumbing to the a priori method of belief formation or, in its proliferation to others,
assuming the position of authority. What Talisse calls “epistemic pluralism,” Peirce’s
pragmatism did not adjudicate as to the answers to any of the “Big Questions” precisely
because those inquiries are still ongoing. What he did provide, however, was a
hyperbolically inclusive method by which those Big Questions may be engaged by the
widest breadth of inquirers imaginable. Further, although “Truth” may exist down the
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long run of inquiry, a unified opinion that all are destined to share, precisely because this
“Truth” has not yet been achieved, and may well never be achieved apodictically, in the
here and now Peirce’s pragmatism not only allows for pluralism but demands it as the
only way by which these distinct beliefs may encounter one another in authentic
dialogue. If some beliefs should prove more conducive to democratic values than others,
that is a consequence of inquiry, not something assumed from its start. Precisely because
the Truth will only ever hypothetically be achieved somewhere down the long run of
inquiry’s unfolding, until that destined moment, by his first rule of reason, no blockade of
inquiry is permitted and thus pluralism may flourish far more fully than a Deweyan
manifestation of pragmatism wherein democratic ideals, benevolent as they may be, are
prescribed from the get-go.
Throughout his career, Marcuse turned to a variety of different potential solutions
to the problem of capitalistic indoctrination, distinct yet mutually complementary. In his
Freudian-Marxism, he saw potential in the endurance of the pleasure principle within the
reality principle, aching for a release made increasingly possible with the diminishing of
scarcity. In his analysis of negative thinking, he saw potential in the university system
and dialectical philosophies that championed the “constructive tension” of a Socraticcum-Kingian “gadfly” that could illuminate the contingency of the current milieu from
higher perspectives. So, too, did he see potential in the radically disenfranchised, those
that could not participate in the indoctrinating milieu.
Peirce, too, adamantly rejected any form of authority that would dictate beliefs for
a populace, chief among them were capitalistically motivated beliefs that altered the
trajectory of inquiry in the classroom, in the laboratory, and in the everyday walks of life.
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I argue that Peirce’s critique of the method of authority and the ways in which the
authoritarian structure is capable of indoctrinating its citizens into passivity is perfectly
compatible with Marcuse’s critique of one-dimensional society though the latter digs
deeper into the specific mechanisms of indoctrination than the former ever did, an
excavation that would only increase the veracity of Peirce’s critique.
Whereas Marcuse framed the indoctrination of capitalism on the level of instinct
and the implantation (and subsequent fulfillment) of false “needs,” Peirce framed it as the
manipulation of beliefs. Beliefs were forged, for Peirce, within a cultural milieu and
manifested as habits of conduct.
Contrary to critiques against him, Peirce was in no way an instrumentalist in the
manner Horkheimer (and others) have accused him of being. As Sheriff notes:
The human predicament, the situation of human intelligence, the
conditions of our use of signs as Charles S. Peirce perceived them are as
follows: truth is in the future, but in our consciousness we cannot help but
assent to what we perceive to be the case in the particular contexts and
language games within which we live.1825

Our social context, and the language games we play within that context, are conditioned,
for Marcuse, predominantly (though not exclusively) through the language and mores of
commodity capitalism. Though there are sites of disruption in the form of the co-opting
of linguistic terms and concepts, the counterrevolution of the Establishment attempts at
every turn to engage the type of artificial desublimation that reduces any revolutionary
movement to the terms of capitalism. Our assent, for Peirce, is certainly conditioned in no
small part by our participation in the mores of society: instrumentally, we adapt, as
organisms, to a social environment conditioned by the Establishment. But this is not the
John K. Sheriff, Charles Peirce’s Guess at the Riddle: Grounds for Human Significance (Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 1994), xvii.
1825

566

end of the story: for Peirce, the Truth, as Sheriff rightly notes, is ever in the future. This is
precisely the reason why Peircean pragmatism is not reducible to instrumentalism or
positivism. As Brent notes, Peirce was inspired by Schiller’s conception of Spieltrieb,
“what Peirce later called ‘the play of Musement,’ a phrase which became for him a
synonym, after 1900, for hypothesis in the sense of a description of its activity.”1826 There
is the perpetual prescription of negative thinking: his fallibilism in conjunction with his
first rule of reason and his critique of the method of authority combine to create an
epistemic commandment to never rest on one’s proverbial laurels, that all beliefs, even
the most sanctified by authority, are open to revision as we move towards a Truth that, by
its nature, can never be captured within a single cultural milieu. Negative thinking, in
short, is the linchpin of Peirce’s pragmatism.
Marcuse did exemplary work in providing a prognosis for the problem of why the
Marxist script failed to unfold and he located sites of potential radical social change.
What was less transparent, however, was the means by which we move from here
(capitalism) to his Utopian vision of the future. By negating the structures of the current
milieu, he was able to postulate a replacement for technical rationality with an aesthetic
dimension, of surplus repression with technology’s deployment towards the termination
of scarcity, and so forth, but never did he quite concretize a robust method by which to
undermine the stagnation of the current milieu and get progress up and moving once
more. Peirce’s entire method of inquiry, however, was aimed at undermining precisely
this sort of stagnation and getting us all back on the long run of inquiry. By applying
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Peirce’s method, complete with his critique of the method of authority, I maintain it is
possible to supply Marcuse with the method by which to help bring about an end to the
stagnation and indoctrination of commodity capitalism. That said, there must be one,
crucial caveat: Marcuse would have to abandon, to no small degree, what few specific
details he maintained about the look and feel of this new society.
For precisely the same reason Peirce would never permit his philosophy to be
placed in service to even the most benevolent political ends, should Marcuse prescribe
specific ideals, values, and structures for his Utopia-to-be, it is hard to see how this would
amount to anything other than a new manifestation of the method of authority. Marcuse
would have to be open to the possibility that whatever social coordination comes next,
should the current, stifling milieu dissolve, it would be the creation of the inquirers who
compose it, freely, autonomously, and to whatever ends their investigations take them.
Now, in no way does this undermine Marcuse’s critical project, however: if he deployed
a Peircean model, it would necessarily strive to dissolve any blockade of inquiry (as per
Peirce’s first rule of reason) which, as we’ve seen, would include segregation,
discrimination, and the ingression of capitalistic values into realms of education and
inquiry. Marcuse and Peirce could work hand-in-hand on the negative side of the coin in
dissolving the barricades of free inquiry that the one-dimensional society has established.
The positive side of the coin, that which comes next, must by contrast necessary be a bit
hazy and indeterminate. Though one can hazard a guess as to what form such a social
coordination would take, the details of it must, necessarily, remain inconclusive as
inquiries that have yet to unfold and answers that must still be sought.

568

Such a command for suspended indeterminacy does not, however, increase the
risk that the next coordination will be worse than the current milieu, as Marcuse had
feared. Although Peirce never prescribed specific beliefs, ideals, or virtues a priori, his
prescribed method, the only method that has any chance of attaining Truth in the long
run, the only method that won’t succumb to cataclysmic doubt or perpetual stagnation,
was a necessarily democratic method. Democracy simply could not dissolve into tyranny
if Peirce’s method were deployed honestly, authentically, and by a sufficiently large
number of participants precisely because it is, itself; (a) fallible (all beliefs are only
provisionally true and contingency and the readiness to abandon them are ever present,
concepts that are not hallmarks of a tyrannical regime whose efficacy lies precisely in
their pawning off their contingent, constructing beliefs as timeless and necessary); (b)
hyperbolically inclusive (adhering to his realism, that society is an organism of which we
are but cells that comprise it, no exclusion is possible and thus no single individual, or
group of individuals, could attain such power as to drown out the voices of the people);
and (c) dissolves all blockades of inquiry according to Peirce’s first rule of reason (there
would be no place for discrimination of any kind and a critical eye would be ever-turned
towards would-be authoritarians who would block inquiry’s unfolding). If the milieu of
the authority, that is, the one-dimensional society, is an impediment to radical autonomy,
then it follows for Marucse that “Utopia…becomes a legitimate object of inquiry”1827 to
which end Peirce provides the method. And there is some hint of a Utopian vision in
Peirce’s pragmatism, nascent, evanescent, and indeterminate as it may be, if an unlimited
community of inquirers is ultimately “destined” to find Truth, that destiny can be fulfilled
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only if a hyperbolically inclusive, radically critical form of inquiry is allowed to unfold in
a profoundly democratic socio-political structure.
Conversely, when we look through the myriad passages where Peirce leveled a
scathing critique against this authority, coupled with the ways in which capitalism seems
to have altered or stagnated the trajectory of inquiry, there’s a hint of mystery in his tone,
of curiosity as to what, precisely, is the driving force behind this stagnation. Peirce sited
“Greed” as the culprit, that is, those that adhere to the “Gospel of Greed,” and
extrapolated out that it is some motivation along these lines that brings about often
massively long epochs under authoritarian rule. That such societies did exist, and that
such societies do still exist, of this Peirce was quite certain. But how did they come to
indoctrinate so many, leaving social progress in the hands of those scant few with “wider
social feeling,” remains a bit of an enigma, for Peirce, or at least, nothing he ever
commented on explicitly. Who better to fill in this gap that Marcuse? If we were to insert
One-Dimensional Man squarely into Peirce’s critique of authority in “The Fixation of
Belief,” not only would the two critiques be easily enmeshed but, too, it would provide a
clear and exhaustive exploration of how the authority manages to maintain its dominance
for so long over so many (at least as it applies to the advanced industrial society).
Marcuse’s scathing critique of the indoctrinating mechanisms of commodity capitalism
would shed new light on the method of authority’s efficacy and illuminate, with shocking
specificity, sites of blockages to inquiry and provide those individuals of “wider social
feeling” with innumerable new tools at the ready for their critique. Indeed, I would argue
Marcuse, himself, could have been one of these Peircean individuals. In sum, Peirce
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offers us a positive theory of belief formation while concurrently offering us a nascent
critical theory of all impediments to autonomous, communal progress towards Truth.
As such, Peirce’s nascent critical theory is, as I’ve explored, compatible with
Marcuse’s own in a variety of ways. Just as “Marcuse discovered a radical kernel – the
dialectical theory of negativity – and spent the rest of his life making use of this approach
in an attempt to analyze and criticize existing ideologies and social institutions,”1828
Peirce’s own critique of the method of authority utilized a dialectical theory of negativity
to analyze and criticize the existing social institutions that would seek to dictate beliefs
for a populace rather than allowing inquiry to unfold freely:
These men possess a wider sort of social feeling; they see that men in
other countries and in other ages have held to very different doctrines from
those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they
cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught
as they have, and of their having been surrounded with the manners and
associations they have, that has caused them to believe as they do and not
far differently…thus giving rise to doubts in their minds.1829

The false sense of necessity is dissolved by bringing the current milieu into stark contrast
with socio-political coordinations elsewhere, illuminating the obfuscated contingency by,
as Marcuse might say, negating these “existing forms of thought and reality from the
perspective of higher possibilities.”1830
As Marcuse lamented:
The mass democracy developed by monopoly capitalism has shaped the
rights and liberties which it grants in its own image and interest; the
majority of the people is the majority of their masters; deviations are
easily ‘contained’; and concentrated power can afford to tolerate (perhaps
1828
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even defend) radical dissent as long as the latter complies with the
established rules and manners…the opposition is thus sucked into the very
world which it opposes.1831

Just as Peirce lamented:
Let the will of the state act, then, instead of the individual. Let an
institution be created which shall have for its object to keep correct
doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually,
and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent
contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed.1832
All of the methods of Marcuse’s “counterrevolution” are in full bloom in Peirce’s
authority: the people are “kept ignorant, lest they should learn of some reason to think
otherwise than they do” and “their passions be enlisted, so that they may regard private
and unusual opinions with hatred and horror” such that “all men who reject the
established belief be terrified into silence.”1833 Consider the synchronicity with Marcuse’s
critique of the Third Reich, a paradigmatic example of a Peircean authority:
In National Socialist Germany, the reign of terror is sustained…by the
ingenious manipulation of the power inherent in technology: the
intensification of labor, propaganda, the training of youths and workers,
the organization of the governmental, industrial and party bureaucracy—
all of which constitute the daily implements of terror—follow the lines of
greatest technological efficiency.1834

The individuals who would try to undermine the authority were, for Marcuse, labeled
“deviant,” “enemy,” words whose “meaning is defined and validated by the actions of the
Enemy regardless of their motivation and goal.”1835 Such deviations are easily contained,
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as Marcuse said, but “as long as the social system reproduces, by indoctrination and
integration, a self-perpetuating conservative majority, the majority reproduces the system
itself – open to changes within, but not beyond, its institutional framework,” just as
Peirce noted that:
No institution can undertake to regulate opinions upon every subject. Only
the most important ones can be attended to, and on the rest men’s minds
must be left to the action of natural causes. This imperfection will be no
source of weakness so long as men are in such a state of culture that one
opinion does not influence another – that is, so long as they cannot put two
and two together.1836

Thus, as Marcuse said:
The struggle for changes beyond the system becomes, by virtue of its own
dynamic, undemocratic in the terms of the system, and counterviolence is
from the beginning inherent in this dynamic. Thus the radical is guilty –
either of surrendering to the power of the status quo, or of violating the
Law and Order of the status quo.1837
The “radical,” the individual with wider social feeling, seeks not to make minute
alterations within the system of authority (alterations acceptable by the status quo so long
as the more fundamental principles that perpetuate the authority’s power remain intact),
but to undermine it entirely, risking becoming a part of the “general massacre of all who
have not thought in a certain way.”1838 As Marcuse said, “they are contagious…and
threaten the clean, anesthetized, healthy free world. They must be liquidated, smoked out,
and burned out like venom.”1839 The Peircean radical is an adherent of the scientific
method, true, but also an adherent of a democratic way of life that is requisite for this
individual’s method to flourish at all. Further, the Peircean radical is a historian and
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semiotician, those that “study the past to find out what happened and what it meant, using
the plethora of signs that was left behind. In studying the past”1840 we negate the
necessity of the indoctrinating milieu of the present, making it contingent once more,
coming to the realization that it was “mere accident of their having been taught as they
have, and of their having been surrounded with the manners and associations they have,
that has caused them to believe as they do and not far differently.”1841 This negation of
necessity is the dissolution of a blockade of inquiry, the creation of a “constructive
tension,” in the words of King, requisite for intellectual growth. These critical theorists,
these individuals of wider social feelings, are the “gadflies” of their day, and like King
and Socrates, as both Marcuse and Peirce warn, they are the primary targets of the
authority’s counterrevolution.
Such a Peircean-Marcusean fusion philosophy would have to find a way to
reconcile Marcuse’s language of “instinct” and “need” with Peirce’s language of “belief”
and “habit.” I see no insurmountable difficulty here, however. In fact, precisely because
Marcuse took so much of Freud’s language of instinct and repression at face value, he
thus opened himself, indirectly, to all of the criticisms leveled against Freud by his
detractors. It is possible to retain the core of Marcuse’s insights while shifting the
language frame from one of instincts and needs to one of beliefs and habits through a
Peircean lens.
Consider Marcuse’s concern that we seek an “idea” purified from the “mutilated
experience which is the work of society” wherein it is “given” in a “false” and “distorted”
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form.1842 This is job of “negative” thinking that “negates”1843 the false by exposing the
contingency of that belief by bringing it into constructive tension with an alternative
belief (precisely as Peirce prescribed). Although Marcuse was wary that science worked
hand-in-hand with technology to further alienation and indoctrination into the status quo,
for Peirce the scientific method, which is neither the sole province of scientists, scientism,
nor science-for-the-sake-of-science, is the method by which such constructive tension can
be forged. “Reality has to be discovered and projected,”1844 Marcuse noted, “projected”
in so far as it is postulated as existing beyond or behind the stultifying confines of
capital’s discourse and commodity fetishism, and thus “discovered” via negative thinking
that which is not the false, artificial ideology of exploitation and toil which has, at least,
the potential to be what really is. “The senses must learn not to see things anymore in the
medium of that law and order which has formed them; the bad functionalism which
organizes our sensibility must be smashed.”1845 Peirce was critical of naïve empiricism
and was no instrumentalist. “Reality,” which is comparable with Truth as the ultimate
opinion destined to one day be reached, is not the “reality” or “truth” of the here-andnow, at least, not necessarily, and the scientific method, deployed earnestly, will bring
about any tension that exists between a lack of “correspondence” between the truths of
the present and the Truth awaiting us at the end of the long run. Peirce “projected” reality
insofar as it was a goal not-yet-achieved, but a goal of the future and, as such, is ever in
tension with the “reality” as it is experienced sensibly in the present. As Marcuse noted:
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Knowledge is transcendent (toward the object world, toward reality) not
only in an epistemological sense – as against repressive forms of life – it is
political. Denial of the right to political activity in the university
perpetuates the separation between theoretical and practical reason and
reduces the effectives and the scope of intelligence.1846

As with Peirce, knowledge claims in the present are always only provisional and
knowledge proper is transcendent towards Truth at the end of the long run. “Denial of the
right to political activity,” especially in the university, was precisely the sort of blockage
that Peirce sought to dissolve since its result was the reduction of the effectiveness and
scope of intelligence: it limits our exposure to the alternative beliefs require for inquiry’s
progression, i.e., it negates the potential for negative thinking. As Feenberg notes, for
Marcuse, “to be obstinate means to reject the easy reconciliation with society, to keep a
sense of reality based on longer time spans, deeper tensions, higher expectations and
goals.”1847 Peirce’s “long run” provides the perspective of this “longer time span,”
creating a perpetual “tension” (for those adherents of the method) between any
provisional belief in the here and now and the Truth at the (hypothetical) end of inquiry’s
trajectory.1848
Marcuse gave us clues, intermittently, as to how we can bridge the divide between
the language of instinct and need and the Peircean language of belief and habit. Consider
the following:
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Once a specific morality is firmly established as a norm of social behavior,
it is not only introjected – it also operates as a norm of ‘organic’ behavior:
the organism receives and reacts to stimuli and ‘ignores’ or repels others
in accord with the introjected morality, which is thus promoting or
impeding the function of the organism as a living cell in the respective
society.1849

This language could as easily been culled from Peirce as from Marcuse. For Peirce,
beliefs are “introjected” by the authority and manifest as habits of conduct within that
milieu. Peirce’s organicism, that is, belief formation via the transaction of organism and
(social) environment, operated in precisely this manner. The authority engages in a very
Marcusean “artificial desublimation” wherein alternative doctrines are either repelled or
reduced the terms of the system of control, reifying it further. This impedes the function
of the organism (a “living cell” precisely as Peirce, himself, described the individual
organism within the mega-organism of society) as a free participant in inquiry.
As Marcuse said, “it is precisely this excessive adaptability of the human
organism which propels the perpetuation and extension of the commodity form and, with
it, the perpetuation and extension of the social controls over behavior and
satisfaction.”1850 Here the core of Marcuse’s project is distilled concisely and framed in
the Peircean language of adaptation and belief formation. Human beings are habitforming, belief-forming creatures within the frame of organism-environment transaction.
The terms of that social environment are set by the authority1851 and thus the organism,
simply living out its adaptive nature, conforms to the beliefs and mores of that
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environment in order to survive and, ideally, in order to flourish. This is the
“performance principle” (in the language of Eros and Civilization) and the proliferation
of “false needs” (in the language of One-Dimensional Man) as the key facet of that
“social control” over behavior and their fulfillment provides the “satisfaction” that
perpetuates the “drugged stupor” of acquiescence and reifies the status quo.
The charge that Peirce was a mere instrumentalist was based, I argue, on the
assumption that adaptation into any milieu was the sole purpose of rational thought, that
so long as beliefs “cashed out” they were true and valid. As Marcuse lamented:
The individual’s performance is motivated, guided and measured by
standards external to him, standards pertaining to predetermined tasks and
functions. The efficient individual is the one whose performance is an
action only insofar as it is the proper reaction to the objective requirements
of the apparatus, and his liberty is confined to the selection of the most
adequate means for reaching a goal which he did not set.1852
But Peirce’s critique of the method of authority was testament to his awareness that there
is more to reason than mere adaptation: reason’s proper deployment is towards the Truth
which necessarily transcends any socio-political coordination and true beliefs are not
reducible to what is proliferated by a power majority. As Marcuse said,
“society…demands to a considerable extent…belief in the operative value of society’s
values.”1853 That is the mechanism of indoctrination of the method of authority put as
succinctly as anywhere in Peirce. But authentic adaptation, human flourishing, in a sense,
can take place only within a socio-political system where inquiry unfolds freely, without
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barricade and without external influence, especially from an authoritarian system of
control. Marcuse’s concerns here echo Peirce’s own with outstanding synchronity and,
like Marcuse’s conception of “negative thinking” as the cognitive ability to militate
against such passive acceptance of needs implanted and instincts repressed, Peirce’s
“method of inquiry” achieves precisely the same ends.
This distinction between adaptation with a free society and adaptation within the
method of authority was central to both Peirce and Marcuse. As Marcuse noted, for
example, in discussing what the “new relationships” between individuals within a
radically different, post-capitalist society might look like:
These new relationships would be the result of a ‘biological’ 1854 solidarity
in work and purpose, expressive of a true harmony between social and
individual needs and goals, between recognized necessity and free
development – the exact opposite of the administered and enforced
harmony organized in the advanced capitalist (and socialist?)
countries…solidarity and cooperation: not all their forms are liberating.
Fascism and militarism have developed a deadly efficient solidarity.
Socialist solidarity is autonomy: self-determination begins at home – and
that is with every I, and the We whom the I chooses.1855
Because of Peirce’s realism1856 (and aversion to nominalism1857), he saw a fundamental
“solidarity” between all “cells” within the greater organism of society. This authentic

Marcuse qualified his use of the term “biological” in a footnote, noting: “I use the terms ‘biological’
and ‘biology’ not in the sense of the sci- entific discipline, but in order to designate the process and the
dimension in which inclinations, behavior patterns, and aspirations become vital needs which, if not
satisfied, would cause dysfunction of the organism. Conversely, socially induced needs and aspirations may
result in a more pleasurable organic behavior. If biological needs are defined as those which must be
satisfied and for which no adequate substitute can be provided, certain cultural needs can ‘sink down’ into
the biology of man. We could then speak, for example, of the biological need of freedom, or of some
aesthetic needs as having taken root in the organic structure of man, in his ‘nature,’ or rather ‘second
nature.’ This usage of the term ‘biological’ does not imply or assume anything as to the way in which needs
are physiologically expressed and transmitted,” Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, Op. Cit., Footnote 1, 10.
1855
Ibid., 88.
1856
Peirce’s correspondence with St. Louis Hegelian William Torrey Harris resulted in Peirce’s
“examination of the matter” (of realism vs. nominalism) and Peirce came to recognize that “generals, such
as the laws of science, are real,” Brent, Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 72.
1854
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solidarity is brought about “from every individual merging his individuality in sympathy
with his neighbours.”1858 This sentiment can thrive only in a society under the aegis of the
method of free inquiry and is juxtaposed with the faux “solidarity” forged of the mass
mentality under the method of authority. There is, indeed, a solidarity under authority,
one of indoctrination and passive acceptance of proliferated beliefs creating a legion of
“intellectual slaves”1859 like “the oarsmen, who cannot speak to one another, are each of
them yoked in the same rhythm as the modern worker in the factory, movie theater, and
collective,”1860 as Horkheimer and Adorno would say and in Marcuse’s words here, an
“administered and enforced harmony organized” in the advanced industrial society.
Society, for Marcuse…
…is, to be sure, composed of individuals—but of individuals who cease to
be isolated, who cease thinking. The isolated individual within the crowd
cannot help thinking, criticizing the emotions. The others, on the other
hand, cease to think: they are moved, they are carried away, they are
elated; they feel united with their fellow members in the crowd, released
from all inhibitions; they are changed and feel no connection with their
former state of mind.1861

As such, Peirce was a social individualist through and through, but not a naïve one, as
instanced in celebration of those critical theorists of wider social feeling that can
transcend the indoctrinating milieu: unique and “atomic” in their revolutionary attitude

Peirce was critical of “the pluralism of nominalism with its discrete units, a view that he counters with
his emphasis on continuity or synechism,” forwarding “his own unique pluralism that attacks ‘the pluralism
of nominalism,’” Rosenthal, Peirce’s Pluralism, Op. Cit., ix. Further, as Peirce says, “1st, that all the
intelligible philosophers, even Hegel, have been more or less nominalistic; 2 nd, that nominalism is false in
all its shades and degrees; and 3rd, that it has had a baleful influence upon civilization,” cited in Brent,
Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life, Op. Cit., 71.
1858
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.294.
1859
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.381.
1860
Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, “The Concept of Enlightenment,” in Critical Theory: The
Essential Readings, ed. David Ingram (New York: Paragon House, 1998), 55.
1861
E. Lederer, State of the Masses (New York, 1940), 32f. cited in Marcuse, “Some Social Implications of
Modern Technology,” Op. Cit., 53.
1857
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seeking the authentic solidarity “of autonomy,” in Marcuse’s words, under a more
egalitarian socio-political system.
Though Marcuse championed indiviudualism, it was the individualism of the
Peircean individuals of “wider social feeling”: “the bourgeois individual is not overcome
by simply refusing social performance, by dropping out and living one’s own style of life.
To be sure, no revolution without individual liberation, but also no individual liberation
without the liberation of society.”1862 This “dialectic of liberation”1863 entails that the
“individual liberation (refusal) must incorporate the universal in particular protest, and
the images and values of a future free society must appear in the personal relationships
within the unfree society.”1864 Within a society freed from the indoctrinating mores of
commodity capitalism, “individualism” would take on a radically different connotation,
for Marcuse. But within the frame of his critical theory, in his critique of this milieu,
“individualism” of a social variety amounts to little more than the pacified, intellectual
“slaves” of Peirce’s method of authority. Neither Peirce nor Marcuse championed that
form of “social individualism.” But within that milieu, conditionally, a kind of “atomic”
individualism is championed that highlights those critical theorists, those negative
thinkers, those individuals of wider social feeling, to rise above the stultifying mores of
the authority precisely by separating themselves from their neighbors if their neighbors
have been reduced to little more than heteronymous automatons under the Establishment.
Not to abandon them, however, but to help liberate them: like the enghlightened soul
returning to the cave, Peirce’s individual of wider social feeling could not bring about an
end to the method of authority (which must be the individual’s goal for without the
1862

Marcuse, Counterrevolution and Revolt, Op. Cit., 49
Ibid.
1864
Ibid.
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dissolution of authority there is no socio-political framework within which a method of
inquiry could flourish) without likewise “freeing” individuals and dissolving the efficacy
of the authority. This is precisely why Marcuse called for an “individual liberation
(refusal)” that “must incorporate the universal in particular protest”: it is not enough for a
few, select individuals to bask in the glow of freedom from authority for that freedom
would be all too short-lived if a new socio-political coordination wasn’t formed to
provide the bedrock of freedom for inquiry to unfold uncoerced and autonomously. For
as Bronner notes, one of Marcuse’s central concerns throughout his career was the
“rendering of critical theory capable of building solidarity and informing radical
practice.”1865
Douglas Kellner defines “a critical theory of society” as “a project underway; it is
always partial, historical, and subject to revision.”1866 Explicit in Peirce’s method of
inquiry are two, vital components: fallibilism and his first rule of reason which demands
we dissolve any blockade to further inquiry. For Peirce, no inquiry “is exempt from
revision and correction”1867 and that every belief “is subject to revision on the basis of
new discoveries.”1868 It is “historical” in so far as our beliefs are forged from the fires of
inquiries past as the unlimited community of inquirers is not only an ideal coordination in
some nebulous future but is already in progress, stretching across nations and stretching
back through time. And it is “partial,” not yet complete (perhaps only ideally ever
complete), as the long run continues to stretch out before us. As Rockmore notes, “for
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Bronner, Of Critical Theory and its Theorists, Op. Cit., 237.
Douglas Kellner “Introduction: Herbert Marcuse and the Vicissitudes of Critical Theory,” in Collected
Papers of Herbert Marcuse, vol. 2, Towards a Critical Theory of Society, ed. Douglas Kellner (New York:
Routledge, 2001), 32.
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(1940): 69 – 80, 78.
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Peirce, knowledge is the result of an ongoing process that has neither an absolute
beginning nor an absolute end, that is always subject to rational criticism, whose results
are hence always provisional.”1869 For as Peirce said, “there is nothing…to prevent our
knowing outward things as they really are, and it is most likely that we do thus know
them in numberless cases, although we can never be absolutely certain of doing so in any
special case.”1870
It is this appreciation of the partiality of our knowledge (not a lack of knowledge
that amounts to skepticism, but a fallibilism that never claims to know what one does not
know, as per Socrates’ famous dictum) that gave Peirce a persistent air of negative
thinking in his method: we must always be ready to challenge our beliefs (especially the
beliefs that flow from some source of authority). As Peirce said:
Ideas under the designation fallibilism; and indeed the first step toward
finding out is to acknowledge you do not satisfactorily know already; so
that no blight can so surely arrest all intellectual growth as the blight of
cocksureness; and ninety-nine out of every hundred good heads are
reduced to impotence by that malady – of whose inroads they are most
strangely unaware!1871

For Marcuse, as Schoolman says:
To think negatively, or dialectically, is to conceive of things as they
appear as being limited. Such conceptions spring from a recognition of
something’s potentiality. To think in this manner is to deny, cancel, or
‘negate’ a thing’s apparent form. And to think negatively, critically, there
must be freedom of thought. Rational faculties must be free from any sort
of conditioning by social and political factors that would blind reasoning
processes to the existence of possibilities for growth and development.1872

Tom Rockmore, “Hegel, Peirce and Knowledge,” The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, New Series,
13, no. 1 (1999): 166 – 184, 174.
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Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.311.
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Morton Schoolman, The Imaginary Witness: The Critical Theory of Herbert Marcuse (New York: The
Free Press, 1980), 75.
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Peirce maintained that he has always stood for, “the very freest of free-thinking. If there
is anyone who goes beyond me in reprobation of all attempts and any attempt to stifle or
discourage free-thought or its proper expression all I can say is that I have never yet met
such a person.”1873 The entirety of Peirce’s critique of the method of authority was, as
Schoolman notes as central to Marcuse’s own project, to free the “rational
faculties…from any sort of conditioning by social and political factors that would blind
reasoning processes to the existence of possibilities for growth and development.” By
postulating the attainment of Truth as a goal not yet achieved, Peirce wove negative
thinking into the very fibers of the method of inquiry that propels inquiry into the future.
As Peirce said:
The doctrine of fallibilism will also be denied by those who fear its
consequence for science, for religion, and for morality. But I will take
leave to say to these highly conservative gentlemen that however
competent they may be to direct the affairs of a church or other
corporations, they had better not try to manage science in that way.
Conservativism…is altogether out of place in science – which has on the
contrary always been forwarded by radicals and radicalism…not the
radicalism that is cocksure, however, but the radicalism that tries
experiments.1874

The experimentalism of his method assumes from the start that there is some need for
experimentation, that our knowledge is as yet still “partial,” and thus flies in the face of
the “conservatism” that would see stagnation instead of progress and recede into the
safety of one’s tenaciously held beliefs like so much ostrich sinking its head into the
sands.
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Charles S. Peirce in Richard Robin, Annotated Catalogue of the Papers of Charles S. Peirce (Amherst:
University of Massachusetts Press, 1967), L387b.
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Perice, Op. Cit., CP 1.148.
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Peirce often called a facet of his pragmatism “critical common-sensism.” Not the
“common sensism” of positivism, but a critical form uniquely situated in opposition to
such bare claims. Peirce, as we’ve seen, railed against positivism as viscerally as
Marcuse, who lamented that:
Positivism, the philosophy of common sense, appeals to the certainty of
facts, but, as Hegel shows, in a world where facts do not at all present
what reality can and ought to be, positivism amounts to giving up the real
potentialities of mankind for a false and alien world. The positivist attack
on universal concepts, on the ground they cannot be reduced to observable
facts, cancels from the domain of knowledge everything that may not yet
be a fact…when [Hegel] emphasizes time and again that the universal is
pre-eminent over the particular, he is struggling against limiting truth to
the particular ‘given.’ The universal is more than the particular. This
signifies in the concrete that the potentialities of men and things are not
exhausted in the given forms and relations in which they actually appears;
it means that men and things are all they have been and actually are, and
yet more than all this. Setting the truth in the universal expressed in
Hegel’s conviction that no given particular form, whether in nature or
society, embodies the whole truth.1875

Time and again pragmatism has been accused of being little more than a kind of selfdeluded form of positivism, the heart of both Horkheimer’s and Habermas’ critiques as I
discussed. To what degree that may be true of Dewey and James who, as some scholars
note, never quite rid themselves of a certain gnawing nominalism and subjectivism, I
hope I have exhaustively demonstrated that Peirce was neither a nominalist nor a
subjectivist in any sense of those terms. Peirce made a clear distinction between
“practices” and “ethics,” quite possibly inspired by Peirce’s reading of Kant. Scholars
like Gava, inspired by Apel’s Kantian reading of Peirce, highlight Peirce’s adaptation of

Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, Op. Cit., 113 – 114. However, one must likewise be conscious of the
tyranny of the universal whereby the givenness of things is ignored. For this reason, Peirce’s triadic method
of inquiry might be quite a boon for those wishing to circumnavigate the Scylla and Charybdis of the
tyranny of the particular and the tyranny of the universal by highlighting the integral place of both in
inquiry: the immediacy of Firstness and the generality of Thirdness.
1875
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the Kantian distinction between “purposefulness and purposiveness” that “turn out to be
primarily regulative principles

of our thought.”1876

The distinction between

“purposefulness” and “purposiveness” mirrors the distinction between “practics” and
“ethics” as Peirce presented them. Indeed, the very name “pragmatism” is a testament to
Peirce’s close reading of Kant:
For this doctrine he invented the name pragmatism. Some of his friends
wished him to call it practicism or practicalism (perhaps on the ground
that {praktikos} is better Greek than {pragmatikos}. But for one who had
learned philosophy out of Kant, as the writer, along with nineteen out of
every twenty experimentalists who have turned to philosophy, had done,
and who still thought in Kantian terms most readily, praktisch and
pragmatisch were as far apart as the two poles, the former belonging in a
region of thought where no mind of the experimentalist type can ever
make sure of solid ground under his feet, the latter expressing relation to
some definite human purpose. Now quite the most striking feature of the
new theory was its recognition of an inseparable connection between
rational cognition and rational purpose; and that consideration it was
which determined the preference for the name pragmatism.1877
The

coordination

of

“practics”

and

“ethics”

(“purposiveness”

and

“purposefulness”) was central to Peirce’s doctrine precisely because Peirce was not
merely advocating a philosophy of wholly practical and subjective concerns, but
establishing the groundwork for how knowledge acquisition was possible at all. The
growth of knowledge (the progress of thought and science) depends on the ascertaining
of both ends and means: ethics orients us towards an end just as practics helps us
conform our actions to that end.
As Bernstein notes in his exploration of Marcuse:

Gabriele Gava, “The Purposefulness of Our Thought: A Kantian Aid to Understanding Some Essential
Features of Peirce.” In “A Symposium on James Good’s ‘A Search for Unity in Diversity,’” special issue,
Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 44, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 699 – 727, 699.
1877
Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 5.412.
1876
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The battle between negativity and positivity is the most consequential and
decisive battle in the contemporary world. It is not only a battle that takes
place between competing philosophical or intellectual orientations. We are
threatened with the triumph of positivity which infects every aspect of
culture and social reality, a positivity that reflects a basic impotence in the
face of what is given, what appears as existing historical social fact.
Everything Marcuse said and did was motivated by the basic desire to
expose and combat the invidious consequences of positivity.1878

For Peirce, there is no impotence in the face of what is given because, in part, he rejected
any form of passive “spectator” theory of organism-environment transaction. Further,
what is presented in phenomenological experience is only the basis of a provisional belief
which is ever-pitted against a Truth still unfulfilled at the end of the long run. Negativity
is implicit in every facet of a method of inquiry that is necessarily fallible and whose
results are always only provisional.
Positivism, as well as a naïve sort of instrumentalism, is a way of thinking that
“identifies truth with what exists” and “disdains any attempt to investigate possible
alternatives to the established reality or the means by which these possibilities might be
realized, denigrates reason to the level of mere manipulation of facts, and refuses to judge
established conditions in the light of already existing possibilities for transcending those
conditions.”1879 Peirce’s ethics, his purposefulness, his first rule of reason, all conspire to
elevate his method of inquiry out of this naïve sort of positivism. His method is no “mere
manipulation of facts. As Peirce said, “knowledge must involve additions to the facts
observed. The making of those additions is an operation which we can control and it is
Richard Bernstein, “Negativity: Theme and Variations,” in Marcuse: Critical Theory and the Promise
of Utopia (Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey Publishers, Inc. 1998), 14. The “impotence” that Bernstein
refers to here seems to be that of posivitism’s inability to move beyond the “existing historical facts” to
construct a viable critique, that is, positivism lacks the tools and resources within its basic frame to critique
the frame that it works within.
1879
William Leiss, John David Ober, and Erica Sherover, “Marcuse as Teacher,” in The Critical Spirit:
Essays in Honor of Herbert Marcuse, ed. Kurt H. Wolff and Barrington Moore, Jr. (Boston: Beacon Press,
1969), 422.
1878
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evidently a process during which error is liable to creep in” for, as Peirce maintained, “all
our knowledge must be said to rest upon observed facts” but that “these observed facts
relate exclusively to the particular circumstances that happened to exist when they were
observed. They do not relate to any future occasions upon which we may be in doubt
how we ought to act.”1880
As Marcuse said, “truth does not steadily and automatically grow out of the
earlier state; it can be set free only by an autonomous act on the part of men”1881 and,
further, that “the realization of freedom and reason requires the free rationality of those
who achieve it.”1882 The autonomous act, the freedom to inquire, is precisely that which
Peirce’s individuals of wider social feeling bring to their critique of the method of
authority. Knowledge can progress steadily towards truth only once those obstacles are
dissolved. There is no “steady” or “automatic” growth, for Peirce, but an ongoing
struggle that necessitates the dissolution of forces that would block inquiry, as Marcuse
would say, that present a “mutilated experience which is the work of society” wherein
truth is presented in a “false” and “distorted” form.1883
Peirce’s actual scientific experience, his comprehensive grasp of the
scientific enterprise, and his analysis of induction, led him to expect no
specific guarantees of unfailing correctness, no royal road…but instead to
understand that its power dwells in the capacity, through constant
modification of its own conclusions, to approximate indefinitely to the
truth.1884
1880

Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 6.522 - 524. It should be noted that this particular citation has the scent of
instrumentalism about it as Peirce was referring to the ways in which we may act in the future. However, a
charitable reading (and it can only be charitable as Peirce is unclear here) might be that, as Peirce noted in
“Fixation of Belief,” a belief is a predisposition to act and, thus, perhaps he meant here only that such
future occasions may arise to test and try our current beliefs (which are “true” now but that’s the extent to
which they ever “cash out”).
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It is an imaginative act, a creative deployment of our rational faculties not only to analyze
what is but concurrently to postulate what might otherwise be, the very essence of
Marcuse’s negative thinking. As Peirce said, in the inquirer’s “imagination” is “a sort of
skeleton diagram, or outline sketch,” and the inquirer “considers what modifications the
hypothetical state of things would require to be made in that picture, and then examines
it, that is observes what he has imagined” not of what “is” the case but of “what would
be.”1885 As Smith notes, for Peirce “science requires a large dose of feigned doubt and
hesitancy; it depends, in short, on running ahead of our genuine doubts, on making and
tracing out the supposition that some former belief or theory might be mistaken and in
asking ‘theoretical’ questions for the purpose of trying out the possibilities.”1886 There is
no submission to authority or passive acquiescence to the status quo found anywhere in
Peirce’s method of inquiry but an active, purposeful problematizing of beliefs to see what
we can do better. There is no mere shuffling around of bare facts but a concurrent
postulation of alternative possibilities yet to be tried and tested. As Marcuse said:
As long as the social system reproduces, by indoctrination and integration,
a self-perpetuating conservative majority, the majority reproduces the
system itself – open to changes within, but not beyond, its institutional
1885

Peirce, Op. Cit., CP 2.227.
John E. Smith, The Spirit of American Philosophy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966), 19.
This problematizes Peirce’s anti-Cartesianism. Although Peirce was advocating we allow our will to
outpace our intellect (which Descartes warned against in the fourth meditation), nevertheless, the sort of
feigned doubt that Smith highlights here sounds like precisely the sort of thing Peirce would critique about
Descartes’s method. The subtle distinction I would make is this: although Peirce criticized doubt for
doubt’s sake, feigned doubt (the active problematizing of experience where no doubt currently exists for a
given belief) would be championed in terms of scientific innovation. But this would not be doubt for the
sake of doubt, but doubt for the sake of innovation and innovation for the sake of approximating Truth.
However, was this not also Descartes’ project? Descartes was not a skeptic but was merely utilizing the
method of doubt in order to ascertain apodictic certainty. In a sense, this was Peirce’s project as well and
the only real difference between Descartes and Peirce was that the former located certainty as a foundation
and beginning of inquiry whereas the latter would postpone that adjudication indefinitely if needs be by
placing it at the end of the long run of inquiry. Yet both, I maintain, appreciated and championed the
integral role of doubt in inquiry.
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framework. Consequently, the struggle for changes beyond the system
becomes, by virtue of its own dynamic, undemocratic in the terms of the
system, and counterviolence is from the beginning inherent in this
dynamic. Thus the radical is guilty – either of surrendering to the power of
the status quo, or of violating the Law and Order of the status quo.1887
If, as Kellner notes, the one-dimensional society “is for Marcuse a conservative
formation resisting any attempt to negate the social whole in the name of radical
transformation,”1888 then why not find common ground with Peirce who said that
“conservativism…is altogether out of place” in his method of inquiry, a method of
inquiry “which has on the contrary always been forwarded by radicals and
radicalism.”1889 These “highly conservative gentlemen…however competent they may
be to direct the affairs of a church or other corporations…had better not try to manage
science in that way,” had better not block the path of inquiry by trying to impede an
inquirer’s ability to freely investigate the world, for conservatives, those who, for
Marcuse, are “reproducing the system” precisely by stopping such free experimentation
that might undermine their proliferated beliefs by discovering truths counterproductive to
their agenda. The “radical is guilty,”1890 Marcuse said, of mounting a revolution against
these conservative forces by rejecting their proliferated and mutilated beliefs and so why
not appeal to a method, as Peirce said, “forwarded by radicals and radicalism…not the
radicalism that is cocksure…but the radicalism that tries experiments”1891?

Marcuse, An Essay on Liberation, Op. Cit. 69 – 70.
Douglas Kellner, Tyson Lewis, and Clayton Pierce, On Marcuse: Critique, Liberation, and
Reschooling in the Radical Pedagogy of Herbert Marcuse (Rotterdam: Sense Publishers, 2008), 10.
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